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Summary 
This is a study of regional security in the Middle East from a Critical Security 
Studies perspective. The main aim of the thesis is to provide an account of the 
pasts, presents and futures of regional security in the Middle East cognisant of 
the relationships between the three in one's thinking as well as practices. This is 
achieved through the threefold structure of the thesis, which looks at Cold War 
pasts (Part I), post-Cold War presents (Part II) and possible futures (Part III). 
The thesis also has a set of more specific aims. First, it aims to present a 
critique of prevailing security discourses in theory and practice with reference to 
regional security in the Middle East and point to unfulfilled potential immanent in 
regional politics. Second, the thesis aims to explore the mutually constitutive 
relationship between (inventing) regions and theories and practices of security. 
And finally, it aims to show how Critical Security Studies might allow one to think 
differently about the futures of regional security in the Middle East. The overall 
thesis is that the Critical Security Studies perspective presents a fuller account of 
regional security in the Middle East; it offers a comprehensive framework 
recognising the dynamic relationships between various dimensions and levels of 
security, as voiced by multiple referents. 
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Introduction 
Although I have been an observer of Middle Eastern politics since my 
days as an undergraduate student of International Relations, it is my interest in 
Critical Security Studies that led me to embark on a research project the end- 
result of which is this thesis. The appeal of Critical Security Studies for me- 
strong enough to bring me to Aberystwyth from another part of the world-could 
partly be explained by my aversion to all that was presented under the title 
Security Studies or Strategic Studies when I was an undergraduate student at the 
Middle East Technical University, Ankara. For example, I remember avoiding 
courses on security and opting instead for those on political theory, social and 
economic history or, my favourite, political anthropology. What was on offer 
under the label security was nuclear strategy and, in particular, deterrence. 
Turkey being a non-nuclear state beleaguered by perceived conventional threats, 
the emphasis put on nuclear deterrence only added to my puzzlement as to the 
way these courses were set up. 
As a Master's student at Bilkent University, Ankara, I was introduced to 
critical theories of International Relations and gradually began to make more 
sense of what I had been studying in the previous four years. There, I remember 
dropping a Master's course on crisis management not being able to grasp the 
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exclusive focus given to superpower conflict, and feeling uncomfortable with the 
lack of critical reflection in the 'problem-solving' approaches to conflict resolution, 
the course I took in its place. A year later, when writing up my Master's thesis I 
began working for a government department as a junior researcher on affairs 
related to security in the Middle East. It was during that brief period that I began 
to think more deeply about the need to broaden our conceptions of security, 
problems involved in zero sum thinking and practices, and the ways in which 
security thinking was constitutive of the very 'reality' to which it responded. 
However, I did not know how to put such thoughts into words. To learn that, I 
had to wait until I came to Aberystwyth to find out more about Critical Security 
Studies. 
Critical Security Studies 
Critical Security Studies represents a convergence of numerous trends that have 
emerged since the 1960s, such as the works of Peace Researchers to broaden 
the concepts of violence and peace; ' the endeavours of alternative security 
thinkers to focus on 'common security' and ways of mitigating the security 
dilemma; 2 alternative practices promoted by the likes of the US 'Freeze' 
movement, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) based in Britain, and 
END (European Nuclear Disarmament) ;3 the efforts of Third World specialists to 
1 Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research, ' Journal of Peace Research 6: 3 (1969) 
167-92; Kenneth Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978). 2 Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Program 
for Disarmament (London: Pan, 1982). 
David J. Dunn, 'Peace Research versus Strategic Studies, ' in New Thinking on Strategy and 
International Security, ed. Ken Booth (London: Harper Collins, 1991) 56-72; Jim Garrison and 
John Francis Phipps with Pyare Shivpuri, The New Diplomats: Citizens as Ambassadors for 
2 
broaden the security agenda and emphasise the structure of the international 
economic system as a source of insecurity in the Third World ;4 the works of 
feminists that underlined the relationship between the personal, the political and 
the international; 5 and the important inroads post-positivist approaches made into 
International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular. 6 Thus, 
Critical Security Studies could be viewed as an attempt to combine the insights of 
these trends with a particular set of meta-theoretical principles and precepts 
derived from Critical Theory7 to develop an explicitly emancipation-oriented 
approach to security in theory and practice. 8 
It should be noted that the specific approach adopted here is only one of 
a variety of approaches to Critical Security Studies. Keith Krause and Michael 
Williams, for instance, view Critical Security Studies as an umbrella term covering 
a number of approaches that are critical of Cold War Security Studies in one way 
or another. 9 Krause's definition in particular embraces work produced by, among 
Peace (Devon: Green Books, 1989). 
Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1985); Caroline Thomas, In Search for Security: The Third World in International Relations 
(Boulder, CO: Wheatsheaf, 1987). 
Cynthia Enloe, Bananas. Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990); J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International 
Relations: Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1992). 
6 R. B. J. Walker, 'Security, Sovereignty and the Challenge of World Politics, ' Alternatives 15: 1 
(1990) 3-28; David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies 
and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
Throughout the thesis 'critical theory' refers to post-positivist approaches to international 
relations, one of which is 'Critical Theory' of the Frankfurt School tradition. On the latter, see 
Max Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory, ' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. 
Matthew J. O'Connell and others (New York: Continuum, 1982) 188-243; Andrew Linklater, 
Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 
1990); Jürgen Haacke, 'Theory and Praxis in International Relations: Habermas, Self-reflection, 
Rational Argumentation, ' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 25: 2 (1996) 255-89; 
Richard Wyn Jones, Security. Strategy and Critical Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999). 
s Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation, ' Review of International Studies 17 (1991) 313-26; Wyn 
Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, ix. 9 Keith Krause and Michael Williams, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and CasesKeith Krause, 
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others, James Der Derian, who stresses the impossibility of being 'secure, ' and 
calls for a strategy to 'celebrate' the anxiety and insecurity of the contemporary 
world; 10 Ole Weever, who questions the usefulness of a broader security agenda 
and makes a case for 'desecuritization' instead; 11 and Mohammed Ayoob who 
has adopted a 'subaltern realist perspective' to study security in the Third 
World. 12 The specific approach adopted here-following Ken Booth and Richard 
Wyn Jones-favours broadening and deepening our conceptions of security to 
have fuller agendas as part of an attempt to achieve security conceived as a 
process of emancipation. 13 
Understood as such, Critical Security Studies provides a new framework 
to study security; it is a framework that is fundamentally different from Cold War 
Security Studies. First, Critical Security Studies challenges the ways in which 
security has traditionally been conceptualised by broadening and deepening the 
concept and by rejecting the primacy given to the sovereign state as the primary 
referent for and agent of security. It also problematises the militarised and zero 
'Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Programme of "Critical Security Studies, "' 
Cooperation and Conflict 33: 3 (1998) 298-333; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, eds. Critical 
Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press, 1997). 
James Der Derian, 'The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, Baudrillard, ' in On 
Securit , ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 24-45. "Ole Weever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization, ' in On Security, ed. Lipschutz, 46-86. 12 Mohammed Ayoob, 'Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective, ' in Critical Security 
Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 121-46; idem, The Third World Security Predicament: State 
Making. Regional Conflict and the International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 
13 Booth, 'Security and Emancipation'; idem, 'A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical 
Considerations, ' South African Perspectives No. 30 (1994); idem, 'Security and Self: Reflections 
of a Fallen Realist, ' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 84-7; idem, 'Three 
Tyrannies' in Human Rights in Global Politics, eds. Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 31-70; idem, 'Nuclearism, Human Rights and 
Constructions of Security (Part I), ' The International Journal of Human Rights 3: 2 (Summer 
1999) 1-24; Ken Booth and Peter Vale, 'Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The 
Case of Southern Africa, ' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 329-58; 
Richard Wyn Jones, "'Message in a Bottle"? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies, ' 
Contemporary Security Policy 16: 3 (December 1995) 299-319; idem, "Travelling Without 
Maps": Thinking About Security After the Cold War, ' in Security Issues in the Post-Cold War 
World, ed. Jane Davis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1995) 196-218; idem, Security. Strategy 
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sum practices informed by prevailing discourses and calls for re-conceptualising 
practice. Second, Critical Security Studies rejects the conception of theory as a 
neutral tool, which merely explains social phenomena and emphasises the 
mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice. That is, the way 
we (the community of students of security) think and write about security informs 
practice; it privileges certain practices whilst marginalizing others, thereby helping 
constitute what human beings choose to call 'reality. ' Theory is itself a form of 
practice; theorising is recognised as a political activity. Finally, Critical Security 
Studies adopts an explicitly normative, emancipation-oriented approach to 
security in theory and practice. 
Middle East 
The thesis adopts a Critical Security Studies perspective to study regional 
security in the Middle East. The Middle East is arguably a hard case for Critical 
Security Studies to engage in. It has for long been viewed as a region that 'best 
fits the realist view of international politics'; 14 or 'an "exceptional" case eternally 
out of step with history and immune to trends affecting other parts of the world. '15 
Indeed, it has been argued that whereas critical approaches to security may have 
relevance within the Western European context, in other parts of the world-such 
as the Middle East-more traditional approaches retain their validity. 16 The Gulf 
War, the frustratingly slow pace of Arab-Israeli peace-making and the seeming 
and Critical Theory. 
14 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History 
(New York: Harper Collins, 1993) 147. 
is Paul Aarts, 'The Middle East: A Region Without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism? ' 
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lack of enthusiasm for addressing the problem of regional insecurity, especially 
when viewed against the backdrop of increasing regionalisation in security 
relations in other parts of the world, does indeed suggest that the Middle East is a 
place where traditional conceptions and practices of security still prevail. 
The point I am trying to make is that the main purpose behind my choice 
of the Middle East as the empirical referent for this thesis (apart from my previous 
interest in Middle Eastern politics, which was critical in that I did not start with a 
clean slate when making this choice) was to see whether a Critical Security 
Studies perspective can indeed provide a fuller account of regional security in this 
conflict-ridden part of the world. The thesis will try to show that it can. 
Contesting such approaches that present the Middle East as only amenable to 
realist readings, the thesis will argue that the Critical Security Studies perspective 
is indeed relevant in the Middle East, while accepting that some of the items of 
the traditional agenda also retain their pertinence and should be addressed, but 
within a comprehensive framework cognisant of the dynamic relationships 
between multiple dimensions of regional security. 
Regional Security 
The thesis seeks to expand the Critical Security Studies approach to the study of 
regional security by suggesting that both concepts-'region' and 'security'- 
should be opened up when studying regional security from a Critical Security 
Third World Quarterly 20: 5 (1999) 911. 
ýs Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, 8-12. 
s 
Studies perspective. In this sense, the thesis pays attention to the 'regional' 
component in 'regional security' and seeks to explore what Simon Dalby has 
called the 'politics of the geographical specification of politics. '17 The aim here is 
to question the politics behind the invention of the 'Middle East' as well as that of 
other alternative spatial representations (such as 'Arab Regional System, ' 'Euro- 
Med Region' or'Muslim Middle East') that have been adopted by different actors. 
Towards this end, I will make use of the burgeoning literature on critical 
approaches to Political Geography (or Critical Geopolitics) that has emphasised 
the 'invented' character of regions as opposed to some earlier conceptions that 
'1 viewed regions as 'eternal. 8 
Indeed, there is nothing `natural' or 'neutral' about geographical 
assumptions or language. Throughout history, the driving purpose behind the 
identification and naming of geographic sites has almost always been military 
strategic interests. Indeed, as Kären Wigen and Martin Lewis note, 'some of the 
most basic and taken-for-granted "regions" of the world [such as Southeast Asia 
and Latin America] were first framed by military thinkers. '19 In other words, the 
" Simon Dalby, 'Critical Geopolitics: Discourse, Difference and Dissent, ' Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 9 (1991) 274. Also see his Creating the Second Cold War: The 
Discourse of Politics (London: Pinter, 1990) for elaboration on this theme with reference to the 
conflict between the 'East' and 'West. ' For similar approaches to security in Europe, see Ole 
Waever, 'Visions of Conflict: Conflicts of Vision, ' in European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond 
East-West Dialogue, eds. Ole Weever, Pierre Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tromer (New York: 
StMartin's Press, 1989) 283-325; Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Contending 
Philosophies About Security in Europe; in Strategy and Security in the New Europe, ed. Colin 
McInnes (London: Routledge, 1992) 3-36. 
18 P. J. Taylor, 'A Theory and Practice of Regions: The Case of Europes, ' Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 9 (1991) 183-95. For the emerging literature on critical 
approaches to Political Geography (or Critical Geopolitics) see John Agnew and Stuart 
Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony. Territory and International Political Economy (New 
York: Routledge, 1995); John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics (London: 
Routledge, 1998); Gearöid Ö Tuathail and Simon Dalby, eds., Rethinking Geopolitics (London: 
Routledge, 1998); Gearöid Ö Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge, eds., The Geopolitics 
Reader (London: Routledge, 1998). 
19 Kären E. Wigen and Martin W. Lewis, The Myth of Continents: A Critigue of Metageography 
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origins of regions have had their roots in the security thinking and practices of 
their inventors. 20 To anticipate the argument I will be making in Chapter 2, the 
reason why the lands to the south-west of Asia and north of Africa have been 
lumped together in the mind's eye and labelled as the Middle East is because this 
particular representation helped British (and later US) strategists think about and 
organise action for maintaining security in this part of the world. 
The significance of questioning the 'politics of the geographical 
specification of politics' becomes apparent once one recognises that the current 
state of regional (in)security in the Middle East has its roots in practices that have 
been informed by this representation. As John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge 
argued, 'to designate an area as "Islamic" or "Western" is not only to name it, but 
also brand it in terms of its politics and the type of foreign policy its "nature" 
demands. '21 Throughout the twentieth century representations of the Middle East 
have underwritten security practices that were deemed fit for the 'character' of the 
region. The enunciation of statements such as the one quoted above (that the 
Middle East 'best fits the realist theory of international politics')22 has had the 
effect of privileging certain security practices (such as the 1998-1999 bombing 
campaign directed at obtaining Iraqi cooperation with the UN team inspecting the 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programme) whilst marginalizing others (such 
as the adoption of a more comprehensive long-term policy of creating a nuclear- 
free zone in the Middle East). To recap, in seeking to maintain security in the 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997) xiii. 20 Yves Lacoste, Coýrafya Savasmak Icindir [Geography is for Waging War] trans. Ay§in Arayici 
(Istanbul: Özne, 1998); "'Questions of Geography, " Interview with Michel Foucault, ' in 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon 
(Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1980) 63-77. 
21 Agnew and Corbridge, Mastering Space, 48. 
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Middle East, British and later US policy-makers adopted certain security practices 
that were informed by this dominant representation. What informed this particular 
representation was the conception of security adopted by its inventors. Hence 
the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories 
and practices of security. 
Becoming aware of the 'politics of the geographical specification of 
politics' and exploring the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) 
regions, and theories and practices of security helps reveal the role human 
agency has played in the past and could play in the future. Such awareness, in 
turn, would enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security to help 
constitute an alternative future whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors' 
multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent 
object(s), and how they think security should be sought in this part of the world. 
Whilst admitting that the 'Middle East' is a contested term, it will still be 
employed throughout the thesis. Following Kären Wigen and Martin Lewis, it is 
assumed that problems of language are inescapable in a project involving the 
deconstruction of existing representations of world politics. In the words of Wigen 
and Lewis, 'in order to continue talking about the world, we must have the cake of 
metageography while deconstructing it too. 923 As with the use of 'women' in 
some feminist writing, the purpose behind continuing to use the 'Middle East' is to 
highlight the multiplicity of meanings attached to the concept, its fluidity and 
22 Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 147. 
23 Wigen and Lewis, The Myth of Continents, 17. 
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indeterminacy, whilst searching for the roots of its multiple representations. 24 The 
goal, then, is not to present a `brand new' alternative representation to replace 
that of the `Middle East, ' but to draw attention to the relationship between 
(inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security. 
Aims 
The main aim of the thesis is to provide an account of the pasts, presents and 
futures of regional security in the Middle East from a Critical Security Studies 
perspective. This is achieved via the threefold structure of the thesis which looks 
at Cold War pasts in Part I, and post-Cold War presents in Part II. Part III looks 
at possible futures of regional security in the Middle East. The intention here is to 
emphasise the dynamic relationships between pasts, presents and futures in 
thinking as well as practices. 'We endlessly create the past as we make the 
future, ' as Philip Allott put it. 25 'As we walk into the future it becomes the past, ' 
wrote Kenneth Boulding. 26 Presents, the time frame in which this thesis is being 
written, is that walk during the course of which people(s) re-create their pasts and 
invent their futures. 
The thesis has three more specific aims that correspond to the three 
tasks of Critical Security Studies identified above. First, it aims to present a 
24 See, for example, Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a 
Postmodern Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) esp. pp. 1-19. Also see 
Marysia Zalewski, 'The Woment'Women" Question in International Relations, ' Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 23: 2 (1994) 407-23. 
25 Philip Allott, 'The Future of the Human Past, ' in Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and 
Beyond, ed. Ken Booth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 332. 
28 Kenneth Boulding, 'Part I: Introduction, ' in The Future: Images and Processes, Elise Boulding 
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critique of prevailing security discourses in theory and practice with reference to 
regional security in the Middle East and point to unfulfilled potential immanent in 
regional politics. Second, the thesis aims to explore the mutually constitutive 
relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security 
via its structure. Finally, it aims to show how Critical Security Studies might allow 
one to think differently about futures of regional security in the Middle East. 
Parts I and II are further divided into three chapters: representations, 
theories, practices. Having one chapter each on theories and practices was 
intended to investigate the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and 
practice. The idea behind having a chapter on spatial representations, in turn, is 
to investigate the relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and 
practices of security; the point is that when re-thinking regional security, it is not 
enough to open up the concept 'security' in itself, but, both concepts 'region' and 
'security' need to be opened up. Part III has a different chapter layout. It 
elaborates upon Critical Security Studies thinking about the future as well as 
other future scenarios and their practical implications. It also investigates the 
potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East. 
The adoption of the Cold War/post-Cold War divide as a juncture where 
pasts end and presents begin may require justification. Admittedly this is a 
disputable choice, not the least because it reinforces the prevalent tendency to 
see an unproblematic dividing line between Cold War and post-Cold War eras. 
As Fred Halliday noted, one's understanding of when the Cold War ended and 
and Kenneth E. Boulding (London: Sage, 1995) 2. 
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the post-Cold War began depends on his/her conception of what the Cold War 
was all about. 27 Cynthia Enloe echoes Halliday when she questions whether the 
Cold War has come to an end at all, say, for women who live next to military 
bases in the Philippines or for women in Afghanistan doing daily `battle' under a 
militarist regime. Her point is that some Cold War structures still remain despite 
the end of the conflict between the United States and (former) Soviet Union. The 
Cold War is bound to have not one, but'a multitude of endings, ' concludes Enloe, 
each ending resulting from the pulling down of yet another structure (such as the 
Berlin Wall) that helped sustain the Cold War. 28 
The adoption of the Cold War/post-Cold War divide as defining the 
juncture between Part I and Part II, pasts and presents, could be viewed as an 
attempt to reinforce the points made by Halliday and Enloe and to provide a 
critique from within. Thus, the thesis will seek to destabilise the prevalent 
tendency in Security Studies literature to present the emergence of critical 
thinking about security issues as a post-Cold War phenomenon, the implication 
being that what is being criticised was exclusive to the Cold War and therefore 
long past and gone. Instead I will seek to present an array of spatial 
representations, security theories and practices adopted by different actors. It 
will be argued that some critical thinking existed during the Cold War, just as 
much traditionalist thinking remains in the post-Cold War era. 
27 Fred Halliday, 'The Ends of the Cold War, ' New Left Review 180 (1990) 5-23. 
28 Cynthia Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1993) 3. Also see Ken Booth, 'Cold Wars of the Mind, ' in 
Statecraft and Security, ed. Booth, 29-55. 
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The foregoing is a very broad-brush picture of the thesis. Before 
proceeding to explain the thesis structure in greater detail, an account of the 
sources on which it is based is in order. 
Sources 
The thesis is the product of a library-based research project. Its claim to 
originality is not rooted in heretofore untapped material; on the contrary, it is 
based entirely on secondary sources. Rather, the contribution the thesis makes 
is in the way the information provided by these sources is brought together in a 
fundamentally new framework to provide fresh insight into the study of regional 
security in the Middle East. I utilised a wide range of sources (in Turkish and 
English) from a variety of disciplines (including area studies, critical geopolitics, 
ecology, economics, futurology, history, literary criticism, political anthropology, 
political theory, sociology and religion) as well as studies that could be found on 
library shelves reserved for Security Studies and International Relations. I have 
also made extensive use of Internet sources. An ever increasing number of 
actors in the Middle East and diaspora in North America and Western Europe are 
grasping the opportunities provided by the leap in information technology to get 
their voices heard, to exchange information and to organise action across 
borders. I found Internet-based research invaluable not only for getting 
up-to-date information (which has to be treated with extreme caution) but also for 
gaining insight into the main concerns of those peoples who are active in 
cyberspace. 
13 
During the course of my research, I came across a surprisingly large 
number of studies putting forward arguments that echoed the call of Critical 
Security Studies for broadening and deepening security, and looking below and 
beyond the state level for other referents and agents. Some of this material is 
produced by scholars who would not otherwise consider themselves as 
addressing security issues (such as Palestinian born professor of English 
literature Edward Said and Moroccan feminist sociologist Fatima Mernissi). Yet it 
is such scholars who often voice the diverse security concerns of different actors 
at multiple levels. 
Preliminary findings and conclusions of the thesis have been presented 
at conferences, workshops and seminars in Bristol, Sussex, London and 
Manchester in Britain; Mannheim, Germany; Oslo, Norway; and Ankara, Turkey 
to audiences that included scholars from the Middle East as well as Western 
Europe and North America. At the Oslo 1998 Conference of the Nordic Society 
for Middle Eastern Studies, I presented a paper outlining the main contours of the 
argument on the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions, 
theories and practices of security. By coincidence, of the three other papers on 
the panel, one looked at politics in the 'Arab homeland, ' another traced the 
historical trajectory of the 'Greater Middle East, ' and a third focused on the 'Euro- 
Med Partnership Process. ' Competing representations of the Middle East coming 
together on the same panel reinforced my own confidence (as well as the 
audience's, it seemed) in the argument I was developing. 
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At the British International Studies Association (BISA) conferences in 
Sussex (1998) and Manchester (1999), the European Consortium on Political 
Research (ECPR) joint sessions of workshops in Mannheim (1999) and the 
Contemporary Research in Political Theory (CRIPT) workshop in Bristol (1997) 1 
presented different aspects of the Critical Security Studies perspective developed 
in the thesis by using illustrations from the Middle East. At each and every one of 
these occasions the discussions centred on the issue of broad versus narrow 
security agendas and the value of 'securitization. ' This led me to develop my 
thinking on the issues of agency, practice and constitutive theory that I felt were 
sidelined in these discussions. 
A more developed version of the argument of the thesis was presented to 
a faculty seminar at Bilkent University, Ankara (1998). The audience's response, 
whilst overall receptive to the call for broadening and deepening security in the 
long run, was sceptical regarding the presence of a potential for a security 
community to be created in this of all regions. This led me to think harder about 
the issue of practice, and to search for and point to instances of cooperation and 
collaboration-the immanent potential in which a Critical Security Studies 
approach to the future could be anchored. All the feedback received at the 
aforementioned conferences has been worked into the thesis as noted in the 
Acknowledgements. 
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Thesis Structure 
Following an overall introduction to the thesis provided in the Introduction, 
Chapter 1 presents a Critical Security Studies perspective which is then utilised 
in Parts I and II to criticise Cold War and post-Cold War theories and practices of 
security. The aim of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive overview of the 
origins and development of Critical Security Studies. Rather, it seeks to clarify 
the key concepts that will be used throughout the thesis such as 'Cold War 
Security Studies, ' 'Statism' and 'Referents for Security, ' and seeks to explain 
some key analytical moves, namely, 'Broadening Security, ' 'Deepening Security, ' 
'Re-conceptualising Agency' and 'Re-conceptualising Practice. ' Being self- 
conscious and open about one's own assumptions and normative predisposition 
is central to Critical Security Studies; opening the thesis by clarifying my own 
perspective is true to this spirit. 
The rest of the thesis has a threefold structure looking at pasts, presents 
and futures of regional security in the Middle East. Part I: 'Pasts' looks at 
regional security in the Middle East during the Cold War period and investigates 
the relationship between representations of the region (Chapter 2), theories 
(Chapter 3) and practices of security (Chapter 4). Chapter 2 traces the trajectory 
of the emergence and development of the dominant representation, that is, the 
Middle East, by focusing on British and US security practices. It argues that the 
Middle East was invented to help British and later US policy-makers to think 
about and organise action in this part of the world. Chapter 2 also presents 
critiques of the 'Middle East' as a representation and an alternative, that of 'Arab 
Regional System. ' I will argue that the latter is rooted in the security thinking and 
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practices of actors whose practices were informed by an alternative approach to 
regional security, that of Arab national security. Contending approaches to 
security that shaped these representations will be looked at in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 opens by historicizing and contextualising the growth of Cold 
War Security Studies as a discipline. The argument here is that 'Security 
Studies, ' as we came to know it, was a product of the Cold War. It will further be 
argued that Cold War Security Studies helped constitute the Cold War whilst 
responding to it. This mutually constitutive relationship between theory and 
practice, the chapter will argue, was obscured by an objectivist conception of 
theory. The chapter further argues that Cold War Security Studies focused on 
the security of states, emphasised the military dimension and privileged the 
status quo. Chapter 3 also presents critiques of Security Studies in the attempt 
to show that alternative ways of thinking about security existed all throughout the 
Cold War period. 
Another focus of Chapter 3 will be regional security thinking. Here I look 
at the approach of Cold War Security Studies to regional security in the Middle 
East (hereafter referred to as 'Middle Eastern security discourse') in juxtaposition 
to some regional actors' approach to security in the Arab Regional System: the 
'Arab national security discourse. ' I argue that the Middle Eastern security 
discourse was informed by top down thinking that privileged the security of states 
and military stability. The Arab national security discourse, in turn, put stress on 
non-military dimensions of security (such as the security of 'Arab' identity29 and 
29 The definition of 'Arab' is hugely contested among 'Arab' peoples themselves, and the 
landmass covered by this alternative spatial representation is home to a considerable number 
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economic independence) but nevertheless privileged state and regime security. I 
conclude by maintaining that notwithstanding the differences between these two 
contending approaches, both were united in their embrace of an outward-directed 
and statist conception of security. This, as Chapter 4 will argue, was illustrated 
by the security practices of different actors. 
Chapter 4 concludes Part I by bringing together the arguments made in 
Chapters 2 and 3 in the attempt to further illustrate the relationship between 
(inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security. Towards this end, the 
chapter is organised along spatial lines; practices are grouped according to the 
spatial representations they shape and were shaped by. First, the chapter will 
look at a set of security practices shaped by the dominant representation, the 
Middle East. I argue that these practices were informed by the Middle Eastern 
security discourse. These practices privileged the security of states (or certain 
states), emphasised the military dimension, and sought to maintain stability. 
Then, the chapter turns to look at those practices shaped by an alternative 
representation, that of Arab Regional System and argue that these were informed 
by the Arab national security discourse. This latter set of practices, I argue, was 
designed to emphasise the Arab character of this part of the world, and prioritised 
issues such as the struggle against colonialism, economic and political 
independence and the plight of Palestinian peoples. Finally, the chapter also 
provides an account of the practical manifestations of the competition between 
the two discourses. 
of other peoples including Kurds and Turks, Berbers, Copts and Jews (depending on one's 
definition of 'Arab'). For a discussion, see Bassam Tibi, 'From Pan-Arabism to the Community 
of Sovereign States: Redefining the Arab and Arabism in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf 
War, ' in The Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration, ed. Michael 
18 
To recap, Part I aims to historicize and contextualise Cold War Security 
Studies and the spatial representation this approach helped shape by way of 
informing security practices. It presents other approaches and representations 
that existed throughout this period in the attempt to introduce an alternative 
reading; it also shows how the Cold War security discourse prevailed over the 
others. This reading, I contend, is cognisant of the choices that were made in the 
past to bring regional (in)security in the Middle East to its present state. Lastly, 
Part I sets up a framework to investigate the mutually constitutive relationship 
between (inventing) regions, theories and practices of security-a framework 
adopted in Part II: 'Presents. ' 
Part II, Chapters 5-7, is structured along the same lines as Part I. 
Chapter 5 continues to trace the trajectory of spatial representations the 'Middle 
East' and 'Arab Regional System' that were looked at in Chapter 2. It looks at 
two more representations, those of 'Euro-Med Region, ' and the 'Muslim Middle 
East. ' I argue that although the Middle East still prevails over other 
representations, this has more to do with the decline of the Arab national security 
discourse for Arab policy-makers, especially following the Gulf War and the 
establishment of the US-backed Middle East Peace Process, than it has to do 
with the appeal of Middle East itself as a representation. I further argue that in 
the post-Cold War era, it has been mostly non-state actors who shaped the 
spatial representations Muslim Middle East and Arab Regional System. The 
C. Hudson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 92-106. 
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Middle East and the Euro-Med Region were shaped, respectively, by the United 
States and the European Union and their local allies. 
Chapter 6 looks at security thinking in the post-Cold War period and 
traces its development in the attempt to see its differences from as well as 
similarities to Cold War approaches. The chapter opens by sketching the 
development of thinking about Arab national security, which emerged during the 
Cold War as a critique of Middle Eastern security discourse. Next, it looks at the 
contributions made by the students of Third World30 security. The chapter also 
focuses on two key debates in the attempt to present an overview of issues that 
have been raised by post-Cold War critics of Cold War Security Studies. These 
are: 'broadening security' and 'appropriate referent(s) for security. ' Finally, I point 
to those issues that were sidelined by these debates-issues I identify as the 
silences of post-Cold War debates, namely, agency, practice and constitutive 
theory. This argument will be further developed in Chapter 8 where I present a 
Critical Security Studies perspective on thinking about the future. 
Chapter 7 concludes Part II. Like the previous 'practices' chapter 
(Chapter 4) this one is also organised along spatial lines, looking at security 
practices within the context of the spatial representations they shaped and were, 
in turn, shaped by, namely, the '(New) Middle East, ' 'Arab Regional System, ' 
30 It has become less and less meaningful to speak of the Third World since the term was first 
coined during the 1950s when their under-developed economies was thought to bring this 
otherwise diverse group of states together under the banner 'Third World. ' Throughout the 
years, as they began to diversify in economic terms, and especially after the dissolution of the 
'Second World', the use of the term 'Third World' has become increasingly problematic. It is 
equally problematic to use the term within the security context; despite certain similarities like 
low levels of social cohesion and weak political infrastructures, it still makes little sense to put 
India, Kuwait and Somalia all in the same basket. See Thomas, In Search of Security, 1-2, for a 
discussion of the problematic character of the term. Also see the debate in Third World 
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'Euro-Med Region, ' and 'Muslim Middle East. ' Here I argue that in the post-Cold 
War era, the competition between these four representations has taken place at 
multiple levels with the practices of non-state actors shaping and being shaped 
by the spatial representations Arab Regional System and Muslim Middle East. 
Practices shaped by the US approach to regional security in the Middle East and 
the EU approach to security in the Euro-Med Region have remained top down 
and privileged the status quo whereas the other two representations have shaped 
and been shaped by the practices of non-state actors that have sought to alter 
the status quo. 
Part II therefore looks at security thinking and practices in the post-Cold 
War period as well as the spatial representations they shaped and, in turn, were 
shaped by. Having considered these four contending representations and their 
practical implications, I conclude that it would be highly unlikely for their 
proponents to come to an agreement on one of them. The question then 
becomes, if they cannot agree on the definition of the region how could they ever 
agree on common security practices? This is where the argument comes back 
full circle, for conceiving the relationship between (inventing) regions, theories 
and practices of security as mutually constitutive enables me to make the 
analytical move and argue that an alternative approach to security (that of Critical 
Security Studies) could inform alternative practices thereby helping constitute a 
new region in the form of a security community. This argument is fully developed 
in Part III: 'Futures. ' 
Quarterly, 1: 1-3 (1979). 
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Chapter 8 introduces Part III. Here I seek to develop Critical Security 
Studies thinking about the future by focusing on three main themes identified in 
Chapter 6 as the silences of post-Cold War debates on security, namely, 
constitutive theory, practice and agency. The aim here is to show how Critical 
Security Studies allows one to think and act differently towards shaping 
alternative futures. Chapter 8 also makes a case for the adoption of a security 
community approach, arguing that from a Critical Security Studies perspective, 
processes of imagining, creating and nurturing security communities constitute 
emancipatory practices. 
Cognisant of the existence of other ways of thinking about the future, 
Chapter 9 looks at other plausible future scenarios and their potential practical 
implications within the Middle Eastern context. Here I look at 'globalisation, ' 
'fragmentation, ' 'regionalisation, ' 'clash of civilizations' and 'democratic peace. ' 
This chapter is also intended to show that Critical Security Studies thinking about 
the future does not evolve in a vacuum and that it is concerned with exposing the 
limitations of other scenarios as well as presenting its own 'desired' future. 
Chapter 10 returns to discussing 'desired' futures and investigates the 
potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East. Here I 
present the security community approach as developed by Karl Deutsch et al. 
and, more recently, by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. Adopting the 
framework of Adler and Barnett for the study of security communities as a 
checklist, I investigate the potential for the creation of a security community in the 
Middle East. The chapter maintains that it is indeed possible to imagine the 
22 
creation of a security community in the Middle East, but there are significant 
hurdles to be overcome on the way. The overall conclusion is that even the very 
act of investigating the potential for the creation of a security community 
constitutes a first step towards its achievement by way of pointing to unfulfilled 
potential immanent in world politics and emphasising the problems that would 
have to be addressed on the way. 
The Conclusion returns to the question asked in the Introduction that is 
whether the Critical Security Studies perspective does indeed provide a fuller 
account of regional security in the Middle East. After summing up the main 
arguments developed in the thesis, I answer the question in the affirmative, 
maintaining that a Critical Security Studies perspective provides a more 'realistic' 
understanding of regional security in the Middle East than other perspectives 
(including realism). 
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Chapter 1: A Critical Security Studies Perspective 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce a Critical Security Studies 
perspective, which will then be utilised to criticise Cold War and post-Cold War 
conceptions and practices of security (Parts I and II). As a result, this chapter 
does not provide an exhaustive overview of the origins and growth of Critical 
Security Studies. Rather, I seek to clarify the key concepts and analytical moves 
central to Critical Security Studies and most relevant to this thesis. Here I will 
look at 'Cold War Security Studies, ' 'Broadening Security, ' 'Deepening Security, ' 
'Statism, ' 'Referents for Security, ' 'Re-conceptualising Practice, ' and 'Re- 
conceptualising Agency. ' Critical Security Studies thinking about the future will 
be addressed in Chapter 8 (which introduces Part III: 'Futures') where three 
themes, namely, constitutive theory, practice and agency will be further 
developed. 
Cold War Security Studies 
What is referred to here as Cold War Security Studies was mostly called 'National 
Security Studies' in the United States and 'Strategic Studies' in Britain. 
Notwithstanding the difference in titles, the focus on states as the primary 
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referent (to whom security refers), the emphasis put on the military dimension of 
security, and the privilege accorded to the status quo united the two traditions. ' 
This, of course, is not to suggest that Cold War Security Studies was unified in its 
approach to international phenomena. On the contrary, there were major 
differences among its students as witnessed in the many debates that took place 
throughout this period. 2 However, as Hugh Gusterson has argued, these debates 
served to 'reinforce the foundational precepts of strategic discourse' by 
channelling disagreements into certain frameworks within which 
the act of disagreement obscures actors' shared allegiance to 
deeper structures of thought that contain their disagreements. 
Thus, in the act of debating, members of a discourse reproduce 
the categories, taken for granted, that make disagreement 
possible. 
Accordingly, despite the differences, two characteristics shared by its students 
justify treating their otherwise diverse contributions as a body of thought under 
the label Cold War Security Studies. These are their embrace of realism and the 
Cold War context in which they were produced. 
The first characteristic students of this otherwise rich and diverse body of 
thought shared was the realist outlook. The realist theory of International 
Relations emphasised a state-centred outlook, a military-focus, and a scientific- 
objectivist understanding of theory and the theory/practice relationship to the 
1 Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation, ' Review of International Studies 17: 4 (1991) 318. 
s See Hedley Bull, 'Strategic Studies and its Critics, ' World Politics xx: 4 (July 1968) 593-605, for a 
discussion of and response to some of the criticisms brought against academic strategists 
during the 1950s and 1960s. For other critics of the Cold War Security Studies, see Philip 
Green, Deadly Logic: The Logic of Nuclear Deterrence (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966); 
idem, 'Strategy, Politics and Social Scientists, ' in Strategic Thinking and its Moral Implications, 
ed. Morton A. Kaplan (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1973) 37-68; Anatol Rapoport, 
Strategy and Conscience (New York: Shcoken, 1964). 
3 Hugh Gusterson, 'Missing the End of the Cold War in International Security, ' in Cultures of 
Insecurity: States. Communities. and the Production of Danger, eds. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, 
Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 
326-7. 
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study of security. 4 Contemporary critics of realism are sometimes (rightly) 
criticised for caricaturing an old and sophisticated body of thought. Such a fallacy 
is partly in the nature of the task of summarising a rich and diverse tradition; 
crucial details and nuances inevitably get lost in the process. But, as Chapter 3 
will argue, sometimes realists themselves presented such simplistic pictures of 
their own thinking. Furthermore, from the mid-1950s onwards, students of 
realism moved away from the more sociological approaches of classical realism. 
Indeed, as the Cold War waxed and waned, classical realism was obscured by its 
more simplified and purportedly 'scientific' variant. Within the context of Security 
Studies this shift manifested itself in the discipline becoming increasingly state- 
centric and non-military dimensions of security being marginalized in favour of a 
military-focused security agenda. 5 
Realism's state-centred outlook introduced a degree of neatness and 
clarity to the study of the complexity of international phenomena. However, as 
with all simplifications, many crucial aspects were lost in the process. 6 Moreover, 
despite this focus on states, state building was under-theorised; states were 
taken to be 'black boxes' the internal components of which were not considered 
worth investigating. As Georg Sorensen has argued, the problem with 
4 Richard Wyn Jones, Security. Strategy and Critical Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999) 
95; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical 
Security Studies, ' in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and 
Michael Williams (London: UCL Press, 1997) 36-43. 
5 David Baldwin, 'Security Studies and the End of the Cold War, ' World Politics 48 (October 1995) 
117-23. Also see Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 31-2; J. Ann Tickner, 'You Just Don't 
Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists, ' International Studies 
Quarterly 41 (1997) 618. 
Cynthia Enloe, 'Margins, Silences and Bottom Rungs: How to Overcome the Underestimation of 
Power in the Study of International Relations, ' in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, 
eds. Ken Booth, Steve Smith and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996) 186-202. 
26 
International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular has had 'less 
to do with an exaggerated focus on the state than a lack of analysis of the state. ' 
The military-focus of realism manifested itself in a search for militarised solutions 
to problems that could have been addressed through non-military means. 
Indeed, there came a time when it was simply common sense to think that 
'deterrence was foreign policy. '8 The title of an article by Michael MccGwire, a 
long-time critic of Cold War thinking and the associated practices of security, 
summarised it well: 'Deterrence: The Problem, not the Solution. '9 The scientific- 
objectivist understanding of theory and the theory/practice relationship, in turn, 
resulted in essentially (but not always openly) normative theories of Cold War 
Security Studies masquerading as 'objective' approaches to international 
phenomena and being viewed as 'knowledge, ' whilst the explicitly normative 
approaches of their critics were presented as 'propaganda' (Chapter 3 will further 
develop this theme). 
In addition to this particular set of ontological and epistemological 
assumptions imported from realism, Cold War Security Studies shared a second 
characteristic: it was a product of the Cold War. This is not meant to be a 
tautological statement. Rather, the point here is that Cold War Security Studies, 
as with all academic approaches, should be understood with reference to the 
historical context in which it emerged, developed and helped sustain. 10 This is 
7 Georg Sorensen, 'Individual Security and National Security: The State Remains the Principal 
Problem, ' Security Dialogue 27: 4 (1996) 371. Also see Fred Halliday, 'State, Society and 
International Relations: A Second Agenda, ' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 16: 2 
(1987) 215-29. 
e Alexander George quoted in Joseph Nye, 'The Contribution of Strategic Studies: Future 
Challenges, ' Adelphi Papers 235 (Spring 1989) 25. 
9 Michael MccGwire, 'Deterrence: The Problem, Not the Solution, ' International Affairs 62: 1 (1986) 
55-70. 
10 On the impact of the Cold War on US academia, see Noam Chomsky et al., The Cold War and 
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especially necessary in order to understand why a rich and diverse body of 
thought such as classical realism was obscured during this period by its rather 
simplified variant. As Chapter 3 will argue, the development of International 
Relations in general and Security Studies in particular should be understood 
within the context of Cold War fears and policy interests in the West in general 
and United States in particular. " 
Accordingly, my preference for the term Cold War Security Studies 
(rather than 'traditional, ' 'mainstream, ' or '[neo-]realist' Security Studies) 12 to refer 
to this body of thought should be viewed as an attempt to stress the historical 
context in which it developed; and not necessarily a statement about it being a 
unified body of thought (notwithstanding some significant common characteristics 
identified above) or its unique approach to security matters. On the contrary, as 
the thesis will argue, there were elements of critical thinking during the Cold War 
(Chapter 3); and much traditionalist thinking remains in the post-Cold War era 
(Chapter 6). 
the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years (New York: The New Press, 
1997). Also see Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist, ' in Critical 
Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 83-119, for an autobiographical account. 
Ekkehart Krippendorf, 'The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations, ' 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 16: 2 (1987) 207-14; Steve Smith, 'Paradigm 
Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social 
Science, ' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 16: 2 (1987) 189-206; Baldwin, 'Security 
Studies and the End of the Cold War, ' 117-41; Ken Booth, '75 Years On: Rewriting the 
Subject's Past-Reinventing its Future, ' in International Theory, eds. Booth, Smith and 
Zalewski, 328-39; Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security, ' 51; Stanley Hoffman, 'An 
American Social Science: International Relations, ' in International Theory: Critical 
Investigations, ed. James Der Derian (London: Macmillan, 1995) 212-41. 
Ken Booth ('Security and Self, ' 118 n. 38) and Richard Wyn Jones (Security. Strategy and 
Critical Theory, 94) distinguish between Traditional Security Studies and Critical Security 
Studies invoking Horkheimer's distinction between traditional and critical theory. See Max 
Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory, ' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. 
Matthew J. O'Connell and others (New York: Continuum, 1982) 188-243. Keith Krause ('Critical 
Theory and Security Studies, ' 299) uses the terms 'mainstream, ' 'traditional, "orthodox' and 
'neo-realist' interchangeably to refer to the same body of thought. Bill McSweeney (Security. 
Identity and Interests, 23-78) looks at Cold War Security Studies together with some post-Cold 
War critics under the title 'Objectivist Approaches to International Security. ' 
11 
12 
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Broadening Security 
As an analytical move, broadening security entails questioning the military- 
focused security agendas of Cold War Security Studies and calling for opening 
up the agenda to include other non-military threats. In making this move, 
students of Critical Security Studies have followed in the footsteps of Peace 
Researchers who, from the 1960s onwards, had gradually widened their 
conceptions of peace and violence. Distinguishing between 'negative' and 
`positive' peace, John Galtung argued that peace defined as merely the absence 
of armed conflict is 'negative peace. ' 'Positive peace, ' maintained Galtung, 
means the absence of not only direct physical violence but also indirect (and 
sometimes unintentional) 'structural violence'-that is, those socio-economic 
institutions and relations that oppress human beings by preventing them from 
realising their potential. Galtung also emphasised that to attain 'positive peace, ' it 
is not enough to seek to eliminate violence; existing institutions and relations 
should be geared towards the enhancement of dialogue, cooperation and 
solidarity among peoples coupled with a respect for the environment. 13 It is also 
worth noting here that for Galtung peace is not a static concept; it is rather a 
process (as with security and emancipation for students of Critical Security 
Studies). 14 
13 These ideas were first aired in Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research, ' Journal 
of Peace Research 6: 3 (1969) 167-92. For further elaboration see his Peace by Peaceful 
Means (London: Sage with PRIO, 1996) 31-3,197-9. 
14 Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, 265. 
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Building upon Peace Researchers' broadening of the concepts violence 
and peace that took human beings as the referent, students of Critical Security 
Studies broadened security to include-in Ken Booth's words-'all those physical 
and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what they would freely 
choose to do. '15 Such constraints may include human rights abuses, water 
shortage, illiteracy, lack of access to health care and birth control, militarisation of 
society, environmental degradation and economic deprivation as well as armed 
conflict at the state- and sub-state level. Accordingly, the purpose behind 
broadening security, from a Critical Security Studies perspective, is to become 
aware of threats to security faced by referents in all walks of life and approach 
them within a comprehensive and dynamic framework cognisant of the 
interrelationships in between. 
Understood as such, broadening security does not simply mean putting 
more issues on governments' security agendas, but opening up security to 
provide a richer picture that includes all issues that engender insecurity. In other 
words, although the broadening of governmental security agendas is an offshoot 
of broadening security, it is not its main purpose. After all, the US Central 
Intelligence Agency also broadened its agenda in the 1990s, but sought to 
address them through its traditional practices. 16 
Moreover, presenting the broadening move simply as one of adding more 
issues to governmental security agendas would be misleading in that those who 
15 Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation, ' Review of International Studies 17: 4 (1991) 319; idem, 
'Three Tyrannies, ' in Human Rights in Global Politics, eds. Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 40. 
16 Loch K. Johnson, 'Smart Intelligence, ' Foreign Policy (1993) 53-69. 
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drew up Cold War security agendas were never totally ignorant of non-military 
dimensions of security. 17 Although broader conceptualisations of the earlier 
years had been replaced, by the mid-1950s, by more military-focused 
approaches, economic, political and even environmental issues were never 
totally excluded from national security agendas as noted above. For instance, 
water scarcity has always been considered a security issue in the Middle East. 
Likewise, the issue of unhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices was 
successfully securitized by US policy-makers in post-World War II period. As Bill 
McSweeney has argued, the problem with Cold War Security Studies was not 
only that it emphasised the military dimension of security to the neglect of other 
dimensions, but also that it focused on military and non-military issues from a 
statist perspective. 18 
Therefore, it was the narrow conception of security adopted by Cold War 
Security Studies, compounded by its statist outlook and zero sum thinking and 
practices that was the problem. Singling out one of these dimensions (i. e. narrow 
security agendas) and identifying it as the problem whilst neglecting others 
betrays an underestimation of the problems involved in Cold War approaches to 
security-some of which are still apparent in post-Cold War thinking and 
practices. It could further be argued that the debate about broadening security 
and especially the calls for 'desecuritization' are all rooted in such an 
underestimation. These themes will be further developed in Chapter 6, when 
discussing post-Cold War security thinking. It should suffice to say here that 
conceptualising security in a narrow, military-focused manner has so far helped 
17 David Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security, ' Review of International Studies 23: 1 (1997) 5-26. 
18 McSweeney, Security. Identity and Interests, 35. Also see R. B. J. Walker, 'The Subject of 
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gloss over other structurally based (economic, political, societal or environmental) 
security concerns. Dealing with the military security agenda is always necessary, 
but the adoption of military-focused and determined security agendas (coupled 
with zero sum conceptions and practices of security) have so far caused a 
diversion of valuable resources into the military sector in the Middle East. The 
ensuing militarisation of the region not only made it difficult to meet traditional (i. e. 
military) challenges, but also undermined regional states' capacity to provide 
welfare to their citizens thereby exacerbating non-military threats to security as 
voiced by various actors. 19 
Deepening Security 
From a Critical Security Studies perspective, re-thinking security also requires 
deepening one's conception of security to be able to see the links between 
security discourses and the worldviews from which they derive. 20 Concepts such 
as 'national security', 'security policy, ' and 'Security Studies' are all inter- 
subjectively constituted. As Booth has maintained, different worldviews and 
political philosophies deliver different discourses about what 'security' is or may 
be. 21 Or, as R. B. J. Walker argued, 'questions about security cannot be 
separated from the most basic questions of political theory. v22 For example, if the 
Security, ' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 75-6. 
19 For a political economy perspective, see Yahya Sadowski, Scuds or Butter? The Political 
Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 
1993). For a feminist perspective, see Fatima Mernissi, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the 
Modern World, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland (London: Virago, 1993), esp. pp. 1-10; idem, Women's 
Rebellion and Islamic Memory (London: Zed, 1996) vii-xv. 
20 Booth, 'Security and Self, ' 111. Also see, idem, '75 Years On, ' 337. 
21 Booth, 'Security and Self, ' 110-12. 
22 Walker, 'The Subject of Security, ' 63. 
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conception of Arab national security adopted by Middle Eastern actors is different 
from the US conception of regional security in the Middle East (see Chapters 3 
and 6), this is because the two are rooted in different world views. Becoming 
able to grasp the ways in which the two are different, rather than explaining away 
the differences solely with reference to the promises of Arab nationalism requires 
students of Security Studies to embrace the deepening move and understand 
security as a derivative concept. 
By way of deepening security, Critical Security Studies takes inspiration 
from two sources. The first is Robert Cox's maxim, 'theory is always for someone 
and for some purpose, '23 and the second is the feminist motto, 'the personal is 
political. '24 These formulations seek to reveal the linkages between theorist and 
theory, and thinking about security and acting for security. From a Critical 
Security Studies perspective, whether they are self-conscious and open about it 
or not, all approaches to security have normative concerns embedded within 
them. Such concerns may include the maintenance of the status quo in the 
international system or the promotion of state sovereignty, at times to the 
detriment of individual and group rights. Critical Security Studies, on the other 
hand, favours an explicitly normative security agenda based on human 
emancipation. This is in contrast to Cold War approaches to security, which, 
under the guise of objectivism, privileged the security of the state (or certain 
23 Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders, ' Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 10: 2 (Summer 1981) 182. 
24 Or, 'the personal is international, ' in Cynthia Enloe's formulation. See Bananas. Beaches and 
Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1990) 195-201. 
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states), and, in Walker's words, 'allowed questions of political theory to curdle 
into caricature. '25 
Furthermore, viewing alternative conceptions of security as rooted in 
alternative understandings of 'what politics is and can be all about'26 serves as a 
reminder that having a better grasp of security requires students of security to 
question-in Walker's words-'how the modern subject is being reconstituted 
and then ask what security could possibly mean in relation to it. i27 The point here 
is that conceiving security in a narrow manner merely with reference to military 
issues and the state betrays a statist approach (embedded in realism) that could 
only help produce more of the same. Embracing statism affirms the centrality of 
the state as the primary referent of and agent for security, thereby challenging the 
'possibility of referring to humanity in general-and by extension, to world politics 
or world security-in any meaningful way. '28 Deepening security, on the other 
hand, leaves open the possibility of the transformation of political community (this 
theme will be further developed in Chapter 8). 
Lastly, deepening security enables students of security to further broaden 
the security agenda. A broader conception of security was defined above as 
inclusive of 'those physical and human constraints which stop people [as 
individuals and groups] from carrying out what they would freely choose to do. i29 
The key phrase here is 'what they would freely choose to do'; for, it suggests an 
element of choice. People, however, may not be presented with choices. Or, to 
25 Walker, 'The Subject of Security, ' 63. 
26 Booth, 'Security and Self, ' 111. 
27 Walker, 'The Subject of Security, ' 78. 
28 Walker, 'The Subject of Security, ' 73. 
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put it differently, their choices may not be apparent to them because of the way 
security discourses are set up. The deepening move, however, enables students 
of Critical Security Studies to investigate how security discourses are 
constructed. Depending on the theory or theories employed, security discourses 
close off certain possibilities whilst opening others; they lay the groundwork for 
the practices of politicians, soldiers and 'ordinary people' by providing the 
assumptions on which they operate and the norms with which they judge. 30 
Realism, for example, helped produce the Cold War discourse in the United 
States. Its statist norms helped legitimise certain security practices whilst 
marginalizing calls for 'common, ' 'cooperative' or 'global security. ' Critical 
Security Studies, in turn, seeks to present peoples with a different reading of their 
situation, taking into account issues that were marginalized if not rendered 
invisible by Cold War security discourses; it points to choices that were made in 
the past and unfulfilled potential that could have been tapped. 
The task of presenting peoples with choices that have been obscured by 
prevailing discourses should not be interpreted as a claim to know about peoples' 
'real interests. ' The argument here is not that students of Critical Security 
Studies can point to what peoples' 'real interests' are. Rather the argument is 
that, given the ways in which dominant discourses shape security agendas, one 
could reasonably assume that regional security agendas could have been set up 
differently, had other discourses come to prevail. For example, during the Cold 
War 'female illiteracy' was not treated as a threat to security in the Middle East 
although it was (and still is) at the root of problems such as population rise, 
29 Booth, 'Security and Emancipation, ' 319. 
1 See Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics (London: Pinter, 
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unemployment, lack of awareness of health issues, and women's low life 
expectancy. 31 This, however, could not be taken as evidence that women in the 
Middle East chose not to define illiteracy as a threat to their security. It cannot be 
assumed that Middle Eastern women made such a choice, especially if they were 
not aware of the choices available to them. As Fatima Mernissi has argued, 
many Arab women were discouraged from making any 'radical' demands from 
their governments; such 'radical' demands included the right to basic education. 
Thus, by way of continual invocation of the need to divert resources into the 
military sector in order to eradicate the last remnants of colonialism and/or 
address the threat posed by Israel, policy-makers made women feel unpatriotic if 
they asked for more resources to be put into their own well-being. The point is 
that women's choices were obscured by prevailing security discourses that 
emphasised state security and privileged the channelling of meagre resources 
into the military. 
By presenting female illiteracy as a security issue that was kept off 
regional security agendas, I do not claim to know what Middle Eastern women's 
'real interests' were/are (although one could reasonably argue that many would 
prefer not to remain illiterate if given the choice). 32 Rather, by pointing to feminist 
thinking about security that embraced broader conceptions of security, I argue 
that had Cold War security discourses not prevailed, the issue of 'female 
illiteracy' could have been raised as a security issue. Critical Security Studies, by 
1990) esp. pp. 4-29, for further elaboration on this point. 
31 For example, female illiteracy rate in Morocco is 78.3 percent; Algeria 63.1 percent; Egypt 79.8 
percent; North Yemen 74.8 percent; and South Yemen 96.6 percent (note that the figures are 
from pre-unification period). Iraq, the'rogue state' of the Middle East, has 12.5 percent female 
illiteracy. See Mernissi, Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory, 58. 
32 High illiteracy rate is included in Galtung's definition of 'structural violence. ' See Galtung, 
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way of deepening security and pointing to the links between theory and theorist, 
security thinking and practices, aims to raise peoples' awareness of their 
choices-those that were made in the past and those that are available at 
present. 
Statism 
Statism is understood here as 'the concentration of all loyalty and decision- 
making at the level of the sovereign state. '33 As Abdul Monem Al-Mashat notes, 
statist approaches to security provide the state apparatus with strong reasons to 
be superior over the society. He writes: 
By so doing, [statism] strengthens the psychological dependency 
on the state organism and confronts social powers with a real 
challenge to their functions and their very existence. Society's 
sacrifices are perceived as obligations, but the state's privileges 
justified as necessary to survival. Individual initiatives and 
creative group interactions are confronted by the limits of 
manoeuvres laid down by the state. 
Understood as such, statism is different from state-centrism; the latter entails 
focusing on states as referents and agents of security without necessarily giving 
primacy to their well-being. However, the difference between the two is often 
blurred. For, adopting a state-centric approach in studying security may end up 
reinforcing statism by way of rendering invisible other potential referents and 
agents. Then, according primacy to the state in our studies does not simply 
reflect a `reality' our there, but helps reinforce statism in Security Studies by 
'Violence, Peace and Peace Research, ' 169. 
33 Ken Booth, 'Cold Wars of the Mind, ' in Statecraft and Securi : The Cold War and Beyond, ed. 
Ken Booth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 52. 
34 Abdul Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1985) 33-4. 
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making it harder to move away from the state as the dominant referent and agent 
where all loyalty and decision-making is concentrated (this argument will be 
further developed in Chapter 6). 
In Security Studies, the state has traditionally been viewed as the primary 
referent ('security is about the state') and agent ('the state is about security'). 35 
As noted above, although non-military issues were allowed on security agendas 
during the Cold War, this was always done from a statist perspective, by 
prioritising the needs of sovereign states. This is why, broadening security 
without questioning statist and military-focused thinking and practices 
characteristic of Cold War years will not suffice. Hence, the call of Critical 
Security Studies that security should be about referents other than the state, such 
as individuals, social groups or global society (see the next section on 'Referents 
for Security'). States, in turn, 'should be treated as means not ends'-to quote 
Booth. 36 It should also be noted that the limits of relying on the agency of states 
to provide security in a globalising world are becoming increasingly apparent. In 
this sense, it is worth qualifying Booth's statement above by noting that states 
should be treated as means, but not the only means. The issue of the agency of 
non-state agents would be further discussed below in the section on 'Re- 
conceptualising Agency. ' 
3s Barry Buzan, Ole Waver and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998) 37. 
36 Booth, 'Security and Emancipation, ' 319. 
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Referents for Security 
Questioning the statism of Cold War Security Studies, and asking basic (yet 
crucial) questions such as 'what is security? ' and 'whose security should we be 
concerned with? ' has been central to Critical Security Studies. As Booth has 
argued: 
If security is conceived in terms of a wide variety of threats to 
human life and well-being then it is necessary to consider not just 
the threats which are relevant at the state level, but at all the 
levels appropriate for individual and group living. 37 
Cold War Security Studies, on the other hand, treated the state as the primary 
referent. It should be noted here that in its initial formulations, the ultimate 
referent for security was assumed to be human beings. 'It is from the human 
need to protect human values, ' maintains McSweeney, 'that the term "security" 
derives its meaning ... [and] a security policy derives its legitimacy and power to 
mobilise resources. P38 Indeed, in theory, human beings were (and still are) taken 
to be the ultimate referent. However, in Cold War practices, means were allowed 
to become the end, and the state was treated as the primary referent of 
security. 39 Why and how means were allowed to become the end could be 
explained with reference to two things: the underlying assumption that the 
sovereign state provides security for its peoples, and the disciplinary aim of 
building a `science' of Security Studies. 
First, the treatment of the state as the primary referent could be explained 
with reference to the assumption that the state provides security for all those over 
37 Ken Booth, 'A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations' South African 
Perspectives No. 30 (1994) 4. 
38 McSweeney, Security. Identity and Interests, 33. 
11 Booth, 'Security and Emancipation, ' 319. 
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whom it has jurisdiction. `Security comes from being a citizen, ' as Keith Krause 
and Michael Williams have written; insecurity, on the other hand, is assumed to 
be caused by citizens of other states towards 'individuals qua citizens (that is, 
toward their states) . 
40 However, states do not always fulfil their side of the 
bargain and act as providers of security. For, although they are there, in theory, 
to provide security for their citizens, there remain the practices of a significant 
number that are constant reminders of the fact that some are worse than others 
in fulfilling their side of the bargain. Added to this is the case of 'gangster' states 
that constitute a major threat to the security of their own citizens 41 
Furthermore, as J. Ann Tickner reminds us, the policies of those states 
that fare better in providing security for their citizens 'might be challenged by 
marginalized groups, such as women and minorities, whose economic security is 
often compromised when military security takes priority. P42 Some invaluable 
insights into these processes are provided by Cynthia Enloe's works where she 
has laid bare how the United States has built its security on the insecurities of 
some women at home and abroad. A case at hand is institutionalised sexism. 
This affects not only women who live near US bases, but also helps disempower 
women's peace efforts. 43 In short, privileging states irrespective of their record in 
fulfilling their duties is confusing means and ends. 
40 Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security, ' 43. 
41 Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: The Ethical Claims of International 
Society Revisited, ' Political Studies 44: 1 (March 1996) 123-36. 
42 J. Ann Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security, ' in International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth 
and Steve Smith (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995) 186. Also see idem, 'You Just Don't Understand, ' 
627. 
43 Enloe, Bananas. Beaches and Bases; idem, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of 
the Cold War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993). 
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Second, the focus of Cold War Security Studies on the security of states 
could also be viewed as an attempt to introduce some neatness and clarity into 
the complexity of studying international phenomena for the purposes of building a 
'scientific' discipline. As McSweeney notes, if human beings had been taken as 
the main focus in Security Studies, 'the quantification of their behaviour for 
scientific analysis would [have been] complicated by the obvious difference in 
their interests and preferences. '44 Given the perceived urgency of Cold War 
concerns (and against the backdrop of the experience of pre-World War II 
Europe) students of Cold War Security Studies did not see themselves in a 
position to afford the luxury of conducting such daunting and complex analyses. 45 
Furthermore, the complex task of dealing with human beings (as referents or 
agents) would not have produced the neat and tidy analyses a 'science' of 
Security Studies (modelled after natural sciences) was taught to demand. 46 
Although Cold War Security Studies never really aspired to the 'iron laws and 
inescapable forces' of natural sciences, the desire to control and predict-which 
was further perpetuated by the Cold War-resulted in its embrace of the realist 
project of 'uncovering' the causes and laws of state behaviour. 47 
Arguably, this ambition to have a `scientific' discipline of Security Studies 
is one of the reasons why the focus of Critical Security Studies on human beings 
44 McSweeney, Security. Identity and Interests, 34. 
45 Tickner, 'You Just Don't Understand, ' 618. 
46 See Wyn Jones, Security. Strategy and Critical Theory (101) and 'The Nuclear Revolution, ' (in 
Fin de Siecle: Meaning of the Twentieth Century, ed. Alex Danchev [London: Tauris Academic 
Press, 1995] 90-110) where he notes that the very scientific paradigm to which the science of 
Security Studies aspired (i. e. Newtonian paradigm) was at the time under challenge by the 
Einsteinian paradigm. Perhaps ironically, the latter's challenge was based on the very scientific 
discoveries that enabled the construction of nuclear weapons (for the study of the threat and 
use of which a'science' of Security Studies was being constructed). 
47 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 199) 50. 
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as referents of security has generated controversy. 48 For, what worries some 
critics of alternative approaches to security, such as Stephen Walt, is that a study 
of security in the Middle East, for example, that takes into account people (as 
individuals and social groups) as well as states would not produce as neat and 
tidy an analysis as one that focuses solely on states, thereby making it more 
difficult to find solutions 49 Leaving aside the problematic character of Walt's 
conception of the theory/practice relationship (that fails to recognise how theories 
help constitute the very 'reality' they seek to respond to) one should ask whether 
it is worth forsaking deeper insight for tidiness in research design. One possible 
answer is to say that the world is complex, so must be our analyses. Indeed, the 
world is more complex than the simplifications of state-centric analyses would 
allow. It could further be argued that the choice is not between studying the 
security of states or individuals, but between studying more of the same (that is, 
states) or the dynamic interrelationships in between myriad actors (referents and 
agents) including individuals, social groups, states and a potential global society. 
This would necessarily mean adopting a complex framework to study security 
(more complex than the simplifications of neo-realism would allow). However, as 
McSweeney has argued, this is 
the key to understanding social action and to explaining the self- 
evident fact that we can never succeed in generating the kind of 
stable explanations of human behaviour espoused by objectivists 
aspiring to cumulative knowledge-such as the practitioners of 
security studies orthodoxy. 50 
In sum, the justifications students of Cold War Security Studies provide for 
focusing on states as primary referents of security are far from convincing. 
48 See Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 112-7 for an overview of this debate. 
49 Stephen M. Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies, ' International Studies Quarterly 35 
(1991) 212-13. See Chapter 6 for further discussion on Walt. 
5o McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 148. His emphasis. 
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As noted above, Critical Security Studies favours looking at multiple 
referents and adopting a sociologically adequate conception of security that takes 
into account how different actors (agents and referents) are constituted, for what 
purpose, how they interact over time, and may be re-constructed in the future. In 
this sense, referents for security, such as states, social groups, or individuals, are 
never taken as given, as finished projects like states were (and to an extent still 
are) taken to be by Cold War Security Studies. 51 Indeed, as will be seen below, 
Critical Security Studies stresses the importance of understanding change 
towards constituting alternative futures. This, in turn, is in contrast to state- 
centrism (or indeed statism) of Cold War Security Studies, which could only 
promise more of the same. It should also be noted that in this task of inventing 
alternative futures, Critical Security Studies gives priority to considering the 
predicament of 'those men and women and communities for whom the present 
world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security. 952 
Re-conceptualising Practice 
The issue of re-conceptualising practice has been central to Critical Security 
Studies. Given the emphasis put on the theory/practice relationship by its 
students, they are expected to suggest alternative or emancipatory practices. 
However, in fulfilling this task, they have not received much help from Critical 
51 Martin Shaw, 'There is no Such Thing as Society: Beyond Individualism and Statism in 
International Security Studies, ' Review of International Studies 19 (1993) 159-75. 
52 Richard Wyn Jones, '"Message in a Bottle"? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies, ' 
Contemporary Security Policy 16: 3 (December 1995) 309. 
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International Theory. As Richard Wyn Jones maintains, the absence of 
'systematic considerations of how a Critical Theory of international relations could 
help generate, support or sustain emancipatory politicsi53 has meant that Critical 
International Theory has yet to fulfil its promise of becoming a 'force for change'54 
in world politics. Despite the limited nature of guidance provided by Critical 
International Theory, students of Critical Security Studies have chosen not to 
remain silent on the issue of re-conceptualising practice. In the attempt to find 
and suggest ways in which Critical Security Studies can 'orient toward political 
practice in a manner that encourages and supports emancipatory 
transformation, '55 its students have so far put emphasis on theory as a form of 
practice, the point being that by informing actors' practices, theories help shape 
the world in line with their tenets. This is in contrast with Cold War Security 
Studies' conception of theory as an explanatory tool. From a Critical Security 
Studies perspective, theories do not just explain; they are constitutive of what we 
may choose to call 'reality. ' This is not to suggest that theories create the world 
in a philosophical idealist sense of the term. Rather, theories help organise 
knowledge, which, in turn, enables, privileges, or legitimises certain practices 
whilst inhibiting or marginalizing others. Different theories produce different 
security discourses by way of laying down the rules that enable one to 'write, 
speak, listen and act meaningfully. '56 Depending on the theory or theories 
employed, discourses close off certain possibilities whilst opening others, and lay 
the groundwork for the practices of various agents. 
53 Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 151. 
54 Mark Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-paradigm Debate, ' Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 16: 2 (1987) 233. 
55 Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 153. 
56 John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony. Territory and International 
Political Economy (London: Routledge, 1995) 45. 
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Perhaps the best example of the mutually constitutive relationship 
between theory and practice is the relationship between Security Studies and the 
Cold War. As argued above, Security Studies is a product of the Cold War. It 
developed as a specific answer to the problems of that era and attempts to 
understand its evolution require an awareness of the context in which it originated 
and, in turn, shaped. For, Security Studies not only originated in but also thrived 
upon the Cold War environment. The concepts, assumptions and findings of 
Cold War Security Studies helped sustain the Cold War. As Chapter 3 will argue, 
Mary Kaldor's The Imaginary War is an excellent account of the symbiotic 
relationship between Security Studies and the Cold War. 57 
Revealing the mutually constitutive relationship between security theories 
and security practices, in this sense, is more than an 'intellectual' exercise; it is a 
form of practice in itself. Thus, the purpose of Critical Security Studies in pointing 
to the normative character of theory and the theory/practice relationship is to 
undermine Cold War Security Studies, its claim to knowledge and its hold over 
practice. Furthermore, the task of Critical Security Studies is not only to uncover 
the workings of the theory/practice relationship of days gone but also be self- 
conscious and open about the mutually constitutive relationship between theory 
and practice when thinking and writing about security at present. As argued 
above (see sections on 'Statism' and 'Deepening Security'), those students of 
Security Studies who produce state-centric analyses do not just explain a world 
where states are the main referents of and agents for security; but they also help 
S' Mary Kaldor, The Imaginary War: Understanding East-West Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990). 
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perpetuate statism in world politics by feeding 'common sense' back into the 
system thereby marginalizing other potential referents and agents and making it 
harder to invent alternative futures. 
One implication of conceiving theory as a form of practice is that 
theorising itself is recognised as a political act. As Richard Devetak has argued: 
'Theory-as-practice ... defines a task that 
is simultaneously theoretical and 
practical, philosophical and political. '58 Once theorising is recognised as a 
political act, then the role of the theorist could no longer be viewed as that of an 
'objective' or 'neutral' observer but an actor with his/her own normative agenda to 
pursue. As opposed to most (but not all) of their Cold War counterparts, students 
of Critical Security Studies recognise and are open about the normative character 
of the relationship between theory and practice, theorist and what is being 
theorised. 
Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, 
revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold 
War Security Studies is only a first step. In other words, from a Critical Security 
Studies perspective, self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in 
themselves. They should be compounded by other forms of practice (that is, 
action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of Critical Security 
Studies to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities 
for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory practices if it 
is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. The 
58 Richard Devetak, 'Theories, Practices and Postmodernism in International Relations, ' 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs xii: 2 (1999) 72. 
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issue of how Critical Security Studies could contribute to shaping futures will be 
further developed in Chapter 8. Suffice it to say that, cognisant of the need to 
find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda 
without adopting militarised or zero sum thinking and practices, students of 
Critical Security Studies have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of 
security communities as emancipatory practices. 59 
Needless to say, at this point Critical Security Studies treats the security 
community approach as a starting point, a necessary step on the road of 
emancipation. In other words, the creation of security communities is not an 
endpoint in itself. For, emancipation is not a static concept; it is rather a process. 
Hence the stress put on the adjectival form, 'emancipatory, ' which implies 
movement. 60 This theme will be further developed in Chapter 8. 
Re-conceptualising Agency 
The state, as noted above, has traditionally been viewed as both the primary 
referent of and agent for security in Cold War Security Studies. Students of 
Critical Security Studies, by posing the question `whose security are we 
concerned with? ' have challenged the primacy accorded to the state as the 
primary referent for security. However, although the privileged status of the state 
as the primary referent has been challenged, Security Studies continues to 
ss Ken Booth and Peter Vale, 'Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The Case of 
Souther Africa, ' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 338; Booth, 'A Security 
Regime in Southern Africa. ' 
60 Booth, 'Three Tyrannies, ' 41. 
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accord the state a central position largely due to its status as the dominant agent 
for security. This is partly because states have had the license to legitimate use 
of violence and are therefore better endowed than any other agent to provide for 
certain dimensions of security (such as military defence). 61 But perhaps more 
significant is the fact that students of International Relations in general and 
Security Studies in particular have not been orientated to look at the agency of 
actors other than the state concerning security issues. 62 The prominence of the 
state's agency in the economic and financial sectors has for long been 
challenged, but it is yet to be de-throned in (certain types of) security matters. 
The point is that a broader security agenda requires students of security 
to look at agents other than the state, such as social movements, non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) and individuals, instead of restricting his/her 
analysis to the state's agency. This is essential not only because states are not 
always able (or willing) to fulfil their side of the bargain in providing for their 
citizens' security, as noted above, but also because there already are agents 
other than states-be it social movements or intellectuals-who are striving to 
provide for the differing needs of peoples (themselves and others). This is not 
meant to deny the salience of the roles states play in the realm of security; on the 
contrary, they remain significant actors with crucial roles to play. 63 Rather, the 
argument is that the state's dominant position as an actor well endowed to 
provide (certain dimensions of) security does not justify privileging its agency. 
61 It should be noted that states increasingly resort to collective defence and alliance warfare as 
experienced in the Gulf War (1991). 
62 Scott Turner, 'Global Civil Society, Anarchy and Governance: Assessing an Emerging 
Paradigm, ' Journal of Peace Research 35: 1 (1998) 25-42. 
63 What roles states might assume in meeting a broader security agenda, however, is an empirical 
question and will be addressed in the following chapters with reference to empirical illustrations. 
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Furthermore, broadening the security agenda without attempting a re- 
conceptualisation of agency would result in falling back upon the agency of the 
state in meeting non-military threats. The problem with resorting to the agency of 
the state in meeting non-military threats is that states may not be the most 
suitable actors to cope with them. In other words, the state being the most 
qualified actor in coping with some kinds of threats does not necessarily mean it 
is competent (or willing) enough to cope with all. This is why students of Critical 
Security Studies aim to re-conceptualise agency and practice. 
Critical Security Studies views non-state actors, in particular, social 
movements and intellectuals as potential agents for change. This echoes 
feminist approaches that have emphasised the role of women's agency and 
maintained that 'women must act in the provision of their own security' if they are 
to make a change in a world where their security needs and concerns are 
marginalized. 65 This is not necessarily wishful thinking on the part of a few 
academics; on the contrary, practice indicates that peoples (as individuals and 
social groups) have taken certain aspects of their own and others' security into 
their own hands. 66 Three successful examples from the Cold War era-the 
64 Mark Hoffman, 'Agency, Identity and Intervention, ' in Political Theory. International Relations. 
and the Ethics of Intervention, eds. Mark Hoffman and Ian Forbes (London: Macmillan, 1993) 
194-211; R. B. J. Walker, 'Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of 
Contemporary Political Practice, ' in Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community, 
eds. R. B. J. Walker and Saul Mendlowitz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990) 159-85; Wyn 
Jones, 'Message in a Bottle'; idem, Security. Strategy and Critical Theory; Cox, 'Social Forces, 
States and World Orders'; idem, 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an 
Alternative World Order, ' Review of International Studies 25: 1 (1999) 3-28. 
65 Tickner, 'You Just Don't Understand, ' 624. Also see Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and 
International Relations in a Postmodern Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
66 Pearl-Alice Marsh, 'Grassroots Statecraft and Citizens' Challenges to U. S. National Security 
Policy, ' in On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 
130-5; Turner, 'Global Civil Society, Anarchy and Governance. ' 
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Nestle boycott, the anti-apartheid campaign for South Africa and the campaign 
against nuclear missile deployments in Europe-are often viewed as having 
inspired the social movements of the post-Cold War era. 67 Christine Sylvester 
has also pointed to the examples of the Greenham Common Peace Camp in 
Britain (1980-9) and women's producer cooperatives in Harare, Zimbabwe (1988- 
90) to show how women have intervened to enhance their own and others' 
security. 68 These are excellent examples of how a broader conception of security 
needs to be coupled with a broader conception of agency. 
It should be noted here that the call of Critical Security Studies for looking 
at the agency of non-state actors should not be viewed as allocating tasks to 
preconceived agents. Rather, Critical Security Studies aims to empower non- 
state actors (who may or may not be aware of their own potential to make a 
change) to constitute themselves as agents of security to meet this broadened 
agenda. Nor should it be taken to suggest that all non-state actors' practices are 
emancipatory. As the thesis will show, Middle Eastern history is replete with 
examples of non-state actors resorting to violence and/or adopting zero sum 
practices in the attempt to capture state power. In fact, it is often such violent 
practices of non-state actors (that is, terrorism or assassination of political 
leaders) that are mentioned in security analyses. Such examples also serve to 
remind us that there clearly are problems involved in an unthinking reliance on 
non-state actors as agents of security or an uncritical adoption of their agendas. 
Nevertheless, the fact that not all non-state actors are fit to take up the role of 
67 George A. Lopez, Jackie G. Smith and Ron Pagnucco, 'The Global Tide, ' in Peace and 
Security: The Next Generation, eds. George A. Lopez and Nancy J. Myers (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) 230-1; Marsh, 'Grassroots Statecraft and Citizens' Challenges to 
U. S. National Security Policy. ' 
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serving as agents of emancipatory change should not lead one to downplay the 
significant work some have done in the past, and could do in the future. After all, 
not all states serve as providers of security; yet Security Studies continues to rely 
on their agency. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was ground-clearing. It sought to introduce a Critical 
Security Studies perspective, which will then be utilised to critique Cold War and 
post-Cold War theories and practices of security in Parts I and II. Such 
ground-clearing is considered crucial given the novelty of Critical Security Studies 
and its somewhat contested character. Indeed, as noted in the Introduction, the 
Critical Security Studies perspective introduced here is only one of a variety of 
approaches to Critical Security Studies. What will be referred to as Critical 
Security Studies in the rest of the thesis is the perspective introduced here. 
The chapter discussed seven key concepts and analytical moves central 
to Critical Security Studies and most relevant for the thesis, namely, 'Cold War 
Security Studies, ' 'Broadening Security, ' 'Deepening Security, ' 'Statism, ' 
'Referents for Security, ' 'Re-conceptualising Practice' and 'Re-conceptualising 
Agency. ' It was argued that re-thinking security entails re-conceptualising 
security in both theory and practice by broadening and deepening; looking below 
and beyond states for other referents and agents; and suggesting emancipatory 
practices towards shaping alternative futures. The Critical Security Studies 
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perspective on thinking about the future will be the focus of Chapter 8 where 
issues of constitutive theory, agency and practice will be taken up and further 
developed. 
52 
Part I: Pasts 
Chapter 2: Representations of the Middle East During 
the Cold War 
One of the central arguments put forward in the thesis is that when re- 
thinking regional security from a Critical Security Studies perspective, both 
concepts-'region' and 'security'-should be opened up to investigate the 
relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security. 
Part I of the thesis is devoted to investigating the workings of this relationship 
during the Cold War. Chapter 2 opens the discussion by tracing the trajectory of 
the Middle East from its origins in Britain's security policies during the late 
nineteenth century into the Cold War era when reference to this part of the world 
as the Middle East became 'common sense. ' This is intended as a further 
illustration of the point (also reinforced in Chapter 5) that regions are geopolitical 
inventions that have their roots in the security discourses of their inventors. This 
chapter will argue that the Middle East was invented to help British and later US 
policy-makers to think about and organise action in this part of the world. 
Chapter 2 will also present critiques of the Middle East as the dominant 
representation, and an alternative, that of the 'Arab Regional System. ' 
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The `Cartographic Slipperiness" of the Middle East 
There is an agreement in the literature on the Middle East2 to ascribe the 
invention of the Middle East as a geopolitical concept to Captain Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, US naval officer and author of key works on naval strategy. 3 In an article 
published in The National Review in 1902, Mahan suggested that Britain should 
take up the responsibility of maintaining security in the (Persian) Gulf and its 
coasts-an area that he labelled as the 'Middle East'-so that the route to India 
would be secured and Russia kept in check. 4 However, despite this seemingly 
unanimous agreement in the literature to ascribe the coinage of the term to 
Captain Mahan, the first reference to the Middle East could be found in article 
entitled 'The Problems of the Middle East' by General Sir Thomas Edward 
Gordon published in 1900 in The Nineteenth Century. 5 General Gordon was an 
officer of the British Army who was assigned to India for over four decades and 
his article was written from the perspective of a person who had spent most of his 
life thinking about India's defence. It is not known whether General Gordon 
1 Kären E. Wigen and Martin W. Lewis, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) 71. 
2 See, for example, Roderic H. Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' Foreign Affairs 38 (1960) 
665-75; Marwan R. Buheiry, 'Alfred T. Mahan: Reflections on Sea Power and on the Middle 
East as a Strategic Concept, ' in The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World: 
Studies by Marwan R. Buheirv, ed. Lawrence I. Conrad (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press Inc., 
1989) 157-69; Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East: Regional Dynamics and the 
Superpowers. 1967-91, trans. Clare Krjzl (London: Macmillan, 1993); James Derrick Sidaway, 
'Geopolitics, Geography, and "Terrorism" in the Middle East, ' Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 12 (1994) 357-72; Roger Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle 
East: Money. Power and War, 1902-1922 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Rashid 
Khalidi, 'The "Middle East" as a Framework of Analysis: Re-mapping a Region in the Era of 
Globalisation, ' Comparative Studies of South Asia. Africa and the Middle East xviii: 1 (1998) 74- 
81. 
3 Philip A. Crowl, 'Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian, ' in Makers of Modern Strategy: 
From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986; reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 444-77 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 
a Alfred Thayer Mahan, 'Persian Gulf and International Relations, ' The National Review 
(September 1902) 27-45. 
T. E. Gordon, 'The Problems of the Middle East, ' The Nineteenth Century xlvii: 277 (March 1900) 
413-24. 
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himself coined the term or merely adopted it; he does not offer a definition let 
alone some explanation. Assuming that he would have included a definition had 
he been the inventor, it could be argued that the term's origins go back further. 
However, no earlier reference has yet been found. 6 What is beyond doubt is that 
the geopolitical concept Middle East was invented when thinking about and 
organising action for India's security. Then, the Middle East has its origins, via 
Gordon and Mahan's descriptions, in British policy-makers' conceptions and 
practices of security in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Notwithstanding its origins in the British India office, the term Middle East 
seems to have entered public discourse via Mahan's use in 1902.7 The term took 
off from then onwards but as time progressed, the area so designated shifted 
westwards. During the inter-war period, the discovery of considerable quantities 
of oil in the Arabian peninsula and the increasing pace of Jewish migration into 
Palestine linked these chunks of territory to Mahan's Middle East. During World 
War II, British policy-makers began to use the term with reference to all Asian 
and north African lands to the west of India. No definite boundaries were set to 
the region during this period. In line with changes in British wartime policies 'Iran 
was added in 1942; Eritrea was dropped in September 1941 and welcomed back 
again five months later. i8 Towards the end of World War II the United States got 
involved in the Middle East adopting British wartime definition. These switches 
from one definition to another took place so swiftly that it prompted a well-known 
6 Clayton R. Koppes, 'Captain Mahan, General Gordon, and the Origins of the Term "Middle 
East, "' Middle Eastern Studies 12: 4 (1976) 95-8. 
Sidaway, 'Geopolitics, Geography, and "Terrorism" in the Middle East, ' 357. 
e Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 669. 
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historian of the region, Roderic Davison, to ask in the pages of Foreign Affairs: 
'Where is the Middle East? '9 
Writing in 1960, Davison's concern was with the 'cartographic 
slipperiness' of the Middle East. 10 For, he thought that this lack of a precise 
definition of the region resulted in an ambiguity in US foreign relations in that US 
policy-makers, by way of changing their definition of the region to suit different 
policy purposes, were giving contradictory signals as to where they were 
prepared to act if there need be. For instance, in 1957, when the Eisenhower 
Doctrine was declared, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles defined the Middle 
East as 'the area lying between and including Libya on the west and Pakistan on 
the east and Turkey on the north and the Arabian peninsula to the south' plus the 
Sudan and Ethiopia. 11 Davison noted that Dulles was hesitant to provide a more 
precise definition, for he felt that drawing a 'defence perimeter' could be 
considered as issuing an invitation to Soviet policy-makers to seize anything 
outside that line. One year later, in 1958 when Eisenhower addressed the United 
Nations General Assembly (following the crisis in and intervention into Lebanon 
and the revolution in Iraq), the region had shrunk considerably; now its definition 
covered Egypt, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
sheikhdoms only. Considering the fact that the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 was 
still in practice, this change in the definition of the Middle East further complicated 
the matter. In criticism, Davison argued that although a degree of ambiguity 
could be considered useful for deterrence purposes, it was also 'important to 
9 Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 
10 Wigen and Lewis, The Myth of Continents, 71. 
11 Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 665. 
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know where the United States ... [was] prepared to do something and 
presumably to let other governments to know. '12 
In order to bring an end to this confusion, Davison suggested that the 
term should either be properly defined or abandoned altogether. Without wishing 
to underplay the significance of Davison's concerns regarding the pitfalls of 
ambiguity in policy-making, it should nevertheless be noted that such 
'cartographic slipperiness' is not isolated to the Middle East. There exist 
contending definitions of Central Europe as well, as Timothy Garton Ash 
explained in an aptly titled article: 'The Puzzle of Central Europe. '13 The point 
here is that the presence of multiple definitions of regions such as the Middle 
East and Central Europe stem from the fact that they are geopolitical inventions 
rooted in the security thinking and practices of their inventors. As these 
conceptions and practices change, the definitions of these regions also change. 
For instance, during the first half of the twentieth century, the area represented as 
the Middle East shifted in tandem with the changes in British security conceptions 
and practices (this will be explained in further detail in the next section). Contra 
Davison, therefore, there is nothing unusual about the 'cartographic slipperiness' 
of the Middle East. 
It could further be argued that coming to an agreement on a more precise 
definition of the Middle East, although useful for policy purposes, would bring a 
premature end to a potentially fruitful discussion on the reasons behind the 
coinage of the Middle East as a term and its adoption to represent the landmass 
12 Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 675. 
13 Timothy Garton Ash, The Puzzle of Central Europe, ' New York Review of Books, 18 March 
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to the south-west of Asia and the north of Africa as a 'region. ' The key point is 
that questions such as 'why the lands to the south-west of Asia and north of 
Africa were lumped together to constitute a region? ' and 'why "Middle East" but 
not, for instance, "Southwest Asia and North Africa" was adopted to represent 
this part of the world? ' could be answered only by looking at the security thinking 
and practices of Western policy-makers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. Whilst accepting Davison's argument that it may be necessary for 
practical purposes to adopt a common and more precise definition of the Middle 
East, it will be argued that it is also imperative to raise one's awareness of the 
region's character as a geopolitical invention in order to understand how the 
region has developed in the past and could change in the future (this theme will 
be elaborated upon in the final section of this chapter). 
The argument so far should not be taken to suggest that it was solely the 
military strategic interests of Western powers that have been the driving force 
behind the production of such geopolitical concepts. Throughout history, all 
societies have produced their own representations of the world. The term 
'Maghreb' (meaning 'the West' in Arabic) has its origins in the geopolitics of an 
earlier era, that of the first waves of Arab invaders who came to the north of 
Africa in the seventh and eighth centuries. 14 However, not all societies have 
been able to impose their maps onto others. This is where relative endowment of 
material resources comes into play in deciding whose discourse emerges as the 
dominant one. To put it in other words, the reason why the lands to the 
southwest of Asia and north of Africa have been lumped together in the mind's 
1999,19-23. 
14 Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: 
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eye and labelled the Middle East has its roots not merely in the strategic interests 
of Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but also in Britain's 
material and representational power. 
It is not only the relative endowment of material resources of rival powers 
but also the changes in communications and transportation technologies that 
have had an impact on the way geographical categories are invented and 
adjusted. During the nineteenth and twentieth century, as the military strategic 
interests and capabilities of the major geopolitical actors changed (such as the 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the Royal Navy's switch from coal to oil in 
1912) the Middle East shifted in tandem with these changes (see the next two 
sections). Indeed, technological, economic as well as political changes alter the 
way actors 'see' the world thereby helping shape their practices. For instance, 
the idea of Europe began to take firmer root in the minds of people living in this 
part of the world with the 'discovery' of other continents in general and America in 
particular. 15 Likewise, it became possible for peoples to begin thinking and acting 
globally only after they were able to imagine the world they lived in as a globe- 
thanks to the developments in astronomy and geographical discoveries. 16 
Having noted the way spatial representations are shaped by the theories 
and practices of security adopted by their inventors, the following sections will 
seek to further illustrate this process. The next section will provide a brief history 
of the evolution of the dominant representation-the Middle East-until the 
Prentice Hall, 1989) 3. 
15 Jacques Attali, 1492,2"d ed., trans. Mehmet Ali Kiligbay (Ankara: Imge Yayinlari, 1999) esp. 
pp. 15-136. Also see Denys Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, rev. ed. (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1968). 
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beginning of the Cold War. The third section will trace its development during the 
Cold War era. Finally, the chapter will look at the critiques of the Middle East and 
the alternative representations that emerged during this period. 
The Middle East as a Geopolitical Invention 
Notwithstanding its origins in the British India Office, the term Middle East, as 
made clear in the previous section, entered public discourse via Mahan's use in 
1902.17 Mahan had made his reputation with The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History, 1660-1783, published in 1890. He had soon become a public figure 
sought out by magazine editors for articles on naval affairs and strategy. 18 In this 
article entitled 'The Persian Gulf and International Relations' Mahan called for 
Britain to take up the responsibility of maintaining security in the Gulf in order to 
secure the route to India and hold Russia in check. He wrote: 
The Middle East, if I may adopt a term which I have not seen, will 
some day need its Malta as well as its Gibraltar; it does not follow 
that either be in the Gulf. Naval force has the quality of mobility 
which carries with it the privilege of temporary absences; but it 
needs to find on every scene of operation established bases of 
refit, of supply, and, in cases of disaster, of security. The British 
Navy should have the facility to concentrate in force, if occasion 
arise, about Aden, India, and the Gulf. 19 
Mahan had used the term Middle East to refer to the (Persian) Gulf and its 
coasts. It was Valentine Chirol, head of the foreign department of the Times 
(London), who adopted and popularised the term by using it in a series of twenty 
16 John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics (London: Routledge, 1998). 
" Sidaway, 'Geopolitics, Geography, and "Terrorism" in the Middle East, ' 357. 
18 Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 667. 
19 Mahan, 'The Persian Gulf and International Relations, ' 39. According to Koppes, Mahan had 
very little knowledge of the affairs of this part of the world and had to be persuaded by the editor 
of The National Review to write this piece. See Koppes, 'Captain Mahan, General Gordon, ' 95. 
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articles entitled 'The Middle Eastern Question' (1902-03). 20 Chirol's Middle East 
represented an area larger than the one conceived by Mahan. This new 
definition included not only the Gulf and its coasts (Mahan's Middle East) but all 
land as well as sea approaches to India. 21 In this way Chirol adopted the term 
invented by Mahan but changed the area designated as the Middle East. 
Mahan's Middle East was essentially a naval concept; Chirol's definition, on the 
other hand, was drawn up to call for the maintenance of the security of all land 
and sea approaches to India. This was to become the first of the many changes 
in the definition of the Middle East. 
By the time the Times finished publishing Chirol's articles in 1903, it had 
ceased to place Middle East in quotation marks. 22 However, although the term 
Middle East gradually became common sense from then onwards, the definition 
of the region changed in tandem with the security thinking and practices of British 
policy-makers. One thing that remained constant throughout this period was that 
the Middle East as a region was tied to the defence of India. 
In the aftermath of World War I, the definition of the region changed due 
to the expansion of the British Empire and the incorporation of the former 
Ottoman territories of Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq. In 1921, the Colonial 
Secretary Winston Churchill set up a Middle Eastern Department in the Foreign 
Office to supervise Palestine, Jordan and Iraq. The reasoning behind this 
westwards shift was that these chunks of territory had become linked, in the 
20 Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 667-8. 
21 Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East, 24. 
22 Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East, 26. 
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minds of British policy-makers, to the defence of India. 23 Moreover, another 
factor, that of oil had also entered the picture. By 1912, oil had begun to replace 
coal in the British Navy, and British policy-makers were anxious to find 
'dependable sources of oil. '24 Although the significance of the oil reserves in this 
part of the world were still to be discovered, and notwithstanding the fact that the 
United States still supplied about 80 percent of British demand for oil at this 
stage, the politics of oil was not totally absent from British policy-makers' 
calculations. 25 
However, this broad definition of the region adopted by Churchill failed to 
win broader approval either in Britain or in the United States for a long time. At 
this stage, US policy-makers' interest in the region was still peripheral (despite 
the increasing pace of Jewish migration into Palestine). Officially, they preferred 
to adhere to an earlier term, the Near East (the definition of which included 
former Ottoman territories in the Balkans, Africa and Asia Minor, the Arabian 
peninsula and most of Iran). The Mediterranean was also used to represent this 
part of the world in US strategic discourse well until the end of World War 11.26 
During the inter-war period, Middle Eastern (and to a certain extent European) 
affairs constituted peripheral interests for an isolationist United States. 
Knowledge of the region as studied in the universities or disseminated in the 
23 Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 668; Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle 
East, 26. 
24 Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East, 97-100. 
25 Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East. 1914-1971, rev. ed. (London: Chatto 
and Windus, 1981) 95-115. 
26 See, for example, William Reitzel, The Mediterranean: Its Role in America's Foreign Policy 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1948) esp. pp. 94-101. 
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media depended largely on travellers' accounts and the information provided by 
their continental counterparts. 27 
In Britain as in France, Germany and the Netherlands, there has been a 
tradition of studying the East, or the 'Orient. ' The study of and accounts on the 
'Orient' and imperial policy-making had a symbiotic relationship, as portrayed by 
Edward Said in Orientalism. 28 The study of lands far away was funded by either 
governments or private entrepreneurs who had business interests in these lands. 
For instance, the University of London's School of Oriental Studies (which later 
became the School of Oriental and African Studies) was founded in 1917 for the 
study of Asian and African languages in order to meet the needs of an expanding 
empire. Until then, 'Oriental Studies' was offered in the universities of London, 
Oxford and Cambridge, among others, but these programmes mainly focused on 
the study of ancient texts rather than the study of contemporary languages, the 
knowledge of which was becoming increasingly necessary to maintain the British 
presence in the East. 29 
In sum, it was not solely British policy-makers but also students of the 
East (including members of the Royal Geographical Society) as well as other 
opinion-makers who helped invent and establish the Middle East in the minds of 
British public. The role played by Chirol (and the Times) has already been noted. 
The Royal Geographical Society, for its part, decided in the early 1920s that, 
27 Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978; reprint, London: Penguin, 1995) 290. 
28 Said, Orientalism. 
29 The School opened one year after the conclusion of the Sykes-Picot agreement between 
Britain and France partitioning the former Ottoman territories in the Middle East. See Adelson, 
London and the Invention of the Middle East, 62. On the Sykes-Picot agreement, see Monroe, 
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`henceforth the Near East should denote only the Balkans; the lands from the 
Bosphorus to the eastern frontiers of India would be named the Middle East. '30 
With this definition Turkey was being moved from its earlier position in the Near 
East into an expanding Middle East. 
In the late 1920s another British institution, the Royal Air Force, created 
its own Middle East comprising Egypt, the Sudan, and Kenya. During the late 
1930s, with the crisis in Europe looming on the horizon, it was decided that in the 
case of a war breaking up, the Middle East Air Command should cover not only 
the aforementioned territories in Africa, but also Palestine, Jordan and Iraq (that 
were included in Churchill's Middle East) as well as Aden and Malta. The British 
Army followed suit in 1939 by consolidating the heretofore separate commands of 
Egypt, the Sudan and Palestine-Jordan, whilst adding Cyprus, Iraq, Aden, British 
Somaliland and the Persian Gulf. General Archibald Percival Wavell was sent to 
Cairo to take up the post of Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. With the outbreak 
of the war, especially the fall of France and Italy's entry into the war, the Middle 
East Command became a significant part of the war effort, thereby contributing to 
the Middle East as a term and as a region becoming common sense. As the 
German expansion continued, the Middle East Command stretched to cover 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Libya, Greece and Crete as wel1.31 
Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 32-7. 
3o Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 668. On the role played by some members of the Royal 
Geographical Society during WWI, see Michael Heffernan, 'Geography, Cartography and 
Military Intelligence: The Royal Geographical Society and the First World War, ' Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers 21: 3 (1996) 504-33. 
31 Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 669. 
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During the War, the allies established a Middle East Supply Centre based 
in Cairo and Britain created the post of Minister of State for the Middle East. The 
areas over which the Centre and the Minister had control over were not the 
same, `but in general they stretched from Malta to Iran and from Syria to 
Ethiopia, ' noted Roderic Davison. 32 This broadest yet definition of the Middle 
East largely corresponded with the early definitions of the Near East (with the 
exception of Turkey, which was not yet a party to the War). 
The War helped further reinforce the term Middle East as a 
representation of this part of the world. By the end of the 1950s, the term Middle 
East had replaced Near East in British official documents. 33 At this stage, the 
area represented as the Middle East had changed to the extent that Mahan 
would not have recognised it. Notwithstanding these changes in its definition, 
and the shift in its centre of gravity from India to Cairo, the Middle East of World 
War II Britain, like Mahan and Chirol's Middle Easts before that, remained a 
geopolitical concept imposed from outside in line with external actors' thinking 
and practices of security. 
However, although the Middle East as a spatial representation had yet to 
enter peoples' consciousness within the region itself, the lumping together of 
these chunks of territory under the Middle East Command during World War II 
made a significant material impact. The establishment of the Middle East Supply 
Centre to supervise the flow of goods within the region to compensate for the 
break-up of the communication and transportation links with Europe during the 
32 Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 669. 
13 Ritchie Ovendale, The Middle East Since 1914,2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1998) 320. 
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War, helped re-institute the intra-regional trade links that had been interrupted 
during the colonial period. These links were once again to be broken at the end 
of the War, but the inter-personal and inter-institutional relations that were 
established especially among Arab actors during this period contributed to the 
development of Arabism and the spatial representation Arab Regional System in 
the years to come. 
Middle Easts During the Cold War 
Towards the end of World War II, the United States, alongside Great Britain, got 
more closely involved in the Middle East. During the War the Middle East had 
become a part of the public discourse in the United States largely due to the US 
press that adopted the British wartime definition. Although the Department of 
State continued to operate with an Office of Near Eastern Affairs, some US 
policy-makers had already begun to make references to the Middle East. In 
1957, when the Eisenhower Doctrine was declared promising to provide US 
military and economic aid to the states in 'the general area of the Middle East, ' 
the Department of State still did not officially use the term in its organisational 
structure. 35 
As noted in the previous section, during Congressional meetings on the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, in response to a question on the definition of the Middle 
34 Roger Owen, 'Inter-Arab Economic Relations During the Twentieth Century: World Markets vs. 
Regional Market? ' in The Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab 
Integration, ed. Michael C. Hudson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 217-32. 
35 Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 666-9. 
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East, Secretary of State Dulles provided a broad definition that stretched from 
Libya to Pakistan and from Turkey to the Arabian peninsula including the Sudan 
and Ethiopia. One year later the definition provided by the Department of State 
designated a much more restricted area (covering Egypt, Syria, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms). This, in turn, created an 
ambiguity as to where the United States was prepared to act when putting the 
Eisenhower Doctrine into practice. Further complicating the matter was the 
definition adopted by the newly created (1958) 'Aegean and Middle East Division' 
of the Office of Research, US Department of State. This definition covered 
Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan only. 36 
These three different definitions adopted and used by actors working for 
the same government (who presumably functioned with similar conceptions of 
regional security) could be explained with the confusion of a transitory era where 
some still used the Near East as a representation (such as the Department of 
State) whereas others adopted the Middle East to designate either the same area 
(as did the Secretary of State Dulles) or a more narrow one (as with the Office of 
Research). Although the use of such significantly different definitions might have 
been a deliberate tactic adopted by US policy-makers to create ambiguity in the 
minds of their Soviet counterparts as to where they were prepared to act, the 
multiplicity of Middle Easts seemed to reflect more confusion than resolve. 
During World War II, oil had become a more significant factor in both US 
and British policy-makers' calculations regarding the Middle East, but there were 
36 Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 666. 
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considerable differences between the stress placed upon it by the policy-makers 
of Britain and the United States. Although the politics of oil was not totally absent 
from British security practices, US interest in the region surpassed that of Britain 
by the end of the War. 37 In the beginning of the twentieth century US production 
not only met its own consumption but provided above 80 percent of what Britain 
needed as well. At that stage, the United States still produced 140 times more oil 
than did Iran (where the first discovery of oil was made). 38 This was to change 
during the inter-war period when major quantities of oil were discovered in Iran 
and the Arabian peninsula, and US oil-production companies began to take over 
from British firms in the region. By the 1950s, the reserves of Saudi Arabia alone 
had overtaken that of the United States39 and ARAMCO (Arab-American Oil 
Company) had replaced British companies in many Arab countries. US policy- 
makers' interest in the region during this period had less to do with its domestic 
needs than the needs of its Western European allies. For, during the 1950s it 
had become clear that the United States did not have enough reserves to 'oil 
another war beyond a year or two, if need be. 40 As Britain began to withdraw 
from the region and British oil-production companies started to be replaced by 
their US counterparts, US interest in this part of the world expanded. 
The formation of Israel in what once was Palestine also helped increase 
US policy-makers' as well as peoples' interest in the Middle East. It was in such 
a climate of rising interest in world affairs in general and that of the Middle East in 
37 Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 95-115. 
38 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East. 1914-1922 
(London: Andre Deutsch, 1989) 29. 
39 George Philip, The Political Economy of International Oil (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1994) 68. 
40 Quoted in Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington, DC: 
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particular that Area Studies was established in the United States. In the US the 
study of foreign cultures and societies remained, until the 1940s, an intellectual 
enterprise pursued largely by 'amateur enthusiasts. '41 During the War the US 
Army had set up a school of languages to meet the needs of the war effort. The 
framework created for these schools was later adopted by the Social Sciences 
Research Council when founding Area Studies 42 In the 1950s half a dozen Area 
Studies associations were created with the help of government funding. The 
Middle East Institute was founded in 1946 under the aegis of the US 
government. 43 Out of that grew the Middle East Studies Association, established 
in 1966. The first academic programme was opened at Princeton in 1947 (under 
the title 'Near Eastern Studies') with support and encouragement from the 
government as well as private sources (such as the Ford Foundation)44 
The point here is that since US intellectual circles did not have much 
experience of direct contact with the region, when Middle East Studies began to 
flourish during the 1950s, students of Area Studies, with no historical legacy to 
draw upon, allowed their research to be shaped directly by the interests of their 
funding institutions and governmental agencies that had Cold War concerns on 
top of their agenda 45 The Cold War origins of Middle East Studies in the United 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991) 47. 
41 Robert A. McCaughey, International Studies as an Academic Enterprise: A Chapter in the 
Enclosure of American Learning (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) 34. 
42 Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies, ' in The Cold 
War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years, Noam Chomsky et 
al. (New York: The New Press, 1997) 195-231. 
as Said, Orientalism, 295. 
as Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, 'Middle Eastern Studies in the United States, ' in 
Middle East Studies: International Perspectives on the State of the Art, ed. Tareq Y. Ismael 
(New York: Praeger, 1990) 3. 
as Judith Tucker, 'Middle East Studies in the United States: The Coming Decade, ' in The Next 
Arab Decade: Alternative Futures, ed. Hisham Sharabi. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988) 
312-21. Also see, Said, Orientalism, 301-2; Lisa Anderson, 'Policy-making and Theory-building: 
American Political Science and the Islamic Middle East, ' in Theory. Politics and the Arab World: 
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States distinguished it from British and French approaches to the region. 
Although the concerns of their respective governments and business interests did 
shape the studies of British and French scholars to some extent, they also 
retained their literary, philological and religious-text oriented approaches to the 
study of the East. The US area experts, with limited pre-Cold War experience or 
knowledge to draw upon, concentrated on language (that is, the use of 
contemporary languages) and technical knowledge as instruments of influence 
and control. 46 As a result, to quote Edward Said, students of the Middle East in 
the United States tended to reduce the region to "'attitudes, " "trends, " statistics: in 
short, dehumanized. 947 
Although other disciplines such as Latin American Studies were also 
influenced by Cold War concerns, the presence of Israel in this particular region 
and the influential role played by the Jewish lobby in the society in general and 
the US Congress in particular introduced a uniqueness to Middle Eastern Studies 
in that it ended up being more policy-driven than some other disciplines in which 
there seemed to be relatively little public interest. Soviet Studies in the United 
States was perhaps the only other discipline shaped mostly by policy concerns. 48 
As a result, when, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Latin American, East 
Asian and African Studies were undergoing a critical phase reflecting upon their 
Cold War origins, Middle Eastern Studies remained, to quote Judith Tucker, the 
'Rip Van Winkle' of the Area Studies scene. 9 This, however, is not to suggest 
Critical Responses, ed. Hisham Sharabi (New York: Routledge, 1990) 52-80. 
46 Said, Orientalism, 288- 93. 
47 Said, Orientalism, 291. 
48 See Wallerstein, 'The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies, ' 195-231 for an 
overview. 
49 Tucker, 'Middle East Studies in the United States, ' 312-13. 
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that there was no self-reflection and criticism by students of the Middle East. 
Indeed, some of the challenges brought against the representation of this part of 
the word as the Middle East came from within the discipline itself. The next 
section will present the criticisms of and the alternatives provided to replace it. 
`Is There a Middle East? '50 
The question heading this section was put by a well-known student of Iran, the 
anthropologist Nikki Keddie, in an article published in the International Journal of 
Middle East Studies in 1973.51 By asking this question, she went one step further 
than Davison (who had asked where the Middle East was) and challenged the 
existence of a region called the Middle East. Following an analysis of the factors 
that worked for and against making the Middle East a 'real historical entity 952 
Keddie concluded that 
what probably keeps the strange term 'Middle East' (What is 
Morocco supposed to be in the middle of? ) alive today is the 
cumbersomeness of any more scientific designation thought of 
thus far. 53 
The 'cumbersome' designation Keddie had in mind was 'South West Asia and 
North Africa' (SWANA). One could add Marshall Hodgson's 'Nile to Oxus' to the 
short list of such alternatives. 54 
50 Nikki R. Keddie, 'Is There a Middle East? ' International Journal of Middle East Studies 4 (1973) 
255-71. 
51 It is interesting to note that US-based journals and institutions mostly use the Middle East in 
their titles: Middle East Journal, International Journal of Middle East Studies, and Middle East 
Polic . Those with a more critical perspective, 
however, have opted for titles such as the Arab 
Studies Journal, Arab Studies Quarterly, and The Journal of Palestine Studies. An exception is 
the Middle East Report (published by MERIP [Middle East Research and Information Project]) 
which remains critical. 
52 Keddie, 'Is There a Middle East? ' 257. 
53 Keddie, 'Is There a Middle East? ' 267. 
54 Marhsall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, vol. I 
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Keddie's critique could be summed up in two main points. First, the term 
Middle East is Eurocentric and has its origins in Western strategy. Second, the 
region is not a 'real historical entity, ' and there are relatively little number of 
common characteristics that could be used to view this group of states together 
as a region. 
Without wishing to downplay Keddie's criticism regarding the Western 
strategic origins of the term, it should be noted that this is not a phenomenon 
unique to the Middle East. For, throughout history, the naming of land has often 
implied control of that land. 55 Colonial powers in the Middle East and Africa as 
well as the settlers in the Americas and Australia mapped the areas they set foot 
on; invented places when naming them engaging in acts of 'imaginative 
geography'; 56 and then wrote histories of these lands rendering authority to the 
new names and constructs that were instituted often in neglect of what they 
replaced. Ghana, for instance, was known as the 'Gold Coast' until its 
independence. The people of Guinea, on the other hand, chose to retain the 
name, which is another 'colonial relic. 47 Latin America was called 'Latin' by 
France as a colonial power to emphasise the notion of a 'Latin' character linking 
France with Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking south American peoples in the 
attempt to outdo its (non-Latin) rivals in the competition for colonies in the south 
of The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974) 60. 
55 Keith W. Whitelam, The Invention of Ancient Israel: The Silencing of Palestinian History 
(London: Routledge, 1996) 40. 
56 Said, Orientalism, 49. 
57 Amir Taheri, The Cauldron: The Middle East Behind the Headlines (London: Hutchinson, 1988) 
2. 
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of America. 58 Furthermore, peoples of the Middle East have once been at the 
other (not receiving but giving) end of this relationship. As noted above, the term 
'Maghreb' was coined by Arab invaders of the north of Africa in the seventh and 
eighth centuries and is therefore vulnerable to a similar set of criticisms. The 
Middle East, in this sense, is no exception; it is just another representation (like 
Maghreb) which has its origins in the security thinking and practices of external 
actors. 
Neither should the Eurocentric character of the term Middle East 
constitute a sufficient reason to do away with it. It is true, as some critics note, 
that the Middle East could be viewed as being in the middle only in terms of 
latitude; viewed in terms of longitude part of the region lies to the west of 
Greenwich. Moreover, viewed from India, for instance, the region could be 
regarded as in the middle west. Indeed there has been an attempt in India to 
adopt 'Western Asia' to replace the term Middle East. 59 The problem with this 
alternative is that-as Bernard Lewis, another well-known student of the Middle 
East noted-'it is no less misleading to view the region as the west of an entity 
called Asia than as the Middle East of another unspecified entity. i60 The 
ambiguous character of the lines dividing continental Europe from Asia further 
reinforces Lewis' argument. 61 
58 Wigen and Lewis, The Myth of Continents, 181. 
59 Davison, 'Where is the Middle East? ' 675. 
60 Bernard Lewis, The Shaping of the Modern Middle East, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994) 4. 
Hay, Europe, xvi. For an account questioning the representation of Europe as a 'continent', see 
Wigen and Lewis, The Mvth of Continents, 35-8. 
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Thus, Keddie's first set of criticisms regarding its Eurocentric character 
and Western strategic origins is not unique to the Middle East. Throughout the 
history the naming of land has always been done by some people who at the time 
were in a position to exercise power over the land and its peoples. In this sense, 
the answer to the question set in the beginning of the chapter, namely 'why 
"Middle East" but not, for instance, "Southwest Asia and North Africa" was 
adopted to refer to this part of the world? ' is power-be it military, economic or 
representational. Edward Said's Orientalism is an exceptional account of the 
workings of the unequal relationship between Western colonial powers and 
peoples of the Middle East during the nineteenth and twentieth century and how 
this manifested itself in the production of knowledge about this part of the world 
which, in turn, helped keep the distance and further reinforce the inequality 
between the two. 62 In sum, the reason why the lands to the south-west of Asia 
and north of Africa have been lumped together in the mind's eye and labelled as 
the Middle East has its roots not merely in the strategic interests of Britain in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but also in Britain's material and 
representational power. 
The second set of criticisms advanced by Keddie arguing that the Middle 
East is not a 'real historical entity' and that there are relatively few common 
characteristics linking this group of states together as a 'region' is more difficult to 
dismiss. Leaving aside the problematic character of Keddie's use of the phrase 
'real historical entity' (there are very few if any 'real historical entities' as such; 
what makes constructs seem 'real' is the myths created through the stories 
62 See Said, Orientalism. 
75 
people tell themselves)63 it should be noted that her second point goes to the 
heart of the other question set in the beginning of the chapter that asked 'why the 
lands to the south-west of Asia and north of Africa were lumped together to 
constitute a region? ' Keddie maintained that the answer could not be found in 
historical experience or religion. For, although the area roughly corresponds to 
the three largest Muslim empires-those of the Umayyads, the Abbasids and the 
Ottomans-as Keddie noted, 'for pre-Islamic times the Middle East as defined by 
its current borders has no meaning. '6' 
The point here is that the reason why the answer to this question cannot 
be found in historical experience or religion is necessarily because the origins of 
the region lie in the security thinking and practices of actors external to the 
region. The Middle East was invented because it served as a convenient 
geopolitical concept to help British (and later US) strategists think about and 
organise action in this part of the world-not because General Gordon or Captain 
Mahan thought this part of the world shared a history and culture and therefore 
constituted a region. If, to paraphrase Robert Cox, 65 all regions are for someone 
and for some purpose, the Middle East, for most of the nineteenth and twentieth 
century, has been for Western strategists and has served their purposes. When, 
in the late 1960s, Soviet policy-makers re-conceptualised their approach to Arab 
countries within the framework of 'collective security in Asia' it was still the military 
63 See, for example, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence O. 
Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983; 
reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
64 Keddie, 'Is There a Middle East? ' 257. 
61 Cox's formulation is'all theories are for someone and for some purpose. ' See Robert Cox, 
'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, ' Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 10: 2 (Summer 1981) 182. 
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strategic interests of an external actor that was behind this representation, it was 
still an outward directed conception of security adopted to secure 'Asia. P66 
In one sense, then, dwelling upon the Eurocentric character of the term 
Middle East, or the lack of shared characteristics that make it a region is a rather 
futile exercise. Such criticism misses the point. It hardly matters if the region is 
called the Middle East or 'Southwest Asia and North Africa. ' For, the latter term 
also represents the same part of the world; the strategic purposes behind viewing 
this group of states together as a region is still there. The argument that the latter 
is devoid of any Western strategic background and therefore constitutes a 
development upon the former also does not hold water when one considers the 
fact that continents such as Asia, Africa and Europe are also constructs; they 
were invented by someone and for some purpose as Kären Wigen and Martin 
Lewis demonstrate in their aptly titled book, The Myth of Continents. 67 
If the reasoning behind viewing this group of states together and 
presenting them as a region called the Middle East is not indigenously generated 
but invented by actors outside the region, adopting a new label to represent the 
same area would not constitute too much of an improvement. This, however, 
should not be taken to suggest that there is no need to question the origins of the 
Middle East. Rather it is to argue that while doing this, one should go beyond 
simply stating the 'obvious' (i. e. that the Middle East is a geopolitical invention 
ss Ian Clark, 'Collective Security in Asia: Towards a Framework for Soviet Diplomacy, ' The Round 
Table (October 1973) 473-81; Ken Booth and Lee Dowdy, 'Soviet Security Interests in the 
Indian Ocean Region, ' in Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, ed. David R. Jones, 6 (1982) 
342. 
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rooted in British colonialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century) 
and question the reasoning behind the invention of such a region. 
Keddie was not alone in questioning the existence of a region called the 
Middle East. 68 In 1978 Mohammed Heikal, editor of Egyptian daily AI-Ahram and 
one-time advisor to President Nasser, gave voice to such concerns. To put it in a 
nutshell, Heikal's argument was that the representation of this part of the world as 
the Middle East marginalized Arab peoples living in these lands. 69 Instead, 
Heikal opted for another representation, 'Arab System' which was based, he 
maintained, on the unity of religion, history and culture. According to Bahgat 
Korany, Heikal's words exemplified the mood of the time in the Arab world where 
many refused to be 'reduced 970 to become a part of a 'hinterland laying between 
Europe and Asia, a mere geographical expansion. 971 The Arab System, 
submitted Heikal, could be better conceived as 'one nation having common 
interests and security priorities distinct from those of the West. '72 
One year later, two Egyptian authors, All Eddin Hillal Dessouki and Jamil 
Matar put forward a thesis similar to Heikal's when they introduced the 
representation `Arab Regional System' to replace that of the Middle East, in their 
68 See, for example, A. E. H. Dessouki and Jamil Matar, The Arab Regional System: An 
Examination of Inter-Arab Political Relations [in Arabic] (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 
1979) summarised in F. Gregory Gause III, 'Systemic Approaches to Middle East International 
Relations, ' International Studies Journal 1: 1 (1999) 11-31; Abdel Monem Said Aly Abdel Aal, 
The Superpowers and Regional Security in the Middle East, ' in Regional Security in the Third 
World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and the Middle East, ed. Mohammed Ayoob (London: 
Croom Helm, 1986) 197-8. 
69 Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, 'Egyptian Foreign Policy, ' Foreign Affairs 56 (July 1978) 712-27. 
70 Baghat Korany, 'The Old/New Middle East, ' in The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics 
and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation, ed. Laura Guazzone (London: 
Macmillan, 1997) 139. 
71 Heikal, 'Egyptian Foreign Policy, ' 719. 
72 Heikal, 'Egyptian Foreign Policy, ' 719. 
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`standard and widely read' Arabic work entitled The Arab Regional System: An 
Examination of Inter-Arab Political Relations. 73 Originally published in 1979, the 
book was reprinted twice in 1980 and 1983 and has since become a `popular' 
textbook in Arab universities. 74 The following quotation represents the core of 
their argument: 
(1)the term Middle East does not refer to a geographical area but 
rather it represents a political term in its creation and usage; 
(2)the term is not derived from the nature of the area or its 
political, cultural, civilizational and demographic characteristics; 
for when we use the term 'Middle' we have to ask 'middle' in 
reference to what?; (3)the term tears up the Arab homeland as a 
distinct unit since it has always included non-Arab states. 75 
The first two points made by Dessouki and Matar echoed Keddie's critique, but 
the third point went one step further and challenged the reasoning behind the 
representation of the Middle East as a region. Elaborating upon this latter point, 
Dessouki and Matar maintained that the reasoning behind Western usage of the 
term Middle East was to portray the region as an ethnic mosaic thereby 
weakening the cause for Arab nationalism and discrediting the calls for Arab 
unity. The spatial representation Arab Regional System could have served 
better, argued Dessouki and Matar, as a key for the analysis of 'interactions 
among Arab states, with their neighbours and with the international system at 
large. '76 In other words, by proposing an alternative, Dessouki and Matar 
challenged not only the colonial origins or Eurocentric character of the Middle 
73 For useful summaries, see Gause, 'Systemic Approaches to Middle East International 
Relations, ' 13-17; Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East, 47-8; Abdel Aal, 'The Superpowers 
and Regional Security in the Middle East, ' 197-9; Abdel Monem Said Aly, 'The Shattered 
Consensus-Arab Perceptions of Security, ' The International Spectator xxxi: 4 (October- 
December 1996) 26-8. 
74 Gause, 'Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations, ' 13. 
75 Abdel Aal, 'Superpowers and Regional Security in the Middle East, ' 197-8. 
76 Dessouki and Matar included all members of the Arab League when drawing their mental map 
of the'Arab Regional System, ' namely: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, PLO, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates. 
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East, but the conception of security behind lumping this part of the world together 
to constitute a region. 
It should be noted that there existed other terms, before Dessouki and 
Matar coined the term Arab Regional System, to represent the lands where Arab 
peoples have historically lived. 'Arabian peninsula' and 'Arab homeland' had 
been widely used to refer to these lands that stretched from the Gulf in the east to 
the Atlantic Ocean in the west. What distinguished the spatial representation 
Arab Regional System from these others was the fact that the former was rooted 
in a state-centric perspective whereas the latter predated the independence of 
Arab states and the emergence of the Arab state system, and were therefore 
reminiscent of an earlier era (when Arab peoples were not divided into states) or 
a future dream (that of Arab unification) . 
77 In short, the Arab Regional System as 
a representation not only emphasised the Arab character of this part of the world 
thereby de-legitimising the roles played by non-Arab actors (such as Britain, the 
United States, Iran, Israel and Turkey) but was also state-centric. 
Adopting the Arab Regional System to replace the Middle East could be 
considered to have one advantage; it is an indigenously generated 
representation-not'a euphemism for secure spheres of influence for any outside 
power, ' to use the words of Dessouki and Matar. 78 However it still is not an 
improvement over the Middle East. For one thing, it does to non-Arab peoples of 
77 See Paul Noble, 'The Arab System: Pressures, Constraints, and Opportunities, ' in The Foreign 
Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, eds. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal 
Dessouki (Boulder: Westview, 1984) 49-102; Yezid Sayigh, 'The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab 
Regional Order Failed, 'International Affairs 67: 1 (1991) 487-507; Muhammad Faour, The Arab 
World After Desert Storm (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993). 
78 Abdel Aal, 'The Superpowers and Regional Security in the Middle East, ' 198. 
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the region what the term Middle East does (according to Heikal, Dessouki and 
Matar) to Arab peoples: it downplays their existence. For another thing, it 
neglects the roles played by Iran, Israel and Turkey in the affairs of this part of 
the world. Lastly, the portrayal of the region as an Arab Regional System 
overemphasises its Arab character. Non-Arab peoples (including Berbers and 
Kurds) make up nearly half of the population in the area represented as the 
Middle East. Moreover, the definition of who is and is not Arab is highly 
contested among Arab peoples themselves. 
The fact that the Arab Regional System is no less ambiguous a 
representation and that it does not necessarily constitute an improvement over 
that of the Middle East should not be taken to suggest that it should be neglected. 
On the contrary, as noted above, the arguments Heikal, Dessouki and Matar 
made in justifying their choice of term go to the very heart of the argument of this 
thesis. For, by way of criticising the spatial representation Middle East, Dessouki 
and Matar laid bare the (Western) conception of security at the root of this 
representation and presented an alternative, that of Arab Regional System, which 
has been shaped by the Arab national security discourse. This point will be 
further developed in Chapter 3. 
The juxtaposition of these two spatial representations Middle East and 
Arab Regional System in this chapter should not be taken to mean that no other 
alternatives existed. There emerged at least two more representations during 
this period, namely, the 'Euro-Med Region', and the 'Muslim Middle East. ' From 
the late 1960s onwards, particularly following the 1967 war and the ensuing 
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decline of pan-Arabism, other representations came to the fore. 79 For instance, 
although Egypt's Mediterranean identity had been mentioned in debates, 
following the 1967 defeat voices were raised suggesting that 'Egypt should stop 
fighting the wars of the Arabs and turn to its Mediterranean roots. r80 The decline 
of pan-Arabism coincided with the efforts of European Community (later the 
European Union) to distance itself from US policy towards the Middle East and 
adopt a more equivocal attitude by way of initiating a Mediterranean policy. 
Although some progress was made in creating a Euro-Mediterranean framework 
that would bring together EC-member states and Mediterranean-rim countries 
towards strengthening economic and cultural relations, the onset of the Second 
Cold War meant reverting back to the domination of the superpower agenda and 
the shelving of the Mediterranean policy to be revived once again in the post- 
Cold War era. Then, despite its origins being in the Cold War era, the Euro-Med 
Region will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5 in view of the fact that it 
was then when it came to prominence. 
Another alternative that emerged during this period was that of the 
Muslim Middle East, which was shaped by the Islamist security discourse. Its 
proponents consider the Middle East a representation designed to downplay the 
region's Muslim character and legitimise Israel's presence. As is the case with 
the Euro-Med Region, the spatial representation Muslim Middle East came to 
prominence in the post-Cold War era and will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
79 Mohammed EI-Sayed Selim, 'Mediterraneanism: A New Dimension in Egypt's Foreign Policy, ' 
Kurasat Istratiiiya [Strategic Papers of the AI-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies] 
4: 27 (1995); available from http: //www. acpss. org/ekuras/ek27/ek27a. html; Internet; accessed 
September 19,1999. 
82 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to trace the development of the spatial representation 
'Middle East' as well as an overview of the criticisms to it and the alternatives that 
emerged during the Cold War. It tried to answer the two questions set in the 
beginning, namely: 'why the lands to the south-west of Asia and north of Africa 
were lumped together to constitute a region? ' and 'why "Middle East" but not, for 
instance, "Southwest Asia and North Africa" was adopted to refer to this part of 
the world? ' Answers to both questions were found in the security thinking and 
practices of Britain and later the United States. 
British policy-makers adopted the term Middle East to designate an area 
(then under Ottoman control) that was viewed as crucial in maintaining the 
security of British interests in India. The term Middle East became common 
sense afterwards, but the definition of the region changed as the security 
conceptions and practices of its inventors changed. When US policy-makers got 
more closely involved in regional affairs this group of states had already become 
linked in the minds of many people in the West. In many Western languages, 
terms similar to the English-Middle East-are used: El Medio Oriente (Spanish) 
and Le Moyen-Orient (French). In German, the older terms, Vorderasien 
(Anterior Asia) or Naher Osten (Near East) are used. 81 Throughout time, regional 
peoples themselves have also adopted the spatial representation Middle East. 
Al-sharq al-awsat, khavare mirayeh, orta doggu, and ha mizrakh a tikhan, 
80 Selim, 'Mediterraneanism. ' 
81 Wigen and Lewis, The Myth of Continents, 235. 
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represent its Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Hebrew equivalents, respectively. 82 Al- 
Sharq al-Awsat (Middle East in Arabic) is the name of a newspaper with 
international circulation published in London. 83 
However, the fact that it has become 'common sense' to represent this 
part of the world as the Middle East should not hide its Western strategic origins. 
As this chapter tried to argue, emerging alternatives such as the Arab Regional 
System challenged not only the Middle East's colonial origins or its Eurocentrism, 
but also uncovered its character as a geopolitical invention. By examining these 
alternative representations, and in particular that of Arab Regional System, the 
chapter tried to lay bare the way representations of regions are rooted in the 
security thinking and practices of their inventors. Chapter 3 will present 
conceptions of security that lay behind these representations before turning, in 
Chapter 4, to practices of security that they shaped and were, in turn, shaped by. 
82 'The Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East, ' in Building Peace in the 
Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society, ed. Elise Boulding (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1995) 12. 
e3 Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East (London: Penguin, 1991) 1. 
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Chapter 3: Security Thinking During the Cold War 
The aim of Chapter 3 is to draw the contours of security thinking during 
the Cold War. The first section of the chapter will historicize and contextualise 
the growth of Cold War Security Studies as a discipline in the attempt to show the 
Western and Cold War origins of the concept of 'security. ' The next section will 
present Cold War critiques of Security Studies in an attempt to show that 
alternative ways of thinking about security existed all throughout this period. The 
chapter will also look at the conceptualisation of theory and the theory/practice 
relationship in Cold War Security Studies in an attempt to understand how the 
Cold War security discourse prevailed whilst its critics remained on the margins. 
In the final section I will look at the approach of Cold War Security Studies to 
regional security in the Middle East in juxtaposition to some regional actors' 
approach to security in the Arab Regional System (or the Arab national security 
discourse) in an attempt to illustrate how different conceptions of 'region' and 
'security' are rooted in contending approaches to regional security. 
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Western Origins of Cold War Security Thinking 
It may come as a surprise to some that security is a relatively new concept in 
International Relations. The term 'national security' has begun to be used in the 
aftermath of World War II in the United States and Great Britain, where the 
academic field of Security Studies originated. The first reference to the term 
'national security' in US official documents may be traced back to the National 
Security Act of 1947, which aimed at providing 'for integrated policies and 
procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government 
relating to national security. '1 The National Security Council was established with 
the same act 'to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, 
foreign and military policies relating to the national security. '2 The Office of 
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs was also 
established with this act. 
Walter Lippmann, in U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, provided 
the following (and reputedly the first) definition of national security (1943): 
A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its 
legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to 
maintain them by war. 3 
Lippmann used the terms 'security' and 'national security, ' 'state' and 'nation' 
interchangeably, without problematising either term. It was such uncritical use of 
the concept 'national security' that Arnold Wolfers pointed to, in an essay entitled 
P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, 'The Emerging Field of National Security, ' World Politics 19 
(1966) 122-36. Also see Peter Mangold, National Security and International Relations (London: 
Routledge, 1990) 3. 
z Morton Berkowitz and P. G. Bock, 'National Security, ' in The International Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences, ed. David Sills (New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1968) 40. 
Walter Lippmann, U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (New York: Pocket Books, 1943) 
38. 
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'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol' (1952). Wolfers made the following 
observation: 
Statesmen, publicists, and scholars who wish to be considered 
realists, as many do today, are inclined to insist that the foreign 
policy they advocate is dictated by the national interest, more 
specifically, national security interest. This should not be 
surprising. Today any reference to the pursuit of security is likely 
to strike a sympathetic chord. 4 
Wolfers' essay is one of the first sustained analyses of and, to quote Barry 
Buzan, `the best known conceptual piece' on security. 5 For, although the term 
had begun to be used frequently from the 1940s onwards, its meaning had been 
left unquestioned. 
During the Cold War, then, national security became a key concept used 
to justify policy-making. As P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz noted, at the time 
there was 'hardly a national policy that [had] not been publicly justified by an 
almost ritualistic appeal to some mystical "national security interest. " This was 
what Wolfers was critical of in his above-quoted essay: this uncritical acceptance 
and employment of what he regarded as an 'ambiguous' concept. His point was 
that, by presenting national security as an unproblematic policy guide, the 
meaning of which was clear to all, policy-makers kept their normative projects 
hidden behind its veil. Wolfers maintained that 'security, in an objective sense, 
measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the 
absence of fear that such values will be attacked. '' By emphasising the 
4 Arnold Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, ' Political Science Quarterly lxvii: 4 
(December 1952). This article was later published in Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: 
Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962) 147 
(page references are to the 1962 edition). 
5 Barry Buzan, People. States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post- 
Cold War Era, 2" ed. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 4. 
e Bock and Berkowitz, 'The Emerging Field of National Security, ' 132. 
Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, ' 150-65. The quotation is from p. 150. 
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subjective dimension of the task of defining security, Wolfers wanted to point to 
the normative character of any policy justified in national security terms. 
Wolfers' argument was not that he thought national security policies 
should not be guided by normative concerns. On the contrary he emphasised 
that 
no policy, no human act in general, which calls for the sacrifice of 
other values, as any security policy is bound to do, can escape 
being made subject of moral judgement-whether by the 
conscience of the actor himself or by others. 8 
Wolfers' criticisms, then, were directed against the 'misleading' character of the 
manner in which national security was presented as the ultimate policy guide as if 
its meaning was clear to all who used it or were affected by its use. Put in other 
words, Wolfers thought national security was too 'ambiguous' a concept to be 
adopted as a guide in policy-making without reflecting upon its normative 
dimension. As will be argued below, such self-reflection was largely absent from 
many analyses undertaken during the Cold War? 
It could be argued that the ambiguity that surrounded the concept 
national security during this period stemmed partly from the fact that it was of 
relatively recent origin. Until the end of World War II, neither the United States 
nor any of its European counterparts had (what later came to be known as) 
`national security policies' that `[involved] the framing of coherent objectives, and 
their pursuit by the coordination of the military and non-military instruments of 
8 Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, ' 162. 
Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist, ' in Critical Security Studies: 
Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael Williams (London: UCL Press, 1997) 83- 
119; James Der Derian, 'The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard, ' in 
On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 24-45. 
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statecraft. '10 The study of strategy, until this period, usually took the form of the 
study of military history. 11 Wolfers' essay was an early attempt to clarify this 
relatively new concept, the systematic study of which took off during the Cold 
War. Needless to say, as with Area Studies that also flourished during this 
period, the Cold War origins of the study of security made a significant impact on 
the way it was conceptualised and practised. 
As already noted in Chapter 1, in the United States, security was studied 
under the title 'National Security Studies'; in Britain it was 'Strategic Studies. 12 
Notwithstanding the difference in the titles, the focus on states as the primary 
referent of security, the emphasis put on its military dimension, and the privilege 
accorded to the maintenance of the status quo as an endpoint for security united 
the two academic traditions to constitute Cold War Security Studies. 13 This, of 
course, is not meant to gloss over the differences between its many students. 
After all, the security community approach of Karl Deutsch et al. (see Chapter 10) 
was also a product of the Cold War. 14 However, notwithstanding such 
differences, two common characteristics shared by its students justify bringing 
10 Ken Booth, 'American Strategy: The Myths Revisited, ' in American Thinking About Peace and 
War, eds. Ken Booth and Moorhead Wright (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978) 3. 
" Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959) 
39; Ken Booth, 'Strategy, ' in Contemporary International Relations: A Keyguide to Theory, eds. 
A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (London: Pinter, 1994) 109. 
12 Michael Howard, one of the founders of the Institute of Strategic Studies noted that he initially 
suggested that the Institute be called the 'Institute for the Study of International Security. ' Its 
current name was adopted, according to Howard, thinking that it would 'sell' better. See Michael 
Howard, 'IISS-The First Thirty Years: A General Overview, ' Adelphi Papers 235 (Spring 1989) 
12. The Soviet Union, having its own 'nationalities question, ' opted for the term'state security' 
instead of 'national security. ' See Caroline Thomas, 'Southern Instability, Security and Western 
Concepts: On an Unhappy Marriage and the Need for a Divorce, ' in The State and Instability in 
the South, eds. Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu (London: Macmillan, 1989) 
176. 
13 Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation, ' Review of International Studies 17: 4 (1991) 318. 
14 Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, 
Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim and Richard W. Van Wagenen, Political 
Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical 
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their otherwise diverse contributions under a single label. Let us look at these 
two common characteristics in more detail. 
First, Cold War Security Studies was a product of the Cold War. The 
significance of this apparent truism is that the growth of the discipline should be 
understood with reference to the historical context in which it emerged, 
developed and helped sustain. This is especially necessary in order to 
understand why a rich body of thought such as classical realism was obscured 
during this period by its rather simplified variant. Accordingly, the development of 
International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular should be 
understood within the context of the Cold War fears and policy incentives in the 
West in general and the United States in particular. The adoption of a state- 
centric approach to the study of security, for instance, was done in the attempt to 
introduce some neatness and clarity to the complexity of studying international 
phenomena for the purposes of building a 'scientific' discipline. This was not only 
because the complex task of dealing with human beings would not have 
produced the neat and tidy analyses a 'science' of Security Studies was thought 
to demand, but also because the perceived urgency of Cold War concerns made 
it difficult for its students to undertake the complex analyses the study of peoples 
(individuals and social groups) required. 15 
The second characteristic students of Cold War Security Studies shared 
was the realist outlook. John Garnett expressed the realist position as follows: 
Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
15 J. Ann Tickner, 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR 
Theorists, ' International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997) 618. 
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Realists tend to be conservative in their views ... [they] tend to 
accept a world subdivided into independent sovereign states as 
being the normal, if not permanent, condition of international 
society, and they consider realpolitik an inescapable feature of 
the international environment.... 
... The realists also emphasise the ubiquity of the power 
struggle, and their literature is dominated by the concepts of 
national power and interest. Conflict is regarded as an 
inescapable condition of international life. This simple assumption 
is the starting point of realism. 16 
Contemporary critics of realism are sometimes criticised for caricaturing an old 
and sophisticated body of thought. But, as the above-quoted text shows, realists 
themselves sometimes presented such simplistic pictures of their own thinking. 
Indeed, from the mid-1950s onwards, realist theory of International Relations 
moved away from the more sociological approaches of classical realism towards 
a more simplified and purportedly 'scientific' variant. Within the context of 
Security Studies this shift manifested itself with the discipline becoming 
increasingly more state-centric and non-military dimensions of security being 
marginalized in favour of a military-focused security agenda. 17 
Cold War Security Studies embraced realism's scientific objectivist 
conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship as well. Indeed, even 
some critics of Cold War approaches to security such as those who participated 
in the 'traditionalist vs. behaviouralist' debate of the 1950s and 1960s, shared 
realism's ontological and epistemological outlook. 18 As Steve Smith noted, this 
debate focused on methodology (the methods through which the subject should 
16 John Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions, ' in Contemporary Strategy, 2nd rev. and 
enl. ed., eds. John Baylis et al. Vol. l. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987) 9.10. 
17 Baldwin, 'Security Studies and the End of the Cold War, ' World Politics 48 (October 1995) 117- 
23. Also see Bill McSweeney, Security. Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 31-2; Tickner, 'You Just Don't 
Understand, ' 618. 
t8 See Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach, ' in Contending 
Approaches to International Politics, eds. Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (Princeton, NJ: 
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be studied) to the neglect of ontology (what is there to be studied) and 
epistemology (what constitutes knowledge about the subject of study). 19 In sum, 
in line with realism's precepts, Security Studies adopted a state-centric ontology, 
a military-focused security agenda, and a scientific-objectivist understanding of 
the theory/practice relationship. 20 The conception of theory and the 
theory/practice relationship adopted by Cold War Security Studies will be the 
focus of the third section of the chapter. The remainder of this section will trace 
the development of Cold War Security Studies by focusing on the other two 
aspects identified above, namely, state-centrism and military-focus. 
State-centrism could be defined as treating state as the central actor in 
world politics and concentrating on states' practices when studying international 
phenomena. The state-centric outlook of realism introduced a degree of 
neatness and clarity to the study of the complexity of international phenomena. 
However, as with all simplifications, many crucial aspects were lost in the 
process. 21 During the Cold War, the state-centric character of security thinking 
manifested itself in the notion that security is about the state and the state is 
about security. 22 Though this may come as an oversimplification to some, it is 
nevertheless difficult to deny the way the state was viewed as both the primary 
referent and agent in Security Studies. As will be seen in the next section, even 
Princeton University Press, 1969) 20-38. 
19 Steve Smith, 'Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory, ' in 
International Theory, eds. Ken Booth, Steve Smith and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) 33. 
20 Richard Wyn Jones, Security. Strategy and Critical Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999) 
95; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical 
Security Studies, ' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 36-43. 
21 Cynthia Enloe, 'Margins, Silences and Bottom Rungs: How to Overcome the Underestimation 
of Power in the Study of International Relations, ' in International Theory, eds. Booth, Smith and 
Zalewski, 186-202. 
22 Barry Buzan, Ole Weever, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, 
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some students of Third World security, who were otherwise critical of the Cold 
War security discourse, produced state-centric analyses. 23 However, although 
the referent for security remained the state throughout the Cold War, the 
conceptual focus of security thinking showed slight variations over time and 
space, as will be seen below. 
Over the years, then, security thinking increasingly came to privilege the 
state as the primary referent and agent, and emphasise the role of the military 
instrument in maintaining stability. Stability was understood as the strategic 
balance between two groups of states: 'the East' and 'the West. ' Military factors 
were paid more and more attention in threat assessments and policy calculations 
of states as the East-West conflict intensified during the 1960s. The military 
dimension of security was always dominant, but in an era of detente and oil 
shocks (1969-76) a broader range of issues was added to the agenda, cognisant 
of the economic and environmental dimensions of security. However, this 
constituted more of a parenthesis rather than a break; things returned to 
security-business-as-usual with the re-intensification of the Cold War in the late 
1970s. 
During the first decade of the Cold War (1945-55) security analyses 
concentrated on issues of offence and defence, deterrence and aggression, 
massive retaliation and limited war, surprise attack and arms racing. The 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998) 37. 
23 Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon, 'Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The 
"Software" Side of Third World National Security, ' in National Security in the Third World: The 
Management of Internal and External Threats, eds. Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon 
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988) 77-101; Mohammed Ayoob, 'Regional Security and the Third 
World, ' in Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies From Southeast Asia and the 
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emphasis put on the nuclear dimension of strategy during this period is difficult to 
exaggerate. 24 Theoretical development between 1955-65 focused on four major 
themes, namely, deterrence, disarmament and arms control, crisis management 
and limited war. In the following two decades (1965-85), the same issues were 
addressed through more rigorous attempts to establish new standards of analysis 
and productivity and to attain new levels of strategic rationality. 25 
However, despite such common concerns that crossed the Atlantic to 
occupy the minds of the members of both academic traditions in the United 
States and Great Britain, conceptions and practices of security were far from 
being uniform in the West. As the East-West conflict intensified, whilst US 
security thinking came to focus more and more on military stability and the 
problems encountered by the United States and its allies, the produce became 
less and less relevant to those states and peoples with alternative worldviews, 
less complacent attitudes towards the status quo and different conceptions of 
security. France's withdrawal from NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 
military wing in 1962 and the rift between the United States and some Western 
European governments and peace movements over the placement of Cruise and 
Trident in Europe in the 1980s were exemplary of these cross-cutting differences 
in the West. 
Middle East, ed. Mohammed Ayoob (London: Groom Helm, 1986) 3-23. 
2a See, for example, Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1983); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2" d ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1989). 
25 See, for example, John Garnett, ed., Theories of Peace and Security: A Reader in 
Contemporary Strategic Thought (London: Macmillan, 1970); Phil Wiliams, Crisis Management: 
Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (London: M. Robertson, 1976); Roman 
Kolkowicz and Niel Joeck, eds., Arms Control and International Security (Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1984); Kenneth Waltz, 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better, ' 
Adelphi Papers 171 (1981) 1-32; Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New 
York : Wiley, 1963). 
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During the 1970s, Cold War Security Studies saw some emphasis put on 
area studies, history and political psychology. 26 It was during this period that 
economic and political-in addition to military-aspects of security began to find 
some space, however limited. The 1973 OPEC oil embargo further accelerated 
this process. In 1975, a prominent realist thinker, then US Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger, noted that 'progress in dealing with the traditional agenda' was 
no longer enough, because a 
new and unprecedented kind of issue has emerged. The 
problems of energy, resources, environment, population, the 
issues of space and the seas now rank with the questions of 
military security, ideology and territorial rivalry which have 
traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda. 27 
With the onset of the second Cold War the security agenda of the superpowers 
returned to its nuclear focus once again. This time there was a difference, for 
some non-state actors' agenda did not follow suit. Some (such as Alternative 
Security thinkers, see below) refused to return to security-business-as-usual as 
debates between the superpowers of the period once again focused on issues of 
nuclear war, prevailing strategies, nuclear winter, ballistic missile defence and 
nuclear blackmail. Nevertheless, the strategic defence initiative ('Star Wars') and 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) (1987) stole the limelight during the 
1980s. 28 
To summarise, what is referred to here as Cold War Security Studies 
emerged as a product of the Cold War. The embrace of realism by its students 
26 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 
1979). 
27 quoted in Trevor Salmon, 'The Nature of International Security, ' in International Security in the 
Modern World, eds. Roger Carey and Trevor Salmon (London: Macmillan, 1996) 1-2. 
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as well as the context provided by the Cold War unified this otherwise rich body 
of thought. In line with realism's state-centric, military-focused and stability- 
oriented outlook Cold War Security Studies focused on the security of states, 
emphasised the military dimension and privileged the maintenance of the status 
quo. By the end of the 1980s Cold War security thinking could no longer account 
for the developments taking place in Eastern Europe let alone other parts of the 
world. This was because the students of Cold War Security Studies expected the 
future to be more of the same: a ceaseless power struggle, balancing and 
bandwagoning of sovereign states. As Hugh Gusterson argued, the 'telling 
failure' of Cold War Security Studies was not that 'it did not predict what actually 
happened, but that [it was] to a striking degree unable to even entertain the 
possibility of its happening. '29 The 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe caught 
Cold War Security Studies unaware, laying bare not only its limitations but also 
the lack of grounds for its claim to 'knowledge. ' 
Cold War Critics of Security Thinking 
The prevalence of Cold War Security Studies notwithstanding, alternative ways of 
thinking about security had begun to emerge from the 1960s onwards. This 
section will discuss three main strands of criticism brought against the 
mainstream thinking by students of Alternative Security, Peace Research and 
Third World security. 
28 Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics (London: Pinter, 1990). 
29 Hugh Gusterson, 'Missing the End of the Cold War in International Security, ' in Cultures of 
Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, eds. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, 
Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 
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Alternative Security Thinking 
Among those who refused to return to security-business-as-usual with the onset 
of the Cold War from the mid-1970s onwards was a school of thought that came 
to be known as the Alternative Security thinkers. Students of Alternative Security 
took up the issues raised during the detente era and carried them further by 
seeking ways of mitigating the security dilemma and focusing on non-offensive 
defence (NOD), nuclear freeze, military confidence-building, democracy and 
disarmament, individual security and human rights, and alternative security 
30 orders. 
Olof Palme, in the introduction he wrote to Common Security: A 
Programme for Disarmament (prepared by the Independent Commission on 
Disarmament and Security Issues), outlined the main tenets of the arguments put 
forward by the Alternative Security thinkers. Palme wrote: 
Our alternative is common security. There can be no hope for 
victory in a nuclear war, the two sides would be united in 
suffering and destruction. They can survive only together. They 
must achieve security not against the adversary but together with 
him. International security must rest on a commitment to joint 
survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction. 31 
In this way, Alternative Security thinkers were rejecting zero sum approaches to 
security, that is, thinking and practices based on the assumption that in an 
adversarial relationship one's gain is the other's loss. Most of Cold War security 
324. Also see Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations 
Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
30 Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A 
Programme for Disarmament (London: Pan Books, 1982); Bjorn Moller, Common Security and 
Non-offensive Defence :A Neorealist Perspective (London: UCL Press, 1992); Gene Sharp, 
Making Europe Inconguerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defence 
(London: Taylor & Francis, 1985); idem, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter 
Sargent, 1980); Colin McInnes, 'Alternative Defence, ' in Security and Strategy in the New 
Europe, ed. Colin McInnes (London: Routledge, 1992) 130-1. 
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thinking, particularly nuclear strategic theorising, was based on this zero sum 
conception of security. 32 
Criticising the fashioning of defence policies on zero sum conceptions of 
security, Alternative Security thinkers argued that, since both sides stand to lose 
in the event of a nuclear war, it was in the interest of both sides to work together 
to prevent it from happening. They further argued that the security dilemma 
could be mitigated through confidence-building, adopting NOD postures and 
stabilising inter-state relations through strengthening interdependence. 33 By way 
of showing how security practices need not be zero sum in order to further 
security, students of Alternative Security attempted to address one of the issues 
central to Critical Security Studies: alternative security practices. 34 
However, it should be noted that much of the thinking done on Alternative 
Security and especially non-offensive defence during this period was in reference 
to European security. As was the case with the rest of Cold War security 
thinking, little research was undertaken on the applicability of ideas, originally 
conceived for the Western European context, to other parts of the world. 35 
Indeed, in order to make the adoption in the Third World of the principles of 
common security and in particular the NOD postures possible, a major re-thinking 
31 Common Security, ix. 
32 A significant exception to zero sum thinking among the 'golden-age' strategic thinkers is 
Thomas Schelling. See Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); idem, 
The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). Also see Richard Ned 
Lebow, 'Thomas Schelling and Strategic Bargaining, ' International Journal (Summer 1996) 555- 
76. 
33 Moller, Common Security and Non-offensive Defense. 
3a Many of the ideas produced by alternative security thinkers were similar to those voiced by the 
feminists. See, J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on 
Achieving Global Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). 
35 Bjorn Moller and HAkan Wiberg, 'Introduction, ' in Non-offensive Defence for the Twenty-first 
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would be required as to how to make them compatible with sustainable 
development in the Third World. 36 
The policies advocated by the Alternative Security thinkers that sought 
greater mutual transparency and a shift from offensive to non-offensive military 
postures helped shape Gorbachev's 'new thinking' during the late 1980s. 
Gorbachev's embracing of the policies advocated by the Alternative Security 
thinkers, in turn, helped revolutionise threat perceptions and political relations 
across Europe. Towards the end of the 1980s, there came a time when Soviet 
policy on arms control and disarmament was proceeding more quickly than the 
treaties being negotiated. 37 
Peace Research 
Although it was Gorbachev's adoption of the precepts of Alternative Security 
thinking that made the headlines, such critical thinking had also begun to 
manifest itself in the practices of non-state actors such as the US 'Freeze' 
movement that attempted to halt the nuclear arms race, the UK based Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament, and END (European Nuclear Disarmament) which 
prompted a debate centred on the nature of peace and security in Europe after 
detente. 38 According to the 'maximal' approach introduced by Peace 
Researchers, peace did not just mean the absence of war; it was also related to 
Centu , eds. Bjorn Moller and HAkan Wiberg (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994) 4-7. 36 Moller and Wiberg, 'Introduction, ' 6-7; L. Mosjov, 'Common Security and the Third World, ' in 
Policies of Common Security (London: Taylor & Francis with SIPRI, 1985) 77-9. 
37 Jane O. Sharp, 'Disarmament and Arms Control, ' in New Thinking About Strategy and 
International Security, ed. Ken Booth (London: Harper Collins, 1991) 121. 
38 David J. Dunn, 'Peace Research versus Strategic Studies, ' in New Thinking About Strategy and 
International Security, ed. Booth, 57. For a brief overview of the debate on the concept of and 
conditions for peace, see Emanuel Adler, 'Condition(s) of Peace, ' Review of International 
Studies 24 (December 1998) 165-91. 
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the establishment of the conditions for social justice. The distinction Johan 
Galtung drew between 'personal' and 'structural violence' pointed to the futility of 
the task of trying to achieve peace without tackling the structural causes of 
insecurity. 39 Kenneth Boulding's conception of 'stable peace, ' in turn, was 
invaluable in emphasising that peace maintained through the threat and use of 
war cannot be stable 40 
Although students of Alternative Security had introduced concepts such 
as individual security and human rights to the security agenda, students of 
academic Peace Research focused with vigour on individuals and social groups 
as well as a potential global society as referents for security. They also 
suggested alternative (non-military, non-zero sum, non-violent) security practices 
putting special emphasis on peace education and the role of the intellectuals. 41 
Where many Peace Researchers were less successful was when they 
failed to challenge the claim to knowledge heretofore commanded by Cold War 
Security Studies. Although many valuable works were produced during this 
period on the causes of war, disarmament, conflict theory, violence and social 
transformation, the empiricist epistemology adopted by many Peace Researchers 
did not enable them to credibly contest Cold War Security Studies' claim to 
knowledge. Academic Peace Research has been a rich tradition and has had 
students that adopted empiricist epistemologies as well as those with an explicit 
39 Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research, ' Journal of Peace Research, 6: 3 (1969) 
167-92; idem, Peace By Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict. Development and Civilization 
(London: Sage with International Peace Research Institute, 1996). 
40 Kenneth Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978). 
41 Paul Smoker, Ruth Davies and Barbara Munske, eds., A Reader in Peace Studies (Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, 1995); Dunn, 'Peace Research versus Strategic Studies, ' 56-72. 
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commitment to normative approaches. However, since neither of these two 
groups contested the objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice 
relationship adopted by Cold War Security Studies, they failed to mount a 
credible challenge to Cold War Security Studies on this epistemological ground. 2 
By failing to adequately lay bare the normative character of Cold War security 
thinking, students of Peace Research were themselves pushed to the margins 
whilst their research was labelled as 'propaganda. ' This theme will be further 
developed in the next section. 
Third World Security Thinking 
Whereas Cold War security thinking in the United States and Western Europe 
was under challenge by the likes of Alternative Security thinkers, there was 
relatively little evidence of interest in concepts such as common security or 
practices such as non-offensive defence in the Third World. This is not to 
suggest that there were no attempts to adopt non-violent resistance techniques. 
Mahatma Ghandi remains a noteworthy example of the successful employment 
of non-violent resistance techniques in a Third World context. 43 Indeed, many 
Third World actors, including some from the Middle East, conducted non-violent 
political struggles against former colonial powers or their own governments. 44 It 
is also worth noting that the Intifada, Palestinian peoples' uprising against the 
42 For a recent attempt to incorporate Critical Theory into Peace Research, see Lee-Anne 
Broadhead, 'Beyond the Traditions: Casting a Critical Light on Peace Research, ' in Issues in 
Peace Research. 1997-98: Theory and Practice, ed. Lee-Anne Broadhead (Bradford: 
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 1997) 1-18. 
43 Rex Ambler, 'Gandhian Peacemaking, ' in A Reader in Peace Studies, eds. Smoker, Davies and 
Munske, 199-205. 
44 Brad Bennett, 'Arab-Muslim Cases of Nonviolent Struggle, ' in Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle 
in the Middle East, eds. Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant and Saad E. Ibrahim (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1990) 41-57; Stephen Zunes, 'Unarmed Resistance in the Middle East and North 
Africa, ' in Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective, eds. Stephen Zunes, 
Lester R. Kurtz and Sarah Beth Asher (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) 41-51. 
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Israeli regime in the occupied territories, began as non-violent resistance in the 
late 1980s. 45 However, as Third World states gained their independence, they 
also embraced more conventional methods of defence-a process dubbed as the 
`internationalization of the National Security state' by A. W. Singham 46 
Where the Third World security discourse differed was the emphasis put 
on development. The writings of academic Peace Research, especially 
Galtung's stress on the structural causes of insecurity struck a chord in the Third 
World in an era marked by the formation of the non-aligned movement, the Group 
of 77 and the calls for a New International Economic Order in the United 
Nations. 47 The non-aligned movement was composed of a group of states which 
proclaimed their refusal to ally themselves with either one of the superpowers 
during the Cold War-though some were closely aligned in practice (such as 
Egypt). The ideology of the movement constituted a fundamental challenge to 
mainstream thinking at the time 48 
During the 1980s, some Third World security experts took up these 
issues once again. Caroline Thomas, for instance, noted that 
a great gulf exists over the basic issue of what constitutes 
security, and therefore over what constitute the most legitimate, 
desirable and appropriate methods of pursuing the goal of 
45 Philip Grant, 'Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Occupied Territories, ' in Arab Nonviolent 
Political Struggle in the Middle East, eds. Crow, Grant and Ibrahim, 59-73; Souad Dajani, 
'Nonviolent Resistance in the Occupied Territories: A Critical Reevaluation, ' in Nonviolent Social 
Movements, eds. Zunes, Kurtz and Asher, 52-74. 
46 A. W. Singham, 'The National Security State and the End of the Cold War: Security Dilemmas 
for the Third World, ' in Security of Third World Countries, eds. Jasjit Singh and Thomas 
Bernauer (Aldershot: Darmouth with UNIDIR, 1993) 7. 
47 Mosjov, 'Common Security and the Third World, ' 73-82. 
48 Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1985) 11. 
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creating a more secure international environment and more 
security for each individual and state within it. 49 
Thomas differentiated between two different approaches to security. The first 
approach was adopted by those states in the developed world that were 
(relatively) satisfied with the status quo and saw security mainly in terms of its 
maintenance. They privileged the maintenance of stability of the existing system 
as a foremost security concern. 
The second and more holistic approach, argued Thomas, was adopted 
by those states in the Third World that included economic, political and 
environmental issues in their security agenda. The search for security in the 
Third World, noted Thomas, was about maintaining domestic security through 
state building, establishing secure systems of food, health, money and trade as 
much as it was about military build-up. 50 Accordingly, many Third World states 
saw a change in the status quo not as a threat to but as conducive to security- 
provided that change came in the desired direction, that is, towards the creation 
of an international economic structure sensitive to the needs of Third World 
states. 
Although the distinction Thomas drew between the security needs and 
interests of developed and developing states is helpful to a certain extent, it 
should be stressed that not all developing states were against the status quo. As 
Chapter 4 will argue, throughout the Cold War, the conservative regimes of oil- 
rich Gulf states, especially that of Saudi Arabia, remained suspicious of the anti- 
as Caroline Thomas, 'Introduction, ' in Conflict and Consensus in South/North Security, eds. 
Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Savaranamuttu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989) 3. 
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status quo rhetoric of Egyptian president Nasser, a leader of the non-aligned 
movement. Furthermore, it was not always the case, as Thomas put it, that 
'[Western] conception of security was basically top down, while the other [Third 
World] was bottom up. '51 Rather, there were both developed states as well as 
developing states among those that propagated top down views on security. For 
instance, when some Third World policy-makers spoke of the need to address 
the non-military dimension of insecurity, they often meant the need to curb down 
the right to exercise democratic freedoms in the attempt to strengthen the state. 
The practical implication of this statist approach to security was the state's 
domination over society where, 'society's sacrifices are perceived as obligations, 
but the state's privileges justified as necessary to survival, ' in Abdul Monem Al- 
Mashat's words. 52 Accordingly, those who dared to challenge the security 
practices of their states were marginalized at best, and accused of treachery and 
imprisoned at worst. 
Bottom up views of security, in turn, were voiced by Western European 
peace movements. The views of non-state actors in the Third World did not get 
heard unless they adopted violent practices in the attempt to form a state (as in 
the case of the Palestine Liberation Organisation) or capture state power in their 
own countries (as with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hizbullah). Academic 
Peace Research provided some-albeit limited-forum for non-state actors' 
views to be voiced. 53 
50 Thomas, In Search for Security, 1. 
51 Thomas, 'Introduction, ' 4. 
52 AI-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, 33. 
53 See Abdul Aziz Said, 'A Middle Eastern Peace Strategy, ' in Rethinking Peace, eds. Robert 
Elias and Jennifer Turpin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 166-72; Johan Galtung, 
Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine (Honolulu: Institute of Peace, University of Hawaii, 1989). 
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In criticising Cold War Security Studies, students of Third World Security 
mainly focused on its Western origins. In particular, they drew attention to the 
fact that it was realism with its black box conception of states that shaped Cold 
War conceptions and practices of security. Their argument was that in the 
developed West, threats to security were (and to an extent still are) conceived to 
stem from outside the state whereas in most parts of the Third World threats to 
security emanated from inside thereby rendering Western conceptions of security 
of limited analytical utility within the Third World context. 54 
They further argued that Cold War Security Studies focused on 
East/West stability and its maintenance through nuclear deterrence and nuclear 
power balancing, whereas some Third World states had been trying to reject the 
automatic categorisation of their problems into an East/West framework-as was 
the case with the non-aligned movement. Cold War security practices will be the 
focus of Chapter 4. Suffice it say that some Third World states, such as Iran and 
Syria, were all-too-happy to accept the nuclear umbrella provided by the two 
superpowers. In other words, not all Third World states were either able or willing 
to escape the Cold War template. Moreover, as noted above, the economic and 
military aid provided by the superpowers to their respective allies provided 
enough incentive for some (such as Turkey) to jump on the bandwagon. 
Third World security thinking, then, focused on the Western origins of 
Cold War Security Studies, which, they argued, rendered its produce less useful 
54 Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, 33; Azar and Moon, 'Legitimacy, Integration 
and Policy Capacity, ' 77-101; Ayoob, 'Regional Security and the Third World. ' See Chapter 6 for 
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in other contexts. Their criticisms emphasised the need to look at the domestic 
sources and non-military dimensions of insecurity in the Third World. Al-Mashat 
criticised the almost exclusive focus in Cold War Security Studies on crises and 
conflicts often to the neglect of 'longitudinal security processes' so that 
only indicators of power such as military expenditures, weapons 
systems, types of defence strategies, nuclear capabilities, and 
deterrence of adversaries have been on the priority list of security 
studies. 55 
This was a concern Al-Mashat shared with Western European peace movements 
as well as Peace Researchers, who maintained that Cold War security thinking 
had become less and less relevant for the security concerns of individuals and 
social groups in the West. 
Much of the critical thinking surveyed above remained on the margins 
throughout the Cold War. Critics of Cold War security thinking were themselves 
criticised for their 'normative' or'political' approaches to international phenomena. 
The essentially normative approaches of students of Cold War Security Studies, 
in turn, were presented as 'objective' or 'apolitical. ' Such reasoning was 
substantiated by the commonly held assumptions as to who had relevant 
'expertise' to talk about issues related to security. The assumption was that 
policy-makers, military elite and academic Security Studies knew best when it 
came to security issues. Feminists, Peace Researchers, Alternative Security 
thinkers and Third World security experts as well as participants to myriad peace 
movements around Europe challenged such assumptions. But their views were 
marginalized by Cold War security experts whose claim to knowledge was 
further discussion on this issue. 
55 Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, 33. 
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licensed by an objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice 
relationship. 56 The following section will further elaborate on this theme. 
Theory/Practice in Cold War Security Thinking 
As noted above, the adoption of an objectivist conception of theory and the 
theory/practice relationship resulted in essentially normative theories of Cold War 
Security Studies masquerading as 'objective' approaches to international 
phenomena and being viewed as 'knowledge' whilst the writings of their critics 
were presented as propaganda. The following quotation by John Garnett 
illustrates how Cold War approaches to security failed to reflect upon the 
normative character of strategic theorising. Garnett maintained that the moral 
dimension of military power is 
a quite separate subject from strategic studies in that it requires a 
quite different expertise, and it is therefore unfair to blame 
specialists in the latter for their lack of competence in it. 57 
Though research in a subject does not necessarily imply approval of it, it would 
nevertheless be wrong to overlook the normative baggage strategists bring to 
their subject. For, issues of morality are not optional extras to be left, as Garnett 
suggested, to `theologians, philosophers, and political scientists'18 only. By 
choosing to privilege the security of states, often to the detriment of individuals 
and groups whose security the state, in theory, is there to provide for, state- 
centric approaches already have intrinsic (if not always explicit) normative 
commitments. In Garnett's case this commitment manifests itself as statism. In 
se Ken Booth, 'War, Security and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for Stable Peace, ' in New Thinking 
About Strategy and International Security, ed. Booth, 335-76. 
s' Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions, ' 13. 
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other words, the moral choice is not in choosing to study nuclear strategy or not, 
but in deciding what to say about it; and decisions always have moral choices 
embedded in them. 59 
The objectivist conception of the theory/practice relationship adopted by 
students of Cold War Security Studies not only helped gloss over the normative 
character of strategic theorising but also proved crucial in that it did not reveal the 
mutually constitutive relationship between the two. 60 Perhaps the best example 
of the constitutive relationship between security theories and practices is the 
symbiotic relationship between Security Studies and the Cold War. As noted 
above, Security Studies is a product of the Cold War. The academic field not 
only originated in but also thrived upon the Cold War environment. The 
concepts, assumptions and findings of Cold War Security Studies, in turn, helped 
sustain the Cold War. 
Mary Kaldor's The Imaginary War is an excellent illustration of how Cold 
War security discourses expressed and legitimised power relationships 
worldwide, and helped maintain social cohesion within the two blocs thereby 
sustaining the conflictual relationship between them. 61 Throughout her analysis, 
Kaldor stressed the role played by strategic theories, explaining how they 
became representations of politics instead of playing the objective or neutral role 
58 Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions, ' 13. 
59 Philip Green, 'Strategy, Politics and Social Scientists, ' in Strategic Thinking and its Moral 
Implications, ed. Morton A. Kaplan (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1973) 39-68. 
so See Michael C. Williams, 'Identity and the Politics of Security, ' European Journal of 
International Relations 4: 2 (1998) 204-25, for an elucidation of how the adoption of an 
objectivist conception of theory by (neo-)realists was a political practice that helped constitute 
the world in line with their wishes. 
61 Mary Kaldor, The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990). 
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of explanation assigned to them by realist Strategic Studies, and maintained that 
'evolving strategies did not necessarily bear much relation to actual military 
capabilities. '62 
Kaldor's argument was that 'the very unreality of strategic discussions 
contributed to the imaginary nature of the East-West confrontation, allowing it to 
become a deep, ongoing, unrealisable fear. v63 The role theories play, however, 
should not be over-emphasised. The growth of actual military capabilities was 
also influenced 'by institutional factors such as inter-service rivalry, technological 
innovation or industrial pressure'64 that fed into strategic theorising via institutions 
such as the RAND Corporation which was a major scene of strategic theorising in 
the United States especially during the 1950s and 1960s. 65 
Not all authors re-considering Cold War history would reach the same 
conclusions as Kaldor. Colin Gray, for instance, blamed the propagation of 
'erroneous' or 'shoddy' ideas, such as stable deterrence, collective security, and 
arms control, for what he termed Cold War policy 'errors. '66 In contrast to 
Kaldor's starting point, that 'any explanation of natural and social phenomena ... 
is partial, '67 Gray viewed the theory/practice relationship as one of the prior 
informing the latter, but very little else. He accordingly saw the academic study of 
strategy as an objective enterprise that 'can and should provide knowledge useful 
62 Kaldor, The Imaginary War, 192. 
63 Kaldor, The Imaginary War, 192-3. 
64 Kaldor, The Imaginary War, 192. 
65 Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon. 
66 Colin Gray, 'New Directions for Strategic Studies? How Can Theory Help Practice? ' Security 
Studies 1: 4 (Summer 1992) 612. 
57 Kaldor, The Imaginary War, 7. 
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for official practitioners of strategy. '68 Consider the following statement by 
Garnett: 'We need more, not less, objectivity if we are to survive. '69 Gray 
concurred: `Strategic study (unlike the strategist) is value-neutral and topic- 
indifferent. '70 
The positions of Gray and Garnett regarding the theory/practice 
relationship are similar to that of their conception of theory. Both authors are in 
favour of and open about the role theories play in informing practice. However, 
their conception of practice is restricted in that they understand practice as policy- 
making and implementation at governmental level. In this sense, those who do 
not engage in issues directly relevant for policy-making are not considered to be 
engaging with practice. This position hints at a narrow view of politics where it is 
considered only to do with governance at the state level. This, in turn, flows from 
the objectivist position adopted by the authors where the study of strategy in 
particular and academic enterprise in general is viewed as a politics-free zone. 
This is a powerful move, for once an approach is regarded as 'objective, ' others 
that are critical of it are immediately labelled at best 'subjective' or 'political' in a 
derogatory sense, and at worst 'propaganda. ' 
It is not only the conception of practice adopted by Gray and Garnett but 
also that of theory that is restricted in that that both conceive theory as 'problem- 
solving theory, ' in Robert Cox's terms; " it is there to assist policy-makers in 
68 Gray, 'New Directions for Strategic Studies? ' 611. 
69 Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions, ' 22-3. 
70 Gray, 'New Directions for Strategic Studies? ' 626. 
71 Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders. ' 
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solving problems. 72 Security Studies, in this sense, is supposed to deal with 
issues that are deemed problematic by policy-makers, 73 leaving untouched other 
issues that do not make it to governmental agendas. This, in turn, created a 
vicious circle where issues to be put on the security agenda were decided by 
policy-makers and analysed by those they considered 'experts. ' Those who 
propounded alternative views were dismissed as mere propagandists and the 
issues they identified, such as 'structural violence, ' were not allowed on security 
agendas. As Chapter 6 will argue, this position is still prevalent in certain strands 
of security thinking in the post-Cold War era. 74 
Moreover, Garnett argued that strategists, even if they adopted a critical 
stance (and were allowed to get their voices heard) would not make much 
difference. He maintained that: 
if a conflict-oriented view of international politics has caught the 
public imagination ... this is not because it is propagated by 
strategists but because it offers the man in the street a more 
plausible interpretation of international reality than any of the 
alternatives to which he has been exposed. 75 
This statement is yet another manifestation of Garnett's restricted notion of theory 
(which, in turn, is representative of Cold War thinking on security). After all, what 
the 'man in the street' views as 'a more plausible interpretation of international 
reality'76 is shaped by theories and discourses that were/are dominant at the 
time 77 
72 Gray'New Directions for Strategic Studies? ' 629-31. 
73 Steve Smith refers to those issues that are considered as 'problems' by policy-makers as 'the 
tip of the iceberg' in 'Power and Truth: A Reply to William Wallace, ' Review of International 
Studies 23: 4 (October 1997) 509. 
74 See, for example, Steven Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies, ' International Studies 
Quarter) 35: 2 (June 1998) 211-39. 
75 Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions, ' 22. 
76 Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions, ' 22. 
77 For an exploration of this process within the Middle Eastern context, see Edward W. Said's 
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Garnett's statement also hints at an underestimation of the power of 
theories in informing not only governmental policies, but also individuals' 
conceptions of the world. These conceptions that individuals absorb, accept and 
live uncritically constitute what Gramsci calls'common sense' which helps sustain 
the status quo by 'making situations of inequality and oppression appear to them 
as natural and unchangeable. '78 To go back to Kaldor's argument regarding the 
Cold War, it was the 'imaginary war' discourse of realist Security Studies that 
informed men and women in North America and Western Europe of the 
relevance, legitimacy and inescapability of power politics, tough responses, and 
brinkmanship. 
In sum, it was these objectivist conceptions of theory and the 
theory/practice relationship, a restricted notion of theory as 'problem-solving 
theory' and practice as governmental policy-making that have, for long, sustained 
an underestimation of the role theories play in helping constitute 'reality' and 
narrowed the ethical and political horizons of security thinking and practice. 
Contra Garnett, the role of theories is not to take these conceptions as given but 
to try and enter into people's 'common sense' and to present them a critical 
understanding of their own situation. In order to substantiate this point, the next 
section will look at the approach of Cold War Security Studies to regional security 
in the Middle East in juxtaposition to regional actors' approach to security in the 
Arab Regional System. This is intended as a further illustration of the general 
trilogy: Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978; reprint, London: Penguin, 1995); 
The Question of Palestine, 2d ed. (London: Vintage, 1992); Covering Islam: How the Media and 
Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, rev. ed. (London: Vintage, 1997). 
78 David Forgacs, ed., A Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935 (London: Lawrence & 
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point that different peoples with different worldviews have different approaches to 
security. From a Critical Security Studies perspective, when re-thinking security 
in the Middle East there is a need to pay attention to what has often been ignored 
so far-that is, regional peoples' conceptions of security, what they view as the 
referent(s), how they think security should be sought. 
Cold War Thinking About Regional Security 
Chapter 3 has so far argued that Cold War security thinking had its origins in the 
security concerns and interests of Western states, mainly the United States. The 
implication of this Western bias in Cold War security thinking within the Middle 
Eastern context has been that much of the thinking done on regional security in 
the Middle East has been based on Western conceptions of 'security' and 
'region'. 
Middle Eastern Security Discourse 
The approach of Cold War Security Studies to regional security in the Middle 
East-referred to here as the Middle Eastern security discourse-was designed 
primarily to maintain the security of Western (mostly US) interests in the region 
and its military defence against any other external actors (such as the Soviet 
Union that could jeopardise the regional and/or global status quo). Western 
security interests in the Middle East during the Cold War era could be summed 
up as the unhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, the prevention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and 
Wishart, 1988) 421. 
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the maintenance of `friendly' regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. This 
was (and still is) a top down conception of security that was directed outwards 
and privileged the maintenance of stability. This section will look at each of these 
characteristics in turn. 
The approach of Cold War Security Studies to regional security in the 
Middle East was top down because threats to security were defined largely from 
the perspective of external powers rather than regional actors. In the eyes of 
British and US defence planners, communist infiltration and Soviet intervention 
constituted the greatest threats to security in the Middle East during the Cold 
War. The way to enhance regional security, they argued, was for regional states 
to enter into alliances with the West. As will be explained in Chapter 4, three 
regional security schemes, the Middle East Defence Organisation (1951), the 
Northern Tier (1953) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), were designed for this 
purpose. Although there were regional states such as Iraq (until the 1958 coup), 
Iran (until the 1978-79 revolution) and Turkey that shared this perception of 
security to a certain extent, many Arab policy-makers begged to differ. 79 
This top down approach to regional security in the Middle East was 
compounded by a conception of security that was directed outwards-that is, 
threats to security were assumed to stem from outside the region whereas inside 
was viewed as a realm of security. Given the number of inter- and intra-state 
wars in the region during the Cold War, it might seem as an exaggeration to 
argue that the region was peaceful. The argument here is that the regional status 
79 Majid Khadduri, 'The Problem of Regional Security in the Middle East, ' Middle East Journal 11 
(Winter 1957) 11-22. 
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quo was considered to serve the interests of Western policy-makers. Indeed, 
with the crucial exception of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was generally assumed 
that threats to security in the Middle East took the form of Soviet intervention and 
communist infiltration. 
Stephen Walt's study, The Origins of Alliances is a good example of how 
Western conceptions of security were put into use in the attempt to understand 
security in the Middle East. 80 Walt's main argument in this study, which was an 
analysis of alliance patterns in the Middle East, was that in order to maintain 
security in the Middle East, alliance behaviours of regional states had to be 
understood. Walt was particularly critical of US policy towards maintaining 
security in the Middle East via the construction of anti-Soviet alliances, for he 
believed that regional policy-makers were not as concerned with the threat posed 
by the Soviet Union as were their Western counterparts. However, although 
critical of US approaches to security in the region, Walt's conception of regional 
security remained outward-directed. In other words, he also understood security 
in the Middle East as one of making the region inviolable to Soviet intervention 
and communist infiltration. Walt's criticism, in this sense, stemmed from his 
rejection of the argument that it was necessary to bring regional states under the 
roof of anti-Soviet alliances (or'pactomania' as it is referred to in the literature), 81 
in order to secure Western interests in the region. 82 Instead, he maintained that 
given the fact that most regional policy-makers were more concerned with each 
other than the Soviet threat (which was the main preoccupation of their Western 
counterparts) the best the United States could do, in order to maintain the 
80 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
8' Ken Booth, 'Alliances, ' in Contemporary Strategy, eds. Baylis et al., 664. 
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security of its interests, was to understand the alliance patterns of regional states 
and manipulate them in accordance with its own concerns. 
Walt's conception of regional security did not constitute a deviation from 
top down, outward-directed and military focused security thinking of mainstream 
approaches. True to his neo-realist perspective, Walt assumed that international 
anarchy conditioned regional states to endlessly seek to balance each other in 
the attempt to maintain security. In fairness to him, it should be noted that he did 
show some awareness of how non-military factors seemed to shape regional 
states' alliance behaviours. He noted, for instance, how non-military dimensions 
of power had an impact on the threat perceptions and alliance behaviours of Arab 
states. He also noted, albeit with a hint of surprise, how 'a different form of 
balancing ... occurred in inter-Arab relations. '83 What he meant by 'a different 
form of balancing' was that Arab policy-makers chose not to invest primarily in 
the military sector in the attempt to balance each other. Instead, noted Walt, 'in 
the Arab world, the most important source of power has been the ability to 
manipulate one's own image and the image of one's rivals in the minds of other 
Arab elites. P84 In other words, rather than fuelling regional arms races, many 
Arab policy-makers got involved in a war of images, where, to quote Michael 
Barnett, 'sticks and stones had little effect, but words could really hurt. i85 This is 
not to suggest that security relations in the region were somehow different from 
other parts of the world. Rather the argument is that the conception of security 
adopted by Walt to understand security in the Middle East-which privileged the 
82 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 3. 
83 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 149. 
84 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 149. 
85 Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: 
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military dimension of security to the neglect of its other dimensions and focused 
on states as the primary referent-did not suffice in understanding regional 
security dynamics. 
Chapter 3 has so far argued that Cold War security thinking was rooted in 
the experiences and interests of Western states (and in particular the United 
States). What was missing from Cold War thinking about regional security in the 
Middle East was an understanding of regional actors' thinking; that is, what they 
perceived as threats and how they sought to achieve regional security. Although 
it could be argued that this was what Walt was trying to do-i. e. bringing regional 
actors' perspective into his analysis of alliance behaviour-by way of failing to 
move away from a mainstream (top down, outward-directed and military-focused) 
conception of security, he ended up neglecting the alternative conceptions and 
practices of regional actors. Looking at regional actors' conceptualisation of Arab 
national security should help clarify the argument here. 
Arab National Security Discourse 
The concept of Arab national security was developed in the aftermath of World 
War II in reaction to Cold War approaches to regional security in the Middle East 
that were viewed as a 'euphemism for secure spheres of influence' for either 
Moscow or Washington. 86 As Chapter 2 noted, the Arab national security 
discourse maintained that the representation of this part of the world as the 
Middle East was intended to underplay the Arab character of this part of the world 
Columbia University Press, 1998) 3. 
88 Abdel Monem Said Aly Abdel Aal, 'The Superpowers and Regional Security in the Middle East, ' 
in Regional Security in the Third World, ed. Ayoob, 198. 
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and to 'tear up' the `Arab homeland' as a distinct unit. 87 The spatial 
representation Arab Regional System, Ali Eddin Hillal Dessouki and Jamil Matar 
argued, could serve better as a key for understanding the interactions among 
88 Arab states, with their neighbours and with the international system. 
There were two assumptions behind Dessouki and Matar's argument. 
One is that the security concerns and interests of Arab states could be better 
understood when viewed in relation to one another. Second, that these concerns 
were different from if not opposed to those of non-Arab states. These two 
assumptions, in turn, were rooted in the precepts of pan-Arabist movement of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century that shaped Arab peoples' 
conceptions of 'nationhood. ' During this period of incessant struggle against 
Ottoman and later British and French domination, Arab policy-makers shaped 
their policies in line with the assumption that their'shared Arab identity generated 
'89 a common definition of what threatened their interests. 
The argument above should not be taken to suggest that a pre-existing 
Arab identity preceded and shaped Arab actors' interests. Although the peoples 
living on the lands that have historically been called the 'Arabian peninsula' have 
shared a common language, culture and traditions, the myth of a shared Arab 
identity was invented in the struggle against colonialism and for political 
independence during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 90 While this 
87 Abdel Monem Said Aly, 'The Shattered Consensus: Arab Perceptions of Security, ' The 
International Spectator xxxi: 4 (1996) 26-7. 
88 Summarised in Said Aly, 'The Shattered Consensus, ' 26-27. 
89 Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, 223. Also see Gamal Abdel Nasser, 'The Egyptian 
Revolution, ' Foreign Affairs 32: 2 (1955) 199-211. 
90 See, Maxime Rodinson, The Arabs, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (London: Croom Helm, 1981) 
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notion of a shared Arab identity helped organise resistance at the state as well as 
sub-state level against external actors, it, at the same time, restrained their 
actions in that demands made in line with the precepts of Arab national security 
often clashed with that of state security. Indeed, as Abdel Monem Said Aly 
argued, 'it is very difficult to find any conceptualisation of security perceptions that 
is not coloured by a pan-Arab perspective. '91 It is worth quoting him at length: 
Most of the Arab literature on security perceptions is based on 
the notion that Arabs have common security needs, even when 
the much narrower security perceptions of one or another Arab 
state are being represented. Major research centres in the Arab 
world take it as a point of departure and analysis. The annual 
Arab Strategic Report of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and 
Strategic Studies in Cairo takes the Arab world as a point of 
departure for analysis of Arab relations with neighbours and the 
world; The States of the Arab Nation, annual report of the Center 
for Arab Unity Studies in Beirut, takes a similar approach, the 
studies of the Arab Though Forum in Amman do not deviate from 
the same tradition. 92 
It should be noted that early conceptualisations of Arab national security referred 
to the security of the society of Arab peoples, i. e. the trans-state entity of the Arab 
nation. However, as more and more Arab states became independent, there 
emerged a tension between the demands of 'state security' and 'societal 
security. ' Practical manifestations of this interplay between state security and 
societal security will be explored in Chapter 4. Suffice it to say that during the 
1950s and 1960s, when Nasser was at the peak of his popularity, he adopted the 
early, more societal-focused conceptualisation of Arab national security and used 
the Arab national security discourse as a tool in the attempt to nudge his fellow 
esp. pp. 1-47. Fatima Mernissi relates how the Berber identity of Moroccan peoples was 
downplayed in favour of an Arab identity that was perceived to be a better tool to fight French 
colonialism. See Fatima Mernissi, Pecenin Otesi: Islam Toplumunda Kadin-Erkek Dinamikleri 
[Beyond the Veil: Male-female Dynamics in Muslim Society], trans. Mine Kürkcü (Istanbul: 
Yayinevi Yayincilik, 1995) 41. 
Said Aly, 'Shattered Consensus, ' 26. 
92 Said Aly, 'Shattered Consensus, ' 27. Also see Bahgat Korany, 'National Security in the Arab 
World: The Persistence of Dualism, ' in The Arab World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: 
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Arab policy-makers into his line. In the long run, Nasser's interventionism led to 
the decline of his conceptualisation of Arab national security; conservative Arab 
regimes of the Gulf felt threatened by his moves and in reaction adopted more 
and more statist approaches. 
These developments informed theory; in time, a more state-centric 
conceptualisation of Arab national security developed in the literature. When 
putting forward the Arab Regional System as an alternative representation, 
Dessouki and Matar were also laying down the precepts of this more state-centric 
conceptualisation of Arab national security. 93 However, the societal-focused 
conceptualisation of Arab national security did not disappear; it remained in the 
background, continuing to shape and be shaped by the practices of non-state 
actors, especially intellectuals and grassroots organisations. 
Arab national security discourse constituted a development over Cold 
War approaches to regional security in two ways. First, it was generated by 
peoples in this part of the world and reflected (some, if not all of) their security 
concerns that did not make into the agendas set by the Middle Eastern security 
discourse. Issues such as food, economic and water security were invariably 
presented as Arab national security issues. However, as will be seen in Chapter 
4, these issues were almost always viewed from a statist perspective. 
Lynne Rienner, 1994) 161-78. 
93 Also see Abdullah Toukan, 'Arab National Security Issues: Perceptions and Policies, ' in 
Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East, Shai Feldman and 
Abdullah Toukan (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefeld, 1997) 33-72. 
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Second, the Arab national security discourse partially did away with the 
top down perspective of the Cold War approaches-only partially because it 
substituted the top down perspective of the United States with the statist and top 
down perspectives of the Arab states that often acted in defiance of the concerns 
of peoples and social groups. Indeed this state-centric conceptualisation of Arab 
national security left little room for the concerns of individuals and social groups 
that chose to define themselves with reference to other dimensions of their 
identity such as gender or (in the case of non-Muslims) religion. This thinking 
stemmed basically from an outward-directed conception of security that assumed 
threats to Arab national security to stem from outside the Arab Regional System, 
that is, from non-Arabs. Inside was assumed to be a realm of peace and 
security. 94 In this sense, the criticisms the Arab national security discourse 
voiced against that of Middle Eastern security stemmed not so much from its 
state-centric or outward-directed conception of security, but from its referent, the 
Middle East. 
In sum, albeit cognisant of non-military dimensions of security, students 
of Arab national security embraced the state-centric and zero sum approach of 
the Cold War security discourse. Students of Arab national security called for a 
broader conception of security to study the security needs and concerns of Arab 
states. This amounted, on the one hand, to the privileging of (military and non- 
military) threats to the security of Arab states thereby marginalizing the concerns 
of individuals and social groups. On the other hand, this meant that the relations 
between Arab states and their non-Arab counterparts (the Arab-Israeli 
94 Also see Toukan, 'Arab National Security Issues, ' 33-72. 
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relationship, for instance) were understood as being governed by the outward- 
directed, zero sum and military-focused conceptions and practices of security 
characteristic of Cold War security discourse-an approach of which they were 
otherwise highly critical. 95 
Conclusion 
Chapter 2 argued that regions are geopolitical inventions that have their roots in 
the security conceptions and practices of their inventors. The Middle East, it was 
argued, was invented to serve the security interests of Britain and later the United 
States. Chapter 3 has sought to historicize and contextualise Cold War security 
thinking and showed how Cold War Security Studies had its origins in the security 
concerns and interests of the very same states that invented and shaped the 
Middle East. The chapter explored the Cold War and Western (mainly US) 
origins of the concept of security. It was argued Cold War Security Studies 
focused on the security of states, emphasised the military dimension and 
privileged the status quo. 
The chapter also presented a brief overview of critiques of Cold War 
Security Studies provided by Alternative Security thinkers, Peace Researchers 
and Third World experts. The aim was to show how, despite the prevalence of 
the Cold War security discourse, alternative ways of thinking about security 
95 For an incisive overview of Israel's security thinking see Dan Horowitz, 'The Israeli Concept of 
National Security, ' in National Security and Democracy in Israel, ed. Avner Yaniv (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1993) 11-53; Yaiv Evron, 'Deterrence Experience in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, ' in 
Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory and Practice Converge, eds. Aharon Kleiman and 
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existed during the Cold War. Emphasis was put on the critiques presented by 
Alternative Security thinkers and Peace Researchers of zero sum conceptions 
and practices of security, which were characteristic of the Cold War security 
discourse. Their efforts to suggest alternative practices to provide security for 
referents other than states was also emphasised. Third World security experts, 
in turn, emphasised the Western origins of Cold War security discourse, and 
emphasised the need to look at the domestic dimension of security, especially 
state-building. 
Another focus of Chapter 3 was conceptualisations of the theory/practice 
relationship in Cold War Security Studies. The argument was that a scientific- 
objectivist conception of theory and theory/practice relationship gave Cold War 
Security Studies its command over knowledge, whilst its critics, many of whom 
shared a similar understanding of theory, failed to challenge it on this 
epistemological ground. It was also argued that the objectivist understanding of 
the theory/practice relationship adopted by the students of Cold War Security 
Studies obscured the mutually constitutive relationship between Cold War 
security thinking and practices, the ways in which the Cold War security 
discourse helped constitute the Cold War whilst seeking to explain it. A final 
implication of adopting an objectivist conception of theory was that the Western 
bias in Cold War security thinking was obscured and was presented as 'scientific' 
knowledge with universal validity. 
Ariel Levite (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993) 98-121. 
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The final section of the chapter analysed the approach of Cold War 
Security Studies to regional security in the Middle East in juxtaposition to the 
Arab national security discourse, the point being that much of the thinking done 
on regional security in the Middle East has been based on Western conceptions 
of what 'security' and the 'region' were. The chapter further maintained that even 
the very act of thinking about security in the Middle East, but not security in the 
Arab Regional System, gives away the Western origins of one's thinking about 
regional security. 
The Arab national security discourse, the chapter argued, criticised the 
top down, outward-directed and pro-status quo approach of the Middle Eastern 
security discourse. Instead it emphasised the need to look at the domestic 
economic and political dimensions of security. Students of Arab national security 
further maintained that the relationship between Arab states could not be 
understood as one of black box states balancing each other through military 
build-up. Their shared Arab identity, they argued, rendered the relations between 
Arab states different from any other group of states which did not share such 
similar characteristics. 
Whilst welcoming their critique of Cold War security discourse, the 
chapter argued that students of Arab national security, notwithstanding their 
awareness of the significance of domestic political and economic dimensions of 
security in accounting for the security needs and concerns of Arab states, 
nevertheless adopted an outward-directed, military-focused and zero sum 
conception of security when thinking about the security relations between Arab 
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states and their non-Arab neighbours. Furthermore, it was argued, non-military 
dimensions of security were almost always studied from a statist perspective, 
which resulted in the privileging of military and non-military threats to the security 
of Arab states whilst marginalizing the concerns of individuals and social groups. 
As Chapter 4 (practices) will show, issues such as food and water security were 
almost always approached from a statist perspective by treating states as primary 
referents and agents. This, in turn, is an illustration of the broader Critical 
Security Studies point that broadening security is not enough in itself; it should be 
compounded by the deepening move to become aware of the political character 
of thinking about security, moving below and beyond the state for alternative 
agents and referents, and suggesting alternative practices to meet a broadened 
agenda. 
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Chapter 4: Practices of Security During the Cold War 
Chapter 4 concludes Part I by bringing together the arguments made in 
Chapters 2 and 3 in an attempt to illustrate further the relationship between 
(inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security during the Cold War. 
Here I will look at Cold War security practices in the Middle East to show how 
they shaped and, in turn, were shaped by contending security discourses and 
spatial representations. The purpose here is not to compress all actions taken by 
numerous actors during this period into a chapter-with the risk of gross over- 
generalisation-but to direct attention to those practices that were designed to 
achieve regional security. As a result, not all practices will be covered. Rather, 
the chapter will focus on those attempts to address the problem of regional 
security. 
The chapter is organised along spatial lines. Security practices will be 
grouped in line with the spatial representation they shaped and were shaped by. 
The chapter will first look at security practices that were adopted within the 
framework provided by the dominant spatial representation, 'Middle East. ' These 
practices, it will be argued, were informed by a regional security approach 
shaped by Cold War Security Studies: the Middle Eastern security discourse. 
Then, the chapter will turn to look at the practices of regional actors that were 
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adopted to achieve security in the Arab Regional System in line with the precepts 
of the Arab national security discourse. The final section of the chapter will 
provide an account of the practical manifestations of the rivalry between these 
two contending discourses. 
Security in the Middle East 
This section will seek to show how the Middle Eastern security discourse shaped 
the practices of Britain and later the United States in their attempts to secure the 
Middle East. Although the focus of the discussion here will be on Cold War 
security practices, it is imperative to provide a brief account of the practices of 
British policy-makers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when 
the Middle East was invented. 
Britain in the Middle East until the Cold War 
Because of the significance of India for British interests, Britain had been 
concerned with the security of land and sea routes that led to the south of Asia 
since the very early days of its engagement. Indeed, as Elizabeth Monroe noted, 
it is difficult to exaggerate how significant India was for Britain until the Indian 
Independence Act of 1947.1 Britain's interest in the security of the Gulf increased 
gradually from the sixteenth century onwards in tandem with the intensification of 
its involvement in India. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 further added to 
the strategic importance of Egypt as well as the Gulf. The practices British 
Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971, rev. ed. (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1981) 11. 
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policy-makers adopted during this period to secure the Middle East included 
signing a'General Treaty of Peace' with Arab tribes of the Gulf to suppress piracy 
and slave traffic, the capture of Aden (1837) and assuming the responsibility for 
Bahrain's external affairs in return for the Sheikh of Bahrain's pledge not to 
prosecute war, piracy and slavery by sea (1880). 2 In the years to come, Aden 
and Bahrain (together with Cyprus) were to become significant staging posts to 
carry out air operations in the Middle East. 3 Then, from the late nineteenth 
century onwards, Britain's grip over the Gulf began to strengthen with the rulers 
of the emirates and sheikhdoms along the Gulf coast beginning to follow 
Bahrain's example and choosing to conduct their foreign relations through the 
British government. In 1899 a treaty was concluded with the Sheikh of Kuwait 
recognising it as an independent state under British protection. 
Britain's search for bases in the region culminated in its occupation of 
Egypt in 1882, symbolising a shift in British practices from, in Monroe's words, 
'security by influence to security by occupation. '4 Following Germany's 
acquisition of a concession from the Ottoman Empire to build a Berlin-Istanbul- 
Baghdad railway (1903), British policy-makers agreed with their French 
counterparts that Britain would exchange a 'free hand' in Egypt with a 'free hand' 
for France in Morocco (1907). This constituted a further shift in British security 
practices in that British policy-makers had, until then, avoided partitioning Middle 
Eastern interests with their rivals, preferring to maintain a weak but nevertheless 
2 Ritchie Ovendale, Longman Companion to the Middle East Since 1914,2nd ed. (London: 
Longman, 1998) 3-4. 
3 Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 183-4. 
4 Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 18. 
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intact Ottoman Empire. 5 The agreement with France was followed by a deal with 
Russia to divide Iran (Persia) into spheres of influences By the time World War I 
broke up, Britain had firmly established its control over the Middle East. The 
strengthening of British control over the Gulf and Egypt was followed by the 
construction of railways and roads in the region strengthening the links between 
the Mediterranean and the Gulf coasts. 7 These developments not only helped 
lump these chunks of territory in the minds of British policy-makers but also led to 
an increase in the region's strategic significance. 
The main reason for Britain's interest in securing the Middle East 
remained India's defence throughout this period. It should also be noted that by 
1914 oil discoveries had been made in Iran as well as the Arabian peninsula, 
which further increased the significance of the area in the eyes of British policy- 
makers. The Royal Navy had switched from coal to oil in 1912 and although it 
was the United States that supplied 80 percent of British demand at this stage, 
and notwithstanding the fact that it still was not known how rich the Middle 
Eastern reserves were, British policy-makers were nevertheless determined to 
keep a check on the region's oil reserves. 8 In 1914, the British government 
became the majority shareholder in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 9 The Anglo- 
Turkish Oil Company, which exploited the `hypothetical' oil fields of Iraq, was also 
controlled by Britain. The Iraqi oil fields were hypothetical because there had yet 
5 Ilber Ortayli, Imparatorluun En Uzun Yüzyili [The Longest Century of the Empire] (Istanbul: Hil, 
1983); Alan Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire (London: John Murray, 1992). 
e Ovendale, Middle East Since 1914,6; Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 19. 
' C. G. Smith, 'The Emergence of the Middle East, ' The Journal of Contemporary History 3: 3 
(1968) 5. 
8 Roger Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money. Power and War. 1902- 
1922 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) 97-100. 
In 1954, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company became the British Petroleum Company. See Monroe, 
Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 98. 
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to be discovered commercial quantities of oil. Still, this did not prevent British 
policy-makers from keeping Mosul (where some of these hypothetical oil wells 
were located) in Iraq when drawing the Iraqi-Turkish border (1926). 10 
With the outbreak of World War I, British and French policy-makers 
sought to support the war effort against the Ottoman Empire by encouraging Arab 
peoples in the region to revolt against the Sublime Porte (the imperial centre). At 
the same time, Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916), 
partitioning the Arabian peninsula into zones of influence, with France assuming 
control in the north and Britain in the south. " The terms of the agreement were 
not disclosed to Arab peoples who had agreed to incite the revolt in return for the 
promise of independence. 
It is difficult to exaggerate the disappointment Arab peoples who joined 
the revolt felt when they found out about the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement 
(which were disclosed by the Bolsheviks after they took power in Russia in 1917). 
The creation of separate states-Iraq, Jordan (under British mandate), Syria and 
Lebanon (under French mandate)-further deepened the disappointment of 
those Arab nationalists who assumed that Arab peoples would become 
independent as a unified entity after the war. 12 Needless to say, neither British 
nor French policy-makers were in favour of Arab unification. This was not 
necessarily because they opposed it in principle, but rather because each feared 
10 Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 103-4; Aptülahat Akin, Atatürk'ün Dis Politika 
Ilkeleri ve Diplomasisi [Atatürk's Principles in Foreign Policy-Making and Diplomacy] (Ankara: 
Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991) 126-31; George Lenczowksi, The Middle East in World 
Affairs, 4th ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980) 123. 
11 Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 32-7. 
12 Ahmed M. Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States: Wartime Diplomacy and 
130 
the other might enhance its influence if Arab peoples were to unite. Moreover, 
the partitioning of Arab peoples into separate states and the creation and 
consolidation of local nationalisms served the purposes of the mandate powers 
by making it easier to maintain stability. 13 
The inter-war period in the Middle East was dominated by two 
interrelated themes, namely, the struggle for Arab independence and the 
emerging deadlock over Palestine. Following the consolidation of the mandate 
system, the struggle for independence had become the main purpose of Arab 
nationalists, resulting in the marginalization of the calls for Arab unity. 14 The aim 
of the Jewish movement at this stage was to ensure unlimited immigration and 
settlement in Palestine. National independence within Palestine was also the aim 
of Palestinian Arabs. The point here is that although the urge to independent 
statehood took precedence over unification among Arab actors, the latter was 
never kept off the agendas for reasons to do with the salience of the Palestine 
issue. For, it was not only the fear of an emergent Jewish state, but also the 
plight of the Palestinian peoples that bolstered the Arab national security 
discourse. As will be seen in the next section, the strength of Arab peoples' 
feelings on the Palestinian issue made it impossible for regional policy-makers 
(even those who were rather sceptical of pan-Arabism such as the Saudi 
leadership) to ignore it. 
Inter-Arab Politics. 1941 to 1945 (London: Longman, 1977) 3; David Fromkin, A Peace to End 
All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East. 1914-22 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1989). 
13 Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 26-9. 
14 Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 5. 
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In order to cope with Arab actors' increasingly vociferous calls for 
independence and a solution to be found to the Palestinian conflict, British policy- 
makers followed a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, they granted nominal 
independence to Egypt, Iraq and Jordan and encouraged their leaders to 
consolidate their own regimes, the assumption being that the region would be 
easier to control if it remained divided into smaller units. In 1921, when setting up 
Jordan and Iraq as separate states, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill had 
reached an understanding with their leaders that they would contain the Arab 
nationalist movement and help maintain the status quo in the region. 15 On the 
other hand Britain also sought to ensure the co-existence of two separate 
communities in Palestine by perpetuating existing divisions and appearing to 
favour both sides. In other words, British efforts to stall Arab unification efforts 
were also designed to prevent the formation of a unified Arab front to confront the 
Jewish agency that represented the Jews in Palestine. 16 
Although the policy of divide-and-rule seems to have worked for a while, 
as the pace of Jewish migration into Palestine quickened in the mid-1930s, Arab 
disgruntlement over the existing situation reached its peak, which culminated in 
the Palestine Arab revolt of 1936 that lasted intermittently until 1939. By the time 
World War II broke out, an `uneasy truce'17 prevailed in Palestine. Outlining the 
situation in the region at the outbreak of the War, Ritchie Ovendale wrote the 
following: 
On outbreak of war against Germany, Iraq breaks off relations 
with Germany. Turkey is neutral. Those areas of the former 
15 Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 26. 
16 Mohammed Heikal, Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 
(London: Harper Collins, 1996) 50-85. 
17 Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 16. 
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Ottoman Empire under British or French control are non- 
belligerent but within the war zone. The Suez Canal and retention 
of India is of strategic and political importance to Britain. 
Protection of oil supplies from Iraq is also important. Egypt is 
Britain's Mediterranean base. The Allies regard the Middle East 
as secure. 18 
Judging by the top down, military-focused and outward-directed conception of 
regional security adopted by British (and other allied) policy-makers, the Middle 
East could indeed have been considered `secure'; regional stability was not under 
threat by any local or external actor. 
At the end of World War II, the significance of the Middle East further 
increased in the eyes of Western policy-makers. For Britain, following the India 
Independence Act of 1947 the Middle East had ceased to be important for where 
it was, that is, on the route to India, but what it was-a region housing a 
significant portion of the world's known oil reserves. Following the declaration of 
the Marshall Plan (1947), the stable flow of oil from the Middle East rose higher 
on the US security agenda as well. By now, the Middle East's contribution to 
world oil production had increased considerably. In 1938, one year before the 
start of World War II, the region's production amounted to less than one-twentieth 
of the world oil output. By 1948, the ratio had become one-eighth. 19 The security 
of the stable flow of oil, together with checking Soviet expansion and the well- 
being of the state of Israel, were to become the pillars of US approach to regional 
security in the Middle East. 
This period of increasing US interest in Middle Eastern oil coincided with 
the advances the Soviet government made to Iran and Turkey in the immediate 
18 Ovendale, The Middle East Since 1914,15. 
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aftermath of World War II. Although it could be (and has indeed been) argued 
that there was sparse evidence of Soviet expansionism in the Middle East until 
well after Khruschev's ascent to power, 20 security assessments of British and US 
policy-makers suggested otherwise. Indeed, the demands the Soviets made 
from Iran and Turkey in the immediate aftermath of World War II were considered 
as instances that signalled the emerging tension between the Soviet Union and 
the United States-a tension that culminated in the Cold War. 21 
Securing the Middle East During the Cold War 
The demands Soviet policy-makers made from Turkey in the aftermath of World 
War II included making the renewal of its 1925 Treaty of Friendship and 
Neutrality with Turkey conditional on the latter's surrendering of Kars and 
Ardahan, two eastern provinces, and the revision of the Montreaux convention 
governing the Turkish Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) so that they would 
gain a say in their control. Although Soviet policy-makers retreated from their 
demands, and denied any breach of Iranian sovereignty or attempts to change its 
regime during its occupation of the north of Iran towards the end of the War, both 
Iran and Turkey soon joined anti-Soviet alliances with the West. 22 This is not to 
suggest that it was purely Stalin's threats and demands that caused these two 
states to ally with the West. On the contrary, the Soviet threat seems to have 
19 Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 95. 
20 Adeed Dawisha, 'The Soviet Union in the Arab World: The Limits to Superpower Influence, ' in 
The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Perspectives and Policies, eds. Adeed Dawisha and 
Karen Dawisha (London: Heinemann, 1982) 8-23. 
21 Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and 
Di lý omacy in Iran. Turkey. and Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980). Also 
see Malcolm Yapp, 'Soviet Relations with Countries of the Northern Tier, ' in The Soviet Union in 
the Arab World, eds. Dawisha and Dawisha, 25-6. 
22 Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, 'Iran and the 
United States: An Experiment in Enduring Friendship, ' Middle East Journal 30 (Summer 1970) 
324-5. 
134 
been used by both Iranian and Turkish policy-makers for domestic security 
purposes, to curb down the `extreme' left and re-inscribe Iranian and Turkish 
state identities as staunch Western allies thereby strengthening their economic 
as well as military relations with the United States. 23 
Although both Iran and Turkey had their own reasons to join anti-Soviet 
alliances, the same could not be said about the Arab states of the region. Nor did 
Soviet policy-makers pursue a consistent policy towards Arab states well until the 
mid-1950s. It should also be noted that the Soviets had little direct economic 
interest in the region other than disrupting those of the West, 24 and complicating 
the US strategic position thereby drawing Western capability away from the 
Soviet Union. 25 
Even during the mid-1950s when Egypt turned to the Soviet Union, or the 
late 1960s when Soviet policy-makers adopted the policy of `Collective Security in 
Asia, '26 it was more the pressure US and British policy-makers put on regional 
states to join anti-Soviet alliances or to grant military bases, rather than mere 
Soviet inducement that enabled it to become a force in Arab politics. 27 For, the 
policy-makers of the newly independent Arab states in the Middle East had 
23 Omer Kürkgüo0lu, Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoüu'suna Karsi Politikasi [Turkish Policy Towards 
Arab Middle East] (Ankara: Seving Matbaasi, 1972) 36-7; Ramazani, 'Iran and the United 
States. ' 
24 Sharam Chubin, 'Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf, ' in Regional Security in the Middle 
East, ed. Charles Tripp (Aldershot: Gower with the IISS, 1984) 125-74; Dawisha, 'The Soviet 
Union in the Arab World, ' 10. 
25 Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 1987) 222. Also see pp. 183-210 and 220-6. 
26 Ian Clark, 'Collective Security in Asia: Towards a Framework for Soviet Diplomacy, ' The Round 
Table (October 1973) 473-81; Ken Booth and Lee Dowdy, 'Soviet Security Interests in the 
Indian Ocean Region, ' in Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, ed. David R. Jones, 6 (1982) 
342. 
27 Dawisha, 'The Soviet Union in the Arab World, ' 8. 
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already made it clear that they did not wish to enter into an alliance with any 
Western power. With the exception of Iraq, most Arab states did not perceive the 
Soviet Union or communist infiltration to be the most significant threat to their 
security. Indeed, many assumed that sheer geographical distance would deter 
the Soviet Union from undertaking any military attack. 28 
Even in Iraq (which was geographically closer to the Soviet Union) the 
anti-colonial and anti-Western mood of the public made it difficult to enter into an 
alliance with the West. The experience of the 1948 Treaty of Portsmouth signed 
between Iraq and Britain, which had to be repudiated within a week because of 
public outcry in Iraq, had showed how strong Arab public opinion was on the 
issue of any concessions given to former colonial powers. The event also 
showed how security conceptions of Iraqi peoples differed from their regime, 
which was in favour of the sustenance of close military links with Britain for 
domestic security purposes. It is also worth noting here that the 1948 protest by 
Iraqi peoples was one of the few instances of the successful employment of non- 
violent action. 29 
When it became clear that regional states would no longer be as 
subservient to British security interests as they were in the past, British policy- 
makers decided to adopt an alternative approach. Instead of seeking to maintain 
military bases by conducting bilateral agreements, they sought to create a 
regional security organisation to which Britain would be a party. It was hoped 
28 Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, 'Egyptian Foreign Policy, ' Foreian Affairs 56 (July 1978) 720. 
29 Brad Bennett, 'Arab-Muslim Cases of Nonviolent Struggle, ' in Arab Nonviolent Struggle in the 
Middle East, eds. Ralph E. Crow, Phillip Grant and Saad Eddin Ibrahim (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1990) 47-8. 
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that this would not only enable Britain to maintain access to military bases in the 
Middle East, but also do this in a cost-effective manner whilst avoiding the 
animosity of an increasingly bitter Arab public opinion. They also hoped that 
creating a region-wide defence organisation would be more attractive to Arab 
policy-makers than the maintenance of purely British military bases and bilateral 
alliances. The idea of forming a Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) 
modelled after the British Middle East Command of WWII emerged when thinking 
30 along these lines. 
British policy-makers were not mistaken in their calculations. The Iraqi 
government embraced the idea of re-packaging its treaty with Britain by putting it 
into a multilateral format as opposed to its current form (a bilateral treaty with a 
former colonial power). 31 Turkish policy-makers were also keen in participating in 
the formation of MEDO not so much because they believed such an organisation 
would help maintain regional security, but rather because they wished to 
strengthen their relations with the West (the United States in particular). As a 
part of the deal British and Turkish policy-makers struck in the aftermath of World 
War II, the former was to help Turkey become a NATO member in exchange for 
the latter helping set up a regional security organisation in the Middle East. 
During this period, Turkish policy-makers also sought to present Turkey as a 
'bridge' between the West and Middle East, an actor that could persuade half- 
hearted Arab policy-makers to join an alliance with the West. In other words, for 
30 Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 155-6; John C. Campbell, Defence of the Middle 
East: Problems of American Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958) 40. 
Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 284; Ara Sanjiyan, 'The Formulation of the 
Baghdad Pact, ' Middle Eastern Studies 33: 2 (April 1997) 235-7. 
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Turkish policy-makers the proposed Middle East regional security schemes 
constituted means to an end-that is, becoming a NATO member. 32 
It is significant to note here that in Spring 1951 Turkey was invited by the 
Egyptian government to join an alternative regional security scheme that would 
have brought together Turkey with the members of the Arab League to create a 
professedly non-aligned bloc in the region. The proposal failed to generate any 
interest among Turkish policy-makers who did not consider non-alignment a 
feasible policy option and had already set their eyes on NATO membership. 33 
Later in 1951, soon after its refusal of the Egyptian proposal, Turkey joined 
Britain, France and the United States to formulate a proposal for the creation of a 
Middle East Defence Organisation. The aim was to initially establish MEDO with 
five members (Britain, Egypt, France, Turkey and the United States) and 
gradually increase the membership. Egypt's participation in the scheme was 
crucial for its success, but this never occurred. The Egyptian government 
rejected the proposal within two of days of receiving it, making it evident that it 
was not given much consideration. 34 
Notwithstanding the Egyptian refusal, both Britain and Turkey were still in 
favour of setting up the Organisation basing it in Cyprus instead of Egypt. The 
United States, on the other hand, was sceptical as to whether a Middle East 
32 Kürkrüo§lu, Türkiye'nin Arap Ortado u'suna Karsi Politikas,, 36-7,71-2. Also see Kemal 
Karpat et al., Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975); Metin Tamkoc, The 
Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of National Security and Modernization of Turkey (Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 1976); Ali L. Karaosmanoglu and Seyfi Taýhan, eds., Middle East. 
Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1987); Süha Bölükbaýi, 
Türkiye ve Yakinindaki Ortadogu [Turkey and the Nearer Middle East] (Ankara: Di§ Politika 
Enstitüsü, 1992). 
33 Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 520. 
34 Campbell, Defence of the Middle East, 43. 
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Defence Organisation without Arab participation would serve the purpose of 
making the Middle East inviolable to Soviet intervention. 35 At this stage US 
policy-makers had become aware of the hesitance on the part of Arab states of 
entering into an alliance with their former colonial powers, France and Britain. 
However, they were still oblivious to the degree to which Arab governments did 
not accord the same significance to the Soviet threat as they did. 
The argument here is that behind Egypt's rejection of the MEDO proposal 
lay the discrepancy between contending approaches to regional security: 
Nasser's Arab national security discourse and the Middle Eastern security 
discourse of the United States. The MEDO initiative helped crystallise the 
differences between these two contending approaches in a way that had not 
become clear before, solidifying the Arab/non-Arab distinction that was to 
become central to Arab national security thinking. The regional actors' practices 
(which were shaped by the Arab national security discourse) will be looked at in 
the next section. It should suffice to note here that the fact that Nasser extended 
an invitation to Turkey, in early 1951, to join a non-aligned pact with the Arab 
League members indicated that he intended to construct a more inclusive 
regional security scheme with the inclusion of some non-Arab states. 36 In other 
words, at this stage, Nasser's Arab national security discourse was defined 
against former colonial powers, and not all non-Arab states. It took two more 
episodes, namely, the Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact, for the Arab/non- 
Arab distinction to become more central to his discourse. 
35 George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection (New York: StMartin's Press, 
1990), 153-4. 
139 
The proposal for the creation of a Northern Tier scheme was put forward 
by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who came to conclude that those 
states that had the Soviet Union as their northern neighbour were more 
'conscious' of the Soviet threat and were therefore more ready to enter into 
bilateral or multilateral military assistance agreements, if not to join regional 
security scheme with the West. 37 The assumption behind Dulles' thinking, an 
assumption shared by Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, was that those 
Arab states (such as Egypt) that did not prioritise the Soviet threat were not 
aware of what the 'real' threats to their security were and therefore not ready for 
cooperation with the West. 38 Dulles hoped that Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Pakistan 
could be convinced to enter into an anti-Soviet alliance, thereby creating the 
Northern Tier, a regional security scheme made up of an association of local 
forces under an indigenous command. 39 The provision of US military assistance 
was hoped to constitute enough of a reason for these states to join the scheme. 
US policy-makers were encouraged in their thinking by their Turkish and 
Iraqi counterparts who were keen to receive US military and economic aid. 4° 
Indeed, following Dulles' tour in 1953 of the Northern Tier, Turkish and Iraqi 
policy-makers took the initiative and began to look for ways of cooperation. In 
April 1954 Turkey and Pakistan signed a defence cooperation agreement. In 
February 1955 Turkey and Iraq signed a separate text agreeing to 'cooperate for 
their security and defence. ' Later in the year, the Turco-Iraqi agreement became 
38 Sanjian, 'The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact, ' 238. 
37 Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 283. 
38 Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, 70; Sanjian, 'The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact, ' 
231; McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection. 
39 Sanjian, 'The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact, ' 227. 
ao Sanjian, 'The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact. ' 
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the Baghdad Pact, with Pakistan, Britain and Iran's adherence. In short, 
initiatives made for the creation of a low-profile Northern Tier scheme led to the 
formation of the more ambitious Baghdad Pact. Hesitant to further alienate the 
Egyptian government the United States declined to join the Pact, but maintained 
'full cooperation, ' which meant that it provided economic and military aid. 41 With 
US membership to the Baghdad Pact not forthcoming, Britain's membership put 
the Iraqi government in a very difficult position by exposing it to the criticism that 
the Pact allowed Britain to 'leave by the door but come back by the window. '42 
The disgruntlement among Iraqi population culminated in the Iraqi coup of 1958 
and the fall of the Hashemite dynasty that had been installed in power by Britain 
in 1921. 
Following the Iraqi revolution, Baghdad Pact headquarters was moved 
from Baghdad to Ankara. The name was changed from the 'Baghdad Pact' into 
'Central Treaty Organisation' (CENTO) 43 It is difficult to know whether the 
Baghdad Pact/CENTO ever served as a deterrent against potential Soviet attack. 
It is highly likely that its main contribution remained in the field of development, by 
providing economic as well as technological aid transfer to member states. 44 It 
supported member-states in their state building efforts thereby helping raise the 
standard of living as well as maintaining regime security. 
41 Nigel John Ashton, 'The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo- 
American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955-1958, ' Review of International Studies 25 (1993) 
123-37. 
42 Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 286. 
43 Guy Hadley, CENTO-The Forgotten Alliance: A Study of the Central Treaty Organisation 
(Sussex: Institute for the Study of International Organisation, University of Sussex, 1971). 
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Although the Baghdad Pact/CENTO had little practical impact from 1959 
onwards, it remained a symbol of the discrepancy between the two contending 
approaches to regional security in the years to come. Writing in 1978, Mohamed 
Hassanein Heikal pointed to the Iraqi coup and the demise of the Baghdad Pact 
as a decisive moment of clash between the two security discourses. In the 
following three decades, the Arab national security discourse failed to prevail 
over that of the Middle East or put the aims behind the formation of the Arab 
League Collective Security Pact into practice (see the next section). US policy- 
makers made no more attempts to create an all-encompassing regional security 
scheme, but concentrated on key states, namely Iran, Turkey and Israel 
(increasingly on the latter from the 1970s onwards) whilst trying to prevent the 
prevalence of Nasser's approach to regional security. 
The argument so far should not be taken to suggest that the practices of 
British and later US policy-makers were designed purely to divide-and-rule and to 
maintain regional stability. On the contrary, British practices during the colonial 
period included building up an infrastructure as well as enhancing transportation 
and communication links between different parts of the region. Although these 
were done partly to make the control of the region easier, enhanced 
communication and transportation facilities also helped strengthen the pan-Arab 
movement by enabling peoples to become more aware of their shared 
characteristics and cooperate and collaborate at the grassroots level 45 Later, 
during the 1950s, successive US governments poured military as well as 
economic aid into the region in the attempt to win hearts and minds. The 
45 Cecil A. Hourani, 'The Arab League in Perspective, ' Middle East Journal 1 (April 1947) 127. 
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economic development of Turkey, for instance, owed a lot to US aid. However, 
notwithstanding such constructive attempts to enhance Western influence in the 
region, other practices such as the maintenance of the mandate system or 
attempts to bloc Arab unity efforts alienated many Arab actors who ranked de- 
colonisation through closer cooperation and collaboration among Arab actors 
high on their security agenda. The next section will look at the practices of 
regional actors that were shaped by and, in turn, shaped the Arab Regional 
System, before presenting, in the third section, an overview of the practical 
manifestations of the competition between two contending security discourses. 
Security in the Arab Regional System 
It has so far been argued that the security practices adopted by the United States 
and its allies during the Cold War were shaped by and, in turn, shaped the Middle 
East security discourse. It was further argued that some, such as Iraqi, Iranian 
and Turkish policy-makers, also shaped their practices in line with the Middle 
Eastern security discourse, albeit for reasons of their own-be it rapid 
development with the help of US economic and military aid and/or regime 
security. Arab policy-makers, on the other hand, with the exception of their Iraqi 
counterparts, were rather hesitant to enter into anti-Soviet alliances with the 
West. There were three main reasons for this. First, they did not consider the 
threat posed by the Soviet Union so significant as to be ranked above all other 
security concerns. In response to Dulles' invitation to join the Northern Tier 
scheme, Nasser is reported to have said: 
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How can I go to my people and tell them I am disregarding a killer 
with a pistol sixty miles from me at the Suez Canal to worry about 
someone who is holding a knife 5000 miles away? 46 
Nasser clearly saw the cessation of British presence in Egypt as the priority as far 
as the stability of his regime was concerned. This ties into the second reason 
why Arab policy-makers were hesitant to join anti-Soviet alliances in that they 
were more concerned with issues of de-colonisation and achieving political and 
economic sovereignty 47 Saudi Arabia and Yemen did not have a colonial history, 
but were also interested in issues of de-colonisation, particularly because of their 
interest in the Palestinian peoples' predicament, which constituted the third 
reason why the Soviet threat did not dominate regional security agendas. The 
Palestine issue occupied many Arab peoples' minds making it very difficult for 
even conservative regimes not known for their pan-Arab credentials (such as that 
of Saudi Arabia) to keep it off their own security agendas. 
Indeed, as Edward Said has noted, the issue of Israel/Palestine has been 
'a symbol for struggle against social injustice' in the Arab world. During the 
Egyptian student demonstrations of the early 1970s, wrote Said, a frequent 
slogan was: 'We are all Palestinians. '48 The Israel/Palestine issue and the very 
inability of Arab regimes to find a solution to the plight of the Palestinian peoples 
was used to voice a number of other issues such as development, economic and 
social justice, democratisation. Given the linkages Arab peoples established 
between the question of Israel/Palestine and that of regional security, it is no 
46 H. W. Brands, Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire 1918- 
1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 277. 
47 Steve Niva, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East, ' in 
Cultures of Insecurity: States. Communities and the Production of Danger, eds. Jutta Weldes, 
Mark Laffey, Hugo Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999) 147-72. 
4s Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine, 2nd ed. (London: Vintage, 1992) 125. 
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wonder that schemes such as MEDO or the Baghdad Pact (which were not only 
initiated by the former colonial powers but also threatened to marginalize issues 
that were on top of regional peoples' security agendas) were deemed 
unacceptable. So much so that, even those more conservative states, which 
practically distanced themselves from the Arab national security discourse from 
the late 1950s onwards, found it difficult to publicly denounce its precepts. The 
Iraqi regime, which did denounce the main principle of Arab national security by 
joining the Baghdad Pact, was toppled by its own peoples in 1958. 
As noted in Chapter 3, during their struggle against former colonial 
powers, many Arab actors assumed that their 'shared Arab identity generated a 
common definition of what threatened their interests. '49 The leaders of the pan- 
Arab movement, when they agreed to rebel against the Ottoman Empire during 
World War I, believed that Arab peoples would become independent as a unified 
entity in exchange for their efforts. The partitioning of the Arabian peninsula into 
separate (but not yet sovereign or independent) states and their allocation to 
Britain and France as the mandatory powers, and the reluctance of British policy- 
makers to prevent the inflow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine or purchase 
land away from the Palestinians, only added to the disillusionment of Arab 
peoples and increased the calls for a unified Arab front to be formed to address 
these issues. 
However, although the appeal of Arab unification for Arab peoples made 
it difficult for regional regimes to openly oppose it, they made little effort to think 
49 Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999) 223. 
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of ways of achieving Arab unity. On the contrary, Arab leaders were busy 
minimising the threats posed to their regimes by their fellow Arab leaders. In 
1936, to minimise such interference in each others' internal affairs, Saudi Arabia 
and Iraq concluded the 'Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance' to which 
Yemen acceded one year later. Although the treaty was presented as comprising 
'collective security arrangements, ' it did not amount to more than an affirmation of 
respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and a declaration of 
intention to cooperate closely on all fields, including security (understood as 
defence). 50 The formation of the Arab League was to constitute a firmer step 
taken in the same direction. 
As noted above, the accelerating pace of Jewish immigration into 
Palestine during the 1930s had further increased the calls for Arab unity and 
accelerated Arab actors' efforts to come up with ideas as to what shape Arab 
unification should take. The 1936 Arab revolt in Palestine was one manifestation 
of the struggle on the part of Arab actors to come up with ways of countering the 
increasing pace of Jewish immigration and land purchases which signalled the 
establishment of a Jewish state. Conferences organised by Britain during the 
1930s and 1940s to discuss the Palestine issue increased Arab representatives' 
awareness of their differences whilst helping them realise the need to create an 
Arab body to represent their views. 51 
50 It is interesting to note here that the draft of the treaty included a stronger clause on security 
cooperation, which was removed from the final agreement following objection by British Foreign 
Office. See Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 7. 
51 Paul Seabury, 'The League of Arab States: Debacle of a Regional Arrangement, ' International 
Organization 3: 4 (1949) 636; Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 8-10. 
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The Alexandria Protocol marked the beginning of the road that led to the 
establishment of such a body, the League of Arab States (LAS). The Protocol 
was signed in 7 October 1944 at a meeting of a preparatory committee 
comprising representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria and Yemen. 52 It was declared that the signatories to the Protocol were 
anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab 
countries and to direct them toward the welfare of the Arab world, 
to improve its conditions, insure its future, and realize its hopes 
and aspirations. 53 
As Ahmed Gomaa noted, the document, agreed after long deliberations, was 
partly a statement of intentions, and partly an attempt to appeal to Arab public 
opinion. 54 The above-quoted article, when considered together with the 
signatories' pledge that 'in no case the adoption of a foreign policy which may be 
prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed' 
is an early manifestation of the interplay between state security and societal 
security in the Arab world (see Chapter 3). The point here is that the Alexandria 
Protocol had given priority to the principle of sovereignty but nevertheless 
mentioned Arab unity as a long-term objective. The LAS Pact was to put further 
emphasis on the former whilst omitting the latter55-an act that indicated how 
jealously the principle of sovereignty was guarded by Arab policy-makers. Even 
the declaration of intent to coordinate foreign policies, which was stipulated in the 
Protocol, was removed from the LAS Pact. 
52 For a detailed account of the negotiations, see Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab 
States, 153-234. 
53 'The Alexandria Protocol'; available from http: //192.203.180.62/mias/alexp. html; Internet; 
accessed October 8,1999. 
54 Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 226. 
55 Hourani, 'The Arab League in Perspective, ' 132-3. 
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The League of Arab States was set up a year later, with the Pact of the 
League being signed on 22 March 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, and Syria. Yemen signed later in the year. It was noted in the preamble 
that the League was being formed in response to 'the wishes of Arab public 
opinion in all Arab lands. ' The Pact stipulated that the League would 
support and stabilize [the ties which link the Arab states] upon a 
basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these 
states, and to direct their efforts towards the common good of all 
the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security 
of their future, the realization of their aspirations and hopes. 56 
Regarding the issue of inter-Arab relations, the main principle was that of non- 
intervention in the internal affairs of member states. Since it was the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention that were given priority, as noted above, 
debates on the issue of peaceful settlement of disputes proved controversial. 
After a lengthy debate between those in favour of establishing a strong 
machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes and those who opposed to the 
idea, it was agreed that the League's jurisdiction would not be compulsory over 
such disputes. 57 This relatively little evidence of attention paid to dispute- 
resolution within the region betrayed an outward-directed conception of security. 
As will be seen below, the Arab League Collective Security Pact, signed in 1950 
in the attempt to relieve the deficiencies of the LAS Pact, also focused on the 
defence of Arabs (inside) from non-Arabs (outside). 
56 'The Charter of the Arab League'; available from http: //192.203.180.62/mlas/charter. html; 
Internet; accessed October 9,1999. 
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However, notwithstanding this stress on statist concerns, in 1948 the 
Arab states joined forces to fight on behalf of the Palestinians-an action that 
showed how Arab policy-makers could not afford to be seen as leaving other 
Arab peoples to their fate. The argument here is not that the 1948 campaign 
undertaken by Arab states to help Palestinian peoples (or the 1967 and 1973 
wars, for that matter) constituted an act of altruism that put the security of their 
respective states in danger-although the war did nothing to enhance their 
credibility regarding their ability to undertake effective military action. Rather the 
argument is that although Arab policy-makers prioritised the security of their 
respective states, they nevertheless found it difficult to act in total defiance of the 
concerns voiced by Arab non-state actors. 
Indeed, although Arab policy-makers' practices were mostly statist, 
undertaken to enhance their own regime security under the mantle of state 
security, it is impossible to deny the fact that they were also concerned, if only at 
the discursive level, with the well-being of Arab peoples. The place accorded to 
the Palestine issue on top of Arab national security agendas (stated repeatedly at 
the end of LAS meetings since the 1940s) when viewed against the background 
of the decrease in the number of concrete actions taken to find a solution to the 
plight of the Palestinian peoples, could indeed be viewed as an indication of this 
delicate balancing act many Arab policy-makers have engaged in the second half 
of the twentieth century. 
The Palestine issue was not only a flag non-state actors raised in voicing 
their multiple security concerns, but also the source of a military threat, that is, 
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the state of Israel. The unsuccessful military experience of 1948 and the 
formation of Israel in 1949 duly led LAS-members to re-think the military 
dimension of their organisation. This culminated in the signing of the Arab 
League Collective Security Pact (ALCSP) in 1950. However, although the 
ALCSP was partly a response to the realisation of the need to create an effective 
collective security scheme to face an increasingly intransigent Israel, it was also a 
reaction to the advances Britain and the United States made to Arab policy- 
makers for the creation of the MEDO. In this sense, the ALCSP was aimed to 
emphasise the intention of LAS-members to remain non-aligned. Lastly, another 
consideration behind the conclusion of the ALCSP was to integrate the principles 
and vocabulary laid out by the United Nations so that the LAS would qualify as a 
'Regional Arrangement' according to the UN Charter. 58 
Thus, ALCSP sought to turn LAS into a collective security organisation to 
organise joint defence against external threats. Accordingly a Joint Defence 
Council (comprising the foreign ministers and ministers of defence of the 
signatory states), a Permanent Military Commission (composed of 
representatives of the general staffs of the signatory states) and a Consultative 
Military Council (composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the signatory states) were 
established. An annex to the ALSCP in 1950 provided for the appointment of a 
joint Arab commander-in-chief in the event of a war. The Pact did not envisage 
the creation of a permanent military command. 59 
5a Hassauna, The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes, 13. 
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Given the competition between the Middle Eastern and Arab national 
security discourses, the creation of the League of Arab States and especially the 
signing of the ALCSP signalled Arab actors' determination to prevail. The 
following section will present an account of the practical manifestations of the 
rivalry between the two discourses. 
A Struggle for Prevalence 
The attempts to create regional security schemes that have been looked at so far 
were intended to illustrate how the two contending approaches to regional 
security solidified in the early years of the Cold War. The Middle East Defence 
Organisation, the Northern Tier, and the Baghdad Pact were all designed to 
secure the Middle East, maintain access to bases in the region, and to make the 
region inviolable to Soviet influence or intervention. With the entry of the Soviet 
Union into the Middle East following the Egyptian-Czech arms deal struck in 
1955, checking Soviet influence among Arab states became an ever higher 
priority for US policy-makers. 
As noted in Chapter 3, Nasser, following his rise to power, adopted a 
more societal-focused conceptualisation of Arab national security, which 'came to 
coincide with the discourses of insecurity that informed the many pan-Arabist 
groups and activists who were challenging regional elites and Western colonial 
rule, ' as Steve Niva has noted. 60 It could be argued that it was British and US 
policy of making economic and military aid conditional on Egypt's joining regional 
151 
security schemes that led Nasser to adopt a broader security agenda, defining 
anti-colonialism, political and economic sovereignty as well as the plight of 
Palestinian peoples as Arab national security issues. 61 As was the case with 
many non-state actors, Nasser also used the Israel/Palestine issue to flag other 
security concerns. 
It should be noted here that until the mid-1950s, US policy-makers had 
shied away from selling arms to Israel or its Arab counterparts in accordance with 
the Tripartite Declaration agreed among British, French and US policy-makers 
(1950). Assuming that the conflict could be managed if the parties to the 
Israel/Palestine conflict were prevented from entering into an arms race the three 
allies had agreed to consider all applications for arms or war materials by these 
countries in view of their needs for the purposes of 'legitimate self-defence. '62 
However, each of the three parties had different ideas as to what 'legitimate self- 
defence' might constitute, and France continued to ship arms (through non- 
official means) to Israel. According to All Eddin Hillal Dessouki, this added to 
Nasser's disillusionment with the United States, leading to the 1955 Czech arms 
deal. 63 
Space does not allow me to go into the details of how the tension caused 
by the Soviet arms deal, US refusal to fund the Aswan dam project and Nasser's 
60 Niva, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East, ' 161. 
61 Niva, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East, ' 161. Also see 
Majid Khadduri, 'The Problem of Regional Security in the Middle East, ' Middle East Journal 11 
(June 1957) 12-22. 
62 Ovendale, The Middle East Since 1914,236. 
63 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, 'Nasser and the Struggle for Independence, ' in Suez 1956: The Crisis 
and its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989) 36. 
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nationalisation of the Suez Canal culminated in the 1956 War. 64 It should suffice 
to say that the war further increased Nasser's standing in the Arab world and 
gave credence to his conceptualisation of Arab national security discourse in the 
competition between two contending discourses. The support Soviet policy- 
makers provided to their Egyptian counterparts during the war, in turn, made it 
relatively easier for them to enhance their influence over some other Arab states. 
However, the increase in Nasser's stature, perhaps paradoxically, 
enabled the United States to enhance its own influence over conservative Arab 
regimes. The policy-makers of conservative Arab states were sceptical of 
Nasser's broader conception of security and felt threatened by the emphasis he 
put on its societal dimension. Indeed, following Suez, Nasser adopted 
increasingly more interventionist practices in an attempt to nudge conservative 
regimes into line with his policies. Nasser's interventions were not military but 
'symbolic. ' They were designed to use his influence over Arab public opinion to 
shape the practices of other governments. 65 In his addresses to Arab peoples 
broadcast on Radio Cairo, Nasser urged Arab peoples to rebel against their 
leaders whenever the latter engaged in a policy that threatened Arab national 
security. 66 
By the end of the 1950s, the increase in Nasser's standing in the Arab 
world resulted in a division of Arab regimes into two camps: conservative (Saudi 
64 Dessouki, 'Nasser and the Struggle for Independence, ' 31-41. 
65 Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics. 
66 According to Rana Kabbani, in order to increase the number of listeners to his broadcasts, 
Nasser used to ask for the programmes of famous Egyptian singer Umm Khaltum to be 
scheduled immediately before or after his addresses. 'Distant Divas, ' on BBC Radio 4,24 
October 1998,11: 00pm. 
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Arabia, and other Gulf states, Iraq [until the 1958 coup]) and radical (Egypt, Syria, 
Iraq [after the coup]). 67 Saudi Arabia took the lead in distancing itself from the 
Arab national security discourse and adopting that of the United States. The 
period of Saudi-US rapprochement also coincided with the Eisenhower Doctrine 
(1957) that was designed to reassure regional states that their sovereignty and 
independence would be protected by the United States 'against the predatory 
desires of "international communism, " i. e. the Soviet Union. '68 The Doctrine 
symbolised a shift in US policy-making from seeking to maintain regional security 
via constructing regional security schemes to that of supporting critical allies in 
the attempt to maintain regional stability. The United States pledged to provide 
military and economic aid to Middle Eastern states in return for their endorsement 
of the Doctrine. Eventually, Baghdad Pact-members together with Lebanon and 
Libya endorsed the doctrine and received aid. Jordan denounced 'international 
communism' but avoided endorsing the doctrine. Israel, at this stage, was not 
supplied with arms by the United States so as not to destroy what was trying to 
be achieved with the new policy aimed to gain the friendship of conservative Arab 
regimes. Although the Saudi policy-makers did not publicly endorse the Doctrine, 
they took up the opportunity provided by this shift in US policy-making. King 
Saud visited the United States in January 1957 and was 'persuaded to reassess 
his policy. '69 
The Saudi change of heart constituted another turning point in the 
struggle for prevalence between the two competing discourses. The division of 
67 At this stage many Gulf states were not yet independent. Jordan, on the other hand, tried to 
balance the two camps. 
e6 Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, 122. 
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Arab states into 'conservative' and 'radical' camps was followed by the members 
of the conservative camp moving to shape their practices more in line with the 
Middle Eastern security discourse whilst purporting to uphold the Arab national 
security at the discursive level. This, in turn, led to the emergence of what 
Bahgat Korany called the gap between 'say and 'do' in Arab politics, the 
discrepancy between the discourse of Arab national security and the practice of 
state security. 70 The practices Saudi policy-makers adopted from the late 1950s 
onwards included concluding significant arms deals with the United States and 
Britain. They also launched a diplomatic campaign to alienate other Arab policy- 
makers from the 'radical' camp. 71 
Saudi policy-makers also sought to introduce another discourse, namely 
an Islamist discourse on security. Instead of using LAS summits to discuss 
issues, King Faisal began to call for the convening of an Islamic summit. Despite 
Nasser's objection, he took the opportunity provided by the fire at Jerusalem's Al- 
Aqsa Mosque to convene an Islamic Conference in September 1969, seeking to 
create an anti-Israeli bloc under its leadership. 72 Considering the centrality of the 
Israel/Palestine issue to the Arab national security discourse, the Saudi action 
constituted an attempt to appropriate it by interpreting the issue within its self- 
styled Islamist security discourse. 73 Although the origins of what is referred to 
here as the Islamist security discourse go back as early as the mid-1960s, it will 
be dealt with in further detail in Part II, the point being that it was in the post-Cold 
ed. Tripp, 2. 
70 Bahgat Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism, ' in The Arab 
World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 174. 
71 On Saudi policies, see Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). 
72 Dawisha, 'Saudi Arabia's Search for Security, ' 3-4. 
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War era that this perspective became more prominent. It should suffice to say 
here that Saudi security practices shaped by the Islamist discourse included 
providing aid to Islamist groups and movements abroad. In the 1970s, when 
Saudi Arabia was experiencing a boom in its oil-based income, the total value of 
grants and soft loans it promised to Third World states was second only to that of 
the United States. 74 
The 1960s also witnessed US policy-makers' re-conceptualisation of the 
Middle Eastern security discourse (already signalled by the Eisenhower Doctrine) 
to put more emphasis on the regime security of the conservative states. This re- 
conceptualisation resulted in a compartmentalisation of US regional security 
thinking and practices in that they increasingly began to treat the regional status 
quo and the security of oil reserves in isolation from their other concerns, those of 
the Israel/Palestine issue and Israel's security. The crystallisation of this policy 
was observed during 1973-74 when US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tried 
to de-link his efforts to bring an end to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the lifting of 
the OPEC oil embargo (which symbolised a rare moment of collaboration 
between the members of the radical and conservative camps). 75 This policy of 
de-linking different dimensions of regional insecurity also had to do with 
increasing Israeli influence on US policy-making. Israel's influence on US 
policies had been on the rise since the 1967 war, when it proved itself to be a 
strong and dependable ally. Israeli policy-makers had for long sought to de-link 
the Israel/Palestine issue from other issues of concern to the United States and 
73 Niva, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East, ' 165-70. 
74 Dawisha, 'Saudi Arabia's Search for Security, ' 19. 
75 R. K. Ramazani, 'The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement: Towards an Integrated U. S. 
Policy in the Middle East, ' Middle East Policy vi: 4 (1998) 49-50; Heikal, Secret Channels, 214- 
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its Arab allies. The US policy-makers' compartmentalisation of their security 
thinking and practices to suit Israel's interests showed how detrimental Israel's 
military successes in 1967 and 1973 had been for the prestige of Arab states. 
The beginning of the end for Arab national security discourse was 
marked by Egypt's decision following the 1973 war, to break ranks with other 
Arab states and sign a separate peace deal with Israel. 76 Considering the fact 
that Egypt had flown the flag of Arab national security during Nasser's 
presidency, its move towards more statist policies constituted a more significant 
blow than the `loss' of Saudi Arabia. 
The final decisive blow to the Arab national security discourse was struck 
by the members of the conservative bloc who decided to form the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. " Although the formation of the GCC 
followed a heightening of the tension in the region as a result of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan (1978), the Iranian revolution (1978-79) and the Iran-Iraq 
war (1980-88), it could be argued that its formation would not have been 
considered possible had the Arab national security discourse not lost its grip over 
Arab public opinion. Although GCC-members maintained that their action did not 
constitute a breach of the precepts of Arab national security, the security interests 
of the Gulf states clearly were more in tune with the Middle Eastern security 
discourse that prioritised the maintenance of the secure flow of oil and military 
44. 
76 Heikal, Secret Channels, 180-289. 
77 Gulf Cooperation: The Path to Progress. Prosperity and Unity (n. p.: Ministry of Information, 
State of Qatar, 1983). 
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stability. One bone of contention between the United States and GCC-members 
remained the status of Israel in the region. 
During the 1980s, the Gulf policy-makers sought to set a clear blue line 
between state security and Arab national security. Arguably, even the massive 
amounts of economic aid they provided to the Palestinian cause could be 
explained by their concerns about regime security. Given the centrality of the 
Palestinian issue to the Arab national security discourse, to be seen to be 
backing the PLO was one way of enhancing their legitimacy in the eyes of their 
citizens as well as other Arab actors. Such legitimacy was urgently needed given 
their stance towards the predicament of their poorer brethren during the 1980s. 
Indeed, during this period the practices of Arab policy-makers increasingly 
discredited the spirit of Arab national security; their discursive practices remained 
the only way to uphold the idea of Arab national security at the governmental 
level. 
Conclusion 
This chapter concludes Part I: 'Pasts, ' which has been devoted to an 
investigation of the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions 
and theories and practices of security in during the Cold War. Chapter 2 
(representations) introduced two spatial representations, the Middle East and the 
Arab Regional System, which, it was argued, were rooted in contending 
approaches to regional security. Middle East is a geopolitical concept, the 
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chapter argued, invented to help British and later US policy-makers to think about 
and organise action in that part of the world. Two Egyptian scholars, Dessouki 
and Matar, pointed to the Western strategic origins of the Middle East and 
proposed an alternative, that of the Arab Regional System, which, in turn, was 
shaped by an alternative approach to security, that of Arab national security. 
Chapter 3 (theories) sought to provide an account of the security 
discourses that shaped these representations. The Middle East, it was argued, 
was shaped by Cold War Security Studies with its military-focused, outward- 
directed and stability-oriented approach to security in theory and practice. 
Chapter 3 also presented Cold War critiques of Security Studies in an attempt to 
show that alternative ways of thinking about security existed all throughout this 
period. The Arab national security discourse was one such alternative, 
generated by those Arab actors critical of US approach to regional security. The 
Arab national security discourse criticised military-focused and outward-directed 
character of the Middle Eastern security discourse and called for more attention 
to be paid to issues such as economic and political sovereignty, decolonisation, 
and state building. 
Chapter 4 (practices) looked at the practical manifestations of these 
contending approaches to security. The aim here was to show how different 
security practices were shaped by and, in turn, shaped contending security 
discourses and spatial representations. It was argued that the three regional 
security schemes attempted to be created by the United States and its allies were 
all military alliances designed to secure the Middle East from outside often 
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regardless of local actors concerns. The British and US policy-makers' reasoning 
behind the creation of such regional security schemes, instead of backing the 
League of Arab States, it was argued, was to prevent the prevalence of the Arab 
national security discourse, which stressed issues such as de-colonisation, state- 
building, economic and political sovereignty, and the plight of Palestinian 
peoples-none of which were high on the US regional security agenda. 
The 1950s and 1960s, argued Chapter 4, were characterised by a 
struggle for predominance between these two contending approaches, which 
were competing to shape the practices of multiple regional actors. Nasser's 
security practices during this period were designed to nudge conservative 
regimes into adopting his own broader and societal-focused conceptualisation of 
Arab national security-a direction that they were hesitant to take. This policy 
backfired in the long run with the policy-makers of the conservative Gulf regimes 
breaking rank with their more radical Arab counterparts and choosing to shape 
their practices in line with the US Middle Eastern security discourse. 
Following Nasser's death, a more statist conceptualisation of Arab 
national security prevailed. Many Arab policy-makers, including those in the Gulf, 
nevertheless continued to use the language of Arab national security in the 
attempt to enhance regime security. Such legitimacy was urgently needed given 
their stance towards the predicament of their poorer brethren during the 1980s. 
As Yezid Sayigh noted, during this period 'famine was allowed to sweep Sudan 
and Somalia, locusts and drought to attack Yemen and Tunisia. Sudan and 
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Egypt tottered constantly on the edge of bankruptcy. i78 In the attempt to prioritise 
state and regime security Arab policy-makers failed to adopt long-term policies 
that could have addressed the inter-related issues of water and food security that 
were high up on the security agendas of regional peoples. The ways in which the 
Arab policy-makers tried to cope with these issues were manifestations of 
regional policy-makers' zero sum and statist conceptions and practices of 
security. This argument begs further clarification. 
There are two dimensions to the problem of food security in the Middle 
East. On the one hand there are the oil-rich states of the Gulf such as Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, which are not self-sufficient but have the financial resources 
to pay for the feeding of their population. For example the Saudi policy-makers, 
as a part of the effort to achieve food security, sought to increase the country's 
wheat production to the point of self-sufficiency by paying their farmers six times 
the world market price. Needless to say, whilst doing this they caused further 
depletion of scarce non-renewable water resources in this and region. 79 
On the other hand there were states such as Egypt and Sudan that had a 
less-developed agricultural sector and a weaker economy. 80 These poorer Arab 
countries suffered from policy failures of the past such as lack of support for and 
heavy taxation of agriculture, as well as the increase in population, which has 
made it impossible for them to feed their population however much they increase 
78 Yezid Sayigh, 'The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab Regional Order Failed, ' International Affairs 67: 1 
(1991) 501. 
79 Martha Wenger and Joe Stark, 'The Food Gap in the Middle East, ' Middle East Report 
(September-October 1990) 15. 
8° Karen Pfeifer, 'Does Food Security Make a Difference? Algeria, Egypt and Turkey in 
Comparative Perspective, ' in The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World, eds. 
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food production. 81 The issue of water scarcity only added to the predicament of 
these countries' already troubled agricultural sectors. 
Therefore, one dimension of food security in the Arab world was that 
faced by the poor peoples of the region, such as those in Sudan who sold their 
labour to purchase food necessary for survival. 82 The other dimension was the 
case of some Arab regimes, which were worried that the 'food weapon' might be 
used against them (as was the case with Iraq during the Gulf crisis) and therefore 
have adopted not-so-cost-effective techniques and have sought to grow water- 
intensive products to achieve agricultural 'self-sufficiency' and food security. 83 
The significance of all this is that, notwithstanding the premises and promises of 
the Arab national security discourse, the practices through which regional states 
tried to address threats to water and food security was symptomatic of their 
unilateral (as opposed to cooperative), zero sum (as opposed to common), and 
statist (as opposed to societal or individual-focused) conceptions and practices of 
security. 84 This is also an illustration of the Critical Security Studies point that 
adopting broader conceptions of security is not enough in itself. After all, the 
Saudi regime was cognisant of the economic, political as well as environmental 
dimensions of security, but conceptualised them from a statist perspective and 
adopted unilateral practices to address them. Taking re-thinking security 
seriously involves seeking to identify and overcome the shortcomings of Cold 
Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble and Rex Brynen (London: Macmillan, 1993) 127-44. 
81 Mark Duffield, 'Absolute Distress: Structural Causes of Hunger in Sudan, ' Middle East Report 
(September-October 1990) 4-5; Pfeifer, 'Does Food Security Make a Difference? ' 138. 
82 Duffield, 'Absolute Distress, ' 4-5. 
83 Pfeifer, 'Does Food Security Make a Difference? ' 142. 
84 See, for example, Rana Haidar, 'Women and Food Security, ' Civil Society 55: 6 (1996) [On-line 
journal]; available from http: //www. ned. org/page_3/ICDS/1996/aug/woman. html; Internet; 
accessed March 3,1998. 
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War approaches to security in theory and practice. Part II will further develop 
these points. 
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Part 11 : Presents 
Chapter 5: Representations of the Middle East in the 
Post-Cold War Era 
Chapter 2 (representations) traced the trajectory of the Middle East' from 
its invention in the late nineteenth century into the Cold War era and argued that 
the Middle East had its origins in British and US security thinking and practices. 
Chapter 5 will continue to follow the trajectory of spatial representations 'Middle 
East' and 'Arab Regional System. ' I will also look at two more representations, 
those of the 'Euro-Med Region' and 'Muslim Middle East. ' It will be argued that 
these representations have shaped and been shaped by the European Union's 
discourse on security in the Euro-Med Region and the Islamist discourse on 
security, respectively. This is intended as a further illustration of the point (made 
in Chapter 2) that the origins of regions have had their roots in security thinking 
and practices of their inventors. It will further be argued that in the post-Cold War 
era, the competition between these four representations took place at multiple 
levels with non-state actors playing more active roles than they did during the 
Cold War. 
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Contending Representations 
In an article entitled 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East, ' Saad Eddin Ibrahim 
identified four approaches competing to shape the future of regional security in 
the Middle East. These four approaches are, to quote Ibrahim, 'four different 
visions of the future and four parallel geopolitical-economic projects: an Arab, an 
Islamic, a Middle Eastern, and a Mediterranean one. ' Ibrahim notes that of 
these four approaches, the first two are 'indigenous' to the region; 'both have 
roots reaching deep into the historical consciousness of Arab actors. P2 The third 
one, that of the Middle East, is the most established of them all and is currently 
identified with the Peace Process launched after the Gulf War. What Ibrahim 
identified as the Mediterranean approach is the most recent of the four and has 
lately been receiving a lot of attention due to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
scheme initiated by the European Union. 
Each of these approaches give primacy to different kinds of threats and 
adopt an alternative spatial representation, namely, the Arab Regional System, 
Muslim Middle East, Middle East and Euro-Med Region. This is not to suggest 
that these four representations exhaust the possibilities. One might add to the list 
of alternatives the so-called 'Greater Middle East'-currently in vogue within 
some US circles. 3 The 'Greater Middle East' was invented after the end of the 
Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is used to represent those 
states that are included in the Middle East as well as the former Soviet republics 
Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East, ' Security Dialogue 27: 4 (1996) 
425. 
2 Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East, ' 425. 
3 See Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer, eds., Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the 
Greater Middle East (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Robert Pelletrau et al., Advancing 
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of Central Asia. This, arguably, is indicative of the security conceptions and 
practices of its inventors that include securing the route to Central Asian oil 
resources (in which there is now much interest) whilst holding Islamism in check 
(which has become a persistent anxiety in the United States since the 1978-79 
revolution in Iran). This new representation is yet to become established in the 
minds of people other than its inventors. 
Another alternative that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War is that 
of 'Middle East and North Africa' or MENA. This label is used to represent the 
same area covered in Cold War definitions of the Middle East, i. e. members of 
the Arab League plus Israel, Iran and Turkey. The fact that there is no change in 
the definition but its label could be taken as an indication of a yearning on the 
part of north African policy-makers to emphasise their difference from the rest of 
the Arab world. It could also be taken as an indication of their increased 
bargaining power-a power they derive from their close economic cooperation 
with the European Union as a part of the Euro-Med partnership scheme (see the 
section on the Euro-Med Region). This representation will therefore not be 
treated separately. 
In the following sections I will trace the development of the 
aforementioned four representations of the region, namely, the Middle East, the 
Arab Regional System, the Euro-Med Region, and the Muslim Middle East. 
These representations have been shaped by the four contending approaches to 
regional security identified by Ibrahim, and have been competing to shape the 
Common Purposes in the Broad Middle East (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1998). 
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future of regional security in the post-Cold War era. First, the Arab Regional 
System. 
The Arab Regional System 
As Part I argued, the Arab Regional System and the Arab national security 
discourse were developed in the aftermath of World War II in reaction to the 
Middle Eastern security discourse. Ali Eddin Hillal Dessouki and Jamil Matar 
have argued that the Arab Regional System could serve better as a key for 
understanding the interactions among Arab states, with their neighbours and with 
the international system. 4 As opposed to early representations such as the Arab 
homeland or the Arabian peninsula that downplayed the existence of sovereign 
Arab states, the Arab Regional System as conceived by Dessouki and Matar was 
a state-centric representation and therefore appealed to Arab policy-makers who 
were concerned with consolidating their sovereign statehood and reducing their 
exposure to external influences. 5 As Chapter 4 argued, since the late 1960s, 
Arab policy-makers, especially the more conservative Gulf leaders, have been 
moving away from the Arab national security discourse. Indeed it has been 
mainly non-state actors whose practices have shaped and been shaped by the 
Arab national security discourse. 
4 Abdel Monem Said Aly, 'The Shattered Consensus: Arab Perceptions of Security, ' The 
International Spectator xxxi: 4 (1996) 26-7. 
Yezid Sayigh, 'The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab Regional Order Failed, ' International Affairs 67: 1 
(1991) 489. 
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Arab peoples have for long been collaborating across borders in order to 
escape intervention by their own governments that restrict their political activities 
at home. Given many Arab regimes' unwillingness to lift restrictions on political 
participation, Arab peoples have been making use of each others' human and 
technical resources when trying to bring about change at home. Although there 
are some signs of cooperation with their Turkish and Iranian counterparts as well, 
if one is to judge by the titles of the organisations they set up, it is clear that the 
Arab Regional System, not the Middle East, that has shaped their practices. 6 
Such organizations include the Arab Association of Sociologists, the Arab 
Association of Political Scientists, Association of Arab Historians (1974), 
Association of Arab Universities (1964), the pan-Arab Organisation of Human 
Rights, the Beirut based Center for Arab Unity Studies (1975), and the Jordan 
based Arab Thought Forum (1985), among others. Arab women's organisations 
have also been active in strengthening civil society in the Arab world. 7 
Although such non-state organisations existed during the Cold War as 
well, what has changed in the post-Cold War period is that they now tend to take 
less the form of stereotypical pan-Arabist movements that called for Arab unity 
during the 1950s, than the form of civil societal groupings that emphasise Arab 
identity, culture, homeland and nationhood whilst working towards 
democratisation and social justice at home. Ibrahim notes that the number of 
Arab NGOs and other civil associations have nearly doubled between 1990 and 
6 Elise Boulding, 'Hope for the Twenty-first Century: NGOs and People's Networks in the Middle 
East, ' in Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society, ed. Elise 
Boulding (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 319-29. 
7 See 'Interview with Salim Nasr-A View from the Region: Middle East Studies in the Arab 
World, ' Middle East Report (October-December 1997) 16-18; 'The Commission Document on 
Peace Building in the Middle East, ' in Building Peace in the Middle East, ed. Boulding, 43. 
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1995.8 As will be explained in Chapter 7, the activities of these non-state actors 
are more often than not designed to bring about change in the Arab Regional 
System by way of focusing on political and economic issues, calling for 
democratisation, increased political participation, an end to restrictions on human 
rights and better provision in fields such as health and education. 
In the 1990s such sensitivity regarding the region's Arab identity has 
been more common among non-state actors than policy-makers. Indeed, the 
post-Cold War era witnessed the latter joining the Middle East Peace Process, 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic forum convened as a part of 
the Peace Process, and discussing potential membership to a Middle East 
Regional Development Bank, all of which involved the participation of Israel, 
Turkey and the United States. 
Furthermore, there are some signs that the salience of the spatial 
representation Arab Regional System is beginning to fade even among some 
non-state actors, such as some Egyptian intellectuals who began to emphasise 
the Mediterranean dimension of Egypt's identity whilst others have emphasised 
the Islamic dimension. As the next section will argue, the debate over the 
Mediterranean, Arab and Islamic dimensions of Egyptian identity amongst 
Egyptian elite dates back to the early twentieth century but had come to a halt 
following Nasser's rise to power in the early 1950s. 9 
Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East, ' 427-8. See Muhammad Faour, The Arab 
World After Desert Storm (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993) for a 
more sceptical view on the potentialities of civil societal groupings in the Arab World. 
9 Mohammed EI-Sayed Selim, 'Mediterraneanism: A New Dimension in Egypt's Foreign Policy, ' 
Kurasat Istratiiiva [Strategic Papers of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies] 
4: 27 (1997); available from http: //www. acpss. org/ekuras/ek27/ek27. html; Internet; accessed 
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As Chapter 4 argued, since the 1960s, the tendency among conservative 
Arab policy-makers has been that of distancing themselves from the Arab 
national security discourse and the Arab Regional System. What has changed in 
the aftermath of the Cold War (and especially the Gulf War) is that regional 
policy-makers' references to the Arab national security discourse became even 
more sparse; at the same time they became less hesitant to identify with the 
Middle Eastern security discourse of the United States. Two reasons could be 
teased out to explain this development. 
First, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has rendered it rather problematic to 
propound openly the Arab national security discourse. The fact that an Arab 
state (Iraq) invaded another (Kuwait) and threatened a third (Saudi Arabia) 
showed that threats to the Arab Regional System could be posed by Arab states 
from within the region as well as external actors (such as Iran, Israel, Turkey and 
the United States). This, in turn, challenged the outward-directed conception of 
security that has been at the root of the Arab national security discourse. 
Second, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War further 
discredited the arguments in favour of greater cooperation and collaboration 
among Arab actors. Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the term 'Arab nation' (al- 
umma al-arabiyya) has come to be identified with Iraqi pan-Arab expansionism. 10 
The Iraqi aggression also strained the relationships among the members of the 
Arab League. For years, the Arab League has served as the backbone of the 
August 1,1999. 
10 Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East. 1967-91: Regional Dynamics and the 
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Arab national security discourse and the main institution that contained the Arab 
Regional System. The Gulf conflict, however, has left the Arab League divided. " 
The deepening of the rifts between Arab states resulted in a relaxation of 
the Arab/non-Arab distinction that drew the boundaries of the Arab Regional 
System, to accommodate the increasing influence of non-Arab actors such as 
Iran, Israel and Turkey, as well as Britain, France and the United States. 12 The 
aforementioned tendency among Arab policy-makers to join institutions and 
organisations framed in line with the Middle Eastern perspective had already 
signalled such a relaxation of boundaries. 
In sum, although the increasing involvement of non-Arab actors and 
especially the United States in the affairs of the Arab Regional System may not 
have too many opponents at the governmental level, the same cannot be said 
about actors at the sub-state level. As noted above, many non-state actors' 
practices continue to shape and be shaped by the spatial representation Arab 
Regional System. The increasing prevalence of the Middle East or the 'New 
Middle East' has been worrying such actors who fear their Arab identity would be 
marginalized. 
Superpowers, trans. Clare Krjzl (London: Macmillan, 1998) 51. 
" Ibrahim Awad, 'The Future of Regional and Subregional Organization in the Arab World, ' in The 
Arab World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 147-60. 
12 Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, 97. 
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The Euro-Med Region 
Mediterranean littoral peoples and societies were conceived as part of a total 
called the 'Mediterranean' in ancient Greece. Indeed it is argued that the first 
uses of the concept the 'West' referred to peoples, societies and states 
surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, whereas the territories further to the east 
and south constituted the 'East. ' Later, with the Muslim invasion of the territories 
to the south of the Mediterranean, as well as Asia Minor, Malta and Spain, and 
the entrenchment of the idea of Europe, the construct referred to as the 'West' 
shifted further to the west and those Mediterranean littoral peoples, societies and 
states to the south and east of the Mediterranean Sea came to be included in the 
(now vast) entity called the 'East' (and later the Middle East) therefore dissolving 
the unity of the 'Mediterranean. '13 This past unity of the Mediterranean was 
remembered rather recently to aid the EU-backed project of constructing a Euro- 
Med Region. 
Among Mediterranean littoral states of the Arab world, Egypt and 
Lebanon are the ones that have been more in touch with the Mediterranean 
dimension of their identity than some others such as Syria. In Egypt, in the 
1920s and 1930s, many Western educated and/or oriented intellectuals 
advocated the Mediterranean identity because it was viewed as 'neither 
completely European or Western nor completely divorced from the Arab-Islamic 
13 Thierry Hentch, Hayali Dofu: Batinin Akdenizli Dofuya Politik Bakisi [Imagined East: The 
West's Political View of the Mediterranean East] trans. Aysel Bora (Istanbul: Metis, 1996). Also 
see, Paul E. Salem, 'Arab Political Currents, Arab-European Relations and Mediterraneanism, ' 
in The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics and Economics of Interdependence versus 
Fragmentation, ed. Laura Guazzone (London: Macmillan, 1997) 23-42. It should also be noted 
that the terms 'East' and 'West' gained new meanings during the Cold War when they were 
used to refer to the two blocs headed by the United States and the Soviet Union. 
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world, ' to quote Paul Salem. 14 However, Egypt's Mediterranean identity was de- 
emphasised in the post-World War II era when it joined the League of Arab 
States and later took part in the 1948 war as a part of the Arab force fighting 
Israel. Gamal Abdel Nasser's advent to power (1954) was also decisive in this 
respect. During Nasser's presidency, the prevalent view was that any kind of 
affiliation with a Mediterranean institution would lead to dependence on the 
former colonial powers. 15 
The debate between the proponents of Egypt's Mediterranean identity 
and those who emphasised the Arab and Islamic dimensions was revived 
following Egypt's defeat in the 1967 war. 16 Nasser's death and Anwar al-Sadat's 
rise to power in the early 1970s further encouraged some intellectuals to dust off 
the arguments about the Mediterranean dimension of Egypt's identity and revive 
the early debate. Some well-known Egyptian intellectuals, disappointed with the 
losses against Israel and the lack of support provided by other Arab states for the 
Palestinian cause, had already begun to argue that 'the time had come for Egypt 
to stop fighting the battles of the Arabs. '17 
Another factor that enabled Mediterraneanism to see the light of the day 
once again was the peace treaty Sadat signed with Israel, which resulted in 
Egypt's isolation from Arab and Islamic institutions. As a result, Egyptian policy- 
makers sought alternative paths, one of which was 'Mediterraneanism. ' It should 
14 Salem, 'Arab Political Currents, ' 38. 
15 Selim, 'Mediterraneanism. ' 
16 Nasser himself emphasised the Arab, Islamic and African dimensions of Egypt's identity. See 
Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, 'Nasser and the Struggle for Independence, ' in Suez 1956: The Crisis and 
its Consequences, eds. Wm Roger Louise and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 
31-41. 
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also be noted that since the independence of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, there 
emerged more independent non-European Mediterranean-littoral states with 
which Egypt could collaborate within a Mediterranean framework. Lastly, its 
break with the Soviet Union in 1972 also enabled Egypt to re-establish close 
relations with the West in general and Mediterranean-littoral European states in 
particular. " 
Egyptian intellectuals were not alone in propounding Mediterraneanism. 
During the 1950s some forthcoming thinkers of Lebanese nationalism also had 
voiced arguments favouring identification with the Mediterranean. Given 
Lebanon's multi-confessional and multi-ethnic make-up, such identification with 
the Mediterranean could potentially have provided Lebanese policy-makers a 
solution to the dormant conflicts that threatened to break the society. Moreover, 
as did their Egyptian counterparts during the 1930s, they viewed the 
Mediterranean identity as a tool to de-emphasise their links with the Arab-Islamic 
world and claim affinity with Europe and the West. Lastly, some north African 
intellectuals also favoured Mediterranean ism as a way of reinforcing the 
uniqueness of the Maghreb's Arab-Berber ethnic mix and its historical links with 
Europe in general and France in particular. 19 
However, although the idea of the unity of the Mediterranean world dates 
back centuries, what is referred to here as the Euro-Med Region began to take 
shape from the 1970s onwards, largely in line with changing security conceptions 
and practices of the European Union (formerly the European Community). The 
17 Selim, 'Mediterraneanism. ' Also see Salem, 'Arab Political Currents, ' 37-8. 
18 Selim, 'Mediterraneanism. ' 
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EU's close interest in Middle Eastern affairs, in turn, was provoked by the OPEC 
oil embargo and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. During this period, a change-of-heart 
on the part of some European policy-makers to adopt a more equivocal attitude 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict resulted in the establishment of the Euro-Arab 
dialogue in 1973.20 
The relationship between the EU and Arab states did not achieve much 
during the Cold War, partly because of the mistrust caused by some European 
states' colonial past and partly due to the atmosphere created by the superpower 
conflict. It should be noted that this period was also characterised by a change in 
the character of the EU itself, which travelled a long since the European Coal and 
Steel Community. The Euro-Arab dialogue was attempted to be re-activated 
after the end of the Cold War. Although the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) interrupted the 
process, the dialogue resumed in 1992.21 The links established as a part of the 
Euro-Arab dialogue formed the backbone of the Euro-Med Partnership Process in 
the following years. 
It was not only the end of the Cold War but also a re-thinking on the part 
of some EU members that caused the re-activation of the Euro-Arab dialogue 
and the re-emergence of the Mediterranean discourse. In the 1980s, changes in 
the societies of EU-member states as a result of the growth of the Middle Eastern 
19 Salem, 'Arab Political Currents, ' 38. 
20 Haifaa Jawad, The Euro-Arab Dialogue: A Study in Collective Diplomacy (Reading: Ithaca, 
1992). 
21 Gary Miller, 'An Integrated Communities Approach, ' in The Middle East and Europe: An 
Integrated Communities Approach, ed. Gerd Nonneman (London: Federal Trust for Education 
and Research, 1992) 7-13, for an overview of the collective Euro-Arab relationship from 1973 
onwards. Also see Jawad, The Euro-Arab Dialogue. For developments since 1992, see Selim 
'Mediterraneanism'; Stephen C. Calleya, 'The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: What 
Prospects? ' Mediterranean Politics 2: 2 (1997) 1-22. 
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diaspora in Western Europe led EU policy-makers to re-think their priorities and 
come to consider stability in the Middle East (and especially the geographically 
closer north Africa) an integral part of their own security. 
Over the years, Euro-Med cooperation schemes have taken various 
forms including the aforementioned Euro-Arab dialogue as well as the EU's 
'Overall Mediterranean Policy, ' agreements with sub-regional organisations such 
as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and 
more recently the still-born 'Conference on Security and Cooperation in the 
Mediterranean, ' and the ongoing 'Euro-Med Partnership' process. 22 The Euro- 
Med Partnership scheme is hoped to encourage inter-state cooperation and 
increase regional interdependence as a way of maintaining security (understood 
as stability) in the Middle East towards enhancing European security. This theme 
will be further developed in Chapter 7. It should suffice to note here that the Gulf 
War only helped reinforce the view that 'regional economic solidarity among all 
the peoples of the region' is 'a cornerstone for peace, stability, and development 
in the Middle East' which is, in turn, viewed as a necessary component of security 
in Europe. 23 
The European Union's conceptualisation of the Euro-Med Region does 
not so far include non-Mediterranean Middle Eastern states (such as Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, the Gulf states, Yemen and Iran). Moreover Mediterranean-rim 
states such as Turkey and Israel have participated only in some of the Euro-Med 
schemes. This is partly because the EU's delineation of the Euro-Med Region 
22 Jawad, The Euro-Arab Dialogue; George H. JoffO, ed., Perspectives on Development: The 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (London: Frank Cass, 1999). 
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reflects its aforementioned security concerns that have had less to do with the 
Gulf than the geographically closer north African states. Israel and the other 
Eastern Mediterranean states have come into the picture due to EU interest in 
finding a peaceful solution to the Israel/Palestine issue. 
The fact that non-Mediterranean Middle Eastern countries (such as Saudi 
Arabia or Iran) are not included in the Euro-Med Region does not seem to bother 
the north African partners. This is arguably because the policy-makers of those 
Arab states that are a part of the Euro-Med process are interested in economic 
cooperation with the EU, not with their fellow Arab countries with whom they have 
attempted several projects of cooperation in the past. The only country that has 
so far expressed reservations about the exclusion of the Gulf countries has been 
Egypt. Egyptian policy-makers have suggested that membership to the Euro- 
Med Partnership scheme should be left open so that non-Mediterranean Middle 
Eastern countries could become members in the future. 24 It is difficult to know 
whether the Egyptian policy-makers are genuinely interested in including all other 
Arab countries, or whether this was a tactical move designed to allay the worries 
of some non-state actors in the Arab World in general and Egypt in particular who 
fear that 'Mediterraneanism will dilute the Arab identity of the Arab Regional 
System and lead to its dismantling. i25 It is significant to note here that such 
concerns again echo the critiques of Heikal, Dessouki and Matar voiced during 
the Cold War (see Chapter 2). 
23 Miller, 'An Integrated Communities Approach, ' 13. 
24 Selim, 'Mediterraneanism. ' 
25 Selim, 'Mediterraneanism. ' 
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However, although the exclusion of some Arab and/or Muslim countries 
from the Euro-Med Region has its problems, their inclusion could also be 
considered problematic. It was such concerns that resulted in the shelving of 
another Mediterranean-focused scheme initiated by two EU-member states, Italy 
and Spain. The proposal for the creation of a 'Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in the Mediterranean' was introduced in 1991, but failed to take off 
largely because it was considered too ambitious in terms of both its objectives 
and scope. 26 The idea has been criticized on the grounds that it covered a very 
wide area (the proposal mentioned inviting any state with 'any substantial 
interest'). This would have meant bringing together all twelve members of the 
EU, the 17 non-EU-Mediterranean littoral states (Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Romania, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and [former] Yugoslavia) nine Gulf states 
(including Iran and Iraq), three others (Canada, the Soviet Union and the United 
States), and one UN-recognised entity (Palestine). 27 The CSCM proposal will be 
further discussed in Chapter 7. Suffice it to note here that the objectives of the 
scheme that included addressing issues areas such as 'security, economic 
cooperation and human rights' were found too difficult to achieve for such a large 
and diverse group of states. 28 
Currently, Mediterraneanism does not have many proponents but it does 
not have many against it either. Both Syria and Israel have responded positively 
26 Miller, 13; Tim Niblock, Towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM), ' in The Middle East and Europe, ed. Nonnemann, 
245-51. 
27 Niblock, 'Towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, ' 247. 
28 Roberto Aliboni, 'Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control in the Euro- 
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to invitations issued for the Euro-Med Partnership activities. As Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim noted, 
unlike the Middle Eastern paradigm, the partnership has not 
generated active hostility in the Arab world. This may be due to 
the absence of the USA and the fact that the Israeli question 
does not play dominant parts. 29 
Indeed, some Egyptian policy-makers view Mediterraneanism as a way of 
bringing Arab states as well as Israel together without moving too many stones. 
Indeed, the strength of the Euro-Med Region as an alternative spatial 
representation comes not from its supporters who are not too many or too 
enthusiastic, but from the fact that unlike the 'new' or 'Muslim' Middle Easts, it 
does not have too many enemies. 
The Muslim Middle East 
The spatial representation referred to here as the Muslim Middle East is rooted in 
the Islamist discourse on security. The Islamist actors' own preferred term is the 
'Muslim world. ' However, defined as the sum of Muslim peoples around the 
world (the ummah), the 'Muslim world' is a trans-state community that 
encompasses a significant portion of the globe. As a result, the adoption of the 
term 'Muslim world' as an alternative to the other three representations looked at 
in this chapter is problematic for mainly two reasons. First, two of the states with 
the largest Muslim populations, Indonesia and Bangladesh are remote from the 
Middle East. Second, there are more Muslims in Central Asia, China, India, 
Southeast Asia and Africa than there are in the Middle East. As Nikki Keddie 
Mediterranean Partnership, ' Perceptions (December 1997-February 1998) 73-86. 
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maintained, if the 'Middle East is unsatisfactory as an entity, the Muslim world is 
scarcely more so. '30 
My preferred term Muslim Middle East is rooted in the observation that 
when Islamist actors in the Middle East refer to the Muslim world, they have a 
Middle East-centred definition in mind. 31 This is also discernible from their 
practices, which suggest that notwithstanding the global character of their 
discourses, they address themselves to a Muslim Middle East when it comes to 
taking action. What is meant by the globalist discourse is the rhetoric that has 
been employed by some Islamist actors (such as Ayatollah Khomeini or the 
Hizbullah in Lebanon), which indicates that they imagine all Muslims to be their 
audience. Theoretically, then, all areas on which the world's Muslims live are 
included in their definition of the Muslim world. During the first decade following 
the Iranian revolution, Iran's practice seemed to live up to its discourse with its 
anti-Israeli and anti-US rhetoric being matched by the support it provided for the 
PLO, the Afghan Mujahedeen and other Islamist movements around the world. 
This has begun to change following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the end 
of the Iran-Iraq war. Since then, Iran has mellowed its globalist revolutionary 
discourse, and concentrated on mending fences at the international arena and 
emphasising domestic development whilst keeping the revolutionary spirit up at 
the home front. 32 
29 Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East, ' 431. 
30 Nikki Keddie, 'Is There a Middle East? ' International Journal of Middle East Studies 4 (1973) 
269. 
31 'Abdul HamTd A. AbüSulaymän, Towards An Islamic Theory of International Relations: New 
Directions for Methodology and Thought, 2nd rev. ed. (Hendon, VA: The International Institute of 
Islamic Thought, 1993) xv. 
32 John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 2"d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995) 151; John Esposito, ed., The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact (Miami: Florida 
International University Press, 1990). 
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Likewise, despite their globalist discourse, most Islamist grassroots 
movements aim to bring about change at home-even though they may 
occasionally undertake action abroad to achieve this aim. Indeed, practice 
indicates that the self-consciously Islamist regimes of Iran and Sudan, and non- 
state actors such as Hamas, Hizbullah, and Algerian FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) 
all address themselves first and foremost to the localities they live in (see 
Chapter 7 for further discussion on this theme). 33 In other words, the globalist 
outlook of the Islamist actors at the discursive level becomes locally oriented in 
practice. Hence my use of the label Muslim Middle East to refer to the spatial 
representation that has shaped and has been shaped by the practices of Islamist 
actors. 
The Islamist discourse on security was initially introduced by Saudi 
leadership, as Chapter 4 noted, to help maintain the regional status quo. The 
1978-79 revolution in Iran, however, led to anti-status quo actors' appropriation of 
the Islamist discourse. They not only appropriated but also re-conceptualised the 
Islamist discourse by focusing, to quote Steve Niva, on 'the need to establish an 
authentic cultural basis from which to assert the sovereignty of Arab states and to 
achieve true decolonisation. '34 This re-conceptualised Islamist discourse 
perceives threats as stemming from 'un-Islamic' influences that could stem from 
inside as well as outside the Muslim Middle East. However, when it comes to 
33 See Esposito, 'Islamic Organisations: Soldiers of God, ' in The Islamic Threat, 119-87, for a brief 
overview of Islamist organisations. 
34 Steve Niva, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East, ' in 
Cultures of Insecurity: States. Communities and the Production of Danger, eds. Jutta Weldes, 
Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999) 167. 
182 
defining what constitutes 'Islamic' or un-Islamic, ' there is more agreement 
amongst Islamist actors as to what they are against than what they are for. 
Some would consider 'Western' influence over and intervention into the region as 
sun-Islamic'. Some Islamists criticise the existing political and religious 
establishments (such as the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that allowed US 
troops on the 'holy lands') as well as the forces of Arab nationalism as being 'un- 
Islamic'. 35 Lastly, there are those who define 'structural violence' as 'un-Islamic' 
and call for its erosion. 36 
It is worth stressing that this conception of security is not a purely 
outward-directed one as suggested by prevalent conceptualisations of dar-us- 
salam ('land of peace') and dar-ul-harb ('land of war'). It is indeed true that the 
Islamist discourse considers threats to security as 'un-Islamic' influences mainly 
stemming from the 'West, ' but it also emphasises how 'external threats have 
been internalised in the very practices of Middle Eastern states. '37 In this sense, 
the Islamist discourse that informs these actors' practices is more complicated 
than Samuel Huntington's conceptualisation of a world order based on 
civilisations would allow for (see Chapter 9). For, there is by no means a 
unanimous agreement among the proponents of the Islamist discourse as to the 
ideal state of the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Moreover, 
salaam is a very rich concept that has multiple meanings within the Islamic 
context (as is the case for both concepts security and peace in the Western 
35 Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, 'Editor's Introduction, ' in Islamic Resurgence: Challenges. Directions and 
Future Perspectives-A Roundtable with Professor Khurshid Ahmad, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi 
(Lahore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1996) 24. 
36 Chaiwat Satha-Anand, 'The Nonviolent Crescent: Eight Theses on Muslim Nonviolent Action, ' 
in Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East, Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant and Saad 
Eddin Ibrahim, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990) 28. Also see, AbüSulayman, Towards 
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context). One important point made by some Muslim authors on this issue is that 
in order to make peace, the elimination of war (understood as inter-state 
violence) is not enough; it is only a beginning. Echoing peace researchers' 
broader conception of peace, Chaiwat Satha-Anand has maintained that, working 
towards peace includes the elimination of 'structural violence' as well. 38 Such a 
view, in turn, renders it rather problematic to present the Muslim world as the 
'land of peace, ' or the rest of the world as the 'land of war'; for, structural violence 
does not recognise such conventional boundaries. 
The proponents of the Islamist discourse have their reservations about 
the other three representations. Indeed, the very concepts region and 
regionalism invoke territoriality, which some Islamist actors consider to be 
offensive to the concept of the ummah. Some argue that the existing system 
which divides believers into separate (nation-)states is against 'Islam' and that 
the ummah should be revived as the primary political unit. 39 Building upon such 
assumptions Abid Mustafa labelled regionalism as the 'disease of the twentieth 
century. ' He argued that 'establishing or promoting such ideas will never allow 
the ummah to revive and regain her status as the number one nation in the 
world . 
40 As is the case with some other projects propounded by the Islamist 
actors, the specifics of how this potential could be fulfilled is not clear. What is 
emphasised is that it cannot be achieved through the construction of a (New) 
Middle East, a Euro-Med Region, or the strengthening of the Arab Regional 
An Islamic Theory of International Relations, 160. 
37 Niva, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East, ' 168. 
38 Satha Anand, 'The Nonviolent Crescent, ' 25-28. 
39 For a discussion of and an argument against this view, see James P. Piscatori, Islam in a World 
of Nation-States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 1-21. 
40 Abid Mustafa, 'Regionalism: Disease of the 20th Century, ' Khalifah Magazine 9: 1 (Rajab 
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System. However, the proponents of such ideas often fail to note the fact that 
many Islamist actors have already accepted the reality of the state; they look 
toward the ummah when emphasising their common Muslim identity, but direct 
themselves to their own milieu in practice. 1 
Pointing to the gap between the discourses and practices of Islamist 
actors, and their lack of consistent strategies is not meant to suggest that their 
critiques are not worth listening to. Rather the point here is that the violent 
practices of certain Islamist actors such as the Hizbullah that aim to capture 
states mechanism obscure their otherwise significant criticisms of the other 
discourses. Indeed, the greatest strength of the Islamist discourse stems from its 
critique of the other representations and the security discourses they shape and 
are shaped by. As Saad Eddin Ibrahim noted, although the proponents of the 
Islamist discourse do not have the power to put their own visions into practice to 
realise their own visions, they have the power to stall the others. 42 
The (New) Middle East 
The Middle East is currently the strongest amongst the four contending 
representations. Its strength stems partly from its backers that include the United 
States, Israel and Turkey. But more significantly, its strength stems from the 
post-Gulf War environment that has seen the further decline of the Arab national 
1419/October 1998) [journal on-line]; available from http: //www. khalifah. comnauframe2. html; 
Internet; accessed May 31,1999. 
41 Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 433. 
42 Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East, ' 433. 
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security discourse. As the section on the Arab Regional System argued, during 
the Gulf crisis three non-Arab states, Iran, Israel and Turkey played active roles 
in the US-led coalition formed against Iraq, whilst the United States took up this 
opportunity to strengthen its relations with conservative Gulf regimes. The 
ensuing broadening of the Arab Regional System to include Israel, Iran and 
Turkey and to accommodate the increasing influence of the United States (and to 
an extent the European Union) resulted in the blurring of the Arab/non-Arab 
divide, and dissolution of the distinction between Arab Regional System and 
Middle East, which Heikal, Dessouki and Matar, among others, tried to establish. 
Increasingly since the end of the Gulf War, non-Arab actors have been playing 
significant roles in inter-Arab relations. 
It was not only the role non-Arab actors played during the Gulf War but 
also the Arab-Israeli Peace Process set in motion in the aftermath of the War that 
enabled the consolidation of the Middle Eastern security discourse. In the 
aftermath of the War, the United States was able to re-introduce itself to the 
region and be accepted largely due to the constructive role it played in the 
making of the Madrid Peace Process. The Madrid Peace Conference (1991) was 
convened after the Gulf War as a part of the pre-war deal the US policy-makers 
struck with the international public opinion in general and regional policy-makers 
in particular. The pace generated by the Madrid talks opened the way to the 
Palestinian-Israeli Accords signed in Oslo (1993). The role US policy-makers 
played in the Peace Process, in turn, enhanced their credibility thereby lessening 
the criticisms voiced against the Middle Eastern security discourse. 43 As Chapter 
43 Muhammed Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1993) 93-6. 
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7 will explain in greater detail, US policy-makers took this opportunity to 
encourage regionalism in the Middle East. Towards this end, a Regional 
Economic Development working group was set up as a part of the multilateral 
track of the Middle East Peace Process. Other US and World Bank sponsored 
activities included the convening of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
economic forum, and proposing the formation of a Middle East Regional 
Development Bank. 
During the Madrid talks, the Middle Eastern perspective received a boost 
by Egyptian intellectuals as well. The ideas they put forward in support of 
regionalisation in the Middle East as a way of maintaining security is referred to 
as Middle Easternism. Although there are very few Arab policy-makers who 
would openly advocate Middle Easternism, the fact that most have so far 
participated in the Middle East Peace Process is indicative of their changing 
policy preferences. One could tease out two main reasons for some Arab policy- 
makers' hesitance to openly back Middle Easternism. The first reason stems 
from the opposition of the proponents of the Arab and Islamist perspectives at the 
sub-state level. Many non-state actors view Middle Easternism as a project that 
would de-emphasise the Arab and/or Islamic character of the region. Some even 
go so far as to warn that Middle Easternism might end up replacing Arabism. As 
Michael Barnett noted, opponents of Middle Easternism in the Arab world tap into 
long-standing fears of the West and Israel. ' This point takes us to the second 
as Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998) 231-2. 
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reason behind Arab policy-makers' hesitance to openly back Middle Easternism, 
that is Shimon Peres' vocal advocacy of Middle Eastern regionalism. 45 
In 1993 Peres published a book entitled The New Middle East in which 
he called for a 'regional-based' approach to security. 6 The adoption of such an 
approach, he stressed, was crucial in the face of the threats posed by the 
weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile delivery systems against 
which there exist no foolproof means of national defence other than a wide- 
ranging regional arrangement. 47 'Outdated' approaches to security based on the 
concept of 'national defence, which depend mainly on military and weapons 
systems, ' argued Peres, should be replaced by a 'modern' concept 'which is of 
necessity based on political accords, and embraces international security and 
economic considerations. '48 Peres expected regionalisation in economic 
relations to have a spillover effect into political relations thereby paving the way 
for the creation of a 'New Middle East' which he envisioned as a 'regional 
community of nations, with a common market and elected centralised bodies, 
modelled on the European Community. '49 
Although Peres' blueprint for the future was received favourably outside 
the region, to some in the Arab world the idea of becoming a part of the New 
Middle East is a precursor to an emerging Israeli hegemony. Israel's economic 
might, which Peres considers a magnet to pull other regional countries towards 
cooperation, seems to have made a contrary effect on some regional actors who 
45 Shimon Peres with Arye Naor, The New Middle East (Dorset: Element, 1993). 
46 Peres, The New Middle East, 33-4. 
47 Peres, The New Middle East, 83. 
48 Peres, The New Middle East, 33-4. 
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hear 'dependence' when Peres says 'interdependence. '50 Indeed, the opponents 
of Middle Easternism invoke Arab peoples' age-old suspicions when they argue 
that the idea of constructing a New Middle East is an attempt at 'imperialism by 
regionalism. '51 I will come back to this debate in Chapter 7 when discussing post- 
Cold War security practices. 
One major reason behind the late-found popularity of Middle Eastern 
security discourse among Arab policy-makers is the fact that there are significant 
financial and political resources available for strengthening regionalism in the 
Middle East. However, although this may constitute good enough a reason to 
convince many policy-makers regarding the virtues of cooperation within a Middle 
Eastern framework, it may not be that easy to persuade many non-state actors. 
For, as noted above, unlike the Cold War years when it was Arab policy-makers 
and some intellectuals that challenged Middle Eastern security discourse, 52 it is 
now mainly non-state actors and especially grassroots movements informed by 
intellectuals that oppose it. In other words, however attractive creating links of 
interdependence in the Middle East as a way of building peace may seem to 
some, others oppose it for the same reason; they do not want to be a part of 
and/or dependent on any non-Arab or non-Islamic entity. 
According to Bahgat Korany, if regional policy-makers were to embrace 
Middle Easternism against the wishes of their peoples, this could produce a 
divisive effect in the Arab world. Korany warns that 
49 Peres, The New Middle East, 62. 
50 Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, 231; idem, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' Political 
Science Quarterly 111: 4(1996-1997)604. 
51 Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' 604. 
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a return to the concept of the Middle East as a mosaic region, a 
pure agglomeration of different races and cultures-where Arabs 
are to be treated interchangeably with other groups like Kurds, 
Berbers or Armenians-would revive old and powerful memories 
of 'divide and rule tactics. '53 
Such concerns echo those that were voiced by Heikal, Dessouki and Matar 
during the late 1970s. What has changed since then, according to Korany, is that 
it is no longer tenable to present this issue as a matter of making a choice in 
between the two competing representations. The end of the Cold War and the 
marginalization of many Arab actors, the alienation of many Arab regimes from 
one another, and the globalisation of economic relations, argues Korany, have 
created what he calls 'a regional Arab vacuum' which may result in the 'triumph' 
of the 'new Middle East ... not because of its own merit but rather by default. i54 
Given non-state actors' misgivings about the (New) Middle East, such a 
development has already started to create divisions in the Arab world. 
In sum, the debates on the Middle East in the post-Cold War era have 
focused on two major concerns: the future of the Arab and Islamic dimensions of 
regional peoples' identity, and the future of regional economies. The latter 
concern rates above that of the prior on many Arab policy-makers' agendas, but 
the vocal opposition of non-state actors against Middle Easternism has so far 
made it difficult for them to embrace it openly. Currently, the stall in the 
multilateral talks in the mid-1990s seems to have caused the debate on Middle 
Easternism to die down. 
52 Mohamed Heikal, 'Egyptian Foreign Policy, ' Foreign Affairs 56 (July 1978) 714-27. 
53 Bahgat Korany, 'The Old/New Middle East, ' in The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics 
and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation, ed. Laura Guazzone (London: 
Macmillan, 1997) 143. 
54 Korany, 'The Old/New Middle East, ' 145. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was follow the trajectory of four alternative 
representations in the post-Cold War period, namely the (New) Middle East, the 
Arab Regional System, the Euro-Med Region and the Muslim Middle East. It was 
argued that in the post-Cold War era the competition between these four 
representations took place at multiple levels. The Middle East is currently the 
prevalent representation at the governmental level thanks to US encouragement 
of Middle Eastern regionalism. However, certain segments of the Arab and/or 
Islamist elite as well as some grassroots organisations have opposed 
regionalisation in the Middle East. The chapter argued that this little evidence of 
enthusiasm for regionalisation in the Middle East is not because of a lack of 
regionalism, but rather because of the presence of a multiplicity of regionalisms, 
initiated, supported and (at times) stalled by myriad actors at multiple levels. In 
other words, the proponents of the other three spatial representations oppose 
Middle Easternism not because they are against regionalisation in itself, but 
because they are against regionalisation within the Middle Eastern framework. 
As the chapter argued, many have voiced their concern that the economic might 
of Israel, coupled with the political, economic and military backing it receives from 
the United States, would enable it to dominate an integrated Middle East if the 
'New Middle East' project were to be put into practice. 55 
ss Korany, 'The Old/New Middle East, 135-50; Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East, ' 
428-30. 
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Among the three alternatives, the Euro-Med Region is the more clearly 
defined one and has so far received positive response at the state as well as sub- 
state level. This is also because it is a relatively neutral representation. The 
other two representations, Arab Regional System and Muslim Middle East are 
popular among non-state actors some of whom actively oppose Middle 
Easternism. The debates between the proponents of these representations have 
showed that the main divide of the post-Cold War period is not one of Arab 
versus non-Arab or Arab Regional System versus Middle East, but pro-status quo 
actors who seek to maintain security by encouraging economic regionalisation 
and anti-status quo actors that seek radical change. The proponents of the Arab 
Regional System and Muslim Middle East do not offer clear-cut alternatives in the 
form of regionalisation projects, but unite in opposing Middle Easternism. They 
nevertheless pose a significant challenge in that although they do not have the 
necessary resources to put their own ideas into practice, they have the power to 
stall others. 
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Chapter 6: Security Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era 
Chapter 6 will trace the development of post-Cold War security thinking in 
the attempt to see its differences from as well as similarities to Cold War 
approaches. The chapter will begin by sketching developments in Arab national 
security thinking, which, as Chapter 3 argued, emerged as a critique of and an 
alternative to the Cold War security discourse. The chapter will also look at the 
contributions made by students of Third World security. Another aim of Chapter 
6 is to offer a glimpse of post-Cold War efforts directed towards re-thinking, re- 
visioning, re-conceptualising security. Two key debates will be focused on: 
'broadening security' and 'appropriate referent(s) for security. ' The arguments 
will be brought together in the concluding section where I will point to some 
issues that were sidelined in these debates. 
Arab National Security Thinking 
Students of Arab national security have for long maintained that Cold War 
approaches to security failed to account for the political and developmental 
dimensions of insecurity in the Arab world. As Chapter 3 argued, Arab national 
security discourse, as developed in Ali Eddin Hillal Dessouki and Jamil Matar's 
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works, was based on two assumptions. First, that security concerns and 
interests of Arab states could be better understood when viewed in relation to 
one another. Second, that these concerns were different from if not opposed to 
those of non-Arabs, particularly the ex-colonial powers. It was further argued that 
Dessouki and Matar's critique of the Cold War security discourse was based not 
so much on the way security was conceived and practiced, but on its referent, the 
Middle East. Their preferred referent was the society of Arab states. Although it 
could be debated whether the Arab state system qualifies as a society or not, it 
nevertheless is difficult to deny the fact that those cultural, linguistic, historical 
and religious factors that cross borders to tie Arab peoples have made the 
relationships between Arab states different from any other group of states whose 
citizens may not share such common characteristics. In other words, the Arab 
world is not merely a 'conglomeration of hard-shelled, billiard-ball, sovereign 
states, ' as Bahgat Korany noted. ' It is such linkages that exist at sub-, inter- and 
trans-state levels that make it difficult for Arab states to neglect the views and 
concerns of the others, thereby rendering the Arab state system more than the 
sum of its parts. 
Chapter 3 also argued that, as more Arab states became independent, 
the early and more societal-focused conceptualisation of Arab national security 
was replaced with a state-centric conceptualisation, a process dubbed as the 
'internationalisation of the national security state' by A. W. Singham. 2 The early 
conceptualisation, however, remained alive at the sub-state level, constituting a 
' Bahgat Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism, ' in The Arab 
World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 173. 
2 A. W. Singham, 'The National Security State and the End of the Cold War: Security Dilemmas for 
the Third World, ' in Security of Third World Countries, eds. Jasjit Singh and Thomas Bernauer 
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constraint upon the increasingly statist practices shaped by the later 
conceptualisation. 
As Chapter 4 noted, security practices of Arab policy-makers did not 
always match the premises and promises of Arab national security. This is 
because Arab policy-makers, especially those of conservative Gulf states, have 
increasingly adopted statist practices in the attempt to maintain regime security. 
However, although far from adopting the trans-state society of the Arab nation as 
their referent for security, Arab policy-makers nevertheless have found it difficult 
to totally disregard its concerns. In other words, although their security practices 
have always been statist, it is impossible to deny that they have also expressed 
concern with the security of other Arab actors. The place accorded to the 
Israel/Palestine issue on top of Arab national security agendas, when viewed 
against the background of the decrease in the number of concrete actions taken 
to find a solution to the plight of Palestinian peoples could be viewed as an 
indication of this delicate balancing act many Arab policy-makers have engaged 
in the second half of the twentieth century. The point here is that the Arab 
national security discourse has often been at odds with, and have constituted a 
constraint upon the practices of those Arab policy-makers that have prioritised 
regime security. Consequently, the argument that Arab states have always 
prioritised state security as reflected in the Charter of the League of Arab States 
(see Chapter 4) only reflects one dimension of this interplay between state 
security and societal security in the Arab world. 
(Aldershot: Darmouth with UNIDIR, 1993) 7. 
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This interplay between the demands of state security and societal 
security-the 'dualism' of Arab national security to use Bahgat Korany's phrase- 
began to receive more attention in the literature in the 1990s. 3 From the first 
establishment of the Arab state system onwards, argued Korany, the prevalence 
of the former among policy-makers has been checked by the popularity of the 
latter amongst non-state actors, especially intellectuals. According to him, the 
enduring popularity of this early conceptualisation of Arab national security 
among non-state actors could partly be explained by the resilience of the 
interconnections between Arab peoples and a high degree of permeability of 
state borders in the Arab world. Indeed, notwithstanding the efforts of Arab 
policy-makers to fortify state boundaries and strengthen sovereignty, 'state 
frontiers have been less important as barriers in collective psychology than has 
the distinction between Arab and non-Arab, ' argued Korany. 4 
Critical of state-centrism, Korany proposed that the Arab civil society be 
treated as the referent for Arab national security. His argument was that in order 
to understand security in the Arab world, one needed to move away from a state- 
centric perspective. Stressing that Arab states did not look like the textbook 
model nation-states of Cold War Security Studies, Korany emphasised the roles 
played by Arab civil societal actors and the need to consider their concerns. He 
maintained that 'the analysis of security issues in the Arab world should not be 
limited only, or even primarily, to the raison d'etat of the territorial state' but pay 
3 Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World, ' 164. 
° Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World, ' 167. Also see Bahgat Korany, 'The Arab World 
and the New Balance of Power in the New Middle East, ' in The Middle East Dilemma: The 
Politics and Economics of Arab Integration, ed. Michael Hudson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999) 35-59; Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble, 'The Analysis of 
National Security in the Arab Context: Restating the State of the Art, ' in The Many Faces of 
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due attention to the security of the trans-state community of Arab civil society. 5 
These concerns differ depending on the socio-economic background of the 
actors voicing them. In general, those higher up on the economic ladder push for 
democratisation and respect for human rights, while those at lower levels of the 
ladder are primarily concerned with achieving daily economic needs such as jobs, 
socio-economic equality, health provision, and in some cases daily food 
subsistence. 6 
In sum, Korany not only paid attention to the non-military dimensions of 
security but also presented a powerful critique of state-centrism in Arab national 
security thinking. However, although Korany's approach constituted a significant 
improvement over Dessouki and Matar's state-centric conceptualisation of Arab 
national security, he failed to problematise another dimension, that of an outward- 
directed conception of security according to which threats to Arab national 
security are assumed to stem from outside the Arab Regional System whereas 
inside is viewed as a realm of peace and security. 
One practical implication of this approach has been the emphasis put on 
unilateral as opposed to common security practices in managing the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Indeed, as Chapter 4 noted, the relations between Israel and its Arab 
counterparts have been textbook examples of worst-case thinking and zero sum 
conceptions and practices of security. The gap between the security perceptions 
of the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict was pointed to by Jordanian scholar 
National Security in the Arab World, eds. Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble and Rex Brynen (London: 
Macmillan, 1993) 1-23. 
Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World, ' 173. 
e Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Arab Elites and Societies After the Gulf Crisis, ' in The Arab World Today, 
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Abdullah Toukan and his Israeli colleague Shai Feldman in their path-breaking 
study, Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East. In 
this study the two co-authors tried to raise both sides' awareness of the dynamics 
of the security dilemma. They also proposed ways of mitigating the security 
dilemma by building on the work done by the Arms Control and Regional Security 
(ACRS) working group of the multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process (see 
Chapter 7). 7 It is significant to note here that in the mid-1990s, as Israeli and 
Arab policy-makers moved towards adopting common security practices such as 
confidence building measures and non-offensive defence postures, the dearth of 
literature on this subject with reference to the Third World in general and Middle 
East in particular became more and more apparent. Toukan and Feldman's 
study, in this sense, constituted a significant step in making up for this growing 
need. 
The feminist sociologist Fatima Mernissi, in turn, challenged the outward- 
directed conceptions and militarised practices of Arab national security. She 
argued that in the attempt to secure the Arab world against external threats, 
security concerns of myriad actors inside were marginalized. Writing in the 
aftermath of the Gulf War, Mernissi reminded women of the sacrifices they have 
made for the purposes of Arab national security and asked of what use years' 
investment into the military sector had been if security in the Arab region was to 
be maintained by the United States (i. e. non-Arabs). She wrote: 
The Gulf War showed the obscenity of the Arab state: its function 
was not to defend the interests of the citizen, it was to crush any 
chance of building a civil society and to censure any attempts to 
ed. Tschirgi, 77-89. 
Shai Feldman and Abdullah Toukan, Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the 
Middle East (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefeld, 1997). 
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check on what the chiefs were doing. The Gulf War showed, for 
example, that although the military expenditures in our Arab 
world were the highest in the world ... they were grotesque in 
their uselessness during the Gulf conflict. 8 
In other words, Mernissi was critical of not only the drawing of a boundary 
between Arabs and non-Arabs in an attempt to secure inside from outside, but 
also the way security was sought at the expense of women, by prioritising the 
military dimension and marginalizing women's concerns. 
Mernissi's critique of Arab national security is penetrating because of the 
way it challenges the ways in which the Arab national security discourse has 
been employed to justify policy-making, to privilege statist and militarised 
practices whilst marginalizing human rights in general and women's rights in 
particular. Mernissi has sought to emphasise that not only did this investment 
into the military sector cause meagre resources to be diverted away from other 
issues such as education and health care, but also that it failed to deliver what it 
promised, that is securing the Arab Regional System. What is also significant 
about Mernissi's critique is that she echoes the Critical Security Studies argument 
that the prioritisation of the military dimension of security and the ensuing 
militarisation of the society not only makes it difficult to meet traditional 
challenges, but also undermines the capacity of states to provide welfare to their 
citizens thereby exacerbating non-military threats. 
Clearly, not all would agree with Mernissi's critique (or that of Critical 
Security Studies, for that matter). Indeed, in the 1990s, the literature on Third 
e Fatima Mernissi, Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory (London: Zed, 1996) viii. Also see her 
Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland (Reading, MA: 
Perseus Books, 1992) esp. pp. 1-21. 
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World security in general and Arab national security in particular chose to focus 
not on the similarities and interrelationships, but the differences between the 
security needs and interests of states in the developed world and the developing 
world-a tendency traces of which was also discernible in Korany's approach to 
Arab national security? 
Third World Security Thinking 
'Third World Instability, Security and Western Concepts: On an Unhappy 
Marriage and the Need for a Divorce, i10 the title of an article by Caroline Thomas 
summed the main argument put forward by most of the post-Cold War produce 
on security in the Third World. Thomas, along with other students of Third World 
security such as Mohammed Ayoob, Brian Job and Yezid Sayigh, maintained that 
the concepts of Cold War Security Studies were far from being able to provide a 
full account of (in)security in the Third World. 11 This, she argued, was because 
e Also see Korany, Brynen and Noble, 'The Analysis of National Security in the Arab Context'; 
Paul Noble, Rex Brynen and Bahgat Korany, 'The Changing Regional Security Environment, ' in 
The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World, eds. Korany, Noble and Brynen, 275- 
302. 
10 Caroline Thomas, 'Third World Instability, Security and Western Concepts: On an Unhappy 
Marriage and the Need for a Divorce, ' in The State and Instability in the Third World, eds. 
Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu (London: Macmillan, 1989) 174-91. 
" Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf, 1987); idem, 'Third World Instability, Security and Western Concepts'; idem, 'New 
Directions in Thinking About Security in the Third World' in New Thinking About Strategy and 
International Security, ed. Ken Booth (London: Harper Collins, 1991) 267-89; Caroline Thomas 
and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, eds. Conflict and Consensus in South/North Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security 
Predicament: State Making. Regional Conflict and the International System (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1995); idem, 'Security in the Third World: Searching for the Core Variable, ' in 
Seeking Security and Development: the Impact of Military Spending and Arms Transfers, ed. 
Norman A. Graham (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 15-28; idem, 'Defining Security, ' In 
Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael Williams 
(London: UCL, 1998) 121-46; Brian Job, ed. The Insecurity Dilemma- National Security of Third 
World States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Yezid Sayigh, 'Confronting the 1990s: 
Security in the Developing Countries' Adelphi Papers 251 (Summer 1990). 
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the character of the security problems faced by the Third World states were 
different from those faced by their developed counterparts. This led her to call for 
an alternative approach to study security in the Third World, an approach that 
puts more emphasis on the domestic political and developmental dimensions of 
security. 
Yezid Sayigh maintained that it was the 'crisis of the state' that was the 
major source of insecurity for developing states. Cold War Security Studies, 
despite all its state-centrism, had been surprisingly silent when it came to 
conceptualising states, state formation and consolidation. This neglect of the 
domestic dimension of insecurity, in turn, failed to provide fuller accounts of 
security in the Third World, concluded Sayigh. 12 
Brian Job took up this point and pushed it further when he argued that the 
concepts of Cold War Security Studies, such as the security dilemma, were not 
helpful in accounting for the security problems faced by developing states; for 
threats to their security emanated from inside, not necessarily outside the state. 
The conception of security adopted by the students of Cold War Security Studies, 
argued Job, needed to be turned on its head within the Third World context. Job 
conclusion was that the concept of 'insecurity dilemma' would be more helpful in 
13 understanding security in the developing world. 
However, notwithstanding the strength of Job's argument regarding the 
limits of the security dilemma in accounting for the security predicament of the 
12 Sayigh, 'Confronting the 1990s. ' 
13 Brian L. Job, 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third 
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Third World, his assumption of a certain degree of external security entertained 
by Third World states is contestable. Put in other words, Job's assumption holds 
only when security is conceived in purely military terms. As Thomas has 
maintained, Third World states are very vulnerable vis-ä-vis their external 
environment when economic or environmental dimensions of security are 
concerned. 14 
Furthermore, it would be misleading to suggest that it is developing states 
alone that are concerned with the domestic dimension of security. Ethnic 
conflicts that have haunted developed states of the West indicate that the 
security dilemma has limited analytical utility anywhere in the world when 
accounting for the domestic dimension of security. 15 Lastly, it should also be 
noted that'states are never finished as entities. ' As David Campbell argued: 
The tension between the demands of identity and the practices 
that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the 
performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed. This 
paradox inherent to being renders states in permanent need of 
reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and 
varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have 
to be) always in a process of becoming. 16 
As Campbell showed in his study on the constitution of US identity, it is through 
the making of foreign policy that the United States has re-inscribed its identity. 
Seen in this light, it is not only developing states but also developed states (such 
as the United States) that constantly busy themselves with state building. 17 In 
World, ' in The Insecurity Dilemma, ed. Job, 11-35. 
14 Thomas, In Search for Security. 
15 For a neo-realist explanation of ethnic conflict see Barry Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and 
Ethnic Conflict, ' Survival 35 (Spring 1993) 27-47. 
16 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) 11. 
17 Also see, Richard Devetak, 'Incomplete States: Theories and Practices of Statecraft, ' in 
Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations, eds. John Macmillan and 
Andrew Linklater (London: Pinter, 1995) 19-39. 
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sum, deepening our insight into state building and consolidation, as called for by 
Sayigh, would help enhance our understanding of security not only in the 
developing world, but also in the world as a whole. 
On the more conservative end of this critical spectrum was Mohammed 
Ayoob who emphasised the ways in which the predicament of Third World states 
are different from the West, and made a case for prioritising the security of states. 
In a deliberate echo of the distinction Barry Buzan drew between weak and 
strong states, 18 Ayoob maintained that Third World states are 'junior' states; they 
are at an early stage of state-making, and 'as the European experience has 
shown, violence and conflict are inevitable at this stage. '19 States in the West 
had centuries to reach their current stage, argued Ayoob, and if Third World 
states are going to grow up and become 'proper' states, they should be allowed 
to prioritise state security for a while. Accordingly, Ayoob defined security 
in relation to vulnerabilities that threaten to, or have the potential 
to, bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both 
territorial and institutional, and regimes which preside over these 
structures and profess to represent them internationally. 20 
Note here that Ayoob's definition does not include a reference to the security of 
other potential referents such as individuals or social groups. He maintained that 
the security of state is of prime importance within the Third World context and 
that individuals and groups might have to endure some insecurity if the ultimate 
purpose is the enhancement of the security of the state. By arguing that state 
security should be prioritised on the way to becoming a 'proper' state, Ayoob not 
only presented a state-centric analysis, but also called for more, not less, statism. 
18 Barry Buzan, People. States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era, 2"° ed. (London: Harverster Wheatsheaf, 1991) 96-107. 
19 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, 115. 
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If one is to follow Ayoob's logic, the security of other referents are 
deemed of significance so far as this has an impact upon the legitimacy and 
stability of the state/regime, and the policy-making and implementation capacity 
of the , government. 
This is why, argued Ayoob, those approaches that focus on 
individuals' security (such as Critical Security Studies) are 'far removed from 
Third World realities, ' for in the Third World it is the security of the state that is the 
priority. 21 In reply to Booth's call for conceptualising security as emancipation, 
Ayoob wrote: 
It may be ... possible to equate emancipation with security 
in 
Western Europe (although grave reservations are in order even 
on that score). But it would be extremely far-fetched and 
intellectually disingenuous to do the same in the case of the Third 
World, where basic problems of state legitimacy, political order, 
capital accumulation are far from being solved and may even be 
getting worse. 22 
The statist assumptions that underpin Ayoob's argument will be discussed in 
greater detail in the final section of the chapter. Suffice it to make three brief 
points here. First, from a Critical Security Studies perspective, emancipation is 
not an added extra, something to be aspired for after all other aspects of security 
are achieved, as Ayoob seems to suggest. As Chapter 1 argued, defining 
security as emancipation means adopting an alternative conceptualisation of 
security that incorporates the environmental, societal, economic as well as 
political and military dimensions of security faced by multiple referents. Indeed, 
Ayoob's preference for focusing on the political and economic dimensions of 
state security is challenged by some other students of Third World security such 
as Abdel-Monem Al-Mashat who maintained that the practical implication of such 
20 Ayoob, 'Security in the Third World, ' 15. 
21 Ayoob, 'Security in the Third World, ' 16. 
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statist approaches is the state's domination over society at the expense of 
individuals and social groups' concerns. 23 Second, the problems identified by 
Ayoob, such as state legitimacy, political order and capital accumulation are not 
isolated to Third World states. All states have had to cope with similar problems, 
albeit with varying degrees. The third and related point is that, following Thomas, 
it is not possible to account for (let alone address) such problems faced by 
developing states without searching for some of its roots in the practices of 
developed states. 24 Hence the call of Critical Security Studies for a 
comprehensive approach that takes into account multiple dimensions of threats 
to the security of myriad referents in different parts of the world. 
The overall point here is that although the critiques students of Third 
World security present are helpful in pointing to the limited analytical utility of the 
concepts of Cold War Security Studies in understanding the security predicament 
of developing states, their conclusion that security in the Third World should be 
looked at through different analytical lenses is not helpful. This is not to deny the 
differences between security problems faced by developing states and their more 
developed counterparts. The argument here, to take up Thomas' analogy, is that 
if the marriage between Third World states and Western concepts has been an 
unhappy one, the solution may be found in counselling for both sides rather than 
a divorce. 
22 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, 11. 
23 Abdul Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1985) 33. 
24 Thomas, 'New Directions in Thinking About Security in the Third World. ' Also see Mustapha 
Kamal Pasha, 'Security as Hegemony, ' Alternatives (1996) 283-302. 
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Indeed, students of Third World security often underestimate the degree 
to which their critique of Cold War Security Studies have contributed to a re- 
thinking of security by helping reveal its limitations in accounting for the domestic 
political and developmental dimensions of security and the need for broader 
agenda, as well as emphasising the linkages between security needs of myriad 
actors in different parts of the world. Failing to realise the contributions they have 
made in the past and could potentially make in the future, most students of Third 
World security have so far tended to restrict their conclusions to developing 
states, refraining from commenting on the implications of their analyses on the 
bigger picture of Security Studies. However, as Amitav Acharya maintained 
the security predicament of Third World states provides a helpful 
point of departure for appreciating the limitations of the dominant 
understanding and moving it toward a broader and more inclusive 
notion of security. This redefinition is crucial to understanding the 
problems of conflict and order in the post-Cold War period. 25 
Notwithstanding Acharya's call, the mainstream tendency has been one of 
focusing on the different character of Third World states and their security needs. 
As a result, the critiques presented by students of Third World security regarding 
the underdeveloped state of core concepts such as state and security have yet to 
be fully incorporated into Security Studies. This point will be further developed in 
the next two sections, which trace the development of Security Studies in the 
post-Cold War era by focusing on two major debates, broadening security and 
appropriate referent(s) for security. 
25 Amitav Acharya, 'The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies, ' in Critical 
Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 301. 
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Broadening Security 
As Chapter 3 argued, calls for a broader conception of security began to be 
voiced during the Cold War period by Third World experts as well as students of 
Alternative Security and Peace Researchers. These voices began to gain 
strength in the post-Cold War era with a proliferation of works that attempted to 
re-think, re-define, and re-conceptualise security. 26 Barry Buzan's People, States 
and Fear was a seminal work that brought together the ideas of aforementioned 
critics in a sustained analysis that questioned the core concept of the field: 
security. Maintaining that those conceptions and practices of security 'bound to 
the level of individual states an military issues' were 'inherently inadequate, ' 
Buzan called for broadening the concept beyond its purely military focus and 
looking below and beyond the state for other referents. 27 The issue of proper 
referent(s) for security will be addressed in the next section. What follows is an 
overview of the debate on broadening security. 
In People, States and Fear, Buzan proposed to broaden security in order 
to come to grips with its multidimensional character by taking into consideration 
four other dimensions, namely the political, economic, societal and environmental 
26 See inter alia Jessice Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining Security, ' Foreign Affairs 68: 2 (Spring 
1990) 162-77; Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation, ' Review of International Studies 17: 4 
(1991) 313-26; idem, 'The Interregnum: World Politics in Transition, ' in New Thinking About 
Strategy and International Security, ed. Booth, 1-28; Buzan, People, States and Fear; idem, 'Is 
International Security Possible? ' in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, ed. 
Booth, 31-55; Edward A. Kolodziej, 'What is Security and Security Studies?: Lessons from the 
Cold War, 1-31; Martin Shaw, 'There is No Such Thing as Society: Beyond Individualism and 
Statism in International Security Studies, ' Review of International Studies 19 (1993) 159-75; 
Ronnie Lipschutz, ed. On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); J. Ann 
Tickner, 'Re-visioning security, ' in International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and 
Steve Smith (Oxford: Polity, 1995) 175-97. See also Ken Booth and Eric Herring, Kevguide to 
Information Sources in Strategic Studies (London: Mansell, 1994) esp. pp. 120-38, for a critical 
overview of some of these works. 
27 Buzan, People. States and Fear, 6. 
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in additional to that of the military. The military dimension, maintained Buzan, 
had so far been paid 'disproportionate' attention. This has had two 
consequences. First, other dimensions were paid inadequate attention. Second, 
by concentrating primarily on the military dimension of security, analysts had 
become too preoccupied with 'national' security perspectives 'where competitive 
self-interest dominates perceptions, and consequently discourages analyses of 
security interdependence and the systemic aspects of the concept. '28 Cold War 
approaches to security, with their zero sum conceptions and practices, offered 
little insight into issues such as environmental threats let alone enable 
cooperative action to be taken to address them. 
It should be noted here that Cold War Security Studies was never totally 
ignorant of the non-military dimensions of security. Indeed, as David Baldwin 
noted, the multidimensionality of security is 'not a discovery '; 29 Arnold Wolfers 
dwelt upon similar issues (see Chapter 3). 30 However, as the Cold War waxed 
and waned, broader security agendas of the early years were replaced by more 
narrow and military-focused ones. Furthermore, although some of the ideas 
Buzan put forward had been around for a long time, the difference was that his 
was a voice from within the discipline (that is, Security Studies) as opposed to 
that of 'outsiders' (Peace Researchers, Third World experts) whose ideas were 
not taken as seriously. 
28 Buzan, 'Is International Security Possible? ' 36. 
29 David Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security, ' Review of International Studies 23: 1 (1997) 5-26. 
30 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962) esp. pp. 147-65. 
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Building upon Peace Researchers' broadening of the concepts violence 
and peace that took human beings as the referent, Ken Booth proposed 
broadening security to include 'all those physical and human constraints which 
stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do. '31 Such 
constraints may include human rights abuses, water shortage, illiteracy, lack of 
access to health care and birth control, militarisation of society, environmental 
degradation and economic deprivation as well as armed conflict at the state- and 
sub-state level. Accordingly, to adopt a broader conception of security is to 
become aware of threats to security faced by myriad referents in all walks of life 
and approach them within a comprehensive and dynamic framework cognisant of 
the interrelationships in between. 
The arguments developed by Buzan and Booth calling for broadening 
security have been criticised on various grounds. One major criticism from within 
the ranks of Security Studies came from Stephen Walt as presented in his much- 
cited 1991 article, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies. i32 Walt opposed 
broadening security on two grounds. First, he seemed to worry that a broader 
security agenda will result in less attention being paid to military threats, which he 
was keen to stress, have not yet been eliminated despite the end of the 
superpower conflict. Second, argued Walt, a broader conception of security will 
undermine the coherence of Security Studies as a field of academic study. He 
believed that broadening the concept would 'destroy [the field's] intellectual 
coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important 
31 Booth, 'Security and Emancipation, ' 40. 
32 Stephen Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies, ' International Studies Quarterly 35: 2 
(June 1991) 211-39. 
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problems. '33 In short, Walt's argument was that although non-military issues 
deserved attention, Security Studies was not the place to address them. 
Leaving aside the inconsistency of Walt's own position of arguing against 
broadening but nevertheless drawing up his own broad research agenda, it 
should be noted that his arguments are representative of Cold War Security 
Studies in the way they the need to have a clear (that is, military) focus and 
intellectual coherence is emphasised. As Chapter 3 argued, these issues were 
also at the core of attempts during the early 1950s to create a 'scientific' field of 
Security Studies. Faced with the perceived Soviet threat and the memories of 
inter-war era still fresh in people's minds, having a 'scientific' field of Security 
Studies to produce cumulative knowledge on security issues was deemed vital at 
the time, and the setting up of Cold War Security Studies in the way it was done 
should be understood within this context. However, it does not follow that those 
statist, military-focused and zero sum thinking and practices that characterised 
most (but not all) of Cold War Security Studies should be maintained, as Walt 
seems to suggest. 
Moreover, Walt is indeed correct to point out that military threats have not 
been eliminated. But the proponents of broadening security have never claimed 
this to be the case. Contra-Walt, those who are in favour of broadening security 
do not start with the assumption, as he seems to suggest, that the end of the 
superpower conflict has eliminated most military threats. Rather they maintain 
that broadening security would enable analysts to view an array of threats in a 
33 Walt, ' The Renaissance of Security Studies? ' 213. 
34 Booth and Herring, Keyguide to Information Sources in Strategic Studies, 126-7. 
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comprehensive fashion cognisant of the dynamic interrelationships in between. 
Accordingly, by way of putting non-military threats on the security agenda, it 
would be possible to prioritise and address them before they become militarised. 
Then, from a Critical Security Studies perspective, one purpose behind 
broadening security is to be able to find non-military solutions to a broader range 
of issues. In other words, Walt's worry regarding a diminution of the attention 
paid to military issues is misplaced. 
It should also be noted that given post-Cold War state practices, Walt's 
apprehension that broadening security would cause the discipline to lose its 
theoretical rigour is not grounded. Be it the Central Intelligence Agency that 
broadened its agenda in the 1990s or governments that opted for 'comprehensive 
security' from the 1980s onwards, numerous actors have practically been 
broadening security. A case at hand is Third World policy-makers who have 
been calling for broader conceptions of security since the 1960s. Indeed, not 
even governmental practices sustain Walt's arguments. 
On the other side of the spectrum of critics of broadening security were 
Ole Waver and Daniel Deudney. 35 Their argument was mainly against the 
'securitization' of non-military issues, which, they worried, would become 
intractable if put on governmental security agendas. Waver argued that once 
issues get labelled as 'security' issues, not only a sense of urgency, but also 
35 Ole Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization, ' in On Security, ed. Lipschutz, 46-86; Daniel 
Deudney, 'The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security, ' 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 19: 3 (1990) 461-76. Also see Jef Huysmans, 
'Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of Securitizing Societal Issues, ' in Migration and 
European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, eds. Robert Miles and Dietrich 
Thränhardt (London: Pinter, 1995) 53-78. 
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conflictual, zero sum, militarised mind-sets are invoked thereby rendering them 
intractable. The point here is that Waver's worries stem from a 
misunderstanding which is rooted in his conflation of broadening security and 
'securitization, ' which, from a Critical Security Studies perspective, are not the 
same thing. Let me clarify this point. 
In his 1995 essay, 'Securitization and Desecuritization, ' Mover 
presented a critique of the broadening move whilst seeking to maintain a distance 
from those such as Walt who were also in favour of a military-focused security 
agenda, but for a different reason. Mover built his argument by setting up a 
'straw person' he called the 'traditional progressive' approach to security against 
which he positioned himself. This 'traditional progressive' approach, according to 
Mover, is 
(1)to accept two basic premises of the established discourse, first 
that security is a reality prior to language, is out there 
(irrespective of whether the conception is 'objective' or 
'subjective, ' is measured in terms of threat or fear), and second 
the more security, the better; and (2)to argue why security should 
be more than is currently the case, including not only 'xx' but also 
'yy, ' where the latter is environment, welfare, immigration and 
refugees, etc. 36 
Stated as such, Weever's argument constituted a crucial corrective to those who 
actually belonged to the camp of 'traditional progressive' scholars. Exactly who 
these people are is not clear; Weaver does not name names. It is implied that 
those who are in favour of broadening security all fall into this camp. My 
argument here is that although setting up this 'straw person' does enable Weever 
to clarify his own position, it is not useful in that it obscures the differences 
36 Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization, ' 46-7. 
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between multiple voices who called for broadening security some of whom would 
not fit comfortably into the `traditional progressive' straitjacket tailored by Waver. 
For instance, feminist critics of Security Studies such as Cynthia Enloe 
and Ann Tickner have both criticised the military-focus of Cold War Security 
Studies and emphasised the ways in which statist and militarised thinking and 
practices constituted a threat to women's security. 37 However, neither of the two 
would fit Waever's category in that both would reject the notion of security being a 
'reality' prior to language. Neither would Booth's approach fit into Waever's 
category. For, he views security as a derivative concept rooted in the 
philosophical worldview of those who define it. 38 In sum, not all of those who call 
for broadening security fit Mover's classification. By way of setting up a 'straw 
person' that has significant exceptions, Mover has weakened his otherwise 
rather convincing case for 'desecuritization. ' 
To go back a couple of steps, Wmver argues that security is a 'speech 
act'; that is, threats to security do not exist outside discourse, and that a particular 
issue is constituted as a threat to security via the agency of state elites who 'utter' 
security in reference to that issue. 39 Presented as such, Mover's speech act 
theory is not necessarily any different from the deepening move of Critical 
Security Studies, whereby the prevailing conception of security is recognised as 
deriving from Cold War Security Studies which embraced realism and sought to 
37 Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 199); Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security'; idem, 
Gender in International Relations: Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992); idem, 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements 
Between Feminists and IR Theorists, ' International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997) 611-32. 
38 Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist, ' in Critical Security Studies, eds. 
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serve those in power. In other words, the 'contrast' Waver tries to establish 
between his 'speech act' approach and others (such as students of Critical 
Security Studies) who seek to broaden security, does not exist. 
However, although Weever and Critical Security Studies start from a 
similar point, they build different arguments and arrive at radically different 
conclusions. Weever defines 'securitization' as a process through which state 
elites '[claim] a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it' or 
'to gain control over it. i40 Securitization is a 'conservative mechanism' for Weever. 
This is different from what students of Critical Security Studies mean by 
broadening security. From a Critical Security Studies perspective, the security 
agenda could indeed be broadened by state elites for the purposes mentioned by 
Weever. But it could also be broadened by non-state actors who challenge the 
statist concerns that shape governmental security agendas and seek address 
their own and others' concerns that have been marginalized (if not perpetuated) 
by states. In other words, Critical Security Studies takes into account the agency 
of non-state actors who may seek to broaden security to include non-military 
issues regardless of states' preferences. 41 Weever, on the other hand, maintains 
that securitization is a 'conservative mechanism' operated by state elites, and 
that it should remain as such. His conclusion is that in the long run security 
analysts should be seeking to de-securitize issues, by bringing into the realm of 
'ordinary' politics. 
Krause and Williams, 106. 
39 Waver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization, ' 55. 
40 Weever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization, ' 54-5. 
41 Chapter 8 will further elaborate on the issue of agency. 
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Viewed as a critique of Cold War approaches to security, Waver's essay 
is a welcome contribution. For during the Cold War securitization has indeed 
been used by state elites to keep issues outside the realm of 'ordinary' politics, to 
justify the mobilisation of resources into addressing military and non-military 
issues. Middle Eastern oil, for instance, was securitized in the United States in 
the immediate aftermath of World War II. This enabled the Arab-American Oil 
Company (ARAMCO) to play up the 'communist threat' faced by the Saudi 
regime in the attempt to ensure US government's financial support in meeting 
Saudi demand for 50 percent share of the oil royalties. This act (which amounted 
on the part of the US government to channelling funds to a private firm from the 
national budget to help maintain its share in Middle Eastern oil markets) was 
made possible by the prior securitization of oil. 42 The point here is that by helping 
reveal such examples of securitization as a 'conservative mechanism' whereby 
state elites use it to move issues outside the realm of 'ordinary' politics, or to 
justify the allocation of meagre resources into one area, Waver has made a 
significant contribution to post-Cold War debates on security. 
However, the move Weaver makes to associate all proponents of 
broadening security with state elites and their practices of securitization is not 
equally welcome, because it is misleading. There is a difference between merely 
broadening governmental security agendas but relying on traditional practices in 
addressing them (what Weaver may describe as the 'traditional progressive' 
approach that approves of securitization as a 'conservative mechanism') and 
42 George Philip, The Political Economy of International Oil (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1994) 23,108. 
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Critical Security Studies move of broadening security. The latter also deepens 
security and seeks to re-conceptualise agency and practice. 
Indeed, feminists as well as students of Critical Security Studies not only 
broaden but also deepen security cognisant of the political and constitutive 
character of thinking and writing about security. Furthermore, both have sought 
to re-conceptualise security in the attempt to move away from statist, military- 
focused and zero sum thinking as well as practices. Two cases pointed to by 
Christine Sylvester in her work on feminist approaches to security and 
cooperation are the Greenham Common Peace Camp and women's 
cooperatives in Harare, Zimbabwe. 3 Students of Critical Security Studies have 
also emphasised theory as a form of practice. In other words, both feminists and 
students of Critical Security Studies are aware of the ways in which security has 
functioned as a 'conservative mechanism' but nevertheless favour broadening 
security whilst at the same time seeking to find ways to avoid falling back on 
traditional mind-sets and practices. This, I submit, amounts to taking broadening 
more seriously than Mover's 'traditional progressive' 'straw person' would allow. 
To recap, the argument here is that, by way of failing to recognise other 
responses to securitization, Mover weakens the case he makes for 
desecuritization (taking issues outside the realm of security to address them 
through 'ordinary' politics) as a more effective way of dealing with issues 
heretofore not considered as threats to security. 
43 Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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Daniel Deudney's argument against broadening security is based on 
concerns similar to that of Mover. Deudney's worry is that the securitization of 
issues evokes an 'us versus them' mentality whereas in the environmental 
sphere 'we' not 'they' are the enemy. This is because, as Ulrich Beck argues, 
human agency has been complicit in perpetuating if not creating environmental 
threats. 44 Viewed as such, Deudney's response to the broadening move is 
rooted in his worry that the Cold War security discourse, which remains prevalent 
to this day, would be used to address a broader security agenda thereby 
perpetuating existing threats. As noted above, the Cold War security discourse 
was characterised by militarised, zero sum conceptions and practices of security 
whereby security was sought against an adversary. However, as Chapter 3 
noted, during the 1980s Alternative Security thinkers pointed to the problems 
involved in such approaches and called for the adoption of common security 
practices whereby security is sought with the adversary not against him/her, the 
point being that security maintained through the threat and use of war has not 
proven to be stable. Then, if the problem Deudney identifies with adopting a 
broader conception of security stems from a particular approach to security in 
theory and practice, an alternative approach that embraces common security 
would enable environmental issues to be tackled within a security framework but 
without rendering their solution intractable. 
This is not to deny that Waver's preferred strategy of 'desecuritization' 
may constitute a solution in the attempt to avoid meeting environmental threats 
through traditional statist, military-focused and zero sum practices. However, this 
44 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter (London: Sage, 1992). 
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would amount to leaving a useful tool (in terms of its mobilisation capacity) such 
as security to the monopoly of state elites who have not, so far, proven to be 
sensitive towards the security concerns of peoples (individuals and social 
groups) 45 It would also mean remaining uncritical of the ways in which military 
threats have traditionally been dealt with. As noted above, Alternative Security 
thinkers as well as feminists have presented valuable critiques of as well as 
alternatives to such traditional practices. Taking up from where they have left, 
the students of Critical Security Studies sought to re-conceptualise agency and 
practice (see Chapter 8). 
To summarise, from a Critical Security Studies perspective, broadening 
security does not simply mean putting more issues on governmental agendas but 
re-thinking what security is (or may be) all about. The prior is an offshoot of the 
latter, but not its main purpose. Security may mean different things to different 
peoples depending on where they come from, where they are and what they want 
to do with their lives. This brings us to the question of what the appropriate 
referent(s) for a broadened security agenda should be. 
Referent(s) for Security 
A plethora of works produced in the post-Cold War era critical of Cold War 
Security Studies have argued that security should be about referents other than 
the state, such as individuals, social groups, or a potential global society. Ken 
45 Richard Wyn Jones, Security. Strategy and Critical Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999) 
108.12. 
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Booth submitted that, following Kant, 'we should treat people as ends and not 
means. States, however, should be treated as means and not ends. r46 Martin 
Shaw called for a 'sociologically adequate' approach to the study of security 
when he wrote that 
individual and collective human security do not depend 
overwhelmingly on the state and/or ethnic-national context. ... Security issues are faced at all levels of social life. 47 
On the more conservative end of this critical spectrum was Barry Buzan who 
called for looking upwards to the systemic level and downwards to the individual 
level in order to move beyond statist Cold War conceptions of security. 48 Buzan's 
position is a curious one, for he, whilst critical of statism in Security Studies, 
nevertheless argued for state-centric analyses thereby ending up reinforcing 
statism (albeit unintentionally). The argument here needs further clarification. 
In People, States and Fear, Buzan presented a broader framework for 
studying security, a framework that covered its economic, societal, 
environmental, political as well as military dimensions. As regards the referent 
for security, Buzan maintained that 
security has many potential referent objects. These objects of 
security multiply not only as the membership of the society of 
states increases, but also as one moves down through the state 
to the level of individuals, and up beyond it to the level of the 
international system as a whole 49 
Buzan's study (first published in 1983) marked a crucial corrective to statist Cold 
War conceptions of security prevalent at the time. However, Buzan, whilst 
mentioning other potential referents at the sub- and supra-state levels, 
48 Booth, "Security and Emancipation, ' 319. 
47 Shaw, 'There is No Such Thing as Society, ' 110. Also see Bill McSweeney, Security. Identity 
and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
48 Buzan, People. States and Fear. 
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nevertheless made a case for focusing on the security of states. He built his 
argument in two moves. First, argued Buzan, the anarchic structure of the 
international system rendered the units the 'natural focus of security concerns. ' 
Since states were the 'dominant' units, reasoned Buzan, 'national security' was 
'the central issue. i50 
Buzan's second move was to look at the state's agency ('at the end of the 
day security policy still has to be made by states', he wrote)51 and infer from its 
privileged position as a security agent that its security should be prioritised over 
other potential referents. 'Because policy-making is very largely an activity of 
states, ' argued Buzan, 'there is an important political sense in which national 
security subsumes all of the other security considerations found at the individual 
and systemic levels. 'S2 This argument, in turn, hints at a confusion between 
agents and referents. I will come back to this point later. Let us now look more 
closely at these two moves Buzan made to build up his argument. 
Buzan's first move could be criticised first, for its depiction of the 
international system as anarchical (and therefore the realm of insecurity) and 
second, for identifying individuals' security with citizenship and the state (the 
realm of security). This (neo-realist) stance adopted by Buzan has been 
criticised forcefully by Alexander Wendt among others and will not be dealt with 
here in detail. 53 Suffice it to note that the anarchical conception of the 
49 Buzan, People, States and Fear, 26. 
50 Buzan, People. States and Fear, 19. 
51 Buzan, People. States and Fear, 328. 
52 Buzan, People. States and Fear, 328. 
53 Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics, ' International Organization 46: 2 (1992) 391-425; J. Ann Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security'; 
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international system derives from assumptions made by neo-realists about 
subjectivity and sovereignty, and the reasoning that the absence from the 
international arena of what makes order possible at the domestic arena (i. e., a 
central government) is what renders the latter anarchical. 54 There is indeed no 
world government; but it does not necessarily follow that this makes international 
security impossible. 
Furthermore, the anarchy/order, inside/outside divides introduced by this 
argument are problematic for, as Keith Krause and Michael Williams maintained, 
both are built upon the assumption that 'security comes from being a citizen, and 
insecurity from citizens of other states' and that 'threats are directed towards 
individuals qua citizens (that is, toward their states). '55 However, although states 
are there, in theory, to provide security for their citizens, there remain the 
practices of many states, which are constant reminders of the fact that some are 
worse than others in fulfilling their side of the bargain. Added to this is the case 
of 'gangster states that constitute a major threat to the security of their own 
citizens. 56 
Moreover, as Ann Tickner reminds us, the international arena is not the 
only realm characterised by the absence of mechanisms of order and there may 
be construed yet another anarchy/order divide-that of the 'boundary between a 
public domestic space protected, at least theoretically, by the rule of law and the 
Richard Wyn Jones, '"Travel Without Maps": Thinking About Security After the Cold War, ' in 
Security Issues in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Jane Davis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1995) 
196-218; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical 
Security Studies, ' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 33-59. 
54 Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security, ' 41. 
55 Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security, ' 43. 
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private space of the family' which is not always as well protected particularly 
concerning the case of domestic violence. 57 In sum, the first move Buzan makes 
to justify the privileged position of the security of states is contested in both 
theory and practice. 
Buzan's second move, that of underlining the dominant agency of the 
state to fortify the case for state-centred analyses of security, has been the less 
contested amongst the two. This is partly because states have had the license to 
legitimate use of violence and therefore are better endowed than any other agent 
to provide for (certain aspects of) security. But, perhaps more significant is the 
fact that students of International Relations have not been orientated to look at 
the agency of actors other than the state concerning security issues: "' The 
prominence of the state's agency in the economic and financial sectors has for 
long been challenged, but it is yet to be de-throned in (military-focused) security 
issues. Hence the prevalent focus on states as central actors in world politics, 
i. e. state-centrism. 
A broader security agenda, such as the one propounded by Buzan, on 
the other hand, requires the analyst to look at agents other than the state, such 
as transnational corporations, grassroots movements, and individuals, instead of 
restricting his/her analysis to the state's agency. This is essential not only 
because states, as noted above, are not always able (or willing) to fulfil their side 
of the bargain in providing for their citizens' security, but also because there 
58 Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: The Ethical Claims of International 
Society Revisited, ' Political Studies 44: 1 (1996) 123-36. 
57 Tickner, Gender and International Relations, 57. 
58 Scott Turner, 'Global Civil Society, Anarchy and Governance: Assessing an Emerging 
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already are agents other than states-be it social movements or intellectuals- 
who are striving to provide for the differing security needs of peoples (themselves 
and others). 59 In other words, a broadened conception of security such as that of 
Buzan should be coupled with moving away from state-centrism and paying 
attention to the agency of non-state actors. This is necessarily because 
broadening security without attempting a re-conceptualisation of agency would 
result in falling back on the agency of the state in meeting non-military threats to 
security. The problem with resorting to the agency of the state in meeting such 
threats is that states may not be the most suitable actors to cope with them. The 
state being the most equipped actor in coping with some kinds of threats does 
not necessarily mean that it is competent (or willing) enough to cope with all. 
Related to Buzan's argument regarding the state's dominant agency in 
security matters is Mohammed Ayoob's interjection into the debate. He has been 
prominent amongst critics of Cold War Security Studies with his submission that 
in the case of Third World states, what is needed is more not less state-centrism. 
In The Third World Security Predicament, Ayoob emphasised the need for 
adopting an 'explicitly state-centric' definition when studying security in the Third 
World on the grounds that the state is the provider of security. It should be 
pointed out that Ayoob does not neglect other dimensions of security such as the 
economic or environmental. He rather thinks these other dimensions should be 
taken into consideration only if they 'become acute enough to acquire political 
dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, or regime survival. '60 
This is necessarily because, argues Ayoob, the Third World states, as opposed 
Paradigm, ' Journal of Peace Research 35: 1 (1998) 25-42. 
59 See Chapter 7. 
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to states in the developed world are still busy with state-building and therefore in 
need of being given the time and space to construct 'credible and legitimate 
political apparatuses with the capacity to provide order-in many respects, the 
foremost social value-within the territories under their juridical control. 061 
Ayoob's analysis constitutes a crucial corrective to the outward-oriented 
Cold War conceptions of security, and a reminder of the often neglected domestic 
political dimension of the (in)security problem in the Third World. Nevertheless, 
criticisms made above regarding the problematic character of Buzan's 
assumption about the state being the provider of security in the domestic arena 
are valid for Ayoob's stance as well and need not be repeated here. Moreover, 
as noted above, by way of taking Western developed state as a finished project, 
Ayoob fails to push his argument to its logical conclusion and call for a more 
comprehensive conception of security that is cognisant of the character of the 
state as an 'unfinished project P62 After all, state building Is an on-going process; 
its identity in need of re-inscription, its sovereignty in need of reaffirmation by the 
63 recognition of other states and the symbolic acts of diplomacy. Furthermore, as 
Georg Sorensen has argued, the problem with realist-dominated International 
Relations theory in general and Security Studies in particular, has had 'less to do 
with an exaggerated focus on the state than a lack of analysis of the state. ' 
60 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, 9. 
81 Ayoob, 'Defining Security, ' 131. It is worth noting here that Ayoob, like Buzan, is influenced by 
the ideas of the International Society approach of Hedley Bull. 
62 Devetak, 'Incomplete States. ' 
63 Campbell, Writing Security idem, Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty Ethics and the 
Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993). 
64 Georg Sorensen, 'Individual Security and National Security: The State Remains the Principal 
Problem, ' Security Dialogue 27: 4 (1996) 371. 
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To put it in a nutshell, Ayoob's argument is that if Third World states were 
given the time to grow up to become 'adequate' states, the problem of security at 
the international as well as domestic levels could be better addressed. 65 This 
argument, in turn, echoes Buzan's call for the establishment of 'mature anarchy' 
thorough creating 'strong states. '66 One crucial problem with the logic of this type 
of argument is that it is rooted in a statist conception of security that privileges the 
security of states over that of other referents. Viewed through such statist lenses, 
the security concerns of individuals and social groups are marginalized if not 
rendered invisible. The argument here is not to suggest that 'weak' states of the 
world need not strengthen their infrastructures or try and boost their legitimacy. 
Rather, the argument here is that a conception of security that privileges the 
security of the state to the extent suggested by Ayoob may not be helpful in 
understanding the problem of security in the Third World. The practical 
implication of Ayoob's (and Buzan's) argument is that security at the domestic 
and international level should be sought through strengthening the infrastructure 
and boosting the legitimacy as well as coercive power of the state, which, in turn, 
would have detrimental effects on the security of other potential referents at the 
67 sub-state level. 
Moreover, Ayoob's position not only neglects the security of other 
potential referents, but also fails to establish crucial connections between the 
problem of security in the Third World and those individuals and social groups in 
65 Ayoob, Third World Security Predicament, 4. 
66 Buzan, 'Is International Security Possible? ' For critiques of Buzan, see Steve Smith, 'Mature 
Anarchy, Strong States and Security, ' Arms Control 12: 2 (September 1991) 325-39; Bill 
McSweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School, ' Review of 
International Studies 22 (1996) 81-93; Pasha, 'Security as Hegemony. ' 
67 See Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, 33-4. 
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the world as a whole, whose security is threatened directly or indirectly by the 
policies of states. After all, as noted in the previous section, those states that 
provide security for their citizens are able to do so largely due to their privileged 
position in the international economic system, which further deepens the security 
predicament of some others who live in the peripheries of the world. As Tickner 
argued, 
Buzan's claim that strong states can successfully provide security 
might be challenged by marginalized groups, such as women and 
minorities, whose economic security is often compromised when 
military security takes priority.... even strong states implement 
dubious policies that are not always formulated democratically. 68 
Some invaluable insight into these processes is provided in Cynthia Enloe's 
works where she has laid bare how the United States-a strong state which is 
supposed to provide for its citizens' security-has built its security on the 
insecurities of some women at home and abroad. 69 In other words, the record of 
strong states does not always back Buzan and Ayoob's arguments. 
Added to these is the fact that the process of building strong states defies 
underestimation or being viewed with rose-tinted spectacles; for, it is a long, 
brutal and often violent process. In this sense, remembering how state building 
in Western Europe 'cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and 
unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labour, ' should serve as a reminder that 
there is very little in the Western European state building experience to be 
idealised. 70 Furthermore, there is no guarantee that building up strong states in 
the Third World would lead to 'stable, liberal democratic governance, ' as Ayoob 
Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security, ' 186. 
69 Enloe, Bananas. Beaches and Bases; idem, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of 
the Cold War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993). 
70 Charles Tilly quoted in Georg Sorensen, 'Individual Security and National Security, ' 376. 
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seems to expect. 71 There is also the impact made by the forces of globalisation 
and fragmentation that often mitigate against the creation of strong states. 72 And 
lastly, but perhaps most importantly, these statist approaches foreclose 
alternative non-statist conceptions of security at the international level thereby 
making it more difficult to imagine alternative futures that are not built around 
states as the primary focus of loyalty, decision-making power, and practice. This 
is necessarily because the attempts to achieve security via establishing strong- 
states at the domestic level are often detrimental to community building at the 
global level for it diminishes peoples' respect for difference. This brings us back 
to the point made earlier about the continuing reign of statism in Security Studies. 
As mentioned above, statism in Security Studies has taken many guises. 
Some, such as Ayoob, are self-conscious and open about their statist credentials. 
Some, such as Buzan, on the other hand, argue against statism but nevertheless 
end up reinforcing it. As noted above, Buzan's argument (that since it is states 
that act for security, their security should be given primacy in our analyses) is a 
clear indication of his confusion of agents and referents. By way of this rather 
uncritical acceptance of the state's agency as being central, the agency of non- 
state actors are at best marginalized and at worst rendered invisible. 
In a recent work co-authored with Ole Waver and Jaap de Wilde, Buzan 
tried to address this problem of the confusion between referents and agents that 
obfuscated his analysis in his previous work. 73 Pointing to the difference between 
71 Ayoob, 'Defining Security, ' 135. 
72 Sorensen, 'Individual Security and National Security, ' 376. 
73 Barry Buzan, Ole Weever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998). 
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adopting a 'state-centric approach' and operating in a 'state-dominated field, ' 
Buzan et al. clarified their position as that of the latter. Consider the following 
quotation: 
We do not say security is only about the state (although there is 
much truth to the argument that the state is the ideal security 
actor) nor that security is equally available to all-states and 
other social movements. Security is an area of competing actors, 
but it is a biased one in which the state is generally privileged as 
the actor historically endowed with security tasks and most 
adequately structured for the purpose. 74 
To be fair, this explanation does indeed acknowledge 'the difference between a 
state-centric approach and a state-dominated field . '75 Furthermore, there is no 
denying that the state has for long been the agent best endowed to meet (certain 
types of) challenges to security (as it remains to be the sole agent that has the 
license to legitimate use of violence). However, I still find contestable Buzan et 
al. 's argument that their analysis is not state-centric. 
Since Buzan et al. do not look at the agency of actors other than the state 
when it comes to decision-making and especially taking action, it could be 
inferred that they assume states to be the agents of peace and security. Non- 
state actors do crop up in their analysis to try and force an issue onto the security 
agenda (such as the environmental groups lobbying for action to be taken against 
a pollutant factory), to defend themselves when charged for constituting a threat 
to security (such as the company that owns the pollutant factory) or as referents 
whose security is under threat (as with individuals and social groups that are 
affected by this pollution), but no actor other than the state is considered to have 
the potential to act towards actually meeting this threat (whereas nowadays it is 
74 Buzan et al., Security, 37. 
75 Buzan et al., Securit , 37. 
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often the case that environmental groups would take action themselves or try and 
reach out for support from international environmental groups like the 
Greenpeace or the Friends of the Earth before trying to invoke the agency of the 
state that may or may not choose to step in afterwards). Then, it is by way of 
looking solely at the agency of the state that Buzan et al. end up moving only 
partially away from presenting a state-centric analysis. 
Furthermore, if Security Studies is dominated by states-as Buzan et al. 
suggest-it is partly because security analysts got it that way, not because there 
are no other potential referents and agents that challenge the state's dominance. 
In other words, the difference between these two positions which Buzan et al. try 
to establish-the difference between state-centrism and operating in a state- 
dominated field-dissolves when the theory/practice relationship is conceived as 
mutually constitutive. State-centric approaches to security do not simply reflect a 
state-dominated field, but also help constitute it. The argument here is not meant 
to deny the salience of the roles states play in the realm of security; on the 
contrary, they remain to be significant actors with crucial roles to play. Rather it 
is to argue that the state's dominant position as the actor best endowed to 
provide (certain dimensions of) security does not justify privileging its security; 
nor does it warrant adopting a state-centred conception of security in our studies. 
Accordingly, Buzan et al. 's approach, by way of failing to recognise the important 
role that is already being played by non-state actors, ends up giving the state's 
agency more credit than it deserves. This is also why the distinction between 
state-centrism and statism blurs. To accord primacy in our security analyses to 
the state (i. e., state-centrism) does not simply reflect a 'reality' out there, but 
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helps reinforce statism in Security Studies by way of making it harder to imagine 
non-statist futures. 
Conclusion 
This chapter was devoted to drawing the contours of post-Cold War security 
thinking. The first section looked at developments in Arab national security 
thinking. In the 1990s, the literature on Arab national security was characterised 
by a move away from statist and zero sum thinking of the Cold War years. Here I 
presented Korany's critique of state-centrism and the need to pay attention to the 
concerns of Arab civil society, and Toukan and Feldman's stress on the effects of 
the security dilemma and the need for adopting common security practices. 
Mernissi's critique was utilised to point to the outward-directed and military- 
focused approaches prevalent even among post-Cold War critics of Arab national 
security. It was argued that Mernissi's critique is also significant because of the 
way it echoes Critical Security Studies argument that the prioritisation of the 
military dimension of security and the ensuing militarisation of Arab societies not 
only made it difficult meet traditional challenges, but also undermined the Arab 
states' capacity to provide welfare to their citizens thereby exacerbating non- 
military threats to security. 
The next section turned to look at the contributions made by students of 
Third World security some of which echo those by students of Arab national 
security, especially regarding the critique of top down and military-focused 
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conceptions and the stress put on the need to understand the domestic 
dimension of security in the Third World. It was argued that by pointing to the 
underdeveloped state of core concepts such as 'state' and 'security, ' writers like 
Thomas, Sayigh and Job have made significant contributions to the post-Cold 
War effort in re-thinking security. Ayoob's emphasis on the need for privileging 
state security in the Third World, on the other hand, was criticised. It was argued 
that Ayoob's stance is symptomatic of the tendency among some students of 
Third World security to stress how the security problems faced by developing 
states are different from those faced by developed states without necessarily 
realising the inadequacies of traditional conceptions of security within the context 
of the developed world. Following Acharya, it was argued that deepening our 
insight into the security needs and concerns of developing states would enrich 
our understanding of security in general. 
Chapter 6 also looked at the debates on 'broadening security' and 
'appropriate referent(s) for security' in the attempt to offer an idea as to which 
issues were problematised in post-Cold War debates (and which were not). First, 
I looked at the debate on broadening security. Walt's argument for keeping a 
military-focused agenda was criticised for his prioritisation of the coherence of 
Security Studies as an academic discipline at the expense of gaining insight into 
the security needs and concerns of peoples (individuals and social groups). 
Regarding Waever and Deudney's critique of broadening security, it was noted 
that their worries stem from the adoption of a particular Cold War mindset 
characterised by statist, zero sum and militarised thinking and practices. It was 
argued that Critical Security Studies, cognisant of the problematic nature of 
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meeting a broadened agenda through such traditional practices, has attempted to 
re-conceptualise practice. The chapter suggested that the issue of re- 
conceptualising practice was sidelined in the debate on broadening security. 
It was further argued that although Waver's call for desecuritization 
might actually constitute a way of avoiding meeting non-military threats through 
militarised practices, this would also mean leaving a useful concept like security 
to the monopoly of state elites. Furthermore, it would amount to remaining 
uncritical of their zero sum and militarised approaches to military threats. As the 
Alternative Security thinkers have noted during the Cold War, security maintained 
against the adversary through traditional practices does not tend to be stable. 
Hence the call of Critical Security Studies call for re-conceptualising practice to 
emphasise common as opposed to zero sum, and cooperative as opposed to 
unilateral practices. 
The final section of the chapter argued that the debate on appropriate 
referent(s) for security reflected the continued reign of statism in security thinking. 
The argument Buzan makes for state-centrism was criticised for his confusion of 
referents and agency. It was argued that states may be the dominant agents, but 
this does not justify privileging their security. For one thing, not all states act as 
agents for security; many states' practices show that they often act in defiance of 
peoples' concerns. For another thing, those states that do provide for their own 
citizens create insecurity for those in the margins and peripheries at home and 
abroad. Following Booth, it was argued that states should be treated as means 
and not ends. Furthermore, states should be treated as not the only means. 
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This is not only because the state's agency has become less and less central in 
an increasingly globalising world, but also because there are agents other than 
states that strive to provide for their own and others' security. 
The foregoing review of developments in post-Cold War security thinking 
shows that merely broadening security without attempting to re-conceptualise 
agency and practice does not allow students of security to move away from state- 
centric analyses, thereby ending up reinforcing statism in Security Studies (albeit 
unintentionally). From a Critical Security Studies perspective, broadening 
security in itself would not suffice so long as our conceptions of security remains 
statist, our practices zero sum and militarised. One problem with simply 
broadening the security agenda from a statist perspective without re- 
conceptualising agency and practice is that these new issues are approached not 
from the perspective of individuals or social groups but from states and tried to be 
addressed through traditional practices, which may indeed end up perpetuating 
them. This, I argued, was also characteristic of Arab national security and Third 
World security thinking in that both emphasised the issue of narrow security 
agendas and the need to pay attention to the domestic dimension. As a result, 
the issues of statism and appropriate practices to meet a broadened agenda 
were sidelined in these debates. The point here is that taking the broadened 
security agenda seriously requires paying attention to the issues identified above, 
namely, agency, practice and constitutive theory-issues I term as the silences of 
post-Cold War debates. This argument will be further developed in Chapter 8 
when discussing the Critical Security Studies perspective on thinking about the 
future. 
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Chapter 7: Practices of Security in the Post-Cold War 
Era 
Chapter 7 concludes Part II by bringing together the arguments 
developed in Chapters 5 (representations) and 6 (theories). As was the case 
with Chapter 4 (practices) this chapter is also organized along spatial lines, 
looking at security practices within the context of the spatial representations they 
have been shaped by and, in turn, have shaped. Here I will look at four 
alternative representations, namely, the 'Arab Regional System, ' 'Euro-Med 
Region, ' 'Muslim Middle East, ' and '(New) Middle East. ' The aim here is not to 
cover the complete range of security practices, but rather focus on those 
practices that were adopted to address the problem of regional security. 
Security in the Arab Regional System 
The Arab Regional System as a spatial representation is rooted in the Arab 
national security discourse, which has shaped and, in turn, been shaped by 
security practices of Arab actors, as noted in Chapters 2 and 5. Security 
practices of Arab actors during the post-Cold War era have taken different forms. 
On the one hand were Arab policy-makers whose references to the Arab national 
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security discourse became more and more sparse. Although Gulf regimes had 
begun to make this shift from the Arab national security discourse to that of 
Middle Eastern security in the 1960s (see Chapter 4), as far as the rest of Arab 
states were concerned, the watershed event has been the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. Since the Gulf War, conservative Gulf regimes have openly distanced 
themselves from the rest of the Arab world and expressed their reservations 
regarding the concept of Arab national security-something unheard of until the 
1990s. Jordan and the PLO took up the opportunity to break away from the rest 
of Arab states and sign individual peace treaties with Israel. Egypt consolidated 
its ties with the United States. Even Syrian policy-makers, long-time contenders 
for the leadership of the radical camp, agreed to engage in bilateral peace 
negotiations with Israel. Turkey and Israel grasped this opportunity to strengthen 
the strategic ties they established during the Cold War but kept under covers for 
fear of Arab reaction. As the Arab/non-Arab divide that once was the backbone 
of Arab national security discourse became less and less meaningful, Iran re- 
introduced itself to regional politics and sought to assume the leadership of 
Muslim states particularly since 1997 when it took over the presidency of the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). 
On the other hand were Arab non-state actors whose practices continued 
to shape and be shaped by the Arab national security discourse. Whilst 
intellectuals and grassroots organisations cooperated across borders to demand 
increased political participation and respect for human rights from their 
governments, those economically worse off focused on issues such as 
unemployment, better health provision and education. This section of the chapter 
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will seek to show how non-state actors have continued, in the post-Cold War 
world, to uphold Arab national security discourse seeking to shape and constrain 
the practices of their policy-makers, who have adopted increasingly more statist 
practices shaped by the Middle Eastern security discourse. ' 
The Gulf Crisis was a decisive event for inter-Arab relations. Its decisive 
character mainly stems from the fact that the security practices of Arab 
governments, during and after the crisis, came to focus increasingly on the 
concept of amn qutri (the territorial state) as opposed to the concept of amn 
kawmi (the Arab nation). As Bahgat Korany wrote: 
At the root of the Arabs' different alignments during the Gulf War 
were differing perceptions of security requirements-and these, 
in turn, were determined by whether Arab actors thought of 
security primarily in terms of the individual territorial state (Amn 
Qutri) or in terms of the broader collectivity: Arabs versus non- 
Arabs. 2 
As Chapter 4 argued, there had already emerged during the Cold War a gap 
between 'say' and do, ' or 'the doctrine of (pan-)national security and the practice 
of territorial state security' in Arab politics. 3 However, notwithstanding this 
discrepancy, many Arab policy-makers, until the early 1990s, continued to uphold 
the Arab national security discourse, whilst the rest of their security practices 
increasingly focused on maintaining state and regime security. Then, what has 
changed with the Gulf War is that since then not even the discourses employed 
by Arab policy-makers uphold Arab national security. Note the following 
See Bahgat Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism, ' in The 
Arab World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 161-78; Michael 
Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' Political Science Quarterly 111: 4 (1996-97) esp. 
pp. 598-606. 
s Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World, ' 164. 
Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World, ' 174. 
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statement by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (LAS) made in 
December 1992: 
Each state determines the needs and boundaries of its security 
on its own, because this concerns its people and its future. We 
should basically assume that there should be no interference in 
any country's security. We must acknowledge and proceed from 
this basic principle. 4 
This is not necessarily what one would consider a controversial statement; rather 
a pronouncement of a statist approach to security. Nevertheless it would have 
been unthinkable to utter such a statement publicly during the 1950s and 1960s, 
when Nasser was in power and Arab nationalism was at its peak. The Gulf War, 
in this sense, helped bridge the gap between `say' and 'do' in Arab politics; 
representatives of Gulf states and others no longer feel the need to resort to the 
language of Arab national security to justify their practices. 5 
The Gulf War has constituted a watershed in Arab politics also because 
this was the first time, in the history of the LAS, an Arab state invaded another 
Arab state. Although there had been instances in the past such as Saudi Arabia 
providing financial backing to Islamist movements in other Arab states, or Syria's 
intervention into Lebanon during the civil war, respect for each other's 
sovereignty and especially territorial integrity had been a closely guarded rules 
By invading Kuwait, Iraq not only broke this rule, but also sought to destabilise 
other Arab regimes by legitimising this action with reference to Arab national 
security in a way reminiscent of Nasser's 'symbolic' practices during the 1950s 
and 1960s (see Chapter 4). 7 In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, Iraqi 
° quoted in Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' 602. 
Yezid Sayigh, 'The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab Regional Order Failed, ' International Affairs 67: 1 
(1991) 489; Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' 605. 
s Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' 602. 
On 'symbolic' practices of Arab politics, see Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: 
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president Saddam Hussein suggested that the Iraqi action was part of a large- 
scale process to attain Arab national security which-in his view-included the 
re-distribution of Arab oil wealth equitably between 'haves' and 'have nots. i8 This 
attempt to present the conflict between Kuwait and Iraq as one of Arab 'haves' 
against 'have nots, ' thereby playing up the resentment felt by the peoples of poor 
Arab states against their oil-rich neighbours did not prove to be very credible, not 
the least because Iraq itself was a 'have' state (with oil reserves second only to 
that of Saudi Arabia)9 enjoying a GNP that was nine times that of Somalia, five 
times that of Sudan, and just less than four times that of Egypt. 10 Saddam 
Hussein's claim was made all the less credible by the fact that he had not come 
up with the idea of distributing oil wealth until the Gulf War. ' 
Bahgat Korany likened the Iraqi attempt to legitimise Kuwait's invasion 
with reference to Arab national security to a 'fatal bear hug, ' maintaining that 
Saddam Hussein's reference to the Arab national security discourse only helped 
'downgrade' the ideal itself. 12 Gulf policy-makers were particularly vocal in 
expressing their disillusionment with the Arab national security discourse, 
especially its core assumption that threats to the security of Arabs come from 
non-Arabs. In a statement made after the Gulf War, the Secretary General of the 
Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
8 Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World, ' 165; Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, 
61. 
9 Muhammad Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington, DC: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 1993) 12. 
10 Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World, ' 165-6. These are pre-war and pre-UN sanctions 
figures. 
11 Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World, ' 166; also see Faour, Arab World After Desert 
Storm, 5. 
12 Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World, ' 166. For a similar point, see Michael Barnett and 
F. Gregory Gause III, 'Caravans in Opposite Directions: Society, State, and the Development of 
Community in the Gulf Cooperation Council, ' in Security Communities, eds. Emanuel Adler and 
Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 181. 
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Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Abdallah Bishara expressed his conviction that 
the basic threat to the security of the Gulf states emanated not from Israel, but 
from some Arab states: 13 
We in the Gulf and the people of Kuwait have paid the price of 
fixed emotional positions and of basing our policy on so-called 
solidarity ... My view of the Arab 
future is based on a concept 
which destroys the myth of Arab fraternity, the myth of Arab 
security, and the myth of the one homeland. Future Arab links 
should be based on the Arab dimension of civilized interests, not 
on futile emotional theories. 14 
As noted above, the very fact that an Arab policy-maker did make such a 
statement, which would have been considered heretical if made a decade earlier, 
signalled the diminishing hold the Arab security discourse had over Arab policy- 
makers' practices. 
Another example of Gulf policy-makers' increasingly bold disregard of the 
premises of Arab national security was observed when they decided to punish 
those states that they saw as taking Iraq's side by banishing their migrant 
workers. Following the liberation of Kuwait, hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinians, Iraqis, Yemenis and Jordanians were forced to leave their homes in 
Gulf states. It should also be noted that Iraq and Jordan also sent migrant 
workers back because of their own economic decline. 15 
Gulf policy-makers' banishment of Arab migrant workers becomes all the 
more striking when it is put in its historical context; for until the 1990s labour 
migration had been perceived as 'a dimension of Arab economic 
13 Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World, ' 166. 
14 quoted in Bruce Maddy Weitzman, 'A New Arab Order? Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' 
Orient 34: 2 (1993) 225. 
15 Nader Fergany, 'Arab Labor Migration and the Gulf Crisis, ' in The Arab World Today, ed. 
Tschirgi, 95-6. Also see Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, 82-3; Karawan, 'Arab 
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interdependence and an example of regional integration. 06 The 'have not' 
governments, which exported work force, viewed this as a way of claiming a 
share of the oil revenues of the 'have' states. Workers' remittances not only 
helped feed their families back home but also helped ameliorate the financial 
troubles of their governments. Those 'have' states, which were on the receiving 
end of labour migration, in turn, benefited from the services of their poor 
brethren. 17 Although they were always very cautious about the potential 
destabilising effects of the migrant workers in their societies, not allowing them to 
become a permanent part of the socio-economic fabric, they had never before 
used migrant workers explicitly as a foreign policy tool-not even during periods 
of strain. 18 The Gulf War, then, brought the securitization of labour migration out 
into the public realm. Since 1991, the issue has been treated openly by Gulf 
regimes as 'a matter of national security, state sovereignty and regime stability. il9 
This, in turn is a good illustration of how non-military issues, when put on the 
security agenda, could be approached from a statist perspective and met by 
traditional practices unless alternative practices are adopted in addressing them. 
Another example of the 'atomisation v20 of the Arab region and decline of 
the Arab national security discourse was observed when the Damascus 
Declaration (signed in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War by Arab members 
of the US-led coalition) was allowed to wither. The Declaration was agreed on in 
Dilemmas in the 1990s, ' 444-6. 
16 Karawan, 'Arab Dilemmas in the 1990s, 445. 
" See Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997) for an elaborate analysis of the workings of this 
relationship within the context of Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Also see Fergany, 'Arab Labor 
Migration and the Gulf Crisis, ' 93. 
18 Ibrahim A. Karawan, 'Arab Dilemmas in the 1990s: Breaking Taboos and Searching for 
Signposts, ' Middle East Journal 48: 3 (Summer 1994) 445. 
19 Karawan, 'Arab Dilemmas in the 1990s, ' 446. 
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March 1991 between Egypt, Syria and GCC-member states in the attempt to take 
the issue of Gulf security in the hands of Arab states from those of the United 
States. 21 The declaration was based on the principles embodied in the UN and 
LAS charters with special emphasis being put on state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. In the economic sphere, the intention to establish an 'Arab economic 
grouping' was declared. Regarding defence, the Declaration envisaged the 
constitution of a 'nucleus Arab peace force' which was to be based on existing 
Egyptian and Syrian forces already stationed in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, with 
the stated aim of safeguarding the Gulf as well as serving as 'an example that 
would guarantee the effectiveness of the comprehensive Arab defence order. '22 
By this way, Egypt and Syria were committing themselves to the security of Gulf 
states, whilst the latter were pledging $5bn in economic assistance to Egypt and 
Syria as part of a projected $10-15bn package. 23 
The misgivings of Gulf policy-makers regarding the Declaration began to 
surface shortly, as they repeatedly postponed its ratification. 24 It soon became 
0 
clear that in the eyes of the Gulf policy-makers the real value of the Damascus 
Declaration, as the Kuwaiti ex-Secretary-General of the GCC Abdallah Bishara 
put it, was 'its recognition of the legitimacy of the Arab states' borders, the right of 
each state to arrange its own security, and the exclusive claim to its resources . '25 
When Egypt and Syria withdrew their forces from the Gulf, tired of waiting, this 
served the purposes of Gulf states, which 'seemed intent on watering down the 
20 Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, esp. pp. 77-97. 
21 Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' 602. 
22 Maddy-Weitzman, 'A New Arab order? ' 226-7. Also see Faour, Arab World After Desert Storm, 
86-8. 
23 Maddy-Weitzman, 'A New Arab Order? ' 227. 
24 See Barnett and Gause, 'Caravans in Opposite Directions, ' 181-6, for a discussion on the 
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signed document without scrapping it outright . '26 Finally, on 16 July 1991 the 
foreign ministers of signatory states met and issued a revised version of the 
Declaration that no longer mentioned a 'nucleus Arab peace force. 927 
A few months later Kuwait signed a ten-year security accord with the 
United States (September 1991). Bahrain (October 1991) and Qatar (June 1992) 
followed suit. Kuwait also sought to broaden the net by signing 'defence 
cooperation accords' with the other four members of the UN Security Council. 28 
In other words, the Gulf states were quick to turn away from an 'Arab collective 
security' scheme and towards a 'go it alone defence strategy' as Michael Barnett 
and Gregory Gause argued, with each seeking to buy security by concluding 
colossal defence contracts and negotiating individual security guarantees with the 
United States. 29 They did not seek to coordinate their efforts even within the 
GCC framework let alone with other Arab states. Nor did they show any 'desire 
to come to understandings about burden-sharing, avoidance of duplication, or 
inter-operability' with other GCC-member states. 30 The point here is that in stark 
contrast to the premises of Arab national security, Gulf policy-makers were not 
willing to allow any other Arab actor to shape their policies. 
However although the fate of the Damascus Declaration did indeed 
highlight the 'collapse 931 of Arab national security discourse as far as Arab 
Damascus Declaration and politics in the Gulf Cooperation Council in its aftermath. 
25 Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' 602. 
28 Faour, Arab World After Desert Storm, 88. 
27 Maddy-Weitzman, 'A New Arab Order? ' 227-8. 
28 Barnett and Gause, 'Caravans in Opposite Directions, ' 182. 
29 Barnett and Gause, 'Caravans in Opposite Directions, ' 183; also see Barnett, 'Regional 
Security After the Gulf War, ' 608. 
30 Barnett and Gause, 'Caravans in Opposite Directions, ' 182. 
31 Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, 227. 
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governments were concerned, this should not lead one to gloss over its 
continuing popularity as observed in the practices of individuals, grassroots 
organisations and other civil societal actors. 32 For instance, when Saddam 
Hussein resorted to Arab national security discourse to justify Iraqi actions, his 
views were echoed by the demonstrators in the streets of the Arab world. He 
was received favourably by many when he appealed to Arab peoples and called 
for a unified Arab stance against the foreign (non-Arab) elements that have been 
usurping Arab oil and their regional allies who provided services such as keeping 
the oil prices down and helping maintain a stable international economy without 
eliciting a political quid pro quo (such as a less pro-Israeli stance in the 
Israel/Palestine conflict). 33 When he made his 12 August 1990 speech explaining 
Iraqi presence in Kuwait by establishing linkages with Israeli presence in 
Palestine, southern Lebanon and the Golan, and Syrian presence in southern 
Lebanon, his arguments struck a chord with many people both within and outside 
the Arab world-34 As Rouhollah Ramazani argued, the fact that Saddam Hussein 
chose to justify his actions with reference to these linkages did not mean that 
they did not exist. 35 
Non-governmental actors' protests against the US-led coalition took the 
form of street demonstrations, conferences, and the formation of delegations to 
try and solve the problem within an Arab framework. The demonstrators in Arab 
32 For a discussion on the reactions of Arab policy-makers and intellectuals to the end of the Cold 
War and the Gulf Crisis, see Karawan, 'Arab Dilemmas in the 1990s, ' 433-54. 
33 Walid Khalidi, 'Why Some Arabs Support Saddam, ' in The Gulf War Reader eds. Michael L. 
Sifry and Christopher Cerf (New York: Times Books and Random House, 1991) 161-71; 
Edward W. Said, 'Behind Saddam Hussein's moves, ' in The Politics of Dispossession: The 
Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination. 1969-1994 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1994), 278- 
82. 
34 Khalidi, 'Why Some Arabs Support Saddam, ' 170. 
3s R. K. Ramazani, 'The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement: Towards an Integrated U. S. 
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streets expressed support for Iraq not necessarily because they condoned the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but because they were, as Walid Khalidi noted, 
'[disillusioned] with the Arab status quo-political, social and economic-as well 
as with the regional policies of the United States. i36 In their eyes, the Iraqi action 
'constituted a deserved blow to the status quo (with all its domestic, political, 
socio-economic, and international dimensions) ... which Kuwait was seen to 
symbolise. '37 Their protests were 'not so much pro-Saddam or anti-Kuwait as 
anti the socio-economic status quo, despite the merits of the Kuwaiti case. '38 To 
a certain extent, then, the pro-Iraq demonstrations of the Arab masses were a 
way of voicing their opinion against their governments that otherwise refused to 
listen to their concerns. 39 
Many Arab intellectuals, among them Edward Said, also refused to 
condone the Iraqi action, but at the same time opposed the US-led coalition and 
its resolve to bring an end to the crisis through the use of force. 40 Arab 
intellectuals felt frustrated when the Arab world could not cope with an inter-Arab 
dispute by itself, that it displayed signs of dependence on the West (especially 
the United States), and that Iraq was allowed to be destroyed. 41 Said expressed 
the feelings of many when he wrote: 
No Arab country today can adequately defend itself or its 
borders, yet national security arguments are used to justify 
gigantically large outlays of money for imported weapons, 
standing armies, praetorian guards. Above all, the movement 
Policy in the Middle East? ' Middle East Policy vi: 1 (June 1998) 50. 
36 Khalidi, 'Why Some Arabs Support Saddam, ' 167. 
37 Walid Khalidi, Palestine Reborn (London: I. B. Tauris, 1992) 204. 
38 Khalidi, 'Why Some Arab Support Saddam, ' 168. 
39 Maha Azzam, 'The Gulf Crisis: Perceptions of the Muslim World, ' International Affairs 67: 1 
(1991) 471. 
Edward W. Said, 'A Tragic Convergence, ' in The Politics of Dispossession, 283-6; 'Intellectuals 
and the War: Interview with Edward Said, ' Middle East Report (July-August 1991) 15-20. 
41 Maddy-Weitzman, 'A New Arab Order? ' 225. 
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toward war today has overridden any rational consideration of 
what as Arabs we want out future to be. Where is the real 
discussion of 'Arab' wealth, poverty, society? All of us feel 
connected to an Arab nation, yet we allow massive amounts of 
polemic to cover hypothesized Arabs, while not enough detailed 
attention and care are given to individual, actual Arab lives and 
bodies. 42 
Fatima Mernissi voiced similar concerns, but from a feminist perspective, when 
she wrote: 
It is true that Mecca is still the centre of the world, even though it 
needs the American air force to protect it. But what can such a 
force protect against, against what deviation and confusion? 
What about the women in the city? ... What will become of the 
women in a city where the defence of the hudud [boundary] is in 
the hands of foreigners? 43 
Mernissi sought to emphasise how the Gulf War only added to the predicament of 
Arab women. As Chapter 6 argued, the Arab national security discourse has 
privileged militarised practices by way of invoking the need to secure Arabs 
(inside) from non-Arabs (outside). This, in turn, has resulted in the 
marginalization of women's concerns. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, women 
found themselves once again on the margins, unable to voice their concerns let 
alone put them on Arab national security agendas, because the boundary 
dividing Arabs from non-Arabs is once again under challenge. 
Notwithstanding such criticisms regarding security practices that have 
been justified by regional governments' pro-Arab rhetoric, a more societal- 
focused conceptualisation of Arab national security is still upheld by Arab 
intellectuals as the main tool in the attempt to shape and constrain their 
governments' actions. They take action within the spatial bounds of Arab 
Regional System in collaboration with activists in other Arab countries to put 
42 Said, 'A Tragic Convergence, ' 286. 
43 Fatima Mernissi, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland 
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pressure on their governments. Although not much cooperation is visible with 
their Iranian and Turkish counterparts a4 Arab intellectuals regularly come 
together to address those problems overlooked (if not perpetuated) by their 
governments. 5 Saad Eddin Ibrahim has observed that those of the socialist 
conviction put 'social justice' on top of their agenda; those with liberal convictions 
prioritise 'democracy'. 46 Human rights is another significant issue upheld by Arab 
intellectuals and social activists47 
It should also be noted that the late 1980s and especially 1990s saw the 
relative strengthening of civil society in the Arab world with an increase in the 
number of relevant organisations 48 Arab civil society is argued to be more 
vibrant than ever, with grassroots organisations of all sorts emphasising their 
Arab character. Many Arab non-governmental organisations work on relief and 
survival issues, human rights, provision of health care and education. Lebanese 
and Palestinian NGOs have been doing crucial work in trying to alleviate the 
difficulties of life in civil war (Lebanon) or under occupation (Palestine) by 
(Reading, MA: Persesus Books, 1992) 9. 
as An exception to this tendency is the increasing collaboration between Israeli, Palestinian and 
other Arab peace movements and especially women's movements that cross the conceptual 
borders of the'Arab regional order to work with the Israeli women. See Simona Sharoni, 
'Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Accord: Feminist Approaches to International Politics, ' in 
Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996) 107-26. 
45 'Interview with Salim Nasr-A View From the Region: Middle East Studies in the Arab World, ' 
Middle East Report (October-December 1997) 16-18; Hisham Sharabi, 'Introduction: Patriarchy 
and Dependency in the Future of Arab Society, ' in The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988); 'The Commission Document on Peace-building in the 
Middle East, ' in Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society, ed. 
Elise Boulding (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 43. 
48 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East, ' Security Dialogue 27: 4 (1996) 
428. Also see Sharabi, 'Introduction, ' 6-7. 
47 Sanäa Osseiran, 'The Democratization Process in the Arab-Islamic States of the Middle East, ' 
in Building Peace in the Middle East, ed. Boulding, 86-7. 
48 For a discussion on civil society in theory and practice with a specific focus on the Arab states, 
see Jillian Schwedler, 'Civil Society and the Study of Middle East Politics, ' in Toward Civil 
Society in the Middle East?: A Primer, ed. Jillian Schwedler (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
1995) 1-30. 
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'nurturing a sense of community, solidarity and hope . '49 These are also excellent 
examples of non-state actors acting to provide for their own and others' security 
where governments fail to do so. 
Security in the Euro-Med Region 
Chapter 2 argued that the Mediterranean as an alternative spatial representation 
began to take shape from the 1970s onwards largely in line with the development 
and changing security conceptions and practices of the European Union 
(previously the European Community). The EU's close interest in Middle Eastern 
affairs, as discussed in Chapter 5, goes back to the early 1970s-a period 
marked by the OPEC oil embargo that intertwined with the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. 
Over the years, the EU's policies toward the Middle East have been shaped 
around three major concerns: energy security (understood as the sustained flow 
of oil and natural gas at reasonable prices) ; 50 regional stability (understood as 
domestic stability especially in the countries in the geographically north Africa); 
and the cessation of Israel/Palestine conflict. 51 
In the 1980s, changes in the societies of EU-member states as a result of 
the growth of the Middle Eastern diaspora in Western Europe led EU policy- 
makers to re-think their priorities, and come to consider stability in the Middle 
'"'The NGO Phenomenon in the Arab World-An Interview with Ghanem Bibi, ' Middle East 
Report (March-April 1995) 26. 
50 Eberhard Rhein, 'Europe and the Greater Middle East, ' in Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies 
for the Greater Middle East, eds. Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1997) 49. 
51 Volker Perthes, 'Europe, the United States, and the Middle East Peace Process, ' in Allies 
Divided, eds. Blackwill and Stürmer, 89-90. 
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East (especially north Africa) as an integral part of their own security. 52 
Accordingly, EU policy-makers have sought to create co-operative schemes with 
the Mediterranean-rim countries of the Middle East to encourage and support 
economic development and growth. 53 Although non-EU actors such as the 
International Peace Research Association (IPRA), the IPRA Commission on 
Peace Building in the Middle East, and the European Peace Research 
Association (EUPRA) have also encouraged and supported the search for 
security within a Euro-Med framework, 54 the EU has almost single-handedly 
sought to construct a Euro-Med Region to meet its own domestic economic, 
societal, and, to a much lesser extent, military security interests. 
This, however, is not to suggest that the members of the European Union 
have adopted a single common approach or that EU policy-makers speak with 
one voice regarding Middle Eastern issues. On the contrary, EU-members do not 
all share the same sense of urgency or the need to adopt an independent and 
common European foreign policy towards the Middle East, or to assume a 
prominent a role in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. Whilst France and other 
southern European states press for more assertive policy-making and 
implementation, Germany, the Netherlands and UK have cautioned against it. 55 
52 See Ghassan Salam6, Torn Between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean: Europe and the 
Middle East in the Post-Cold War Era, ' Middle East Journal 48: 2 (1994) 226-49. 
53 Robert Satloff, 'America, Europe, and the Middle East in the 1990s: Interests and Policies, ' in 
Allies Divided, eds. Blackwill and Stürmer, 19. Also see Barry Buzan and B. A. Roberson, 
'Europe and the Middle East: Drifting Towards Societal Cold War? ' in Identity. Migration and the 
New Security Agenda in Europe, Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre 
Lemaitre et al. (London: Pinter, 1993) 131-47. 
54 See 'The Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East, ' 7-66; James Calleja, 
'Educating for Peace in the Mediterranean: A Strategy for Peace-Building, ' in Building Peace in 
the Middle East, ed. Boulding, 279-85. 
11 Perthes, 'Europe, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process; 87. 
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The shift in EU's priorities towards adopting a Mediterranean-centred 
approach, then, should be understood within a context created, over the years, 
by the convergence of domestic societal as well as economic concerns. 56 The 
presence of a large and growing Middle Eastern diaspora in the EU has meant 
that the de-stabilisation of Middle Eastern societies, especially those in north 
Africa, could be detrimental to security and stability in the EU. 57 In short, EU's 
turn towards a more Mediterranean-centred approach has its roots in the 
domestic societal concerns of the EU-member states and a re-thinking of security 
in the European Union against the backdrop of migration from the Middle East; 
the increasing restlessness within the Middle Eastern diaspora in the EU that has 
at times taken the form of militant activism; and the civil war in Algeria, which 
accelerated the pace of the first two processes. 58 
What is also new in the post-Cold War era is the gradual emergence of a 
division of labour between the United States and the European Union over 
regional security in the Middle East59-a division of labour based on the 
differences between EU and US priorities. Put simply, US policy-makers 
concentrate on maintaining security the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli peace process 
(see the final section of this chapter) whereas the EU has put emphasis on 
security and stability in geographically closer north Africa. 
However, these differences in priorities should not obscure the common 
interests that remain. Both the United States and the European Union still share 
56 Rhein, 'Europe and the Greater Middle East, ' 41-59. 
57 Perthes, 'Europe, the United States, and the Middle East Peace Process, ' 92. 
58 Trevor Parfitt, 'Europe's Mediterranean Designs: An Analysis of the Euro-Med Relationship with 
Special Reference to Egypt, ' Third World Quarterly 18: 5 (1997) 865-81. 
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an interest in the sustained flow of oil (and natural gas for the EU) at reasonable 
prices. EU-members (with the exception of the UK) are considerably more 
dependent on Middle Eastern oil than the United States. The latter imports only 
20 per cent of its total energy consumption from the Middle East whereas it is 50- 
90 per cent for some European states. 60 Indeed oil is the only Middle Eastern 
issue over which transatlantic relations have been relatively 'concentric and 
coherent' since the end of the Cold War. 61 The cooperative relationship 
established between the two during the Gulf War could be viewed as an example 
of this phenomenon. 62 
It should nevertheless be noted that although it is true that the EU, like 
the United States, seeks to maintain military stability in the Gulf, when security in 
north Africa is concerned it emphasises economic development and 
democratisation as well as stability. EU policy-makers are very sceptical about 
what military practices could achieve in influencing north African countries (that 
are included in the Euro-Med Region), but they still follow US lead in the Gulf in 
an attempt to maintain military stability. Indeed, there seems to be a tacit 
agreement between EU and US policy-makers that security in the Gulf 
(understood as the maintenance of stability through keeping friendly regimes in 
power) is to be maintained through the threat and use of force if necessary. 
59 Satloff, 'America, Europe, and the Middle East in the 1990s, ' 7-39, esp. pp. 8-9. 
60 Rhein, 'Europe and the Greater Middle East, ' 49. 
61 quoted in Perthes, 'Europe, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, ' 88. 
62 Francois Heisbourg 'The United States, Europe and Military Force Projection' in Allies Divided, 
eds. Blackwill and Stürmer, 277-97; Richard L. Kugler, 'Military Force Projection, ' in Allies 
Divided, eds. Blackwill and Stürmer, 253-75. 
250 
On the issue of security in the Euro-Med Region, EU-members have 
maintained that 'economic, political, and diplomatic engagement can be of 
greater relevance. v63 Francois Heisbourg expands upon this statement: 
Although the Europeans are just as prone-and possibly even 
more so, for reasons of proximity-as the Americans to 
emphasize the combined regional dangers of militant 
fundamentalism and terrorism (not least in Algeria, a prime 
French security concern), thV do not usually see these as 
essentially military challenges. 
In other words, EU's practices towards achieving security in the Euro-Med 
Region are based on a broader conception of security that takes into account its 
non-military dimensions and seeks to adopt non-militarised practices. 
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership that shaped the Euro-Med Region 
was institutionalised at the Barcelona Conference (November 1995) that brought 
together Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, 
the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, and Turkey. 65 The Conference agreed on 
establishing a partnership between Mediterranean littoral states in three areas: 
political and security relations, economic and financial relations, and social, 
cultural and human relations. In order to give practical expression to this 
scheme, the Conference agreed on a work programme of activities in a 
multilateral framework that brought in the private sector to play a role in 
transferring additional resources, both technological and financial. The 
cornerstone of the Euro-Med partnership is the creation of a free-trade zone in 
industrial goods and services over a twelve-year period. The purpose behind this 
63 Heisbourg, 'The United States, Europe and Military Force Projection, ' 284. 
64 Heisbourg, 'The United States, Europe, and Military Force Projection, 285. 
65 Libya was excluded from the conference. 
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formation is stated as not only one of creating an expanded trading bloc, but also 
providing 
incentives for sound economic and financial decision-making by 
Middle Eastern participants, to create a framework for labour- 
intensive European-funded development projects, and even 
reduce intra-Middle Eastern conflicts by providing a non- 
threatening forum for participation across divides. 66 
In this sense, the Euro-Med partnership scheme is based on liberal assumptions 
as can be deduced from British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind's address to 
the Barcelona Conference where he said that the Euro-Med had 'two main 
themes: political stability ... and economic growth. 
In reality these are actually 
only one subject. '67 A similar logic was at the roots of the establishment of the 
multilateral negotiations of the Arab-Israeli peace process (see the final section of 
this chapter). 
The programme agreed at the Barcelona Conference, although less 
ambitious compared to a CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe) type organisation (see below) nevertheless envisaged that the partners 
would discuss issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The partner 
states also called for exchanges at civil societal level as a key element of the 
implementation of the partnership programme. 68 So far, one key achievement of 
the partnership has been to bring together Syria and Lebanon with Israel as part 
of a multilateral scheme. Syria has boycotted the MENA (Middle East and North 
Africa) summits organised as a part of the Madrid Peace Process. 69 
66 Satloff, 'America, Europe and the Middle East in the 1990s; 23. 
67 quoted in Satloff, 'America, Europe and the Middle East in the 1990s, ' 23. 
68 'Bulletin EU 6-1996'; available at http: //www. europa. eu. int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/9606r1038. html; 
Internet; accessed November 25,1998. 
69 Perthes, 'Europe, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, ' 95. 
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The proposal to create a CSCE type organisation in the Middle East, a 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) was an 
earlier attempt by two EU-member states, Italy and Spain to create `a stable 
system of regional cooperation' in the Mediterranean (1990). 70 Later in the year a 
meeting on security and cooperation was held in Cairo, attended by 
representatives from Algeria, Egypt, France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain and 
Yugoslavia. The long-term objectives and principles of the CSCM discussed at 
this meeting were modelled after the CSCE and aimed to achieve consensus, 
among the participant states, on a set of principles and rules dealing with issues 
of security, economic cooperation and human rights 71 Although the CSCM 
proposal was well received by the International Peace Research Association, 
among others'72 it was not followed up 73 Arguably, the formation of a CSCM was 
considered too ambitious a project. A CSCM would have set certain criteria to be 
met in terms of inter-state relations as well as state-society relations and would 
have created responsibilities which very few of the potential CSCM-member 
states were willing to assume. 74 Furthermore, European policy-makers were 
more eager to adopt policies that would show immediate economic effects. This 
is because the European Union's conception of security in the Euro-Med Region 
takes the EU itself as the referent. EU policy-makers have broadened security 
70 Tim Niblock, 'Towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East (CSCM), ' in The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach, 
op. cit., 246. 
71 Niblock, 'Towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East (CSCM), ' 246-7. 
72 'The Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East, ' 49. 
73 Mohammed EI-Sayed Selim, 'Mediterraneanism: A New Dimension in Egypt's Foreign Policy, ' 
Kurasat Istratiiiva [Strategic Papers of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies] 
4: 27 (1997); available from http: //www. acpss. org/ekuras/ek27c/ek27e. htm; Internet; accessed 
August 1,1999. 
74 For a critique of the CSCM proposal, see Roberto Aliboni, 'Confidence-Building, Conflict 
Prevention and Arms Control in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, ' Perceptions (December 
1997-February 1998) 73-86. 
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not from regional peoples' but from the EU's perspective in the attempt to stop 
Middle Eastern problems from becoming European problems. 
Although a Helsinki-type process was not initiated in the Euro-Med 
Region, non-state actors from Western Europe have been active in conducting 
people-to-people diplomacy. In February 1992 a meeting was organised in Paris 
entitled the 'Citizens of the Mediterranean' bringing together the peoples of the 
region and the Helsinki Citizens' Association. 75 A similar bottom up approach 
was the organisation of the three-day UNESCO-supported meeting of the 
Consultation on Educating for Peace in the Mediterranean that took place in 
Malta in November 1991. A network of peace educators has begun to be built by 
the Peace and International Education Programmes of the Foundation for 
International Studies at the University of Malta. Later in the year the 1991 
Conference of the European Peace Research Association in Florence became 
the occasion for a workshop on this theme. 76 
Since it is relatively new, the Euro-Med partnership scheme does not 
have too many proponents at the sub-state level; nor does it have many enemies. 
Its main strength stems from the fact that it has managed to bring together Syria 
and Israel as well as a wide spectrum of NGOs together. Another one of its 
strengths is the assistance the EU has provided to NGOs. Between 1995-99, the 
EU has set $5.528bn to be granted to regional NGOs. " The point here is that 
although the Euro-Med partnership scheme does not have too many backers, if 
75 Osseiran, ? he Democratization Process in the Arab-Islamic States of the Middle East, ' 87. 
76 Calleja, 'Educating for Peace in the Mediterranean, ' 282. 
77 'European Union Funding for the Middle East NGOs, ' Bulletin of Regional Cooperation in the 
Middle East 7: 4 (Winter 1998/99) 15. 
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the EU policy to take civil societal actors on its side bears fruit in the long run, it 
may come to prevail over the other three approaches. 
Security in the Muslim Middle East 
The Islamist discourse on security is the most controversial among the four 
approaches looked at in Part U. This partly stems from the anti-status quo 
discourses and violent practices of some Islamist actors that include the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Sudan, and organisations such as the Hizbullah in Lebanon and 
Hamas in Israel/Palestine that constitute a challenge to military stability the 
United States and its regional allies have been keen to maintain. On the other 
hand, Saudi Arabia, a major US ally and a pro-status quo actor, does not only 
resort to the Islamist discourse to enhance legitimacy, but it has also been a 
major financial supporter to many Islamist organisations78 often regardless of 
their anti-status quo practices. This was done partly to weaken the grip of Arab 
national security discourse over Arab peoples' practices, and partly to prevent 
Iran from dominating the Muslim Middle East. 79 Such practices have, over the 
years, helped maintain regime security for a Saudi leadership that has not been 
keen to allow political participation. However it is also such Islamist organisations 
that challenge the regional status quo. In other words, the very same practices 
78 John L. Esposito, 'Islamic Movements, Democratisation and U. S. Foreign Policy, ' in Riding the 
Tiger: The Middle East Challenge After the Cold War, eds. Phebe Marr and William Lewis 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993) 188; See Dale E. Eickelman, 'Trans-state Islam and Security, ' in 
Transnational Religion and Fading States, eds. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997) 37-8. 
79 Cary Fraser, 'In Defense of Allah's Realm: Religion and Statecraft in Saudi Foreign Policy 
Strategy, ' in Transnational Religion and Fading States, eds. Rudolph and Piscatori, 212-40. 
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designed to enhance Saudi security have at the same time challenged regional 
instability. 
The way Saudi practices seem to have rebounded could partly be 
explained with reference to the different and at times contradictory 
conceptualisations of security adopted by Saudi policy-makers and the Islamist 
actors it has chosen to support. Indeed, there is more agreement amongst 
Islamists as to what they are against rather than what they are for. They often 
define 'un-Islamic influences' as the major threat to Muslims' security, but there is 
little agreement as to what constitutes 'un-Islamic' (or 'Islamic' for that matter). 
Some would consider Western influence over and intervention into the region as 
'un-Islamic'. Some others would criticise existing political and religious 
establishments (such as the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that allowed US 
troops to step on the 'holy lands') as well as the forces of Arab nationalism as 
being 'un-Islam ic. '80 Lastly, there are those who define 'structural violence' as 
'un-Islamic'. This point will be further developed towards the end of this section. 
The practices of Islamist actors range from militant activism (such as the 
New York Trade Centre bombing in 1993) to grassroots activities providing 
welfare services (such as the activities of FIS-the Islamic Salvation Front-in 
Algeria), and to advocating political violence aimed at establishing an 'Islamic' 
state (as with the Hizbullah in Lebanon). 81 From the perspective of the 
governments of the United States, Egypt, and Israel, most Islamist organisations 
80 See Eickelman, 'Trans-state Islam and Security, ' 27-46, for an overview. 
81 Esposito, 'Islamic Movements, Democratisation and U. S. Foreign Policy; idem, Islamic Threat: 
Myth or Reality? 2"d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Dale E. Eickelman and James 
Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Eickelman, 'Trans- 
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constitute threats to regional security due to their anti-status quo discourses and 
(at times) violent practices. However, viewed through the lenses of some 
regional peoples, these organisations serve as major security agents by providing 
welfare services that the state fails to provide its peoples. Indeed, their practices 
indicate that some Islamist organisations aim primarily at bringing about change 
at home although they do, at times, take action abroad to achieve their aims. 
Some Islamist organisations that target the United States, for instance, aim to 
bring pressure upon the US government so that it would cease supporting its 
regional allies some of which (such as Egypt) suppress Islamist opposition at 
home. The point here is that the globalist outlook and discourses of some 
Islamist actors become locally oriented in practice. 
The difference between an Islamist actor with a domestic and reformist 
approach, and one with a more universal and revisionist orientation could be 
seen in the examples of AMAL (Lebanese Resistance Army) and Hizbullah (Party 
of God), both of which have used violence to achieve their aims that included 
fighting Israeli forces in south Lebanon. AMAL initially emerged as the military 
wing of the `Movement for Dispossessed' that was founded in Lebanon in the 
1960s to bring about political and economic parity for the Lebanese Shii 
community. The military wing (AMAL) eventually absorbed the socio-political 
movement, but it also adopted the political wing's goals and has concentrated on 
demanding reform at home. The Hizbullah, on the other hand, was founded in 
the 1980s following Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982). It is an umbrella 
movement comprising like minded groups and militias whose aims converge in 
state Islam and Security. ' 
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dismantling of the Lebanese state and the creation in its place of an Islamic state; 
the acceptance of Khomeini and Iran as the model to be emulated; a consensus 
that the enemies are the Lebanese government, other confessional groups, the 
United States, and France, as well as pro-Western Arab regimes such as Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait; and the belief that it is a religious duty to destroy the 'enemies 
of God' through jihad, martyrdom, and self-sacrifice. 82 
Amongst those Islamist organisations that have acted as agents of 
security, the case of FIS is a telling example of how an Islamist organisation can 
muster domestic support notwithstanding the violent practices of some of its 
members. 83 FIS emerged as a political actor in Algeria during the social 
upheavals in the late 1980s, which were generated by the fall in oil prices and the 
economic crisis that ensued. In 1988 the Algerian government faced massive 
student protests and food riots. 84 As the protests were brutally suppressed, FIS 
emerged as the `self-proclaimed voice of the oppressed masses'85 and went on to 
gain electoral victories in local elections in 1990 and the first round of the general 
elections in 1991. When it became clear that FIS won the majority of seats in the 
parliament, the army intervened, the second round of the elections of cancelled, 
and President Chadli was forced to resign in January 1992 to be replaced by an 
army-backed government. 
In achieving such popularity with the masses, FIS followed a two-pronged 
strategy. One part of this strategy was pointing to the failures of the state in fields 
82 Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 148. 
83 On FIS, see Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 163-83. 
84 quoted in Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 167. 
85 Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 167. 
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such as education, housing and employment as well as governmental 
corruption-criticisms that found receptive ears in a society like Algeria with more 
than 60 per cent of the population under 25 years of age and high levels of 
unemployment. 86 Another popular FIS critique was that the government spent 
too much on arms. Slashing the defence budget to make more money available 
for social expenditures was one of its election promises. 87 The second part of the 
FIS strategy was to proclaim 'Islam's message of social justice and call for an 
'Islamisation' of the society as a solution to the current ills. To get its message 
across FIS undertook grassroots activism and set up a network of medical clinics 
and charitable associations to serve the poorest and most crowded 
neighbourhoods, provided housing, opened shops, created jobs, and cleaned up 
neighbourhoods. 88 Following the 1992 coup, the military wing of FIS has 
engaged in violent activism in defiance of this non-violent past. 
As seen in the case of FIS, Islamist movements and organisations do not 
merely criticise the state for its failures in meeting the socio-economic needs of 
peoples, but also propose visionary solutions, adopt creative practices and 
provide tangible economic, social and moral support to their members as well as 
others who have otherwise been neglected by their state for political or 
infrastructural reasons. 89 
86 Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 168. 
87 Yahya Sadowski, 'Scuds versus Butter: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Arab 
World, ' Middle East Report (July-August 1992) 5. 
88 Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 174. 
89 Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 23,100; Esposito, 'Islamic Movements, Democratisation, and 
U. S. Foreign Policy, ' 191-2. 
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However, the fact that these organisations act as agents of security for 
some should not obscure the ways in which they constitute a major threat to 
women's security. For, it is women who get caught in the middle when Islamist 
actors-be it the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the Hizbullah or HAMAS-play up their 'Islamic' credentials. 90 This, in turn, could 
be taken as an illustration of the point made by students of Critical Security 
Studies that the very same actors that could be considered as engaging in 
emancipatory practices could, at the same time, create insecurity for others. 
In sum, it would be a mistake to generalise about Islamist actors, for they 
have different and at times contradictory aims; they also adopt divergent 
practices. However, notwithstanding such differences, what seems to unite 
AMAL, Hizbullah, FIS, the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Saddam Hussein 
is that they all resort to an Islamist discourse to legitimise their practices, garner 
support for their own policies, or mobilise action to stall others'. For them, 'Islam' 
provides a discourse of politics to reach Muslims, although they may seek to 
communicate radically different messages when using the same symbols. The 
ways in which the concept jihad was used during the Gulf War is a good example 
of the point I am trying to make here. 
The Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's practices during the Gulf Crisis 
were not limited to invoking the Arab national security discourse. He also 
employed symbols such as jihad or the 'holy lands' in the attempt to de-legitimise 
the US-led intervention and to put pressure on the Arab governments that 
90 Eleanor Abdella Doumato, 'Women and Work in Saudi Arabia: How Flexible Are Islamic 
Margins? ' Middle East Journal 53: 4 (1999) 568-83. 
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cooperated with the United States. 91 In one instance he addressed the peoples 
of other Arab/Muslim states as follows: 
Oh, Arab, oh, Muslim and believers everywhere, this is your day 
to rise and defend Mecca, which is captured by the spears of the 
Americans and the Zionists. ... Keep the foreigner away from 
your holy shrines. 92 
As the leader of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party with its commitment to secularism 
and a record of suppression of Islamist groups in Iraq, Saddam Hussein was an 
unlikely leader to resort to Islamic symbolism. Yet he chose to refer to the 
`infidels' of the West that arrayed against him and called for jihad to combat 
them. 93 Perhaps even more significant was the fact that notwithstanding his past 
record, his call was heeded by peoples in the streets of the Muslim world. It was 
not only Muslim peoples in the Arab world, but also those in Malaysia, Iran, and 
Turkey, among others, that reacted to his calls. 
Arguably it may not necessarily have been Saddam Hussein's invocation 
of Islamic symbolism that enabled him to receive a sympathetic hearing, but the 
alacrity of the manner in which the United States decided to come to Kuwait's aid 
and assembled a large number of troops in Saudi Arabia. In the eyes of some, 
the massive build-up of US troops transformed what was initially viewed as a 
defensive operation to free Kuwait into an offensive one set to 'destroy Iraq 
politically and militarily. '94 Some, with the experiences of Western colonialism at 
91 Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (London: Harper Collins, 
1992) 295. 
92 quoted in Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 15. 
ss Eickelman and Pisatori, Muslim Politics, 13. 
94 Esposito, 'Islamic Movements, Democratisation, and U. S. Foreign Policy, ' 192-194. 
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the back of their minds, viewed this as 'threatening, '95 others viewed it as an 
indication of a 'lack of respect for the sanctity of holy places. '96 
Saddam Hussein's calls received support from the policy-makers as well 
as peoples in Arab streets. 97 Some of the Iranian politico-clerical elite, the 
Jordanian ulama and Muslim Brotherhood also joined Saddam Hussein in calling 
for a jihad against 'foreign intervention. '98 The London-based think-tank, the 
Islamic Council criticised the involvement of the United States in what was seen 
as an inter-Arab matter and the Saudi policymakers' cooperation with the United 
States. 99 
In the attempt to counter the anti-Saudi assault undertaken by some 
actors, Saudi policy-makers adopted a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, 
they invited troops from other Arab and Muslim countries to provide what 
Mohammed Heikal referred to as an 'Islamic cover' to obscure its reliance on US 
troops. 100 Egypt and Morocco both sent troops to join the US forces amassed in 
Saudi Arabia. King Fahd invited Syria to send forces as well, to add a 'radical 
Arab' dimension to the 'Islamic cover. '101 
95 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 15; Azzam, 'The Gulf Crisis, ' 479. 
98 Heikal, Illusions of Triumph, 28. 
97 Maha Azzam, 'The Gulf Crisis, ' 476; Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf. 
1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 
241; Esposito, 'Islamic Movements, Democratisation, and U. S. Foreign Policy, ' 192-3. 
98 Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 226; Esposito, 'Islamic Movements, Democratisation and U. S. 
Foreign Policy, ' 192-3; on the attempts to engage in 'collective Islamic diplomacy during the 
Gulf War, see Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, 'The Impact of Islamism on the Arab System, ' in The 
Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World, 
ed. Laura Guazzone (Berkshire: Ithaca Press, 1995) 259-60. 
99 Azzam, 'The Gulf Crisis, ' 480. 
100 Heikal, Illusions of Triumph, 282. 
101 Heikal, Illusions of Triumph, 266-7; Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 131-3. 
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The second prong of Saudi strategy was to minimise the effect of 
Saddam Hussein's call for jihad. Saudi policy-makers sought to get a counter- 
fatwa to sanction their own practices. The contradiction between Saddam 
Hussein's call for jihad and the Saudi fatwa-the latter seeking to de-legitimise 
the former-triggered a theological debate over the religious dimension of the 
presence of non-Muslim troops in the Holy Lands. The Grand Mufti of Egypt 
sanctioned that the invitation extended by Saudi Arabia to foreign troops did not 
breach Muslims laws because it was 'in conjunction with an invitation to Muslim 
troops' and served 'the greater good'. 102 The Mufti of Saudi Arabia went even 
further and declared that 'even non-Muslims participating in the war were 
participating in jihad. '103 
Thus, during the Gulf War 'Islamic' symbols were used by both sides in 
line with their discrepant aims, to legitimise their divergent practices and to de- 
legitimise each other's policies. Islamist actors resorted to 'symbolic exchanges' 
rather than arms races or gunboat diplomacy in the attempt to prevail over each 
other. 104 Indeed, there is little agreement among Islamist actors as to what 
security in the Muslim Middle East might look like. As Saad Eddin Ibrahim 
argued, the Islamist security discourse is at present 'more a promise than reality; 
it can "break" but does not "make. "'105 However, the practices of some Islamist 
actors suggest that there is more potential in the Islamist discourse than Ibrahim 
gives credit for. 
102 Azzam, 'The Gulf Crisis, ' 481. 
103 Azzam, 'The Gulf Crisis, ' 481. 
104 Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics. 
105 Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Middle East, ' 433. 
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Security in the (New) Middle East 
The US approach to regional security in the Middle East has remained military- 
focused and stability-oriented in the post-Cold War era. US policy toward Iraq 
before and after the Gulf War (1990-91) and particularly the 1998-89 bombing 
campaign directed at obtaining Iraqi cooperation with the UN team inspecting 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programme could be viewed as examples of 
this phenomenon. Furthermore, US policy towards regional security in the Middle 
East remains top down. In following a policy of dual containment (see below) US 
policy-makers present Iran and Iraq as the main threats to security in the region 
mainly due to their military capabilities and the revisionist character of their 
regimes that are not subservient to US interests. 106 This top down perspective, 
while revealing certain aspects of regional insecurity in the Middle East, at the 
same time hinders others. Women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, for example, are 
made insecure not only by the threat caused by their Gulf neighbours' military 
capabilities, but also because of the conservative character of their own regimes 
that restrict women's rights under the cloak of religious tradition. 107 Their 
concerns rarely make it into security analyses; certainly not into the Middle East 
security discourse. 
Although the US approach to regional security has remained true to the 
precepts of the Middle Eastern security discourse, what has changed in the 
1990s is that the United States reintroduced itself into Arab politics. It was, 
108 Anthony Lake, 'Confronting Backlash States, ' Foreign Affairs 73: 2 (1994) 45-55. 
107 Mernissi, Islam and Democracy, 1-10; Doumato, 'Women and Work in Saudi Arabia. ' 
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however, not only the 'atomisation' of the Arab regional order, or the enhanced 
credibility of the United States in the aftermath of the Gulf War that enabled the 
Middle Eastern security discourse to prevail. It was also a reflection of the 
change in the practices of US policy-makers which broke with the tradition and 
expressed recognition of the linkages between two major US security concerns, 
that is the Gulf and Israel-linkages they had until then refused to acknowledge 
(see Chapter 4). During the Gulf crisis, in the attempt to garner support for the 
US war effort against Iraq, Secretary of State James Baker chose to break with 
this compartmentalised approach and acknowledged the linkages between Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait and the Israel/Palestine issue-linkages Saddam Hussein 
pointed to. 108 
However, although Baker's acknowledgement of the linkages between 
the multiple dimensions of regional security seemed to signal a change of policy, 
the overall conduct of the US government during the War was more in line with its 
traditional approach. For, the United States sought to bring an end to the threat 
posed by Iraq to the security of Gulf oil by defeating Iraq with the help of an 
international coalition which it itself formed, forged and sustained, without 
inquiring into the roots of the Iraqi action. In other words, Baker's 
acknowledgement constituted a parenthesis rather than a break in the US 
approach to regional security in the Middle East, with the rest of US policy 
establishment carrying on with business-as-usual. It is significant to note here 
that during the 1997-98 standoff between the United States and Iraq over the 
issue of Iraq's non-cooperation with the UN inspection team, Secretary of State 
108 Ramazani, 'The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement, ' 50; Yezid Sayigh, 'Arab Regional 
Security: Between Mechanics and Politics, ' RUST Journal (Summer 1991) 38-46. 
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Madeleine Albright remained loyal to the tradition and refused to acknowledge 
the linkages between the stalled Arab-Israeli peace process and the difficulties 
the United States was facing in organising an Arab coalition supportive of US 
stance. 109 
The strategy of the US-led coalition during the war was to achieve air 
superiority, minimise coalition casualties, and expel Iraq from Kuwait. 10 These 
aims were achieved by the end of the war. There was another less pronounced 
aim, that of debilitating the Iraqi military machine to minimise the threat it would 
pose to regional security in the future. "' In the aftermath of the war, as a part of 
the cease-fire agreement and in accordance with relevant UN resolutions which 
Iraq had agreed to comply with, a UN investigation on Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) programme was put into effect. With the experience of the 
Gulf War in mind (in the course of which Iraq fired Scud missiles to both Israel 
and Saudi Arabia) US policy-makers made it a priority to eradicate the Iraqi WMD 
program and prevent other Middle Eastern states-but Israel-from developing 
nuclear weapons. They also sought to restrict existing chemical and biological 
weapons silos. 12 
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, US policy-makers moved away from 
statements they had made during the crisis regarding the desirability of arms 
control and practicing self-restraint on arms'sales to the region. They banned 
tog Ramazani, 'The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement, ' 49. 
110 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, 'How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War, ' 
International Security 16: 2 (Fall 1991) 23. 
"'Sadowski, 'Scuds or Butter, ' 5. 
112 See Rosemary Hollis, 'Western Security Strategy in South West Asia, ' in From the Gulf War to 
Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Exeter: University 
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arms sales to the two 'rogue states' (Iran and Iraq) whilst supporting the arms 
build-up of GCC states. 113 The massive rearmament policies of the Gulf states 
enabled the Israeli and Iranian policymakers to follow suit by providing a 
justification for further arms purchases. 114 Turkey and Egypt have been 
rewarded by the United States for their services during the Gulf War, in the form 
of military (and economic) aid. Israel and Turkey, in turn, chose to solidify their 
existing security cooperation. 115 What seems to bring Israel and Turkey together, 
apart from their cooperation in the military and intelligence fields is the issue of 
scarce water resources. Indeed, the triangular relationship between Turkey, 
Syria and Israel is a textbook example of worst-case thinking, zero sum 
conceptions of security and reliance on the military instrument to meet threats 
that are political (the Kurdish issue), or environmental (water resources) in 
character. ' 16 
As argued above, it was partly the acknowledgment of multiple 
dimensions regional insecurity that led the United States together with Russia to 
convene the Madrid Peace Conference on 30 October-1 November 1991, 
bringing together, for the first time, the representatives of all major parties to the 
of Exeter Press, 1994) 188-207. 
113 Hollis, 'Western Security Strategy in South West Asia'; Joe Stark, 'The Middle East Arms 
Bazaar After the Gulf War, ' Middle East Report (November-December 1995) 14-19. 
114 Sadowski, ' Scuds versus Butter, ' 11. 
115 Alan Makovsky, 'Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish "Periphery Strategy"? ' in Reluctant 
Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri J. Barkey (Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace, 1996) 147-70. On the background of the Turkish-Israeli relations, see 
Amikam Nachmani, Israel. Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the Eastern Mediterranean 
(London: Frank Cass, 1987). 
16 Nimet Beriker-Atiyas, 'The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties, and Prospects, ' Security 
Dialogue 28: 4 (1997) 439-52; Murhaf Jouejati, 'Water Politics as High Politics: The Case of 
Turkey and Syria, ' in Reluctant Neighbour: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri J. 
Barkey (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996) 131-46; Makovsky, 
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Israel/Palestine conflict. '17 At the Madrid Conference bilateral negotiations were 
set up between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and a Jordanian- 
Palestinian delegation. Subsequently, Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Jordanian 
negotiations were separated. The bilateral talks concentrated mostly on territorial 
control and sovereignty, border demarcations, the security arrangements, and the 
political rights of the Palestinians. 118 
At the Madrid Conference it was also decided to set up multilateral Arab- 
Israeli negotiations alongside the bilateral track to bring the participants to the 
bilateral talks together with other regional states as well as those outside the 
region wishing to make a contribution (financial, technical, political). 119 The 
multilaterals were also hoped to help build confidence among participants and 
facilitate progress at the bilateral level. 120 Furthermore, they were intended to 
permit the discussion of issues that were perceived to be affecting the region as a 
whole. 121 The assumption behind the establishment of the multilateral track 
alongside the bilateral was the perception that the need for cooperative 
arrangements to foster economic development, to preserve and enhance the 
supply of water, and to check environmental degradation is shared by all states in 
the region. It was felt that many of these issues did not demand, nor could they 
117 For an insider's account of the Madrid Conference and its aftermath, see Barbara Victor, 
Hanan Ashrawi: A Passion for Peace (London: Fourth Estate, 1995). 
11 Joel Peters, Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 5. 
19 Peters, Pathways to Peace, 6. Invitations to the bilateral track were issued to Lebanon, Syria, 
Jordan, Palestinian representatives, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Sudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, the European Union, Turkey, 
Canada, EFTA representative, Japan and China. 
120 Peters, Pathways to Peace, 2. 
121 Peter Jones, 'Arms Control in the Middle East: Some Reflections, ' Security Dialogue 28: 1 
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wait for, a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 122 It should be 
noted that this was a rather functionalist view of international cooperation in that 
progress in the multilateral track, where only the 'technical' issues were 
discussed, was hoped to have spillover effects on the bilateral track, which was 
reserved for'political' issues. This point will be further developed later. 
The first organisational meeting for the multilateral talks was held in 
January 1992 in Moscow. Five working groups were set up: 'Water Resources, ' 
'Environment, ' 'Regional Economic Development' (REDWG), 'Refugees, ' and 
'Arms Control and Regional Security' (ACRS). Each working group included 
actors from both within and outside the Middle East. Setting up a working group 
on human rights was also discussed but eventually rejected. 123 Arguably, this 
showed how parties to the negotiations were not ready to acknowledge all 
dimensions of regional insecurity, especially those pertaining to the security of 
individuals and social groups. Indeed, the issues that were allowed on the 
agendas, as will be seen below, were those considered as 'security' issues by 
policy-makers and non-military issues were approached from a statist 
perspective. Let us briefly consider the progress made by the five working 
groups. 
The working group on arms control and regional security (ACRS) was 
intended to compliment the multilateral negotiations more than the other working 
groups by helping build confidence among the parties. The main difficulties 
between the parties during the negotiations emerged over the issue of nuclear 
122 Peters, Pathways to Peace, 5. 
123 Peters, Pathways to Peace, 15. 
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weapons with Arab states under Egypt's leadership seeking to put the issue of 
Israel's nuclear capabilities on the agenda. Israel, on the other hand, 
emphasised the need to develop a set of confidence-building measures as the 
first steps in a long process at the end of which the issue of nuclear weapons 
could be discussed. The absence of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Syria from 
the negotiations also added to Israel's hesitance to discuss the issue. 124 At the 
end, the setting up of the ACRS working group, which was the first region-wide 
attempt to address issues of arms control and confidence-building, remained its 
main outcome. 125 
The working group on the environment focused on establishing codes of 
conduct, prepared 'The Bahrain Environmental Code of Conduct for the Middle 
East, '126 and formulated an Upper Gulf of Aqaba oil spill contingency plan. The 
working group on refugees was fraught with difficulties from the beginning, largely 
to do with the fact that the issue of refugees is a highly sensitive one. The issue 
was nevertheless included in the multilateral track for it concerns a number of 
countries and requires the support of actors outside the region. The discussions 
remained focused on the so-called 'technical' aspects of the issue such as 
databases, public health, child welfare, job creation and vocational training, 
human resource development, family reunification and economic and social 
infrastructure. 127 
124 Peters, Pathways to Peace, 38; Shai Feldman and Abdullah Toukan, 'Bridging the Gap: 
Resolving the Security Dilemma in the Middle East, ' in Bridging the Gap: A Future Security 
Architecture for the Middle East, Shai Feldman and Abdullah Toukan (Lanham, MA: Rowman & 
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The working group on regional economic development (REDWG) was the 
largest of the five groups and made substantial progress in formulating principles 
and defining region-wide projects. A major outcome of the REDWG was the 
convening of four Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic summit 
meetings in Morocco (1994), Jordan (1995), Egypt (1996), and Qatar (1997). 
The first MENA summit in Casablanca, Morocco was attended by the 
representatives of 61 countries including Israel and the PLO (as well as 1114 
business loaders). 128 The reasoning behind the setting up of the REDWG lay in 
the assumption that 'the rewards of economic cooperation will drive tho search 
and strengthen the foundations for political agreomonts. i12° The group also took 
on the responsibility of addressing the economic needs of the Palostinians in 
addition to establishing the Bank for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
the Middle East-Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association, and the Middle 
East Business Council. '30 
The water resources working group was fraught with troubles form the 
beginning because of the absence of Syria and Lebanon. This thwarted the 
hopes for an agreement to be reached on either the Tigris-Euphratos or the 
Jordan river basins. The discussions were also impeded by the disagreement 
between Israel on the one hand and Jordan and the Palestinians on the other, as 
to whether 'water rights' should be included In the agenda. Arab states viewed 
the consideration of water rights as a precondition to cooperation and any 
regional water management agreement. The Israeli side, however, wanted to 
'2° Syria, Lebanon, Iran and the Sudan boycotted tho summit. 
129 Peters, Pathways to Peace, 46. 
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separate what they viewed as the 'technical' and 'political' aspects of the water 
Issue and wanted to limit the working group to technical issues and joint water 
management. The Israeli policy-makers maintained that the Issue of water rights 
was a 'political' issue and had to be addressed at the bilateral negotiations. 131 
Later the dispute was settled with Israel agreeing to sot up a 'water rights' 
working group as a part of the bilateral negotiations. '32 
Although substantial progress was achiovod In the multilateral 
negotiations In terms of promoting dialogue, by the end of 1997 the stall In Israeli- 
Palestinian negotiations led to a halt on both tracks. Progress in the multilateral 
negotiations was stalled in the late 1990s for throe main reasons. First, Arab 
policy-makers thought not enough progress had boon achieved in the bilateral 
negotiations. Second, they were worried about Israel's domination In the 
economic and technological fields if they agreed to strengthen Middle Eastern 
regionalism. And thirdly, they were frustrated with US policies, for they remained 
convinced that not enough pressure was being put on Israel which continued to 
Ignore UN resolutions on Palestine, whilst Iraq faced the throat of air attacks 
because of its lack of cooperation with the UN Inspection team. US policy- 
makers' refusal to acknowledge the linkages between the two has boon viewed 
as 'double standards' by many In the Arab world. '33 
Then, the multilateral negotiations failed to produce the spillover effect as 
suggested by the logic of functionalism, for lack of progress on bilateral 
Peters, Pathways to Peace, 46-60. 
Peters, Pathways to Peace, 17. 
'32 Peters, Pathways to Peace, 16-22. 
133 Ramazani, 'The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochoment, ' 51. 
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negotiations. The argument here is that the problem with the sot up with the two- 
track diplomacy was not that the linkages between several aspects of the 
problem of regional insecurity In the Middle East were not addressed, but rather 
that this was not done in a way that was acceptable to both sides. The 
multilateral negotiations were reserved for discussions on 'technical' issues, 
whilst the 'political' issues were discussed at the bilaterals to which not all Arab 
states participated. As the negotiations in the working group on water resources 
showed, the 'political'/'technical' divide did not prove to be sustainable. 
Moreover, some issues, such as that of nuclear weapons, were loft out of the 
negotiations, and only certain 'technical' aspects of the other Issues, such as 
water or refugees, were discussed. In this sense, the multilateral negotiations 
showed that neither the US nor Israel were ready to acknowledge as many 
linkages as the Arab side would have liked to establish. They also showed that 
no regional policy-maker was ready or willing to establish interrelationships 
between all aspects of regional insecurity as non-stato actors would have 
wanted. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to investigate the relationship between (inventing) 
regions and theories and practices of security by looking at how post-Cold War 
security practices have been shaped by and, in turn, shaped contending security 
discourses and spatial representations. The first suction of the chapter looked at 
those practices that wore shaped by the representation 'Arab Regional System. ' 
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It was argued that in the post-Cold War era it was mainly non"stato actors that 
continued to uphold the Arab national security discourso. Although the Gulf War 
caused further alienation of Arab governments from one another, the chapter 
argued that the practices of Arab peoples and civil societal actors have continued 
to shape and be shaped by the Arab national security discourso. Focusing on 
Issues such as political participation, respect for human rights, unomploymont, 
better health provision and education, they sought to shapo and constrain the 
practices of their policy-makers, who have adopted increasingly moro statist 
practices. ' 
The chapter also looked at the socurity practicos of the EU, the 
locomotive of the Euro-Med partnership process. It was argued that it was the 
EU's adoption of a broader conception of security that led to Its involvement in 
this process. In the attempt to prevent Middle Eastern problems from becoming 
European problems, EU policy-makers sought to maintain stability In the 
geographically closer North African countries. However, this was different from 
their approach to stability in the Gulf. In the case of the latter, they continuo to 
follow the US lead and to rely on militarisod practicos whereas in the case of the 
former they seek to maintain stability by encouraging Euro-Mod regionalism. It is 
hoped that encouraging economic liberalisation and accelerating oconomic 
growth would eventually load to Increasing political participation and 
democratisation. However, since it was the security of the EU rather than that of 
134 See Bahgat Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism, ' In 
Arab World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rionner, 1094) 161-78; Michael 
Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' Political Science Qu rtorly 111: 4 (1096.97) esp. 
pp. 598-606. 
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north Africa that was the referent for this approach, priority was given to 
maintaining stability via non-military measures. 
The third section of the chapter turned to look at the security practicos of 
Islamist actors. It is difficult to generalise about the practices of the Islamist 
actors, which range from Saudi Arabia's pro-status quo practicos to the 
Hizbullah's search for state power in Lebanon; from FIS grassroots activities In 
Algeria to provide basic services to peoples, to the bombing of the Now York 
Trade Centre in the United States. It was further argued that what Is common to 
all those Islamist actors Is their employment of Islamic symbolism, although they 
may seek to achieve radically different aims through invoking the same symbols. 
The example of the concept jihad was used to illustrate this point. The chapter 
concluded that In the post-Cold War era, the Islamist discourse has boon 
appropriated by anti-status quo actors who have sought to bring about radical 
change at home. It was further argued that notwithstanding the global character 
of their discourses, Islamist actors concentrate on bringing about changes at 
home. The practices of grassroots organisations that provide for many peoples' 
needs, notably education and health care, attest well to this. 
The last section of the chapter looked at those practices shaped by the 
Middle Eastern security discourse. It was argued that many Arab policy-makors 
joined the anti-Iraq coalition and later the Madrid Peace Process; this indicated 
the prevalence of the US approach to regional security at the expense of the 
Arab national security discourse. It was argued that despite a momentary 
acknowledgement by Secretary of State Baker of the linkages between the 
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problem of regional stability and the IsraeVPalestino issue, the US approach to 
regional security remained top down and compartmentalisod. 
The difficulty of sustaining this compartmontalisod approach was 
illustrated well In late 1997 when the MENA economic summit convened in Doha 
to discuss regionalisation coincided with a stall in the peace process because of 
Notanyahu government's intransigence and US bombing of Iraq in the attempt to 
attain Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions. Many Arab policy-makors rofusod to 
attend the summit; others sent low-level delegations. The overall message was 
that there was a limit to which Arab policy-makers could overlook the suffering of 
other Arab peoples (such as those of Iraq who continuo to suffor under UN 
sanctions) and carry on cooperating with Israel (that remains defiant of UN 
resolutions) and the United States (which punishes Iraq for not abiding by other 
UN resolutions). This, in turn, showed that oven at a time when Arab intor- 
governmental relations were at a low, Arab policy-makers could not completely 
disregard the concerns raised by non-state actors at homo and abroad. It Is also 
significant to note that the multilateral ('technical') track, which was hoped to have 
a spillover effect on the bilateral ('political') track through strengthening 
regionalism, not only failed to generate the expected spillover effect but also 
came to a stop itself because of lack of progress in bilateral negotiations. 
As noted in Chapter 5, the main post-Cold War divide in the region 
emerged not between the Arab national security discourse and that of Middle 
East, but between pro-status quo approaches of the Unitod Status and its allies 
and the anti-status quo discourses of myriad non-stato actors. The launch of the 
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Euro-Med partnership process and the two-track negotiations of the Madrid 
Peace Process, the chapter argued, marked attempts by the EU and the US to 
use economic tools to increase economic rogionalisation and maintain stability in 
the region. Both processes prioritised stability over other concerns such as 
democratisation and human rights as emphasised by non-stato actors. 
Concerning stability in the Gulf, both the US and the EU prioritised military 
stability and privileged militarised practices, as was tho caso with the Gulf War 
and subsequent bombings of Iraq. It was noted that such stability oriented 
practices that privilege the stable flow of oil and market economies over human 
rights and political participation evoke memories of a colonial era In Arab peoples' 
minds. This, in turn, makes it difficult for their governments to participate in 
region-wide schemes, as the stall of the multilateral negotiations showed. 
Having considered these multiple approaches to regional security and the 
discrepancies between the security needs and concerns of actors that adopt 
them, It could be highly unlikely for their proponents to come to an agreement on 
one of them. The question then becomes, If they cannot agroo on the 
representation of the region, how could they over agroo on common security 
practices? This is where the argument comps back full circle; for, conceiving the 
relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security 
as mutually constitutive enables me to make the next stop. This is to argue that 
an alternative approach to security-Critical Security Studios-could Inform 
alternative practices and thereby help to constitute a now region In the form of a 
security community. This argument will be fully developed In Part III: 'Futures. ' 
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278 
Chapter 8: Thinking About the Future: A Critical 
Security Studies Perspective 
Chapter 8 introduces Part III: 'Futures, ' which looks at altornativo ways of 
thinking about the future and their potential Implications within tho Middle Eastern 
context. The aim of this chapter is to present a Critical Socurity Studios 
perspective on thinking about the future. Hero I will build upon the arguments 
made In Chapter 1, where a Critical Security Studios perspective was Introducod, 
and seek to develop it further. I will focus on throe thomos, namely, constitutivo 
theory, practice and agency, which were identified as the silences of post-Cold 
War debates on security (in Chapter 6). Those throe themes have also boon 
central to Critical Security Studios thinking about the future. The chapter will also 
make a case for adopting the security community approach. The arguments 
developed in Chapter 8 will then be utilised to criticise other future scenarios 
(Chapter 9) and investigate the potential for the croation of a security community 
In the Middle East (Chapter 10). 
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Why Think About the Future? 
Whether s/he is aware of it or not, one always has some ideas about the future 
that inform his/her practices. For instance, those who think that the futuro will be 
no different from the past shape their practices based on this promise, which 
constitutes some kind of knowledge based on one's understanding of what the 
past was like. For instance, students of Cold War Security Studios, who conceive 
world politics as an endless process of balancing and bandwagoning In the 
struggle for power would expect futuro to be more of the same. In other words, 
we all operate based on our (often unthinking and unquestioned) knowledge 
about the future. This is because, as Kenneth Boulding wrote, 'unless we at least 
think we know something about the futuro decisions are impossible, for all 
decisions involve choices among images of alternative futures. " 
Thinking about the future becomes all the more relevant given the 
conception of theory adopted by students of Critical Security Studios as 
constitutive of the 'reality' it responds to. Our knowledge about the futuro-our 
conjectures and prognoses-may become solf-constitutivo. This, however, Is not 
to suggest that it Is totally In our hands to shape the futuro. 'Mon make their own 
history, ' wrote Marx, 'but they do not make it just. as they please; they do not 
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances 
directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. ' Furthermore, 
thinking about the future is only one form of shaping the future, and, admittedly, Is 
not enough in itself. It should be compounded by other forms of practice. As 
Kenneth ßoulding, 'Part I: Introduction, ' in The Future: Imncio and Procossos, Elise Boulding 
and Kenneth E. Boulding (London: Sage, 1995) 1. 
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Fatima Mernissi wrote, 'it is by and through action that the future Is shaped. t3 
Having said that, Memissi herself would endorse the argument that thinking (and 
writing) about the future is a crucial task if the aim is to shape the future. 
Towards this end, that is, shaping the future, students of Critical Security 
Studies have so far looked at 'desired' futures: socurity as emancipation. 5 This Is 
partly because 'being able to picture a desired future Is empowering In the 
prosont'-as Elise Boulding arguod. 6 In order to be able to make a chango, ono 
has to have some knowledge as to what s/he wants to achieve, to shape his/her 
practices in the attempt to shape that desired future. This, however, Is not to 
suggest that emancipation Is an endpoint. As Kon Booth has maintained, 
'emancipation is best likened to a political horizon: something to aim for, 
something that establishes perspective, but something by definition can never be 
reached. '' Nor does the security community approach necessarily constitute a 
blueprint. The security community approach will be discussed later In the 
chapter. It should suffice to note hero that the creation of security communities 
could constitute only a beginning. The security community approach, In this 
sense, should be viewed as the start of a path that could take us from an 
Insecure past to a more secure future. 
2 Karl Marx. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte; (18521 In Karl Marx: Soloctod Writings, 
ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) 300. 
3 Fatima Mernissi, Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory (London: Zed, 1990) 8. 
4 Fatima Mernissi, 'Writing is Better than a Face-lift, ' In Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory, 
1-7. 
Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation, ' Review of International Studios 17: 4 (1091) 313-26; 
Richard Wyn Jones, Security. Strateav and Critical Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynno Rionnor, 1099) 
esp. pp. 145-63. 
° Elise Boulding, 'Image and Action In Peace Building, ' In The Future, Boulding and Boulding, 07. 
' Ken Booth, Throe Tyrannies, ' in Human Rights in Globnl Politics, eds. Tim Dunne and Nicholas 
Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 41. 
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Thinking about the future from a Critical Security Studies perspective 
need not be limited to 'desired' futures only. Students of security could also try 
and shape the future by pointing to what some futures may bring If no preventive 
action Is taken in the present-as Ulrich Bock has done in Risk Socioty. 8 
According to Bock, if threats to security are 'throats to tho futuro, ' as Is the case 
with many environmental threats (such as depletion of natural resources), then, it 
Is Imperative that they be addressed in the present. 'As conjocturos, as throats to 
the future, as prognoses, [such threats] have and develop a practical relevance to 
preventive actions, ' notes Beck. ° However, one problem with trying to mobiliso 
action to meet such threats is that they only exist in the futuro as conjectures. It 
Is only through thinking and writing about such throats that one could raise 
peoples' awareness regarding what the future may bring, and what needs to be 
done in the present to prevent them from happening. When issues such as 
threats to the environment are concerned, thinking (and writing) about the futuro 
becomes crucial; otherwise they have the potential to cause destruction on 'such 
a scale that action afterwards would be practically impossiblo. i10 
Although Beck's thesis is about the environment, the points he makes in 
explaining the way human agency has been complicit, via the production of 
knowledge, in exacerbating (if not creating) 'throats to the future' could be 
adopted and adapted to further develop the critique students of Critical Security 
Studios present of prevailing security discourses in general and Middle Eastom 
security discourse in particular. Bock writes: 
° Ulrich Deck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modomity, trans. Mark Ritter (London: Sago, 1992). 
° Bock, Risk Society, 34. 
10 Bock, Risk Society, 34. 
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In contrast to all earlier epochs ... the risk society is 
characterized by a lack the impossibility of an oxtomal attribution 
of hazards. In other words, risks depend on decisions ... Risks 
are the reflection of human actions and omissions, the 
expression of highly developed productive forces. That moans 
that the sources of danger are no longer Ignoranco but 
knowledge; not a deficient but a perfected mastory over nature. " 
Beck's point is made within the context of environmental politics, where the grip 
of 'scientific' knowledge over practice is even stronger than Is the case for loss 
'scientific' Security Studies. Nevertheless, as noted above, knowledge about the 
future presented in terms of obstacles and opportunities both constrains and 
informs actors' practices thereby helping constitute the future. Then, given the 
ways in which the Middle Eastern security discourse has, in the past, boon 
complicit in shaping regional insecurity in the Middle East, it could be argued that 
uncritical adoption of existing knowledge produced by prevailing discourses that 
do not offer anything other than more of the same dons itself constitute a 'throat 
to the future. ' Accordingly, students of security who fail to reflect upon the sell- 
constitutive potential of their thinking would be complicit In perpetuating regional 
insecurity in the Middle East. 
In sum, given the conception of theory adopted by students of Critical 
Security Studies as constitutive of a future 'reality, ' it is vital that its proponents do 
not limit their thinking to 'desired' futures but criticiso existing knowledge about 
the future that informs myriad actors' practices in an often unthinking manner. 
Indeed, the thinking of the students of Critical Security Studios dons not evolve in 
a vacuum. All approaches to security in the Middle East incorporate some Imago 
of the future, which constitutes the knowledge that informs practices at present. 
Thus, if Critical Security Studios hopes to help Invent alternative futures, the task 
11 Beck, Risk Society, 183. 
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for its students is both to produce knowledge about desired futures, and present 
critiques of existing knowledge in terms of its omancipatory potontial. Chapter 9 
will present other future scenarios and discuss their potontial practical 
implications within the Middle Eastern context. The remainder of the chapter will 
try to develop a Critical Security Studios porspoctivo on thinking about the futuro 
by focusing on three key themes, namely, constitutive theory, practice and 
agency. Those are the themes i identified as silences of post-Cold War debates 
in Chapter 6. 
Shaping Futures: Constitutive Theory 
Critical Security Studios rejects the sciontific"objoctivist conception of theory and 
theory/practice relationship adopted by students of Cold War Security Studios. 
Accordingly, theory is viewed as constitutive of the 'reality' It seeks to explain. As 
Stove Smith has argued: 
Theories do not simply explain or predict. They toll us what 
possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they dofino 
not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and 
political horizons. ' 
The argument hero is not that theories 'create' the world in a philosophical 
idealist sense of the term, but that theories help organiso knowledge, which, in 
turn, informs, enables, privileges or legitimises certain practices whilst inhibiting 
or marginalizing others. 
12 Steve Smith, Positivism and Beyond, ' in International Thvonr. Positivism and Beyond, ods. Kon 
Booth, Steve Smith and Marysia Zalowskl (Cambridge: Cambridgo Univorsity Pross, 1096) 13. 
Also see idem, 'Self -Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of Intornational Rotations Theory; In 
International Relations Theory Today, eds. Kon Booth and Stovo Smith (Oxford: Polity Pross, 
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In Mastering Space, John Agnew and Stuart Corbridgo explain how 
geopolitical discourses Inform spatial practices thereby helping shape geopolitical 
(dis)orders. 'Geopolitical discourse, ' write Agnew and Corbrldgo, 'signifios the 
rules and conceptual resources that political elites use In particular historical 
contexts to "spatialise" the international political economy into places, peoples, 
and disputes. ' By way of Identifying and naming a place, a series of narratives, 
subjects and understandings come Into being. 'Labelling' or 'naming' an area not 
only brands it in terms of its politics and the typo of foreign policy its character 
demands, but helps constitute its very character. 13 A similar argument could be 
made regarding the relationship between security discourses and roglonal 
(in)socurity In that security discourses, by Informing actors' practices, help 
constitute the region they seek to secure. The Invention of the Middle East, as 
Chapter 2 argued, is a good example of how this process works. 
As noted In the previous section, given this soli-constitutivo potential of 
security thinking, critical self-reflection becomes crucial for Its students. The role 
of the students of security, in this sonso, is to try and be soil-conscious about the 
normative and mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice In 
their thinking and writing rather than feeding 'common sonso' back into the 
system hiding behind a notion of 'objectivity. ' 
It should be noted that one advantage of feeding 'common sonso' into tho 
system is that it is readily accepted by those who aro in a position of powor. 
Indeed, as Steve Smith maintains, 
1995) 26-8. 
13 John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Sonco: Honomonv. Territory and Intornntionnl 
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once established as common sense, theories become incredibly 
powerful since they delineate not simply what can be known but 
also what it is sensible to talk about or suggest. Those who swim 
outside these safe waters risk more than simply the judgement 
that their theories are wrong; their entire ethical or moral stance 
may be ridiculed or soon as dangerous just because their 
theoretical assumptions are doomed unrealistic. Defining 
common sense is therefore the ultimate act of political power. " 
In other words, although theory/practico relationship Is one of mutual constitution, 
not all theories get to shape practices. Then, the answer to the question why 
theorising may become self-constitutive in some cases (such as the Cold War 
security discourse) but not in others (as with Peace Research) Is rootod in the 
power/knowledge relationship. More often that not, it is thoorios that are picked 
up by those In positions of power that got to shape what men and women In the 
street view as 'a more plausible Interpretation of International roality'-as John 
Garnett wrote when explaining the way realism has prevailed over the yoars. 15 
Furthermore, 'dominant discourses, especially those of the state, become and 
remain dominant because of the power relations sustaining thom. i18 In this 
sense, it is difficult to underestimate the power of theories In informing not only 
governmental policies, but also individuals' conceptions of the world. Hero, 
Kaldor's argument regarding the Cold War is again instructive in accounting for 
the ways In which Cold War security discourse Informed men and women in 
North America and Western Europe of the relevance, logitimacy and 
inescapability of power politics, tough responses and brinkmanship. 17 
Political Economy (New York: Routledge, 1995) 48. 
'4 Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond, ' 13. 
1S John Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions, ' in Contomoornrv Strnteciy, 2'd od., rov. 
and enl., eds. John Baylis et al. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987) 22. 
Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gustorson and Raymond Duvall, 'Introduction: Constructing 
Insecurity, ' in Cultures of Insecurity: States. Communities and the Production of Danner, ods. 
Jutta Waldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gustorson and Raymond Duvall (Minnoapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1999) 18. 
" Mary Kaldor, The Imaginary War: Understandinn Enst"Wost Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990). 
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The competition between theories over shaping practices and therefore 
the future never takes place on a level playing field. To understand theory as 
constitutive of 'reality' is not to suggest that once we got our thoorios right the rest 
would follow. What shape the future might take would depend on whose thoorios 
got to shape practices. For example, it was argued that the reason why the lands 
to the southwest of Asia and north of Africa were lumpod togothor in the mind's 
oyo and labelled the Middle East, but not something else, had its roots in the 
dominance of British and US security discourses. The sources of their 
dominance could, in turn, be found in the material (military and economic) as well 
as representational power of those states. 
I distinguish between the representational and material dimensions of 
power for analytical reasons in an attempt to stross that the workings of the 
powor/knowlodgo relationship cannot be accounted for by adopting a narrow or 
purely material conception of power. Rather, our conception of power should 
account for its representational dimension as well; that Is, the power to shape 
Ideas. One potential problem Involved In trying to account for the 
representational dimension of power Is that It cannot be observed In the same 
way as the material dimension can be; the latter Is often utilisod to keep issues 
outside security agendas, thereby averting conflict. In the absence of overt (or 
latent) conflict, no observable behaviour change takes place. However, the 
absence of an observable power relationship dons not necessarily moan thorn Is 
not one. 
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To be able to account for such instances of powor relationships, I adopt, 
following Steven Lukes, a 'three-dimensional view of powor' that 'allows for 
consideration of the many ways in which potontlil Issuos are kept out of politics, 
whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or 
through individuals' decisions. '18 Adopting a conception of powor that strossos 
both its material and representational dimensions enables me to account for tho 
ways in which some discourses comp to dominate others, shaping 'reality' by 
Informing certain practices whilst marginalizing others. 'Our liberation will como 
through a rereading of our past, ' wrote Fatima Momissi when discussing tho 
future of women in the Arab world and the need for writing altornativo accounts of 
the Islamic and pro-Islamic past to point to instances of womon's strugglo and 
triumph. 19 Indeed, one task of Critical Security Studios is to present altornativo 
readings of the past and to account for choices that woro made-or worn 
obscured duo to the way security agendas were sot up by keeping curtain issues 
out (as was the case with female illiteracy as argued in Chapter 1). 20 
It should also be stressed that neither material nor representational 
dimensions of power could be monopolisod by one actor only. This is more so In 
the case of the latter. For, although it is true that it is a combination of Ideas and 
material resources that has enabled some discourses to dominate others, 
nevertheless, history is replete with examples of the ideas of the weak coming to 
power (by being taken up by those who are In power, or directly through 
revolutions). One example of this phenomenon is the 1989 revolutions in Eastern 
Europe and the role played by Polish Popo Joan Paul 11 and the Catholic 
Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974) 24. His emphasis. 1° Mornissi, Islam and Democracy, 149.71. The quotation is from p. 160. 
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Church 21 It is perhaps ironic that this Popo, whose predecessor Stalin famously 
ridiculed for not having enough material power when he quipped, . 'how many 
divisions has the Pope? ' played a major role in the 1989 revolutions that 
eventually culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 22 
Another example of the Ideas of the weak coming to power was observed 
when Gorbachev reinterpreted Soviet domestic situation and external relations 
and decided to change the course of Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s and 
adopted the ideas of Peace Researchers, Alternative Security thinkers and peace 
movements who have boon propounding ideas about common security and non- 
offensive defence since the 1960s. 23 As Kon Booth has noted, 
the Berlin Wall did not fall: it was pushed. It was thought up, 
unthought and pulled down. This most symbolic material 
structure of the Cold War was demolished by people changing 
their minds. 24 
Without such Ideas being floated by some (in the Soviet Union and elsewhere) 
Gorbachev would not have had the intellectual resources to tap Into when he 
decided to change course. Those who floated such ideas, on the other hand, 
needed Gorbachev for their ideas to be put into practice. The end of the Cold 
War, in this sense, evolved as a symbiosis of top down and bottom up 
approaches to security, neither of which would have boon successful without the 
other. 25 
20 Also see Ken Booth, 'Cold Wars of the Mind; In Statecraft and Security, od. Booth, 29-55. 21 The Catholic Church is not exactly a powerless institution. The charactor of Its power, howovor, 
Is different from that of states. 
22 Jim Garrison and John-Francis Phipps with Pyaro Shivpurl, The Now Diolomets, Citizens as 
Ambassadors for Peace (Devon: Green Books, 1989) 76-84. 
23 Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas do not Float Frooly: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic 
Structures and the End of the Cold War, ' In International Rotations Theory and the End of the 
mar, eds. Richard Nod Lebow and Thomas Risso-Kappon (Now York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995) 187.222. 
2' Ken Booth, 'Security Within Global Transformation? ' in Statocreft and S . curity, od. Booth, 353. 25 Johan Gattung, 'Europe 1989: The Role of Peace Research and the Poaco Movement, ' In Z(by 
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In sum, Critical Security Studies suggests putting into use the constitutivo 
role played by theories by presenting a fundamentally different approach to 
security in theory and practice in the attempt to open up space for political action 
to take place and help shape alternative futures. The roles students of security 
could play as agents of security will be further developed in the final section of 
this chapter. Suffice it to say that thorn should be some solf"rofloction on their 
part as to the fact that their theories do not leave the world untouched. In other 
words, students of security should reflect upon the constitutivo implications of 
thoir own thinking and writing-to tho oxtont that thoy can bo awaro of thorn. 
"b 
Shaping Futures: Practice 
As Chapter 1 argued, Critical International Theory has so far not offered much 
guidance on the issue of how Critical Theory could become a 'force for change' in 
world politics as it was promised in the 1980s. 0 Proponents of Critical Security 
Studies, not remaining silent on this issue, stressed theory as a form of practice. 
But what Is meant by theory functioning as a form of practice? Richard Dovotak, 
writing from a postmodemist perspective, maintains that theory makes a change 
through disturbing and problematising prevailing discourses, that Is, 'how we 
conceive of theory, the "real world" and agency. ' 'Little by little, ' he writes, 'ono 
the Cold War Ended: A Range of Intorarotations, ads. Ralph E. Sunnoy and Michael A. Salla 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995) 91.105; Mary Kaldor, ? ho Rovolutions of 1009, ' In 
Peace and Security The Next Generation, eds. Goorgo A. Lopez and Nancy J. Myers (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) 243.8. 
21 The phrase is Mark Hoffman's. Sao his 'Critical Theory and the Intor"paradigm Dobato, ' 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 16: 2 (187) 233. 
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can begin to influence modifications to the ways in which we conceive political 
problems such that at least the givens of a problem are changod. r27 
Although Devetak's approach to the thoory/practico relationship echoes 
Critical Security Studios conception of theory as a form of practico, the latter 
seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Ken Booth makes 
between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference 
between the two. Booth writes: 
Thinking about thinking Is Important, but, more urgently, so Is 
thinking about doing.... Abstract ideas about emancipation will 
not suffice: It is important for Critical Security Studios to engage 
with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, 
to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its 
structural wrongs. 28 
In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing 
those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded In Cold War 
Security Studios is only a first (alboit crucial) stop. As noted In Chapter 1, It Is 
vital for the students of Critical Security Studios to ro-think security In both theory 
and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent In world politics and 
suggesting alternative, emancipatory practices. Cognisant of the need to find 
and suggest alternative practices to moot a broadened security agenda without 
adopting militarised or zero sum practices, students of Critical Security Studios 
have suggested that imagining, creating and nurturing of creation of security 
communities constitute emancipatory practices. 
21 Richard Devotak, Theories, Practices and Postmodornism In International Relations, ' 
Cambridge 
-Review of 
International Affairs xii: 2 (1999) 73. 
20 Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallon Realist; In Critical Security Studios 
concerts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael Williams (London: UCL Press, 1097) 114. 
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Karl Deutsch and his colleagues developed the concept of security 
community in the 1950s. What Deutsch et al. were interested in was finding 
ways of creating a community characterised by the cessation of inter-state 
violence and the creation of dependable expectations of peaceful change by way 
of strengthening relationships among a group of states. Accordingly, Deutsch et 
al. defined a (pluralistic) security community as 'one in which there is real 
assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other 
physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. '29 Their conviction was 
that once the conditions and processes that give rise to security communities 
were identified, it would be possible to replicate them in different parts of the 
world so that (preparations for and the idea of) war would not enter into 
calculations of those states. 30 Although Deutsch et al. were positive regarding 
the potential for security communities to travel to different parts of the world, their 
ideas remained largely on paper for four decades until Emanuel Adler and 
Michael Barnett revived them in the late 1990s. 31 Deutsch's original conception 
and the revamped version of the security community approach developed by 
Adler and Barnett will be further discussed in Chapter 10. What follows is an 
account as to why the process of imagining, creating and nurturing security 
communities constitutes emancipatory practices from a Critical Security Studies 
perspective. 
29 Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, 
Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim and Richard W. Van Wagenen, Political 
Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical 
Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957) 5. 
30 Deutsch et al., Political Community, vii, 3,20-1. 
31 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
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The preference of students of Critical Security Studies for the security 
community approach builds upon the emphasis the proponents of Critical Theory 
in International Relations have put on the transformation of political community. 
Common to both Mark Hoffman and Robert Cox is the stress they put on the 
agency of social forces towards creating a future world order where the 
boundaries of political community extends beyond that of sovereign states. 32 In a 
series of studies, Andrew Linklater has sought to fortify the case for the creation 
of more inclusive communities cognisant of peoples' multiple identities. 33 
Linklater's argument is that the twin processes of globalisation and 
fragmentation are already transforming political communities around the world, 
thereby constituting a potential for creating more inclusive communities. The 
creation of more inclusive communities has been considered desirable but not 
attainable for a long time. As Linklater has noted, this had to do with the 
perceived need to organise within states for economic and military purposes. His 
argument is that although the Westphalian state system and its cornerstone, the 
sovereign state have served these purposes for long, the reasons for persisting 
with the system of sovereign states as an organising principle of world politics 
have been gradually eroding in that, given the impact made by the forces of 
globalisation and fragmentation, the state is no longer able to fulfil these roles. 
32 Mark Hoffman, 'Agency, Identity and Intervention, ' in Political Theory, International Relations 
and the Ethics of Intervention, eds. Mark Hoffman and Ian Forbes (London: Macmillan, 1993) 
199; Robert W. Cox, 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative 
World Order, ' Review of International Studies 25: 1 (January 1999) 3-28. 
33 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, 2nd ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1990); idem, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International 
Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990); idem, 'Community, ' in Fin de Sibcle, ed. Danchev, 177- 
97; idem, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post. 
Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity, 1998). 
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The realisation of these developments, maintains Linklater, constitutes an 
immanent potential for the transformation of political community. 
The case Linklater makes for the transformation of political community 
echoes the call Booth and Vale make for 
moving away from simple patterns of statism to complex 
structures and processes characterised by shifting power away 
from the state level (upwards to regional community institutions 
and downwards to local community bodies) and moving away 
from nineteenth century notions of identity towards more complex 
answers to the question `who am 1? 935 
From a Critical Security Studies perspective, transformation of political 
community is desirable not only because the twin processes of globalisation and 
fragmentation have made it more difficult for existing forms of political community 
(that is, states) to fulfil their roles; or that there already exist some potential for 
this transformation to take place; but also that the creation of security 
communities would help directly address the problem of regional security. 
Indeed, the security community approach emphasises the need to organise at the 
regional level by way of forming an inclusive community-a community that takes 
security issues seriously. 
One point of strength for the security community approach is that it 
directly addresses the problem of achieving security, rather than treating it as a 
side effect of increasing globalisation or regionalisation. It also puts emphasis on 
the political project behind the construction of a community. Furthermore, the 
security community approach provides an explicit account of the potentialities of 
34 Linklater, 'Community, ' 178; idem, The Transformation of Political Community. 35 Ken Booth and Peter Vale, 'Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The Case of 
Southern Africa, ' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 352. 
294 
human agency. Lastly, it provides (however imperfect) the start of a path from an 
insecure past to a more secure future. This, in turn, provides a good starting 
point for re-conceptualising regional security in theory and practice and 
investigating the potential for the creation of security communities in different 
parts of the world. 
Shaping Futures: Agency 
Chapter 6 identified the issue of agency and especially the roles non-state actors 
play as agents of security as one of the silences of post-Cold War debates on 
security. This section aims to discuss the roles non-state actors play as agents 
of security in shaping futures. I will begin by looking at the agency of social 
movements. Second, I will turn to look at the roles intellectuals and in particular 
students of security could play as agents of security by using illustrations from the 
Middle East. It will be argued that paying more attention to the agency of non- 
state actors will enable students of security to see how, in the absence of interest 
at the governmental level (as is the case with the Middle East) non-state actors 
could imagine, create and nurture community-building projects and could help in 
getting state-level actors interested in the formation of a security community. It 
should, however, be noted that not all non-state actors are community-minded- 
just as not all governments are sceptical of the virtues of community building. 
Indeed, looking at the agency of non-state actors is also useful because it 
enables one to see how non-state actors could stall community-building projects. 
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In the Middle East, women's movements and networks have been 
cooperating across borders from the beginning of the Intifada onwards. Women's 
agency, however, is often left unnoticed, because, as Simona Sharoni has 
argued, the eyes of security analysts are often focused on the state as the 
primary security agent. 36 However, the Intifada was marked by Palestinian and 
Israeli-Jewish women's adoption of non-zero sum, non-military practices that 
questioned and challenged the boundaries of their political communities as they 
dared to explore new forms of political communities. 37 Such activities included 
organising a conference entitled 'Give Peace a Chance-Women Speak Out' in 
Brussels in May 1989. The first of its kind, the conference brought together about 
50 Israeli and Palestinian women from the West Bank and Gaza Strip together 
with PLO representatives to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The follow-up 
event took place in Jerusalem in December 1989 where representatives of the 
Palestinian Women's Working Committees and the Israeli Women and Peace 
Coalition organised a women's day for peace which, Sharoni noted, 'culminated 
in a march of 6,000 women from West to East Jerusalem under the banner 
'Women Go For Peace. '38 Aside from such events that were designed to alert the 
public opinion of the unacceptability of the Israel/Palestine impasse as well as 
finding alternative ways of peace-making, women also undertook direct action to 
alleviate the condition of Palestinians whose predicament had been worsening 
since the beginning of the Intifada. 39 In this process, they were aided by their 
Western European counterparts who provided financial, institutional as well as 
36 Simona Sharoni, 'Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Accord: Feminist Approaches to 
International Politics, ' in Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives, ed. Deniz 
Kandiyoti (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996) 107-26. 
37 Simona Sharoni, Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Politics of Women's 
Resistance (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi, This 
Side of Peace (New York: Touchstone and Simon & Schuster, 1995). 
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moral support. In sum, women's agency helped make the Intifada possible on the 
part of the Palestinian women, whilst their Israeli-Jewish counterparts helped 
enhance its impact by way of questioning the moral boundaries of the Israeli 
state. 
The Intifada is also exemplary of how non-state actors could initiate 
processes of resistance that might later be taken up by policy-makers. The 
Intifada began in 1987 as a spontaneous grassroots reaction to the Israeli 
occupation and took the PLO leadership (along with others) by surprise. It was 
only some weeks into the Intifada that the PLO leadership embraced it and put its 
material resources into furthering the cause, which was making occupation as 
difficult as possible for the Israeli government. Although not much came out of 
the Intifada in terms of an agreement with Israel on issues of concern for the 
people living in the occupied territories, the process generated a momentum that 
culminated in 1988 with the PLO's denouncement of terrorism. The change in 
the PLO's policies, in turn, enabled the 1993 Oslo Accords, which was also 
initiated by non-state actors, in this case intellectuals. 40 The point here is that it 
has been a combination of top down and bottom up politics that has been at the 
heart of political change, be it the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, or Intifada 
in Israel/Palestine. 
Emphasising the roles some non-state actors, notably women's networks, 
have played as agents of security is not to suggest that all non-state agents' 
practices are non-zero sum and/or non-violent. For instance, there are the cases 
38 Sharoni, 'Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Accord, ' 107. 
39 Mikhail-Ashrawi, This Side of Peace. 
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of Islamist movements such as FIS (the Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria and 
Hamas in the Occupied Territories that have resorted, over the years, to violent 
practices as a part of their strategies that were designed to capture the state 
mechanism. However, although they may be construed as threats to security in 
the Middle East in view of their violent practices, what needs to be remembered 
is that both FIS and Hamas function as providers for security for some peoples in 
the Middle East-those who are often neglected by their own states. 1 In other 
words, some Islamist movements do not only offer a sense of identity, but also 
propose alternative practices and provide tangible economic, social and moral 
support to their members. However, the treatment women receive under the 
mastery of such Islamist movements (which could otherwise be construed as 
agents of emancipatory change due to the services they provide to peoples) 
serve to remind us that there clearly are problems involved in an unthinking 
reliance on non-governmental actors as agents for peace and security or an 
uncritical adoption of their agendas. 
In order to be able to fulfil the role allocated to them by Critical Security 
Studies, non-state actors should be encouraged to move away from traditional 
forms of resistance that are based on exclusionist identities, that solely aim to 
capture state power or that adopt zero sum thinking and practices. Arguably, this 
is a task for intellectuals to fulfil. This is not to suggest that intellectuals should 
direct or instruct non-state actors. As Richard Wyn Jones has noted, the 
relationship between intellectuals and social movements is based on 
4o Sharoni, 'Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Accord. ' 
41 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 2"d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995) 162-83. 
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reciprocity 42 The 1980s' peace movements, for instance, are good examples of 
intellectuals getting involved with social movements in bringing about change-in 
this case, the end of the Cold War. 43 The relationship between intellectuals and 
peace movements in Europe was a mutually interactive one in that the 
intellectuals encouraged and led whilst drawing strength from these movements. 
Edward Said, the well-known scholar of English and comparative 
literature and champion of the Palestinian cause, has also stressed this 
reciprocal relationship between the intellectual and social movements. 44 Said 
views the role of the intellectual as one of representing the ideas and experiences 
of `the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the 
powerless. '45 To fulfil this role, argues Said, the intellectual should be connected 
with a movement, a people, where s/he is 'responsible to and responsible for 
certain things'46-as he has done with the Palestinian cause 47 Looking at the 
role Said himself has played as an intellectual within the Palestinian struggle is as 
informative as his many writings on the role of the intellectual as agent. This is 
what the chapter will turn to now. 
Said has had an undeniable impact as a public intellectual on the political 
discourse in the United States. His main struggle in the US domestic political 
42 Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 162. 
43 Galtung, 'Europe 1989'; Kaldor, 'The Revolutions of 1989. ' 
44 The best known of his writings on the role of the intellectual is the collection of the BBC Reith 
lectures Said gave in 1993 entitled Representations of the Intellectual-The 1993 Reith 
Lectures (London: Vintage, 1994). 
45 Said, Representations of the Intellectual, 84. 
48 Edward W. Said, The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-determination 
1969-1994 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1994) 316. 
47 See Edward W. Said, 'American Intellectuals and Middle East Politics, ' in Intellectuals: 
Aesthetics. Politics and Academics, ed. Bruce Robins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1990) 146. 
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arena has been against the mainstream anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian discourses 
fed by the media and certain parts of the academic community, which help shape 
US foreign policy. His practices of 'speaking truth to power' have included public 
lectures, appearances on television, lectures to college audiences, and opinion 
pieces in newspapers. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that 
since the 1970s, Said's voice has provided a significant 'antidote' to the common- 
sense assumptions about Israel/Palestine prevalent in the mainstream media in 
the United States as well as the rest of the world. 48 
In addition to 'representing, embodying, and articulating' the Palestinian 
side of the story to US audiences, Said also assumed the job of educating 
Palestinian and Arab audiences on a broad range of issues including US foreign 
policy mechanisms, the domestic context in which US policies are made, and the 
representations in Western public discourse of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For 
example, he helped organise a series of seminars on US foreign policy aimed at 
Palestinian intellectuals, students, and policy-makers. More recently, he has 
been contributing articles to newspapers published in the Arab world. These 
articles have been aimed at informing and educating Arab audiences, who 
remain, after all these years, argues Said, ill informed about the functioning of US 
politics and society and know very little as to how to get their voices heard to 
counter the mainstream discourses in the United States 49 
48 Rashid I. Khalidi, 'Edward W. Said and the American Public Sphere: Speaking Truth to Power, ' 
Boundary 2 25: 2 (1998) 162. 
49 Edward W. Said, Peace and its Discontents: Gaza-Jericho 1993-1995 (London: Vintage, 1995) 
xxiii. 
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Over the years, therefore, Edward Said's agency as an intellectual 
ranged from getting directly involved in Palestinian politics50 to taking a 'critical 
distance' to question the very leadership he served under for over a decade. 51 
Since 1991 and especially since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, he 
became even more critical of the Palestinian leadership's failure to reap the 
benefits of the Intifada. 52 
Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals 
and social movements should not be taken to suggest that to make a change 
intellectuals should get directly involved in political action. They could also 
intervene to provide a critique of the existing situation, what future outcomes may 
result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for 
change immanent in world politics. Students of security could help create the 
political space that would enable the emergence of a Gorbachev, by presenting 
such critique. It should, however, be emphasised that such thinking should be 
anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. In other words, intellectuals 
should be informed by the practices of social movements themselves (as was the 
case in Europe in the 1980s). The hope is that non-state actors such as social 
movements and intellectuals (who may or may not be aware of their potential to 
make a change) may constitute themselves as agents when presented with an 
alternative reading of their situation. 
5' Said served as a member of the Palestine National Council (PNC) between 1977 and 1991, 
and played a direct role in Palestinian political and diplomatic initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In 1991 he resigned from the PNC due to personal health reasons as well as his disillusionment 
with the PLO leadership's policies during and following the Gulf Crisis (1990-1991). 
51 Said, 'American Intellectuals and Middle East Politics, ' 146-8. 
52 Said, Peace and its Discontents. 
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Lastly, intellectuals could make a change even if they limit their practices 
to thinking, writing and self-reflection. During the Cold War very few security 
analysts were conscious and open about the impact their thinking and writing 
could make. Wyn Jones cites the example of Edward N. Luttwak as one such 
exception who admitted that 'strategy is not a neutral pursuit and its only purpose 
is to strengthen one's own side in the contention of nations. i53 Still, such explicit 
acknowledgement of the political dimension of strategic thinking was rare during 
the Cold War. On the contrary, students of International Relations in general and 
Security Studies in particular have been characterised by limited or no self- 
reflection as to the potential impact their research could make on the subject of 
research. 54 
To go back to the argument made above about the role of the intellectual 
as an agent of security and the mutually constitutive relationship between theory 
and practice, students of Critical Security Studies could function as agents of 
security by way of reflecting upon the practical implications of their own thinking 
and writing. Self-reflection becomes crucial when the relationship between 
theory and practice is conceptualised as one of mutual constitution. As Chapter 
6 argued, state-centric approaches to security do not simply reflect a reality 'out 
there' but help reinforce statism. Although it may be true that the consequences 
of these scholarly activities are sometimes 'unintended, ' there nevertheless 
should be a sense of self-reflection on the part of scholars upon the potential 
consequences of their research and teaching. The point here is that critical 
approaches that show an awareness of the socially constructed character of 
53 quoted in Wyn Jones, Security. Strategy and Critical Theory, 150. 
54 Wyn Jones, Security Strategy and Critical Theory, 148-50. 
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'reality' need not stop short of reflecting upon the constitutive relationship 
between theory and practice when they themselves are theorising about security. 
Otherwise, they run the risk of constituting 'threats to the future, ' as noted in the 
first section of this chapter. 55 
Conclusion 
Emphasising the need for Critical Security Studies to produce its own ideas about 
the future, this chapter has sought to show how Critical Security Studies allows 
one to think and act differently towards shaping alternative futures. Focusing on 
three themes identified in Chapter 6 as silences of post-Cold War debates on 
security, I discussed the ways in which Critical Security Studies could get to 
shape alternative futures. It was argued that students of Critical Security Studies 
could make use of the constitutive role played by theories to inform alternative 
emancipatory practices. Following Booth, it was argued that such practices 
should include 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing. ' The imagining, 
creation and nurturing of security communities was presented as a prime 
example of 'thinking about doing. ' Regarding agency, the chapter stressed the 
roles non-state actors, especially social movements and intellectuals have played 
in the past (and could play in the future) in a mutually interactive relationship. 
Chapter 8 also underlined the roles students of security could play by not 
only informing emancipatory practices, but also by self-reflection. This point was 
55 Vendulka Kubälkovä, 'Reconstructing the Discipline: Scholars as Agents, ' in International 
Relations in a Constructed World, eds. Vendulka Kubalkovd, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert 
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developed by building upon Beck's argument regarding 'threats to the future. ' It 
was argued that it is only by thinking and writing about the future that one could 
raise actors' awareness of what the future may bring, and what needs to be done 
in order to prevent them from happening. It was also argued that, as ideas about 
the future both shapes and constrains practices thereby helping constitute the 
future, uncritical adoption of existing knowledge produced by the prevailing 
discourses that have been complicit in perpetuating regional insecurity in the 
Middle East in itself is a 'threat to the future. ' The chapter concluded that 
students of security who fail to reflect upon the self-constitutive potential of their 
own thinking would be complicit in perpetuating regional insecurity in the Middle 
East. 
(Mew York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998) 193-201. 
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Chapter 9: Plausible Futures 
Chapter 9 looks at alternative future scenarios and their potential 
implications within the Middle Eastern context with the aim of investigating what 
non-Critical Security Studies futures may bring. Each one of the scenarios 
looked at here raises an alternative set of possibilities on thinking about the future 
of regional security. Despite certain overlaps, they present quite distinct images 
and would prescribe different policies as to how to achieve and maintain security 
in future worlds. The arguments developed in Chapter 8 will be utilised here to 
criticise other future scenarios. As Chapter 8 noted, given their conceptualisation 
of theory as constitutive of a future 'reality, ' it is vital that students of Critical 
Security Studies do not limit their thinking to 'desired' futures but also criticise 
existing ideas about the future that informs actors' practices in an often 
unthinking manner. By looking at the strengths and weaknesses of other ideas 
about the future the chapter will seek to identify the difficulties facing a Critical 
Security Studies future. It will also seek to point to unfulfilled potential immanent 
in regional politics. The first section of the chapter will canvass five future 
scenarios, namely, 'globalisation, ' 'fragmentation, ' 'clash of civilizations, ' 
'regionalisation' and 'democratic peace. ' The next section will investigate the 
potential practical implications of these scenarios within the Middle Eastern 
context. 
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Future Scenarios 
In the 1990s, it has become commonplace to present the future of world politics 
as one of increasing globalisation, with the term itself becoming a 'buzzword'- 
often invoked but rarely defined. ' Here, globalisation is understood as a process 
of increase in the extensity and intensity of relations between peoples, social 
groups, organisations and institutions that has been leading towards a global 
interpenetration of political as well as economic and military sectors. 2 Although it 
is often the economic factors, in particular the global integration of production and 
finance, that are viewed as the driving forces behind globalisation, the impact that 
has been made by the revolution in communications and information 
technologies (especially the expansion of the world-wide web) in increasing 
peoples' awareness of each other whilst diminishing the significance of the 
physical distance separating them (time-space compression) is also recognised 
as a crucial factor in accelerating this process. 
As opposed to those who remain sceptical regarding the impact made by 
the global integration of production and finance in the peripheries of the world, 3 
Jan Aart Scholte, 'Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical Theory of Globalisation, ' in 
Globalisation: Theory and Practice, eds. Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (London: Pinter, 
1996) 44-5. 
2 William L. Robinson, 'Beyond Nation-state Paradigms: Globalisation, Sociology, and the 
Challenge of Transnational Studies, ' Sociological Forum 13: 4 (1998) 561.94; David Held and 
Anthony McGrew, 'The End of the Old Order? Globalisation and the Prospects for World Order, ' 
Review of International Studies 24 (1999) 219-43. 
3 See, for example, States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalisation (UNRISD (United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development] Report prepared for the World Summit for 
Social Development) (London: UNRISD, 1995); Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, 
'Globalisation and Inequality, ' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 24: 3 (1995) 447-70; 
Caroline Thomas, 'Globalisation and the South, ' in Globalisation and the South, eds. Caroline 
306 
those who firmly believe in its virtues maintain that increasing globalisation 
fosters economic efficiency and helps provide a remedy to the very problems it 
perpetuates. In this new world united in its search for new markets and higher 
profits, the argument goes, markets would demand and help produce common 
ways of thinking or even a new global culture, and peoples' identities as 
producers and consumers will overshadow most, if not all, other interests and 
identities. 4 In such a world, myriad actors are expected to solve their conflicts via 
non-military means, not only because they would achieve common ways of 
thinking but also because a break-down in business relations would simply be 
regarded as too costly. 5 Hence the expectation of global security as a side-effect 
of further globalisation. 
One problem with such interpretations of globalisation is that they bear 
striking resemblance to the neo-functionalist writings of earlier decades with 
regard to the emphasis placed on cooperation over certain (technical) issues 
eventually leading to the emergence of a 'superstructure of political behaviour. 96 
Moreover, they often ignore how increasing globalisation also leads to a 
perpetuation of inequalities worldwide. 7 Indeed, the proponents of increasing 
Thomas and Peter Wilkin (London: Macmillan, 1997) 1-17. 
This new global culture is referred to as 'McWorld' by Benjamin Barber. Thomas Friedman calls 
it'DOScapital. ' See Benjamin R. Barber, 'Jihad vs. McWorld, ' The Atlantic Monthly 269 (March 
1992) 53-63; idem, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World 
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1995); Thomas L. Friedman, 'DOScapital, ' Foreign Policy (Fall 
1999) 110-16; idem, 'DOScapital 2.0, ' Foreign Policy (Fall 1999) 121-5. 
Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Global Marketplace (London: 
HarperCollins, 1990; reprint, London: Collins, 1994) 13-14 (page references are to the reprint 
edition). 
6 Ian Clark, Globalisation and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 18. For an overview of neo-functionalism, see Jeppe 
Trankholm-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of 
the New Dynamism of the EC, ' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 20: 1 (1991) 1-22. 
For a critique see McSweeney, Security. Identity and Interests, 133-7. 
1 States of Disarray; Hurrell and Woods, 'Globalisation and Inequality'; Thomas, 'Globalisation 
and the South. ' 
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globalisation do not account for the processes of 'structural violence' perpetuated 
by the globalising forces so far as the latter do not disrupt the course of the 
former. In this sense, what they mean by the attainment of global security is the 
creation of some form of 'macropeace'8 based on the maintenance of the status 
quo by way of exercising social control through the global communication and 
information networks and the entertainment industry. 9 The kind of security that 
could be achieved as such would at best amount to an absence of war- 
'negative peace' in Johan Galtung's terms. 10 
Leaving aside such reservations regarding the desirability of a 'negative 
peace' established through further globalisation, it should also be noted that not 
even 'negative peace' may be within reach given the process of fragmentation 
that goes hand in hand with globalisation. Notwithstanding Thomas Friedman's 
claim that 'the wretched of the earth want to go to Disneyworld, not to the 
barricades, '11 Robert D. Kaplan maintains that the very uniformity that is imposed 
by the global communication and information networks and the entertainment 
industry has, at the same time, given rise to a proliferation of particularisms that 
manifest themselves as cultural and racial clash, increasing erosion of states and 
inter-state borders, and refugee flows. Although Kaplan is not alone in his 
conception of globalisation and fragmentation as two mutually reinforcing 
processes, 12 his approach is singular in its celebration of globalisation in the 
e Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 62. 
s See James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) 
esp. pp. 19-39. On communication and knowledge as power, see Robert W. Cox, 'Civilizations 
in World Political Economy, ' New Political Economy 1: 2 (1996) 149-50. 
10 Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research, ' Journal of Peace Research 6: 3 (1969) 
167-92. 
Friedman, 'DOScaptial 2.0, ' 124. 
12 See, for example, Clark, Globalisation and Fragmentation, 4; James N. Rosenau, 'Distant 
Proximities: The Dynamics and Dialectics of Globalisation, ' in International Political Economy: 
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developed world and warning about the 'coming anarchy' in the developing 
world. 13 
Kaplan's thesis is that environmental dynamics could, in the future, 
further reinforce the process of fragmentation. 14 As a result, argues Kaplan, the 
lines dividing the realm of globalisation (represented by the travellers of his 
metaphorical stretch limo) and the realm of fragmentation (made up of the 
majority of world's peoples who travel on foot and are therefore more amenable 
to the effects of environmental degradation) would further deepen, leading 
towards a future which would be characterised by spreading diseases, population 
upsurges, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, increasing erosion of states 
and inter-state borders, and the augmentation of private armies, security firms 
and transnational criminal organisations (such as drug cartels). '-' 
While certain elements of Kaplan's argument remain valid-such as the 
need to pay more attention to developments in those parts of the world that are 
suffering from environmental and societal stress-he suggests very little as to 
how to alter these dynamics to prevent the 'coming anarchy. ' In fact, given the 
tone of environmental determinism hidden between his lines, it is not clear 
Understanding Global Disorder, ed. Björn Hettne (London: Zed, 1995) 49. It should, however, 
be noted that Rosenau uses the term 'localisation' to refer to the process what is referred to 
here as fragmentation. 
13 Robert D. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy, ' The Atlantic Monthly (1994) 44-76. Kaplan later 
turned his piece into a book (The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 218t Century. 
London: Papermac, 1996) and, despite its many shortcomings, received much acclaim in the 
mass media and was quoted by US policy-makers (included President Clinton) on numerous 
occasions. See Simon Dalby, 'The Environment as Geopolitical Threat: Reading Robert 
Kaplan's "Coming Anarchy, "' Ecumene 3: 4 (1996) 472-4,492 nn. 12-14. 
14 Kaplan bases his thesis on Homer-Dixon's conclusions in his 1991 article that had traces of 
environmental determinism. See Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 'On the Threshold: Environmental 
Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict, ' International Security (1991) 76-116. 
15 Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy, ' 46. 
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whether he deems these dynamics to be alterable at all. For, by way of 
presenting the causes of the 'coming anarchy' as mere 'environmental' (i. e. 
'natural') dynamics, as opposed to human decisions, actions and omissions (as 
seen in Beck's analysis), Kaplan glosses over the role human agency has played 
in exacerbating them. To put it in other words, Kaplan is oblivious to the ways in 
which the developed world (the passengers in the stretch limo), through 
economic interactions usurped raw materials, depleted natural resources and 
polluted rivers in the developing world. 16 
By way of failing to account for the role human agency has played in 
perpetuating these problems, Kaplan also fails to see how human agency may 
intervene to reverse these trends. Even NGOs (that are treated as agents of 
security from a Critical Security Studies perspective) are allocated with the task of 
`wound-binding' in Kaplan's scenario. " This has partly to do with Kaplan's 
fatalism-a trait he shares with Huntington, as will be seen below-and partly 
from his problem-solving approach to international phenomena as opposed to the 
Critical Security Studies approach that points to unfulfilled human potential and 
calls for change. 
Robert W. Cox's conception of fragmentation as a form of 'resistance' to 
globalising forces is exemplary of the 'critical' (as opposed to 'problem-solving') 
approach to international phenomena. To put it in a nutshell, Cox's argument is 
that globalisation's perpetuation of inequalities worldwide could set social forces 
(such as - social coalitions, labour movements, democratisation struggles) that 
16 Dalby, 'The Environment as a Geopolitical Threat, ' 489. 
17 Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth, 432-3. 
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might in the future lay down the groundwork for an alternative ('postglobalisation') 
world order. Although Cox is not unaware of the potential for disintegration and 
violent conflict dormant in the struggles led by such social forces, he maintains 
that the disintegration of some units could result in the formation of new alliances 
thereby bringing about a new order. 18 
What is significant about Cox's scenario is that it introduces an element 
of human agency to reverse the trends set by the forces of globalisation-a factor 
that is missing from Kaplan's approach. As Chapter 8 argued, critical theories of 
International Relations in general and Critical Security Studies in particular share 
Cox's stress on the role social forces could play as agents for change. However, 
if the efforts of these actors are to add up to constitute a transformative force, 
Cox's scenario would need to incorporate an image of a broader community to 
which these smaller groups could attach themselves. Cox indeed recognises the 
need to organise at the 'national, regional and world levels' for 'the creation of a 
vibrant civil society inspired by a strong spirit of solidarity at the community level 
and, by linkage with other strong communities in other countries, at the 
transnational or global level. '19 The point here is that, in its absence of (the 
image of) a broader political community to which social forces could attach 
themselves, the agency of non-state actors may fail to add up to create a 
counter-hegemonic bloc as Cox expects them to do. 
18 Robert W. Cox, "Towards a Posthegemonic Conceptualisation of World Order: Reflections on 
the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun, ' in Approaches to World Order, 156. For a further elaboration on 
this point, see Robert W. Cox, 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an 
Alternative World Order, ' Review of International Studies 25: 1 (January 1999) 3-28. 
19 Cox, 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium, ' 27. 
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Not all are as positive (as Cox) regarding the transformative role social 
forces could potentially assume. Samuel P. Huntington is one who shares 
Kaplan's fatalism regarding the future of world politics. As the universalism of the 
West fostered by the globalising forces brings it into conflict with non-Western 
states, argues Huntington, the latter would increasingly choose to form coalitions 
to stand against the West thereby challenging the Western civilization-hence his 
scenario of the future of world politics as a 'clash of civilizations. ' Huntington 
maintains that this clash would not remain at the macro (inter-state) level only; at 
the micro-level groups belonging to different civilizations vying for power would 
also clash with each other. Accordingly, submits Huntington, the future of world 
politics would be characterised by cooperation within and conflict between 
civilizations. 20 
It is significant to note here that, as opposed to Kaplan, Huntington does 
suggest a way to reverse this trend. The two-pronged strategy Huntington 
recommends requires the West to hold on to its own in the short-term by 
promoting close cooperation and further integration within its own civilization, 
whilst exploiting the differences within and between other civilizations thereby 
preventing the formation of anti-Western coalitions. 21 For the long-term 
Huntington prefers a more accommodationist policy and calls for developing a 
more profound understanding of other civilizations to identify the elements of 
commonality in between. The adoption of the long-term strategy is a must, 
maintains Huntington, or else the futures of both peace and Civilization 
20 Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations? ' Foreign Affairs 72: 3 (Summer 1993) ; 
Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: 
Touchstone, 1998). 
21 Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations? ' 48-9; idem, The Clash of Civilizations, 19-39,301-21. 
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(understood as the opposite of Kaplan's 'coming anarchy') would come under 
threat. 22 What is surprising is it does not seem to strike Huntington that the two 
prongs of his strategy are contradictory; the pursuance of the short-term policies 
he advocates may make it harder to follow the long-term policies. Put crudely, if 
the West holds on to its own and seeks to sow the seeds of division within and 
between non-Western civilizations, it may end up alienating them thereby making 
it more difficult-if not impossible-to follow the long-term policy of 
accommodation. 
Leaving aside the contradictions within Huntington's argument (that have 
been pointed to by others)23 it is his conception of theory that should be criticised. 
Huntington's is a 'problem-solving' approach to international phenomena (as was 
the case with Kaplan's approach). He conceives the role of theory as one of 
explanation. When presenting the future of world politics as a 'clash of 
civilizations' he assumes that he is representing what he sees, albeit in an 
admittedly 'simplified' fashion. 24 However, his is too 'simplified' a representation 
that, for the sake of explanation, glosses over many important aspects of 
international phenomena and leaves 'a great deal of dignity ... on the cutting 
room floor, ' to use Cynthia Enloe's words. 25 Lastly, by way of failing to reflect 
22 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 321. 
23 See, for example, Kishore Mahbubani, 'The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach 
the West, ' Foreign Affairs 72: 4 (1993) 10-14; Liu Binyan, 'Civilization Crafting: No Culture is an 
Island, ' Foreign Affairs 72: 4 (1993) 19-21; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, 'The Modernizing Imperative: 
Tradition and Change, ' Foreign Affairs 72: 4 (1993) 22-4; Richard E. Rubenstein and Jarle 
Crocker, 'Challenging Huntington, ' Foreign Policy 96 (Fall 1994) 113-28; Gearbid d Tuathail, 
'Samuel Huntington and the "Civilizing of Global Space, "' in The Geopolitics Reader, eds. 
Gearöid Ö Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge (London: Routledge, 1998) 170-6. 
24 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 37. 
25 Cynthia Enloe, 'Margins, Silences, and Bottom Rungs: How to Overcome the Underestimation 
of Power in the Study of International Relations, ' in International Theory: Positivism and 
Beyond, eds. Ken Booth, Steve Smith and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997) 188. 
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upon the potential of his thinking to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, Huntington 
fails to see how his scenario could contribute to a deepening of the differences 
between civilizations that have historically had porous borders. 26 The reaction his 
thesis has received within the Middle Eastern context attests well to this (see the 
next section). 
Fragmentation is not the only process that is viewed as going hand-in- 
hand with globalisation. Processes of regionalisation worldwide have been 
accelerated in the attempt to come to terms with increasing globalisation. 27 The 
processes of regionalisation and globalisation, the argument goes, are mutually 
reinforcing in that the rising density of economic, social and military relations 
among myriad actors, at the same time increases their vulnerability and leads 
them to seek a degree of stability by pooling their resources at the regional 
level. 28 The end of the Cold War and the removal of the bipolar template through 
which world politics was viewed for over four decades are also considered to 
have contributed to regionalisation in the economy and security spheres. 29 
26 For a similar point, see Rubenstein and Crocker, 'Challenging Huntington, ' 128. Also see, 
Robert W. Cox, 'Civilizations in World Political Economy, ' 144. 
27 Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, 'Conclusion: The New Regionalism, ' in Regionalism and 
World Order, eds. Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (London: Macmillan, 1996) 253; Andrew 
Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective, ' in Regionalism in World Politics: Regional 
Organizations and International Order, eds. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurell (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) 54-8; Björn Hettne and Fredrik S6derbaum, 'The New 
Regionalism Approach, ' Politeia 17: 3 (1998) 6-21. 
29 Held and McGrew, 'The End of the Old Order, ' 223; Björn Hettne, 'The New Regionalism: 
Implications for Development and Peace, ' in The New Regionalism: Implications for Global 
Development and International Security, eds. Björn Hettne and Andras Inotai (Helsinki: Forssan 
Kirjapaina Oy [UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research] 1994) 10. 
29 Muhtiah Alagappa, 'Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for Analysis, ' Review 
of International Studies 21: 4 (1995) 359-87; Louise Fawcett, 'Regionalism in Historical 
Perspective, ' in Regionalism in World Politics, eds. Fawcett and Hurell, 9-36; Barry Buzan, 
People. States and Fear, 208; Arthur A. Stein and Steven L. Lobell, 'Geostructuralism and 
International Politics: The End of the Cold War and the Regionalization of International 
Security, ' in Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, eds. David A. Lake and Patrick 
M. Morgan (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) 108,120; Richard 
Rosecrance, 'Regionalism and the Post-Cold War Era, ' International Journal 46: 3 (Summer 
1991) 393. 
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What is significant for the purposes of the thesis is that common to most 
of the literature on the re-emergence of regionalism is a relative lack of interest in 
problematising the concepts 'region, ' 'regionalism' and 'regionalisation. ' Indeed, 
very few words are spent on conceptualising what is a 'region. r30 Although most 
analysts would affirm Joseph S. Nye's statement that 'there are no absolute 
naturally-determined regions, '31 there still is a lack of in-depth analysis 
historicising and contextualising the construction of regions across time and 
space. 32 
Moreover, most of the existing studies tend to focus on regionalism as a 
state project informed by intellectuals (mostly state elites). What seems to be 
absent from many analyses is the role non-state actors have played in 
(accelerating or stalling) processes of regionalisation. Indeed, very few look at 
the role played by actors such as NGOs as agents of regionalism. Here it is 
important to note the often neglected distinction between regionalism as a project 
and regionalisation as a multi-layered process. 33 Regionalism as a project may 
emerge as the outcome of a process of bargaining and negotiation among 
political actors (mostly at the governmental level). Regionalisation, on the other 
30 For an exhaustive overview of the literature and its treatment of these three concepts, see 
Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective, ' 37-73. 
31 Joseph S. Nye, 'Regional Institutions, ' in Regional Politics and World Order, eds. Richard A. 
Falk and Saul H. Mendlowitz (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Company, 1973) 80. 
32 Iver B. Neumann's Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999) is an exception to this statement; so is the emerging critical 
geopolitics literature. For an introduction into the latter, see John Agnew Geopolitics: Re- 
Visioning World Politics (London: Routledge, 1998); Gear6id d Tuathail and Simon Dalby, eds. 
Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 1998); P. J. Taylor, 'A Theory and Practice of 
Regions: The Case of Europes, ' Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 9 [19911183- 
95. 
33 For similar conceptualisations, see Hettne and Söderbaum, 'The New Regionalism Approach, ' 
9-10; Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective, ' 39-45; Gamble and Payne, 'Conclusion. ' 
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hand, is a process that develops as a combination of historical as well as 
emergent relations and interactions. In other words, regionalisation, like 
globalisation, is a 'complex articulation of established institutions, rules and 
distinctive new patterns of social interaction' between (state and non-state) 
actors. 34 Then, focusing merely on the roles states (and state elites) play in 
processes of regionalisation may not enable one to understand parts of the world 
such as the Middle East where there is very little sign of interest in or 
commitment to regionalism at state level. In the absence of regionalism at the 
governmental level, non-state actors could create and nurture processes of 
regionalisation. 
The last scenario that will be looked at here, that of 'democratic peace, ' 
is not a new one. 35 The so-called democratic peace theory has been prominent 
since the 1970s, but after the end of the Cold War it has become more and more 
commonplace among US policy-makers to refer to the democratic peace 
phenomenon-that very few democracies in the last hundred years or so have 
gone to war with one another-to justify US policy of supporting the spread of 
democracy. 36 For instance, Anthony Lake, former Assistant to the President on 
National Security Affairs, has maintained that what should replace the policy of 
containment is a 'strategy of enlargement-enlargement of the world's ... 
34 Gamble and Payne, 'Conclusion, ' 250. Also see Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical 
Perspective, ' 40. 
35 Michael W. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics, ' American Political Science Review 80: 4 
(December 1986) 1151-69; Bruce Russett (with William Antholis, Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember 
and Zeev Maoz) Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995; reprint, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1993). 
36 Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 14,313 n. 22-3; Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, 'Politics and 
Peace, ' International Security 20: 2 (Fall 1995) 123. 
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community of market democracies. '37 President Clinton concurred: 'democracies 
rarely wage war on one another. '38 
There are two main assumptions behind US policy-makers' statements. 
First, that free markets and democracy are twins, and that the spread of one 
strengthens the other-hence the popularisation of the term 'market 
democracies. '39 Second, that democracies do not fight each other-the core 
argument put forward by democratic peace theorists. Although the democratic 
peace theory has come under criticism in the literature, especially regarding the 
definitions of its two core concepts-'democracy' and 'war'40-this second 
assumption has nevertheless acquired the 'status of a received truth'41 in that it 
has been used to encourage transition to free markets and democracy worldwide. 
More recently, Thomas Risse-Kappen provided a constructivist 
explanation of the democratic peace phenomenon. Shared norms, maintained 
Risse-Kappen, renders the security dilemma far less significant among 
democracies in that the element of ambiguity and uncertainty that is characteristic 
of the security dilemma could be played down when states perceive each other to 
be bound by similar rules and norms. 42 However, as Tarak Barkawi and Mark 
37 Anthony Lake, 'From Containment to Enlargement' (Address at the School of Advanced 
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, September 21,1993) 
Dispatch (September 1993); available from http: //www. state. gov/www/publications/dispatch; 
Internet; accessed February 10,1999. 
38 William J. Clinton, 'Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World, ' (Address to the UN 
General Assembly, New York City, September 27,1993) Dispatch (September 1993); available 
from http: //www. state. gov/www/publications/dispatch; Internet; accessed February 10,1999. 
39 For a critique, see Robert W. Cox, ' Global Perestroika, ' in Approaches to World Order, 303-5. 
ao Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace, ' International Security 19: 2 
(Fall 1994) 5-49; David A. Spiro, 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace, ' International Security 
19: 2 (Fall 1994) 50-86. 
41 Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to 
War with Each Other, ' Review of International Studies 20: 3 (July 1994) 207. 
42 Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Democratic Peace-Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist 
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Laffey have pointed out, what is missing from Risse-Kappen's argument (along 
with some other proponents of democratic peace theory) is an account as to how 
peaceful relations between democracies have historically been made possible by 
the threat and use of force against non-democracies. Barkawi and Laffey 
maintain that by way of failing to historicize and contextualise the emergence of 
the 'zone of peace' or account for the absence of democracies elsewhere, the 
'a3 democratic peace literature 'betrays a deeply unreflexive attitude to analysis. 
The future scenario drawn from the democratic peace theory is that the 
encouragement of more consensual modes of social control under the rubric of 
democratic peace would help maintain domestic stability thereby smoothening 
the process of opening up heretofore protected markets. Worldwide transition to 
free market economies, in turn, is expected to contribute to global security (as 
noted above when discussing globalisation). Viewed as such, the future scenario 
presented by the proponents of the democratic peace theory may not be very 
different from that of increased globalisation in that peace is defined as the 
absence of war (i. e. 'negative peace') and issues such as 'structural violence' are 
sidelined. Moreover, the very definition of democracy adopted by those who 
propound this scenario is a 'limited' or 'exclusionary' one. In order for free 
markets to operate freely in the developing world, what is required is not 
necessarily fully-fledged democratic systems that could render the freedom of 
market forces vulnerable by imposing restrictions in line with the demands of 
Interpretation of the Liberal Argument, ' European Journal of International Relations 1: 4 (1995) 
491-517. 
as Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 'The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalisation, ' 
European Journal of International Relations 5: 4 (1999) 423. 
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political groups, but rather 'low-intensity democracies'44 that would enable the 
restriction of decision-making power to 'elements acceptable to the financial 
market. '45 As will be seen below, US policy in the Middle East has so far been to 
favour increasing political participation whilst supporting 'limited' or 'exclusionary' 
democracies (such as Egypt and Jordan) along with Gulf sheikhdoms (who allow 
for no or very limited political participation) that help maintain the status quo and 
make the region secure for the transition to free-market economy. 
Future Implications 
After having presented a brief overview of plausible future scenarios, this section 
will investigate their potential practical implications within the Middle Eastern 
context. First, the future of world politics as further globalisation. 
The Middle East has so far had an uneven balance sheet in keeping up 
with an increasingly *globalising world. On the one hand, it is closely linked to 
world markets via oil sales, financial flows and arms purchases. The Gulf being 
the hub of world oil production means it is fully integrated into the world economy. 
On the other hand, the level of integration of the Middle East in general is still 
below the expectations of the proponents of increasing globalisation. This being 
the case despite the increase in the density of financial and trade connections 
between the Middle East and world markets especially since the 1970s boom in 
44 The term 'low-intensity democracy' is from William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: 
Globalisation. US Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
1-12. 
45 Cox, 'Global Perestroika, ' 304. 
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oil prices suggests that the region has had very little to offer with the exception of 
oil. The point here is that in a globalised future where oil may not be as 
significant a commodity as it currently is, the future of the Middle East in general 
and the Gulf in particular may be rather bleak. 46 
The relatively low level of integration between world markets and Middle 
Eastern economies has had partly to do with the fact that the latter were geared 
towards import-substitution in the post-colonial era. Although some (such as 
Tunisia and Turkey) have switched to export-promotion in the last two decades, 
many others have either hesitated or failed to make this shift. 47 As Chapter 4 
noted, Syrian and Saudi policy-makers have chosen to seek self-sufficiency in 
basic foodstuffs production for reasons of food security-that is, fear of having to 
rely on external supplies at times of crises. For others, such as Egypt, the 
transition from import-substitution to export-promotion has been hampered by the 
lack of infrastructure and financial resources. Furthermore, some regional actors' 
negative disposition towards the forces of globalisation has also played a role in 
delaying this shift. Indeed, many regional actors, with the memories of the 
colonial era still fresh in their minds, feel threatened by the very enmeshing and 
interpenetration that is part and parcel of the process of globalisation. The 
growth of so-called 'Islamic banking' is exemplary of some regional actors' 
46 The economies of Gulf states are wholly oil-based. If oil is excluded from calculations, regional 
states participation into global trade (with the exception of Israel, Tunisia and Turkey) is not very 
significant. The ratio of non-oil merchandise to gross domestic product (GDP) in the Middle 
East-excluding Turkey and Israel-is 6.1 percent. Compared to 11.5 percent in Latin America 
(another oil-producing region) this is very low. See Kemal Derviý and Nemat Shafik, 'The Middle 
East and North Africa: A Tale of Two Futures, ' Middle East Journal 52: 4 (1998) 505-16. Also 
see Doug Henwood, 'Global Economic Integration: The Missing Middle East, ' Middle East 
Report 172 (September-October 1993) 8. 
 Roger Owen noted that Lebanon during the 1950s and 1960s was another exception. See 
Roger Owen, 'Inter-Arab Economic Relations During the Twentieth Century. World Markets vs. 
Regional Market? ' in The Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab 
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misgivings regarding the process of globalisation which some view as a 
'colonisation of the future. '48 On the other hand, the satellite networks and other 
information technologies that underpin the communications revolution have been 
dubbed by one author as 'cybernetic colonialism. '49 
Although the proponents of increasing globalisation are not wholly 
unaware of regional actors' misgivings, their response would be to say that 
Middle Eastern regimes would sooner or later have to give in. This is necessarily 
because, they would argue, 'the only thing worse than being a part of the 
evolving economic hierarchy is being excluded from it. i50 If this statement is 
taken to its logical conclusion, it could be argued that if Middle Eastern actors 
were to go against the wishes and expectations of the forces of globalisation, 
they would find themselves marginalized in an increasingly globalising world. For 
example, in a hypothetical future world where oil prices fell drastically, the Middle 
East (with the possible exception of Israel, Tunisia, and Turkey) would find itself 
on the margins of the world economy with the marginalization of Gulf economies 
resulting in a loss of crucial financial support for the rest of the Arab countries. 51 
If oil prices were to remain stable, the Gulf would remain a part of the 
globalised world economy. Southern Mediterranean states should also be 
expected to integrate with the global markets largely due to the European Union's 
Integration, ed. Michael C. Hudson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 224. 
4e Ziauddin Sardar, Islamic Futures: The Shape of Ideas to Come (London: Mansell, 1985) 10. 
49 Al Miskin (pseud. ), 'Globalisation and Its Discontents, ' Middle East Report 193 (March-April 
1995) 28. 
so Henwood, 'Global Economic Integration, ' 8. Also see Joel Beinin, 'The Working Class and 
Peasantry in the Middle East: From Economic Nationalism to Neoliberalism, ' Middle East 
Report (Spring 1999) 22. 
This support is provided through economic aid as well as workers' remittances. See Atif A. 
Kubursi, 'Prospects for Arab Economic Integration After Oslo, ' in Middle East Dilemma, ed. 
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interest in and continued resource input into their economies. 52 In this 
hypothetical world, only Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran should be expected to 
become marginalized-unless, that is, they agree to adopt the recommended 
stabilisation and structural adjustment packages and open up their markets. In 
such a future world, one should not expect much improvement in regional 
security. Given the intimate links between Arab societies, it would be very 
difficult to conceive of security being established in some Arab states whilst the 
rest is still on the margins. 
In the 1990s it was this threat of marginalization in an increasingly 
globalising world that helped persuade regional governments such as those of 
Egypt, Jordan and Morocco to remove the obstacles in front of free trade. 53 So 
far this has involved the implementation of stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes by regional governments in line with the `Washington consensus. '54 
Some Gulf economies have also taken steps towards privatisation and reducing 
governmental subsidies. 55 However, the fact that many Middle Eastern actors 
seem to have given in to the forces of globalisation should not be taken to 
suggest that the outcome is likely to lead to security (understood as stability) as 
the proponents of increasing globalisation hope. On the contrary, the recent 
trend towards economic liberalisation in the Middle East could also be viewed as 
Hudson, 301-11. Also see Derviý and Shafik, 'The Middle East and North Africa. ' 
52 Libya and Algeria are also oil and natural gas producers. 
I Karen Pfeiffer, 'How Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and even Egypt became IMF "Success Stories" 
in the 1990s, ' Middle East Report (Spring 199) 23-7. 
54 The'Washington consensus' entails a series of measures such as fiscal discipline, tax reform, 
financial and trade liberalisation, privatisation and promotion of foreign direct investment that 
are designed to deal with the economic problems of developing countries. See Diana Hunt, 
'Development Economics, the Washington Consensus and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
Initiative, ' in Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, ed. George 
Joffe (London: Frank Cass, 1999) 18. 
55 Alan Richards, 'The Global Financial Crisis and Economic Reform in the Middle East, ' Middle 
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a sign of helplessness and fear of being marginalized, and not necessarily 
commitment to achieving security by way of doing business. There has indeed 
emerged some local resistance against the presentation of increased 
globalisation as the only option to escape marginalization. Hasan Hanafi 
expressed his frustration as follows: 
There are only two alternatives: to compete or to retreat, to 
produce or to consume, to create or to imitate, to invent or to 
assimilate, to give or to take, to export or to import, to be in the 
center or to be in the periphery. 56 
The point here is that the problem with presenting increased globalisation as the 
only option is that it constitutes a 'primary form of alienation'57 and could lead to 
further fragmentation and instability-the very developments the proponents of 
increasing globalisation would want to avoid. To put it on other words, the 
excesses caused by the uncontrolled character of globalisation not only 
constitute a major obstacle on the road to further integration but also feeds into 
the tendency towards fragmentation as explained in the previous section. 
At the first glance, the Middle East does not seem a likely candidate for 
fragmentation in the way depicted in Kaplan's scenario. After all, many Middle 
Eastern countries have got rich oil and natural gas resources, are better off 
economically than some relatively deprived parts of the world and could therefore 
be expected to remain largely immune to the effects of such fragmentary forces 
that affect other parts of the Third World. On the other hand, it could be argued 
that environmental factors could push the Middle East into the realm of 
fragmentation with, for example, the scarcity of water in quantitative terms 
East Policy vi: 3 (1999) 65. 
56 Hasan Hanafi, 'The Middle East, in Whose World? Primary Reflections, ' Opening Address to 
the 4th conference of the Nordic Society of Middle Eastern Studies, Oslo, August 13-16,1998. 
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coupled with a deterioration in its quality (due to excessive use) fuelling already 
existing divisions between parties that share the same river basins. 58 Although 
the impact changes in the global climate would make cannot be predicted, it is 
estimated that the Middle East would emerge as one of the problem areas in the 
not-so-distant future. 
Furthermore, fragmentation could also be caused by a crisis in the 
economies of the oil-rich countries of the region that currently desalinate and/or 
import water at very high costs. A fall in the oil prices could push Saudi Arabia, 
for instance, into the club of water-scarce countries. 59 In other words, not even 
the capital-rich countries of the Middle East would be immune to the kinds of 
dynamics emphasised in Kaplan's scenario if the existing scarcity were to be 
compounded by environmental factors (such as the 'greenhouse effect') and 
demographic trends (unchecked population growth coupled with rapid 
urbanisation). The future may indeed bring 'water wars' if no preventive action is 
taken. 60 Or, alternatively, the world may witness a Middle East where some are 
living in cities and suburbs leading comfortable lives, whereas the shanty-town 
dwellers or rural populations that sustain themselves by agriculture are 'doomed 
by a lack of water to drink, soil to till, and space to survive in'-a future in line with 
5' Cox, 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium, ' 27. 
56 Iraq, Syria and Turkey share the Tigris-Euphrates basin, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian 
Authority share the Jordan basin, and Egypt and Sudan share the Nile basin. See Peter H. 
Gleick, 'Reducing the Risks of Conflict Over Fresh Water Resources in the Middle East, ' in 
Water and Peace in the Middle East (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994) 41-50; Maher F. Abu-Taleb, 
'Regional Cooperation in Water Resource Management, ' in Building Peace in the Middle East: 
Challenges for States and Civil Society, ed. Elise Boulding (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 
253. 
59 It is argued that Middle Eastern countries have the highest median cost of water supply and 
sanitation in the world. See Abu-Taleb, 'Regional Cooperation, ' 254. 
60 J. Starr, 'Water Wars, ' Foreign Policy 82 (Spring 1991) 17-36; John Bulloch and Adel Darwish, 
Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East (London: Gollancz, 1993); Peter H. Gleick, 
'Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security, ' International Security 
18: 1 (Summer 1993) 79-112. 
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Kaplan's stretch limo analogy. 61 And, as Kaplan reminds us, such environments 
would be likely to become a breeding ground for particularisms. 
However, although the emerging particularisms and the challenge they 
pose to the state system may seem like the 'coming anarchy' to some, the same 
processes could be viewed as novel forms of resistance that could constitute a 
solution to the very problems perpetuated by the economic straitjacket forced 
onto regional economies in line with the Washington consensus. As noted in the 
previous section, Cox thinks it would be possible for such social forces to form 
alliances and challenge the hegemony of the liberal economic order. Part of the 
problem with relying on the agency of social forces is that when faced with 
economic hardship, they may show little resistance against the globalising forces' 
attempts to buy them off in an attempt to strengthen their grip over the populace 
(as was the case with the EU effort to channel resources into north African NGOs 
to harvest support for its project of constructing a Euro-Med Region). 62 In sum, 
given the fact that they have to operate under the double burden of restraint 
exercised by both their own governments as well as the pressure put by external 
actors (such as the United States or the EU) for increasing globalisation, social 
forces in the Middle East face a difficult task if they are to fulfil Cox's expectations 
from them. 
Although it is always possible to be sceptical about the relevance of 
Cox's thinking within the Middle Eastern framework given the restraints imposed 
81 Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy, ' 59. 
62 See Cox, 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium, ' 11; 'European Union Funding for the 
Middle East NGOs, ' Bulletin of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East 7: 4 (Winter 1998/99) 
15. 
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upon the activities of non-state actors by regional governments, there exist 
examples from the region's recent past where non-state actors undertook crucial 
roles in working towards alternative futures. As Chapter 8 argued, in the case of 
Israel/Palestine, for instance, women's agency helped make the Intifada on the 
part of some Palestinian women, while some of their Israeli counterparts helped 
enhance its impact by way of questioning the moral boundaries of the Israeli 
state. 63 This, however, is not to suggest that all such social forces would be fit to 
be considered as agents for emancipatory change. Indeed, an unthinking 
reliance on social forces as agents for change and uncritical adoption of their 
agendas would be problematic. 64 
Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' scenario denies the very possibility 
of the formation of such an alliance among social forces (as anticipated by Cox) 
unless, that is, it is formed by actors that all belong to the same civilization. 
Although Huntington's thesis has come under criticism as noted in the previous 
section, its implication for the Middle East stems not necessarily from its 
consistency (or lack of it) but from the fact that it is by building upon the 
declarations of Islamist actors, examples of terrorism and inter-denominational 
conflicts from within the Middle East that Huntington substantiates his argument 
on the need for a new world order based on civilizations. It is worth noting that 
Huntington borrowed the phrase 'clash of civilizations' from Bernard Lewis, a 
63 Simona Sharon!, Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Politics of Women's 
Resistance (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995) 131-49; idem, 'Middle East 
Politics Through Feminist Lenses: Toward Theorising International Relations From Women's 
Struggles, ' Alternatives 18 (1993) 5-28; Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, This Side of Peace (New York: 
Touchstone, Simon & Schuster, 1995). 
64 P. J. Simmons, 'Learning to live with the NGOs, ' Foreign Policy 112 (1998) 82-96. 
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noted student of Middle Eastern history. 65 Thus, Huntington's scenario could 
'unwittingly play into the hands of the fundamentalists, '66 and/or be utilised to 
license interventions and violent practices by extra-regional actors (from other 
civilizations). The argument here needs further clarification. I will make two 
points: 
First, the propagation of Huntington-type arguments have so far played 
into the hands of such Islamist actors who have been trying to convince their 
supporters that the 'Western' and 'Islamic' civilizations cannot peacefully coexist 
and that they should seek to strengthen their side to prepare for the coming clash 
by rallying around their own civilization67-a call Huntington would recognise as 
one of his own. The failure of the mass media in the West in general and in the 
United States in particular to distinguish between Islam as a religion and 
Islamism as an ideology and political movement only adds to the sense of siege 
prevalent among some Muslims and substantiates the claims of some Islamist 
actors that Muslims have been chosen as the enemy to replace the communist 
threat and that they will be victimised no matter what they do. 68 
Second, Huntington's scenario not only plays into the hands of Islamist 
actors in propagating their own perspective on regional security, but it also 
licenses certain kinds of security practices whilst marginalizing others. If people 
65 Bernard Lewis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage, ' The Atlantic Monthly (September 1990); available 
from http: //www. theatlantic. comAssues/90sep/rage. htm; Internet; accessed November 12,1999. 
se Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Order 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998) xii. 
67 Abdel Monem Said Aly (Abdel Aal], 'The Shattered Consensus-Arab Perceptions of Security, ' 
The International Spectator xxxi: 4 (October-December 1996) 38. 
68 On depictions of Islam and Muslims in the West, see Edward Said, Covering Islam: How Media 
and Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, revs. ed. (London: Vintage, 1991). 
On the problems involved in failing to distinguish between Islam and Islamism, see Tibi, The 
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do indeed 'rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language and values, and 
institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones, ' as 
Huntington thinks they would, 69 then the best US policy-makers, for instance, 
could do would be to seek to maximise friction among the Muslims on the one 
hand, and the Muslims and peoples of non-Muslim civilizations on the other, 
whilst holding the West together. Within the Middle Eastern context this may 
amount to upholding the policy of dual containment in the effort to prevent the 
emergence of any regional hegemon, keeping Muslim/Arab states divided whilst 
making sure the regional balance of power tilts toward Israel. Otherwise, a 
closely coupled community of Muslim/Arab Middle East, if it were to emerge, 
could challenge US dominance in the region (this may or may not constitute a 
challenge to Israel's security depending on the conceptions and practices of 
security adopted by actors on both sides). Although it may be argued that this 
has for long been the practice of the United States and does not necessarily 
require a license by Huntington, it nevertheless is true that Huntington's scenario 
could be used to explain, for instance, the futility of the search for a region-wide 
peace agreement or help legitimise reliance on the use of militarised practices in 
the Middle East whilst other (non-military) practices are becoming the norm in 
some other parts of the world. 
As noted in the previous section, the literature on regionalisation depicts 
a future where regional security institutions would shoulder the task of 
maintaining security in different parts of the world. The Middle East, however, 
has so far been treated in the literature as an 'exception' to these trends. It has, 
Challenge of Fundamentalism. 
69 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 126. 
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furthermore, been dubbed 'a region without regionalism. '70 Indeed, the seeming 
lack of enthusiasm for the US-backed Middle East Peace Process and the slow 
progress of the Euro-Med Partnership scheme, especially when viewed against 
the backdrop of increasing regionalisation in other parts of the world, could be 
viewed as substantiating such assertions. The argument put forward in this 
thesis is that the problem in the Middle East is not necessarily a lack of interest in 
regionalism per se, but rather the presence of a multitude of approaches to 
regional security propounded by different actors. The relatively little evidence for 
regionalism-from-above should not lead one to turn a blind eye to the efforts of 
myriad non-state actors that attempt to put their own perspectives into practice 
(regionalism-from-below). 
So far, the staunchest supporter of regionalism-from-above has been the 
former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who has maintained that 
regionalisation in economic relations would have spill-over effect into political 
relations thereby paving the way for the making of a 'New Middle East' modelled 
on the European Community. 71 However, as noted in Chapter 7, the very idea of 
becoming a part of the 'New Middle East' of Peres is viewed by suspicion by 
many in the Arab world. Israel's economic might, which Peres considers a 
magnet to pull other regional countries towards cooperation, so far seems to 
have made a contrary effect on some regional actors who consider the 'New 
i72 Middle East' an attempt at 'imperialism by regionalism. 
70 For the prior view, see Helena Lindholm-Schulz and Michael Schulz, 'The Middle East- 
Exception or Embryonic Regionalism, ' Polietia 17: 3 (1998) 95-111; for the latter see Paul Aarts, 
'The Middle East: A Region Without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism? ' Third World 
Quarter! 20: 5 (1999) 911-25. 
71 Shimon Peres with Arye Naor, The New Middle East (Dorset: Element, 1993) 33-4. 
72 Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' 604. For a summary of the views that oppose 
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Such worries are further reinforced by the fact that some Arab states 
(such as Jordan) have moved towards normalisation in economic relations with 
Israel whereas Egypt has strengthened the links that were established after 
Camp David. Given the current state of weak economic relations among Arab 
countries, these developments are observed with a degree of alarm by some. 
For, it is feared that once Arab states normalise their relations with Israel, there 
will be very few cards left in the hands of Arab policy-makers to push Israel to 
make concessions on various aspects related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that 
any regional cooperation scheme that includes Israel would mean the end of 
hopes for Arab integration (economic or political). It should, however, be noted 
that given the size of the Israeli economy, it is questionable to what extent such 
worries are well founded. 73 It could also be argued that if Arab policy-makers 
were to put their house in order and approach Israel having settled some of their 
inter-Arab disputes, there would be little room left for Israel to take advantage 
of. 74 
One major problem with this scenario is that given the state of weakening 
ties between Arab governments (see Chapter 7) it is not easy to foresee Arab 
economic integration taking root. On the contrary, the tendency on the part of 
many Arab policy-makers in the aftermath of the Gulf War has been one of 
strengthening bilateral ties with non-Arab actors (such as Israel, the United 
States, and the EU). It should nevertheless be noted that although enthusiasm 
Middle Easternism, see Said Aly, 'The Shattered Consensus, ' 37. 
73 Said Aly, 'The Shattered Consensus, ' 44. 
74 Baghat Korany, 'The New/Old Middle East, ' in The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics 
and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation, ed. Laura Guazzone (London: 
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for regionalism is low among Arab policy-makers, there nevertheless exist strong 
links between Arab non-state actors (regionalism-from-below). 75 Indeed, it has 
so far been such non-state actors that have pushed for increasing regionalisation 
in the Arab Regional System. As Michael Hudson has maintained, in the recent 
years, there emerged 'a great deal more sociocultural integration than the naive 
Arab nationalists of the 1940s and 1950s ever imagined. '76 In this sense, the 
problem here is not that there is little or no cooperation, integration or 
interdependence, but that exist very little in terms of institutions. As Hudson 
argued, 'interdependence does not lead directly to the growth of political 
community. i77 
In sum, there clearly is some potential for further regionalisation in the 
Middle East. Given the trends in other parts of the world, there is also the 
understanding among some regional policy-makers that they need to cooperate 
at the regional level in order not to be marginalized in an increasingly globalising 
world. The case for Middle Eastern regionalism so far seems to have struck a 
chord among Egyptian and Jordanian policy-makers, whereas the Euro-Med 
project of the EU is backed by most north African countries. In the future, the 
main obstacle that would face regionalisation in the 'Middle East' is not 
necessarily an absence of regionalism but the presence of a multitude of 
regionalisms (identified in Chapter 7). 
Macmillan, 1997) 135-50. 
75 Nemat Shafik, 'Labour Migration and Economic Integration in the Middle East, ' in The Middle 
East Dilemma, ed. Hudson, 287. 
76 Michael C. Hudson, 'Arab Integration: An Overview, ' in The Middle East Dilemma, ed. Hudson, 
5-6. 
77 Hudson, 'Arab Integration, ' 5-6. 
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The last scenario that will be looked at here is that of democratic peace. 
As explained in the previous section, the democratic peace theory suggests that 
democratic states do not go to war with each other. The implication of this within 
the Middle Eastern context is the assertion that in a future Middle East where 
democracy has taken root, this could have a pacifying effect. One could identify 
two problems with this argument. The first and widely acknowledged problem is 
that it would be rather difficult to envision the establishment of democratic peace 
in the Middle East, as the region has so far proven to be rather 'resistant to 
democratisation. 978 However, although it is true that the region (with the 
exception of Israel and Turkey) has so far remained relatively immune to 
democratisation, to assert that the Middle East could be an exception to the 
democratic peace phenomenon is to let one's thinking be trapped in the present 
state of affairs, not realising the potential for change that exists. Indeed, in the 
aftermath of the Cold War, there has been some movement towards 
democratisation in the Middle East with some Arab policy-makers responding to 
their populations' demands for the adoption of liberalisation and democratisation 
measures. In the last decade or so, multi-party competition for elected legislative 
assemblies have been either introduced or expanded in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestine Authority and Tunisia. 79 
However, although it is possible to argue that a beginning has been 
made, there are significant problems with these developments. For one thing, 
executive posts in some of these countries remain uncontested or at times 
78 James Lee Ray, 'The Future of International War: Global Trends and Middle Eastern 
Implications, ' in Democracy. War and Peace in the Middle East, eds. David Garnham and Mark 
Tessler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995) 3. 
79 Mustapha K. al-Sayyid, 'The Third Wave of Democratisation in the Arab World, ' in The Arab 
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unelected. Moreover, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia still do not have 
universal suffrage. 80 Libya does have universal suffrage but elections are never 
held. In Kuwait suffrage is limited to males aged (who resided in Kuwait before 
1921) their sons, and sons of naturalised citizens. Finally, the few elections that 
have been allowed to take place with limited suffrage are often engineered in line 
with the wishes of the ruling elite. 81 Indeed, it has been suggested that the 
elected assemblies are there not to enable genuine political participation but to 
enhance domestic and international legitimacy. Still, even engineered elections 
are elections and they constitute a deviation from past practices by handing a 
certain degree of control to the public over the executive's actions and lending 
them an opportunity to get their voices heard. It is also worth noting that even 
those regimes that engage in electoral-engineered democracy are viewed as 
threats to regime security by Saudi policy-makers who have so far shied away 
from such reforms. 82 
The second problem with the democratic peace theory within the Middle 
Eastern context is that it is difficult to know whether giving Arab peoples, for 
instance, more say in policy-making would have led to more or less clashes with 
Israel. It could be argued that, if Arab non-state actors had more say in their 
countries' policy-making, they could have pushed for more support for the 
Palestinian cause, not less. Likewise, they could have demanded (and indeed 
achieved) some degree of integration between Arab countries and/or more 
World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 194) 179-89. 
80iNational Elections in the Middle East and the Arab World Since 1980, ' Middle East Report 
(Winter 1998) 16. 
81 Marsha Pripstein-Posusney, 'Behind the Ballot Box: Electoral Engineering in the Arab World, ' 
Middle East Report (Winter 1998) 12-15. 
82 Pripstein-Posusney, 'Behind the Ballot Box, ' 13. 
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uniform responses to Israel's actions. Accordingly, if the future was to bring 
increasing political liberalisation and democratisation in the Middle East, this 
could lead to strained relations with both Israel and the United States. Indeed, it 
is this very unpredictability of democratic systems that has so far led the United 
States to shy away from supporting democratisation whilst backing 'friendly 
tyrants'83 and 'low-intensity democracies' that have helped maintain the status 
quo and make the region secure for the transition to free-market economies. 
This, in turn, provides empirical backing to the point made by Barkawi and Laffey 
(see the previous section) that the establishment of a 'zone of peace' in Western 
Europe should be understood within the context of 'low-intensity democracies' or 
authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the developing world. 
Conclusion 
The previous chapter (Chapter 8) presented a Critical Security Studies 
perspective on thinking about the future. It argued that students of Critical 
Security Studies could make use of the constitutive role played by theories to 
shape 'desired' futures. The emphasis placed upon the need to produce images 
of 'desired' futures should not however be taken to mean that students of Critical 
Security Studies are unaware of existing ideas about the future. In an attempt to 
show that Critical Security Studies does not evolve in a vacuum, Chapter 9 has 
looked at other possible future scenarios. This chapter, therefore, presented a 
critical overview of existing ideas about the future and their potential practical 
ea Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, eds. Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma (London: 
Macmillan, 1991). 
334 
implications within the Middle Eastern context. By looking at the potential 
practical implications of these scenarios, the chapter has sought to identify the 
difficulties facing a Critical Security Studies future. This also enabled me to point 
to unfulfilled potential immanent in regional politics-a potential the 'problem- 
solving' approaches of some (but not all) of these scenarios have tended to 
overlook. 
To summarise, Chapter 9 looked at plausible futures of the Middle East, 
namely, 'globalisation, ' 'fragmentation, ' 'clash of civilizations, ' 'regionalisation' and 
'democratic peace. ' It was argued that those who view the future of world politics 
as one of increasing globalisation maintain that globalising forces foster 
economic efficiency and encourage the solution of problems through international 
cooperation. In this new world united in its search for new markets and higher 
profits, the argument goes, markets would demand and help produce common 
ways of thinking, and peoples' identities as producers and consumers will 
overshadow all other interests and identities. It was based on assumptions such 
as these that a series of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic summits 
were organised with the intention of creating a 'Middle East Common Market. ' A 
major obstacle facing policies based on such expectations is not only limited to 
the relatively weak participation of many Middle Eastern countries in global 
production and finance, the chapter argued, but also the bias shared by some 
regional actors toward the forces of globalisation that is shaped by historical and 
cultural dynamics. With memories of the colonial era still fresh in their minds, 
some feel that they must protect themselves against those forces that have 
historically dominated the region. 
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Such views sceptical of the globalisation process feed into Samuel 
Huntington's broader thesis that the future world politics would be characterised 
by cooperation within and conflict between civilizations. According to Huntington, 
although states would remain to be the major actors, their practices would 
increasingly be shaped by their civilizational identity. The chapter pointed to two 
potential practical implications of Huntington's thesis. First, it may become a self- 
fulfilling prophecy. For, Huntington's thesis is very well received within certain 
Islamist circles that have for long maintained that 'Western' and 'Islamic' 
civilizations cannot peacefully coexist. The world view from such arguments 
derive befits Huntington's arguments to the extent that one could indeed imagine 
the clash of civilizations scenario becoming a 'reality. ' The second and 
interrelated implication is that Huntington's scenario licenses certain security 
practices (such as 'dual containment' in line with the compartmentalised 
approach to regional security adopted by US policy-makers) whilst marginalizing 
others (such as encouraging Israel to give up its nuclear capability by refusing to 
acknowledge the linkages between the nuclear programmes of Iraq, Iran and 
Israel). 
Chapter 9 also looked at the future of world politics as one of 
regionalisation. It was argued that peoples of a globalising world, in search of 
some degree of control over their external environments, have started taking 
action within their own milieu in cooperation with other actors sharing similar 
problems. The chapter argued that the Middle East has remained relatively 
immune to such trends not because there is a lack of interest in regionalisation 
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projects, but because there exist multiple approaches to regionalisation 
competing to shape the future of regional security in the Middle East. As the 
thesis has argued, each of these approaches adopted an alternative 
representation of the region that is rooted in one of the four contending security 
discourses. The literature on regionalism, it was argued downplays the agency of 
non-state actors. As a result, it not only fails to account for how non-state actors 
could nurture alternative projects or stall those of governments, but also fails to 
present ideas as to how regionalisation could be achieved in the absence of 
governments interested in cooperating on a common project. 
Another future scenario Chapter 9 looked at was that of democratic 
peace. Building upon the so-called democratic peace phenomenon, it is argued 
that expanding the zone of democracy would help minimise inter-state wars, for 
democratic states tend not to fight each other. The chapter argued that 
democratic peace theorists, although correct in pointing to certain principles and 
characteristics of democratic systems (such as constitutionalism, the rule of law 
and settled conflict resolution practices) that enable the solution of inter-state 
disputes through non-violent means, nevertheless commit the fallacy of equating 
peace with the absence of war thereby sidelining the issues of 'structural 
violence' which also threaten peoples' security. It was also argued that they fail 
to consider the roles played by the structural relationships between democracies 
and non-democracies and the ways in which peace among the prior relies, to a 
certain extent, upon the absence of peace among the latter. Arms transfers from 
EU-member states to the Middle East and US policy of encouraging 'low-intensity 
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democracies' could be viewed as examples of this phenomenon within the Middle 
Eastern context. 
Finally, Chapter 9 looked at fragmentation as a plausible future. Here I 
presented two alternative ways of looking at the fragmentary tendency in world 
politics. First, the chapter looked at Robert Kaplan's scenario of the future of 
world politics as the 'coming anarchy. ' Kaplan, it was argued, endorsed 
Huntington's thesis when he suggested that the kind of cultural and civilizational 
clash Huntington foresaw could be further accelerated by increasing 
environmental degradation and the privatisation of political violence thereby 
pushing the world towards further fragmentation and even to the brink of anarchy. 
The chapter argued that although factors such as the scarcity of natural 
resources (such as water), and the (at times) violent activism of Islamist militants 
do seem to substantiate Kaplan's thesis, he fails to account for the role human 
agency has played in exacerbating these problems. As a result, he also fails to 
see - how human agency may intervene to reverse these trends, the chapter 
concluded. 
The chapter presented a second way of looking at the fragmentary drive 
in world politics, that of Robert Cox. It was argued that although it is possible to 
view the emerging particularisms and the challenge they pose to the state system 
as a 'coming anarchy, ' following Cox the same processes could also be viewed 
as novel forms of resistance that have the potential to initiate a possible 
transformation of world order. The chapter noted that given the emphasis 
students of Critical Security Studies have put on the agency of non-state actors, 
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Cox's thinking about the future is in line with the overall argument of the thesis. 
However, it was also noted that in order for such social forces to constitute 
themselves as agents of emancipatory change, they would need to be brought 
together in the overall framework of an idea of a community, a community that 
takes security issues seriously. The potential for the creation of a security 
community in the Middle East will be investigated in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 10 : Towards Creating a Security Community in 
the Middle East? 
Chapter 10 concludes Part III: 'Futures. ' It investigates the potential for 
the creation of a security community in the Middle East. Chapter 8 argued that, 
from a Critical Security Studies perspective, the process of imagining, creating 
and nurturing security communities could constitute emancipatory practices. 
Indeed, given global changes and the effects of the twin processes of 
globalisation and fragmentation, the argument for regionalism is fairly strong. 
The end of the Cold War and the marginalization of many Arab actors, the 
'atomisation' of the Arab regional system, and the globalisation of economic 
relations have indeed led some to conclude that it may no longer be possible to 
avoid regionalisation in the Middle East. ' 
What shape should such a process take, on the other hand, is a point of 
contention. Since, the issue of choosing between contending approaches to 
regional security (or competing regionalisms) is a contentious one, one way of 
avoiding the problem of choosing between them is to come up with an alternative. 
' Baghat Korany, 'The Old/New Middle East, ' in The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics 
and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation, ed. Laura GuazzQne (London: 
Macmillan, 1997) 135-50; Michael Hudson, 'Arab Integration: An Overview' in The Middle East 
Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration, ed. Micheal C. Hudson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999) 1-32; Laura Guazzone, 'A Map and Some Hypotheses for the 
Future of the Middle East, ' in The Middle East in Global Change, ed. Guazzone, 237-59; Bruce 
Maddy-Weitzman, 'A New Arab Order? Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' Orien 34: 2 
340 
This is where the argument of the thesis comes back full circle; for, conceiving 
the relationship between (inventing) regions, theories and practices of security as 
mutually constitutive enables me to make the analytical move and argue that an 
alternative conception of security could give rise to a new approach to regional 
security that could be acceptable to all. This new approach could be based on 
the perception of a common threat, that is, regional insecurity, and the need for 
the creation of a security community. 
It is one thing, of course, to state this in abstract terms, it quite another to 
try and envision how this might happen. This chapter will try and present a 
preliminary assessment of the potential for the creation of a security in the Middle 
East. The first section of the chapter looks at the origins of the security 
communities approach as developed by Karl Deutsch. Next, the chapter will 
explain the constructivist twist Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett gave to the 
security communities approach. The final section will try and evaluate the 
potential for the creation for a security community within the Middle Eastern 
context. For this purpose, the chapter will adopt the three-tier framework 
developed by Adler and Barnett and use it as a checklist to assess the potential 
for the creation of a security community in the Middle East. 
Karl Deutsch and the Security Communities Approach 
What Karl Deutsch and his colleagues were interested in when formulating the 
idea of a security community in the 1950s was the cessation of inter-state 
(1993) 221-30. 
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violence and the creation of dependable expectations of peaceful change by way 
of strengthening relationships among a group of states. In The Political 
Community in the North Atlantic Area, Deutsch and his colleagues set out to map 
the road to the creation of security communities. Their conviction was that once 
the conditions and processes that give rise to security communities were 
identified, it would be possible to replicate them in other parts of the world so that 
(the preparations for and the idea of) war would not enter into the calculations of 
those states. 2 
In this pioneering work, Deutsch and his associates defined a security 
community, as 'one in which there is real assurance that the members of that 
community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in 
some other way. 93 They distinguished between two types of security 
communities, 'pluralistic' and 'amalgamated. ' While both developed based on 
expectations of peaceful change, the latter emerged when states decided to 
merge (as in the case of the United States of America) whereas in the case of the 
former members retained their independence. Some kind of integration (defined 
as the creation of a sense of community and the construction of institutions and 
practices to sustain that 'we feeling') took place in both cases, but it is in the case 
of the prior that states decided to forego their independence and merge under a 
unitary or federal government. 4 
2 Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, 
Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, Richard W. Van Wagenen, Political Community 
and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957) vii, 3,20-1. 
3 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 5. 
° Deutsch et al., Political Community, 6-9. 
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Although Deutsch et al. were positive regarding the potential for security 
communities to travel to different parts of the world, their ideas remained largely 
on paper for four decades until they were revived by Adler, Barnett and the other 
contributors to their edited volume, which came out in 1998.5 In the meantime, 
the security communities approach was 'often cited but rarely emulated. '6 
The Constructivist Turn in the Study of Security Communities 
The recently revamped literature on security communities also busied itself with 
the creation of pluralistic security communities. This is largely because Adler and 
Barnett deem pluralistic security communities as 'theoretically and empirically 
closest to the developments that are currently unfolding in international politics 
and international relations theory. '' However, Adler and Barnett, while adopting 
and re-working Deutsch's conception of a pluralistic security community, dropped 
his behaviouralist outlook, giving the study of security communities a 
constructivist twist. 
Adler and Barnett argued that one of the reasons why Deutsch's study 
was not replicated was because Deutsch, despite his initial collaboration with 
historians in the project, remained behaviouralist in outlook and prioritised 
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
6 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective, ' in 
Security Communities, eds. Adler and Barnett, 9. This, of course, is not to suggest that no 
attempts were made to construct security communities. Western Europe, for instance, is often 
viewed as close as it gets to a security community. See Ole Wmver, 'Insecurity, Security and 
Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community, ' in Security Communities, eds. Adler and 
Barnett, 69-118. 
Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective, ' 5. 
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quantitative methods in his research into international transactions in the attempt 
to understand the processes and conditions that foster the creation of security 
communities. Deutsch maintained that transactions generate responsiveness, 
reciprocity and mutual predictability of behaviour and lead to the discovery of new 
areas of interest and identifications thereby resulting in the creation of security 
communities. However, as Adler and Barnett argue, although focusing on 
quantitative research into transactions may help establish the relationship 
between increased transboundary movements and greater interdependence, it 
would not help 'detect a greater sense of cohesion and community based on 
mutual responsiveness, value orientation, and identity. 'e In other words, 
Deutsch's emphasis on quantitative methods when analysing the relationship 
between transactions and the shaping of interests and identities, although 
constituting a major contribution, nevertheless did not enable him to develop a 
better understanding of the 'social relations that are bound up with and generated 
by those transactions, ' or the complex and dynamic way in which identities and 
interests are shaped and reshaped to enable, further or forestall future 
transactions. 9 
Thus, Adler and Barnett justified the need for the adoption of a 
constructivist approach with reference to the need to have a better understanding 
of the 'relationship between structure, social interactions, and the possible 
transformation of that structure that leaves its mark on security practices. r10 In 
other words, they maintained that in the absence of an account as to how actors' 
e Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, ' in 
Security Communities, eds. Adler and Barnett, 48-9. 
Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective, ' 7-8. 
10 Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective, 15. 
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willingness to enter into transactions with each other could be moulded by 
transnational forces, interactions and structures that emerge and evolve due to 
the actions of the very same (state and non-state) actors, the potential for the 
creation of security communities worldwide could not be fulfilled. " 
Evaluating the Potential for the Creation of a Security Community 
In the attempt to understand the emergence and development of security 
communities, Adler and Barnett developed a three-tier framework: precipitating 
conditions (tier one), facilitating conditions (tier two), and necessary conditions 
(tier three). 12 Here I shall adopt their framework and use it as a checklist to 
evaluate the potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East. 
Tier One: Precipitating Conditions 
Tier one comprises what Adler and Barnett term the 'precipitating conditions. ' 
These may include a change in the external environment, technology, 
demography, and economics. Such changes, argue Adler and Barnett, 'can 
propel states to look in each other's direction and attempt to coordinate their 
policies to their mutual advantage. '13 Adler and Barnett are aware that not much 
may come out of these initial interactions; but, alternatively, states may succeed 
in developing social bonds, which could lead them to further improve their 
relations and proceed to tier two. 
For a further elaboration on this point, see Bill McSweeney, Security. Identity and Interests: A 
Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
12 Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, ' 37-48. 
13 Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, ' 38. 
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Some of the following developments in the post-Cold War Middle East 
could be viewed as constituting precipitating conditions for the formation of a 
security community in the region: 
" Recent changes in the external environment caused by the end of the Cold 
War and the ensuing dissolution of the Soviet Union could be viewed as having 
contributed to a re-thinking of security relations in the Middle East. The demise 
of the external threat posed by the Soviet Union brought about a relaxation in 
regional security relations not only because of a relative decline in external 
interventions (direct or indirect, by the United States or the Soviet Union) but also 
due to the end of Soviet support for anti-status quo forces (such as Iraq, the PLO 
or Syria). A relative decline in the strategic importance of some regional states 
(such as Turkey and Egypt) for US post-Cold War security policies also helped 
foster a feeling of marginalization in the Middle East (perhaps with the exception 
of oil-producing states and Israel) thereby presenting some regional states with a 
reason to move towards closer security cooperation. 14 
" Changes in the regional environment caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
and the Gulf War could be considered to have precipitated a re-thinking of 
regional security relations. In the 1990s, Gulf policy-makers became increasingly 
convinced that they should pay more attention to military threats posed to their 
security stemming from inside the Arab world (as was the case with the Iraqi 
14 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, 'A New Arab Order? Regional Security After the Gulf War, ' Orien 34: 
2(1993)225. 
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aggression). This accelerated the decline of the Arab national security discourse, 
thereby providing an opportunity for other approaches to gain further ground. 15 
The Madrid Peace Process set in the aftermath of the Gulf War helped 
break many taboos by bringing about Arab states' recognition of Israel and the 
gradual Israeli acceptance of the PLO. The multilateral negotiations organised as 
a part of the Peace Process brought many regional states together to discuss 
'arms control and regional security, ' 'water, ' 'environment, ' 'refugees' and 
'regional economic development' (see Chapter 7). The initial progress of 
multilateral negotiations, in turn, helped strengthen the voices of those who call 
for common security practices. 16 
However, it is important to note here that not all regional policy-makers 
would benefit from a decisive end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Especially those 
front-line states (such as Syria) or hard-line actors in most states that have, over 
the years, derived legitimacy from this conflict could be expected to stall the 
progress of the peace process. Furthermore, actors (such as Egypt) that have 
assumed the role of the only open channel of communication between the Arab 
states and Israel also stand to lose some stature if a region-wide peace 
settlement was to be agreed upon. 17 
15 Muhammed Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1993) 77-97. Also see Michael Barnett and F. Gregory Gause III, 
'Caravans in Opposite Directions: Society, State, and the Development of Community in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, ' in Security Communities, eds. Adler and Barnett, 161-97. 
16 Shai Feldman and Abdullah Toukan, Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the 
Middle East (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefeld, 1997). 
17 Bruce W. Jentleson and Dalia Dassa Kaye, 'Security Status: Explaining Regional Security 
Cooperation and its Limits in the Middle East, ' Security Studies 8: 1 (Autumn 1998) 204-38; 
Guazzone, 'A Map and Some Hypothesis for the Future of the Middle East, ' 239. 
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" Changes in the natural environment is another factor that could bring regional 
actors together if they choose to interpret, for instance, global warming and the 
increasing scarcity of water resources as a threat to their security. After all, these 
are what Beck terms 'threats to the future, ' to cope with which action would need 
to be taken in the present. However, although a working group addressing this 
issue was formed as a part of multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process, 
there currently is very little evidence of regional actors' willingness to adopt 
cooperative practices. On the contrary, changes in the global environment so far 
seem to have stiffened some actors' positions (as is the case with the conflict 
surrounding the use of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin shared by Iraq, Syria and 
Turkey). In sum, there is some potential for cooperation on this issue should 
regional actors choose to think more seriously about the long-term future and 
adopt cooperative practices that could enhance their gains. Environmental 
politics need not be a zero sum game where one side's gain is the other side's 
loss. All parties stand to gain if they agree to cooperate, for instance, on the 
optimisation of water transportation and irrigation techniques, and minimisation of 
evaporation. 
" Technological changes could have contradictory effects in the Middle Eastern 
context. The increase in the range of surface-to-surface missiles, for instance, 
could be viewed as bringing regional states together by making it difficult to 
defend against them. 18 However, they could also be viewed as increasing 
suspicion and threatening stability thereby pushing for more balance of power 
politics and arms build-up instead of cooperation. 
18 Peres, The New Middle East. 
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Another example of this phenomenon is the revolution in communications 
technology, which has enabled non-state actors to join efforts and cross (physical 
and psychological) boundaries, and organise coalitions pushing for more political 
participation, democracy and respect for human rights. 19 If such non-state actors, 
with their creative practices, could be channelled towards constituting a security 
community, they could indeed help build and sustain it. Still, it is conceivable that 
the very same factors could accelerate the process of fragmentation (as Kaplan 
suggests). 
" Transformations in economic patterns such as the increasing pace of 
globalisation of production and finance has also made an impact on regional 
politics. Faced with the danger of marginalization in a globalising world economy, 
some regional policy-makers have chosen to adopt structural adjustment and 
liberalisation programs to integrate themselves into world markets. The threat of 
marginalization in an increasingly globalising world economy could indeed be 
viewed as a precipitating condition for the creation of a security community 
should actors choose to view it as such. There is some potential for increased 
economic integration (in trade as well as agricultural and industrial sectors) 
should regional actors choose to tap them. 
" Finally, demography is another factor that could be viewed as a precipitating 
condition. On the one hand, it could be argued that the population explosion in 
many Arab states, coupled with the effects of (internal and cross-border) 
19 Jerrold D. Green, 'The Information Revolution and Political Opposition in the Middle East, ' 
MESA Bulletin 33 (1999) 21-7. 
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migration would strengthen the forces of fragmentation in the Middle East. 
Moreover, issues such as birth control could create a divisive effect by polarising 
activists of Arab nationalist and Islamist convictions who view the increase in 
Arab/Muslim population in this part of the world as a point of strength vis-a-vis 
Israel. On the other hand, the issue of birth control could be viewed as a 
potential common ground for women's movements throughout the Middle East to 
form coalitions. As Fatima Mernissi notes, the issues of women's illiteracy, future 
life prospects, and health (which are all closely related to increasing birth-rate) 
are seldom mentioned let alone put on the security agenda by regional 
governments. 20 This could, potentially, constitute a fertile ground for women's 
movements throughout the region to form coalitions around. 
As has become clear from the preceding discussion, most of the factors 
enumerated above could indeed precipitate the creation of a security community; 
they could also lead to fragmentation and even chaos. To put it in less dramatic 
terms, the same set of factors could both encourage increasing cooperation and 
collaboration, or lead regional states to resort to militarised practices such as 
balance of power politics, deterrence and arms build-up. The point here is that in 
order for new interpretations of such dynamics to emerge in a way that would 
`propel states to look in each other's direction and attempt to coordinate their 
policies to their mutual advantage' as Adler and Barnett expect, 21 there is a need 
for human agency to intervene and provide actors with an alternative reading of 
20 Fatima Mernissi, 'Population Planning Without Democracy? The Conflict Between the Muslim 
State and Women: Thoughts on the Morocco Demographic and Health Survey, ' in Women's 
Rebellion and Islamic Memory (London: Zed, 1996) 46-62. 
21 Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, ' 38. 
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their situation-a reading that would need to be informed by an alternative 
conception of security. This is because the threat of further marginalization of 
Arab countries, or increasing scarcity of water as a result of global warming exist 
as 'threats to the future, ' to use Beck's phrase. Since they only exist in the future, 
the only way to prevent such threats from becoming 'reality' is to take action at 
present. In the absence of human agents that could provide such alternative 
readings, actors may choose to remain oblivious to drastic changes such as 
massive population increase, increasing globalisation of world economy or global 
warming, thereby failing to take cooperative measures that could indeed be to 
their 'mutual advantage. ' To present such alternative readings and point to 
unfulfilled potential immanent in world politics is a task for the students of Critical 
Security Studies, as noted in Chapter 8. 
Tier Two: Facilitating Conditions 
In Adler and Barnett's framework, tier two comprises factors that facilitate the 
creation of a security community. Adler and Barnett categorise these factors 
under structure (power and knowledge) and process (transactions, organisations 
and social learning). 
Following Deutsch et al., Adler and Barnett stress power and knowledge 
as structures central to the development of security communities. Their 
conception of power includes the conventional understanding of power (i. e. the 
size and strength of states in terms of material resources) as well as the power of 
shared meanings (such as a `we feeling'). Knowledge, in turn, refers to shared 
meanings and understandings that license and legitimate practices. Adler and 
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Barnett maintain that the interplay between power and knowledge has an impact 
on the construction of security communities in that some understanding into the 
workings of the relationship between the two is essential. 22 
Regarding the category of process, Adler and Barnett look at 
transactions, organisations, institutions and social learning as contributing 
towards the development of trust between members as well as the creation of 
collective transnational identities and shared understandings. Adler and Barnett 
expect tier two to help create trust and collective transnational identities that 
make transtition to tier three possible. I will now look at these facilitating 
conditions in more detail with reference to the Middle Eastern context. 
" In Adler and Barnett's framework, the significance of power stems from the fact 
that those politically, administratively, economically or educationally more 
advanced states could form the core around which a security community might 
develop. These states could create a 'magnet' effect by attracting other 
members, getting the existing-members to agree on certain issues and creating 
an overall we-feeling in the community. As noted in Chapter 7, Shimon Peres 
sees Israel as a candidate for this job. 23 Another candidate would be the Israeli- 
Turkish alliance. The human as well as material resources and experiences in 
cooperation these two states have could indeed be considered to have the 
potential to constitute the core for a security community. 
22 Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, ' 39-41. 
23 Peres, The New Middle East. 
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One major problem with relying on these two states constituting the core 
is that their relationship is based on military strategic cooperation (alongside its 
non-military dimensions) and its anti-Arab image has already generated suspicion 
at best and hostility at worst. 24 In other words, Israel and Turkey lack the non- 
material sources of power such as the ability to generate a we-feeling. Arguably, 
this could be compensated if they were to be joined by an Arab state such as 
Egypt that has the necessary credentials to attract other Arab actors into the 
community. 
Here, the role third parties (non-members) could play in creating the 
magnet effect should also be emphasised, for, the involvement of and 
commitment by third parties such as the United States and the European Union 
would considerably enhance the project's chances for success. This is not only 
because US and/or EU involvement (in one form or another) would encourage 
many regional actors to join in (due to the attraction of their material resources) 
but also because the two have the power to use carrot and stick policies to nudge 
regional actors in the desired direction when negotiations become stalled, or help 
maintain stability in the region by taking up the role of a 'pacifier' to enable 
reconciliation to continue without interruption (the United States played this role in 
Western Europe after WWII). 25 
Arguably, it would be better if both the United States and the European 
Union were involved, because they appeal to different actors at multiple levels. 
24 Alan Makowsky, 'Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish "Periphery Strategy"? ' in Reluctant 
Neighbour: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri J. Barkey (Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace, 1996) 147-70. 
25 Josef Joffe, 'Europe's American Pacifier, ' Survival 26: 4 (1984) 174-81. 
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Whilst the support of the United States is crucial for the participation of Israel and 
the Gulf states, the EU ranks higher in the eyes of the policy-makers of the north 
African states, Syria and the Lebanon, who have so far preferred to participate in 
the Euro-Med partnership process. Moreover, the EU has so far proven itself 
willing and better endowed to conduct people-to-people diplomacy, which has 
served to strengthen its position vis-ä-vis a significant portion of NGOs in the 
Arab world (especially in North Africa). 
Lastly, the power of non-state actors should not be underestimated, for 
they could contribute to community building. Their power largely stems from their 
ability to work at the grassroots level and familiarity with the needs and concerns 
of people on the ground. Intellectuals could also play important roles by 
presenting regional actors with alternative readings of their situation and 
imagining alternative futures. As noted above, this is especially relevant in parts 
of the world such as the Middle East where there is little support for the formation 
of a security community at the governmental level. However, the issue of the 
agency of non-state actors is a subject the framework developed by Adler and 
Barnett is relatively weak on. The role non-state actors could play is potentially 
larger in the Middle Eastern setting than some other parts of the world where 
there is evidence of enthusiasm for regionalisation at the government level. Still, 
at the end of the day, action on the part of both state and non-state actors would 
be required if a security community is to be created. 
" Non-state actors could also assume important roles in the production and 
dissemination of the kind of knowledge that would be required for the formation 
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and the nurturing of a security community. In Adler and Barnett's framework, 
liberalism and democracy are expected to constitute the shared meanings and 
understandings that would form the basis of communication and trust in a 
security community. In the absence of shared knowledge based on liberalism 
and democracy argue Adler and Barnett, (as is the case in the Middle East) 
regional actors could build their community based on an alternative ideology such 
as developmentalism (as with South East Asia) or put emphasis on their shared 
project (i. e. the creation of a security community). 
Thus, it could be argued that in the absence of shared meanings and 
understandings to shape actors' practices and legitimate their activities, the most 
promising option for community-minded actors in the Middle East is to build their 
security community based on their one commonality, i. e. their desire to address 
the problem of regional insecurity. However, as noted above, in order for them to 
come to view the problem of 'regional insecurity' as a commonality, regional 
actors would need to be presented with an alternative reading of their situation. 
To put it in other words, given the competition between four approaches to 
regional security, regional actors would need to be made aware of their shared 
interests and how a coordination of their policies could be to their 'mutual 
advantage. ' The production and dissemination of knowledge on futures of 
regional security, what futures may bring, and alternative strategies that could be 
adopted to meet 'threats to the future' could help propel states to each others' 
direction. 
355 
A step in this direction has already been taken as a part of a project 
entitled 'The Search for Common Ground in the Middle East, ' undertaken by two 
non-governmental organisations: US-based 'Search for Common Ground and 
'The European Centre for Common Ground. ' The title of the initiative is 'Vision 
2020' and comprises a series of eleven newspaper articles written by intellectuals 
from across the Middle East on their visions of the region's future in the year 
2020 and beyond. The articles were published over October-December 1999 
simultaneously in nine newspapers and five languages and reaching millions 
across the Middle East. The series, funded by the Search for Common Ground 
together by UNESCO, was designed to enable peoples of the Middle East to 
become aware of other regional peoples hopes, dreams and fears about the 
future. It was also hoped that the series would raise peoples' awareness of their 
common humanity and common interests in cooperating for a better future. 26 
Building upon the experiences of this project, a similar one could also be 
launched to facilitate the creation of a security community in the future. 
It should also be noted that although their shared project could constitute 
the minimal common ground required to initiate the project in the short-run, in the 
medium to long-run shared meanings and understandings as well as knowledge 
and practice of conflict resolution and non-violent action techniques would have 
to be generated and disseminated in order to create dependable expectations of 
peaceful change. One challenge that would be facing actors is that of generating 
this knowledge whilst remaining sensitive to different conflict cultures that exist in 
the region. There is some knowledge and experience of conflict-resolution and 
26 See the first eight articles at http: //www. sfcg. org/mideast_media/vision202O_index. html; 
Internet; accessed November 15,1999. 
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non-violent techniques generated outside the region which regional actors could 
tap into. But they would also need to turn to their own heritage to anchor this 
knowledge if they wish these practices to be widely adopted by different actors at 
multiple levels. This is not meant to suggest that grounding knowledge of 
conflict-resolution, and non-violent resistance techniques in regional actors' own 
(cultural and historical) heritage would automatically help solve the problem of 
regional insecurity. However, the hope is that pointing to unfulfilled potential in 
terms of knowledge that already exists in the region could help popularise the 
cause for a security community and facilitate its creation. 
Arguably, a beginning has already been made in the field of inter-faith 
dialogue to try and find a common ground for believers of different religions to 
peacefully coexist. 27 Communication on such issues could help develop the 
shared meanings and intersubjective understandings that could generate the 
knowledge on which the project of creating a security community could be based. 
One significant contribution some Islamist actors have made is the little- 
pronounced but potentially significant re-definition of jihad (holy war) as a 
struggle against 'structural violence'. As Chaiwat Satha-Anand notes, there 
exists in the Islamic tradition, 'fertile sources of non-violent thought' should 
Muslims choose to tap them. 28 Then, although it is possible to view some 
Islamist actors as uncompromising (thereby blocking the way to the creation of 
common identities that cross confessional borders) should they choose to re- 
27 This was the theme of the 1998 Conference entitled 'Religion and Pluralism' organised by the 
British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, held at the Centre for the Study of Islam & Christian- 
Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, UK. 
28 Chaiwat Satha-Anand, 'The Nonviolent Crescent: Eight Theses on Muslim Nonviolent Action, ' 
in Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East, eds. Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant and 
Saad E. Ibrahim (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990) 28. 
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think some key precepts of Islam, a concept such as jihad that is often viewed as 
an obstacle to peaceful co-existence today could become the common ground for 
tomorrow's debates between the Islamists and other actors on issues such as the 
structural causes of economic insecurity, human rights, identity, human dignity 
and equality-that is, the nexus of security and emancipation. 
This, of course, is not meant to downplay the existing structures that 
make it difficult for people to re-think their cultural and religious heritage and 
choose reconciliation and coexistence instead of conflict and war. Here, the role 
of the students of Critical Security Studies is to step in and present peoples with 
alternatives that exist, possibilities immanent in world politics. By way of doing 
this, students of Critical Security Studies aim to challenge the claim to knowledge 
monopolised by the prevalent discourses. This, in turn, requires paying more 
attention to the workings of the power/knowledge relationship than Adler and 
Barnett do. As noted above, Adler and Barnett define power with reference to its 
material dimension as well as the power of ideas, the power to generate a 'we 
feeling' among actors. However, as Chapter 8 argued, in order to prevail over 
other prevalent discourses, the students of Critical Security Studies need to 
resort to the potential constitutive role their theories could play. Here, the 
adoption of a three-dimensional view of power to point to choices that have been 
made in the past is crucial in order to be able to make the point that the future is 
open. 
" The use of processes (transactions, international organisations and institutions, 
and social learning) to entrench security communities was the point emphasised 
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by Deutsch et at. when initially writing about the subject. Deutsch's particular 
focus was on the significance of transactions and the spillover effects the 
establishment of trust in one sector could have in other sectors thereby 
strengthening mutual identification and contributing towards the gradual 
emergence of dependable expectations of peaceful change. As noted above, the 
Middle East ranks very low in terms of intra-regional transactions. Accordingly, 
relying on transactions to transform social relations could prove to be futile in the 
Middle East. In fact, it is the very links of interdependence that are created 
through international transactions that some regional policy-makers want to 
avoid. The solution to this problem could be found in the creation of an 
organisational framework for such transactions to take place. With the 
involvement of third parties such as the United States or the European Union, the 
issue of Israel's potential hegemony could be checked until regional actors build 
relationships of mutual trust. 
Indeed it is conceivable that if successful cooperation over one core issue 
area could be developed, cooperation over other issues would follow. This 
argument does not necessarily entail buying into the logic of spillover that 
emphasises the deterministic power of cooperation in one sector leading states to 
upgrade their interests to enable cooperation in another sector. Following Bill 
McSweeney, the argument is that successful cooperation over one issue area 
may not only persuade other states to upgrade their interests but also persuade 
domestic actors to redefine their identities within the framework of a common 
identity by 'seducing' them into further cooperation and collaboration. 
McSweeney maintains that the concept of seduction does away with the 
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mechanical, material and deterministic connotations of spillover by way of 
integrating an element of human agency (conceptualised with reference to the 
state as well as sub-state level) and stressing the 'processual character of the 
project in question ... rather than the discrete moment suggested by spillover. 
29 
Accordingly, if cooperation over one issue area, such as arms control, for 
instance, were to successfully take place, this could not only persuade 
governments to upgrade their interests, but also seduce non-state actors (such 
as individuals, social groups and grassroots organisations) to redefine their 
identities within the framework provided by the common identity of the security 
community thereby making further cooperation and enmeshment possible. 30 
This, in turn, requires paying more attention to the agency of non-state actors- 
more than Adler and Barnett's framework would allow. 
" Without wishing to de-emphasise the significance of transactions, Adler and 
Barnett underline the role institutions/organisations and social learning play in 
helping build trust and collective identity. Building upon the CSCE/OSCE 
experience in Europe, Adler and Barnett stress the role organisations could play 
in disseminating knowledge, contribute to the development of trust and mutual 
identification, and "'engineer" the very conditions that assist in their development' 
by fostering a regional culture that in turn helps fortify their links. 31 
Suggestions have already been made for the creation of a Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) to deal with issues of 
29 McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 169. 
30 See McSweeney, Security. Identity and Interests, 166-72, for a further elaboration on this point. 31 Emanuel Adler, 'Seeds of Peaceful Change: the OSCE's Security Community-Building Model, ' 
in Security Communities, eds. Adler and Barnett, 119-60; Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for 
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`security, economic cooperation and human rights'. 32 Coupled with a Helsinki 
Citizens' Assembly-type organisation to ensure peoples' involvement, the CSCM 
could provide the much-needed setting for regional actors to come together, 
exchange views, build mutual trust and develop bonds. In other words, the 
creation of a CSCM could be a good starting point for the creation of a security 
community. The institutional power of the CSCM could not only work as a 
magnet to pull other members but it could also help reinforce the belief of the 
already existing members in the value and viability of the project. Lastly, 
institutions such as the CSCM also help disseminate knowledge necessary for 
the creation of a non-violent conflict culture. 
" Social learning is another process that is crucial in the development of 
dependable expectations of peaceful change. It involves not only the 
dissemination of knowledge of conflict resolution and non-violent techniques but 
also the moulding of existing identities within the framework provided by the 
common identity of the security community. Adler and Barnett expect social 
learning processes to promote `shared definitions of security, proper domestic 
and international action and regional boundaries' as well. 33 However, as 
suggested above, the emergence of common conceptions of security is 
something that cannot be left to emerge and be disseminated at such a late 
stage. For, it is through the adoption of a new conception of security that new 
interpretations of the social reality could emerge thereby helping precipitate the 
making of a security community. 
the Study of Security Communities, ' 42? 
32 Tim Niblock, 'Towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East (CSCM)' in The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach, 
ed. Gerd Nonneman (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1992) 245-8. 
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In the non-so-distant past, some exploratory steps were taken to promote 
pace and reconciliation through education as Chapter 7 noted. 34 Such meetings, 
at the moment, should not be expected to generate any substantive product other 
than help parties get used to communicating with each other and exchange views 
in a non-confrontational setting. Indeed, the first few meetings of the Arms 
Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group of the Middle East 
multilateral negotiations was spent on introducing parties to each other and 
making general statements. Given the achievements of the first three years that 
surpassed parties' expectations the issue of arms control could be viewed as a 
potential core area to bring regional governments back to the negotiating table 
(see below). 35 Although it is possible to be pessimistic about the potential for 
such a development, it is worth remembering that the setting up of a working 
group on arms control and regional security is a development few would have 
predicted a few years ago. 
Tier Three: Necessary Conditions 
In Adler and Barnett's framework, tier three builds upon the dynamics generated 
by the previous two tiers. It is expected that mutual trust and a common identity, 
which Adler and Barnett view as the 'necessary conditions' of dependable 
expectations of peaceful change would flourish at this stage. The assumption 
here is that if actors start trusting each other, they would also start identifying with 
each other, which would, in turn, feed into the development of a common identity. 
33 Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, ' 45. 
34 James Calleja, 'Educating for Peace in the Mediterranean: A Strategy for Peace-building, ' in 
Building Peace in the Middle East, ed. Boulding, 282. 
35 The negotiations broke down in 1994 for reasons to do with the set up of the agenda (that did 
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The defining feature of this tier is that the relationships that are created through 
tier two is expected to be strengthened and actors are expected to begin to 
identify with each other so that they would `no longer rely on concrete 
international organizations to maintain trust but do so through knowledge and 
belief about each other. '36 This, however, would take time as well as effort. As 
noted above, collective identity formation in a security community is a process 
that requires the agency of community-minded actors. Moreover, the process 
involves the creation of a common identity as well as the moulding of existing 
(individual, group, national, ethnic) identities by inscribing the common identity of 
the security community into other identities. 
Although it is difficult to imagine such progress taking place given the 
current state of inter-community relations in the Middle East, there still are no 
grounds to assume that Middle Eastern peoples cannot show the flexibility 
required to remould their identities and commit to the creation of a new and more 
inclusive common identity (as did their Western European counterparts after 
WWII). After all, peoples of Saudi Arabia, for instance, have already moved from 
being Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire to being (albeit half-hearted) Arab 
nationalists in the 1920s, and then khalijin ('of the Gulf' in Arabic) in the 1980s 
and 1990s. On the other hand, in Egypt, the forerunner of Arab nationalism 
under Nasser's presidency, the Arab identity has never been beyond contention. 
Some Egyptian intellectuals have stressed the Mediterranean and African 
dimensions of Egyptian identity, downplaying the Arab and Muslim dimensions. 
In other words, there could always be found some element within peoples' 
not include nuclear weapons). See Chapter 7. 
36 Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, ' 46. 
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existing identities to enable identification with a more inclusive community should 
peoples choose to do so (and provided that the necessary material resources, 
some of which have been outlined above, are put into effect). 37 
Lastly, becoming a member of and identifying with a security community 
need not mean the 'betrayal' of Arabism, or the downplaying of the Muslim 
character of some regional peoples. For example, the common identity of a 
security community could be a part of the identity of a Coptic woman living in 
Egypt whose other identities may include being an Arab, woman, Christian and 
Egyptian. 
Indeed, as noted above, one strength of the security communities 
approach stems from the fact that it enables one to avoid the problem of the 
incommensurability of the four competing perspectives on regional security by 
way of coming up with an alternative perspective, the adoption of which need not 
mean the rejection of the others. There is no reason why the League of Arab 
States, the Organization of Islamic Conference, MENA Common Market, CSCM, 
and a Helsinki Citizens Assembly-type organisation should not coexist (as is the 
case in Western Europe). After all, each would address different aspects of 
regional insecurity in the Middle East. However, in order for these alternative 
perspectives to peacefully coexist, a broader framework of non-violent culture of 
conflict would need to be created within which myriad actors could put their 
perspectives into practice without depriving the others of their own security. 
37 Iver Neumann makes a similar point with reference to region building. See Neumann, Use$ of 
'The Other' in European Identity Formation, 139-40. Also see McSweeney, Security. Identity 
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The membership of the community is a matter to be decided with 
reference to the core issue(s) actors choose to focus on. One major problem 
involved in imagining the formation of a security community in the Middle East is 
that there is yet to be found a core issue over which initial negotiations and 
cooperation could begin. In other words, Middle Eastern actors have yet to come 
up with their own version of the European Coal and Steel Community, which 
marked the beginning of cooperation in Western Europe. Indeed, the very 
absence of such a core issue in the Middle East could prove to be the biggest 
obstacle on the road to the formation of a security community. 
So far, the issue of arms control has proven to be the most fertile among 
the five issue areas addressed by the multilateral negotiations of the Madrid 
Peace Process. Indeed, the progress made in its initial years 'was greater than 
many expected, or even deemed possible, ' as Bruce Jentleson and Dalia Dassa 
Kaye have argued. 38 It is also noted that 'compared to other regional security 
processes such as the European Conference on Security and Cooperation 
(CSCE) in its early stages, ACRS progress was noteworthy. 939 
The issue of arms control is a promising core area where cooperation 
could be initiated. It is relatively promising not necessarily because regional 
policy-makers are committed to achieving regional security via arms control, but 
rather because they (Arab policy-makers in particular) view arms control as a way 
to deny their adversaries those weapons they cannot afford themselves 40 In 
and Interests, 196. 
38 Jentleson and Dassa Kaye, 'Security Status, ' 205. 
39 Jentleson and Dassa Kaye, 'Security Status, ' 205. 
40 Yahya M. Sadowksi, Scuds or Butter? The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle 
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other words, the reasoning for arms control could be found in the economic 
dimension of security within the Middle Eastern context. However, it should be 
pointed out that the logic behind this approach to arms control is still not based 
on common security thinking where security is sought with the adversary in an 
attempt to achieve stable security. 
It is widely known that the Middle East has the highest military 
expenditure as percent of GNP in the world. 41 The Middle East also includes 
some of the most indebted countries of the world (such as Egypt, Morocco, 
Sudan, Algeria, Syria and Yemen). Even oil-rich states have been facing 
difficulties since the 1980s; they began to post regular budget deficits in the 
recent years. Yet they continue to pour money into arms purchases often under 
encouragement by major arms sellers that include the United States and some 
EU-member states. The point here is that given the willingness of arms sellers to 
sell and the willingness of buyers to buy notwithstanding their economic 
conditions, it would be very difficult to break of this cycle of increasing debt and 
armament in the Middle East. 
A promising development took place in the 1990s when Jordan decided 
to break out of this arms and debt cycle and opted for unilateral arms reductions. 
Seeking to make the most of unilateral arms reductions (and in the attempt to 
avoid further weakening of their military vis-ä-vis their neighbours') Jordanian 
policy-makers proposed an 'arms-for-debt swap' in line with which states that 
East (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993) 40. 
41 The rate for the Middle East is 8.8 percent. For the US it is 6.3, for Europe 6.1, for South Asia 
3.8. See Sadowksi, Scuds or Butter? 12. 
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agree to become a part of a region-wide arms control process would qualify for a 
reduction of their debts. 42 
Emphasising the state of Middle Eastern economies, Yahya Sadowski 
argues that the 'arms-for-debt swap' could prove to be the long-sought incentive 
necessary to get regional policy-makers commit to arms control. He wrote: 
What has been missing in the Middle East is not some vision of 
what arms control arrangements are possible but the appropriate 
milieu for putting them into effect. Regional security plans and 
economic incentive programs supply the missing ingredient. They 
could foster an environment in which states approach arms 
control talks with less fear and more favour. 43 
Sadowski's argument resonates with the call by students of Critical Security 
Studies for adopting a broader conception of security, cognisant of the security 
concerns of myriad actors at multiple levels. For this vision to be put into 
practice, external actors (such as the United States and the EU) and non-state 
actors across the region would need to be brought in. The involvement of 
external actors is crucial, for they would be instrumental in cancelling the debts of 
Middle Eastern countries that agree to get involved. It is also them that stand to 
lose valuable business if and when Middle Eastern arms market contracts as a 
result of an agreement. In this sense, the United States and other arms 
producing states would also need to adopt broader conceptions of security 
cognisant of the interrelationships in between the security concerns of actors at 
multiple levels if they are to agree to support such a process. Lastly, the 
involvement of the United States would be crucial in securing Israel's involvement 
in the process. Israel's nuclear status is likely to cause disagreements and US 
42 Sadowski, Scuds or Butter? 46. 
43 Sadowski, Scuds or Butter? 55. 
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involvement and guarantees to both Israel and its Arab counterparts would be 
crucial to facilitate cooperation. 
The involvement of non-state actors across the region would also prove 
crucial because, as noted above, in order for cooperation over arms control to 
generate interest in and cooperation about other issue areas, peoples' interest in 
and identification with a broader community would have to be generated. Non- 
state actors, especially women's movements and networks, could assume crucial 
roles in this process. For, it is women who suffer disproportionately as a result of 
militarisation and the channelling of valuable funds into defence budgets instead 
of education or health. 44 
Conclusion 
The aim of Chapter 10 was to investigate the potential for the creation of 
a security community in the Middle East. Adopting the security community 
approach-generated by Deutsch and developed by Adler and Barnett-as a 
checklist, I pointed to conditions that could be viewed as conducive to the 
creation of a security community. It was argued that the same conditions that 
could be viewed as propelling regional states towards each other (such as the 
end of the Cold War, globalisation of production and finance or global warming) 
could also be viewed as pushing them apart from each other thereby making 
cooperation more difficult. It was argued that in order for such factors to be 
as Mernissi, Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory; idem, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the 
Modern World, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland (London: Virago, 1993). 
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viewed by actors as conducive to the creation of a security community, they 
would need to be presented with an alternative reading of their situation in the 
light of an alternative conceptualisation of security. This, the chapter argued, 
would require the framework developed by Adler and Barnett to be re-worked 
form a Critical Security Studies perspective by adopting a broader and deeper 
conception of security, paying more attention to the agency of non-state actors, 
and the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
In the Introduction the main aim of the thesis was stated as that of 
providing an account of the pasts, presents and futures of regional security in the 
Middle East from a Critical Security Studies perspective. This I tried to achieve 
via the threefold structure of the thesis, which looked at Cold War'pasts' in Part I, 
post-Cold War'presents' in Part II and 'futures' in Part III. 
The thesis also had three more specific aims corresponding to three of 
the tasks of Critical Security Studies identified in the Introduction. The first aim 
was to present a critique of prevailing security discourses in theory and practice 
with reference to regional security in the Middle East and point to the unfulfilled 
potential immanent in regional politics. The second aim was to explore the 
mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions and theories and 
practices of security. The third aim was to show how Critical Security Studies 
might allow one to think differently about futures of regional security in the Middle 
East. 
These aims were furthered through a structure based on dividing Parts I 
and II into three chapters: representations, theories and practices. The chapters 
on representations showed how alternative representations of the region have 
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shaped and, in turn, been shaped by contending approaches to security in theory 
and practice. The chapters on theories and practices investigated the mutually 
constitutive relationship between the two. Seeking to develop Critical Security 
Studies thinking about regional security, the thesis argued that when re-thinking 
regional security from a Critical Security Studies perspective, it is not enough 
simply to open up the concept 'security' itself. Rather, both concepts -'region' 
and 'security'-need to be opened up in order to reveal the mutually constitutive 
relationship between them. 
Chapter 1 explained what would be taken in the thesis as a Critical 
Security Studies perspective. It looked at seven key concepts and analytical 
moves central to Critical Security Studies, namely, 'Cold War Security Studies, ' 
'Broadening Security, ' 'Deepening Security, ' 'Statism, ' 'Referents for Security, ' 
'Re-conceptualising Practice, ' and 'Re-conceptualising Agency. ' It was argued 
that from a Critical Security Studies perspective, re-thinking security entails re- 
conceptualising security in both theory and practice by broadening and 
deepening; looking below and beyond the state for other referents and agents; 
and suggesting emancipatory practices toward shaping alternative futures. The 
Critical Security Studies perspective presented in Chapter 1 was then utilised to 
criticise theories and practices of regional security in the Middle East. 
Part I: `Pasts' looked at the Cold War pasts of regional security in the 
Middle East, and investigated the relationship between representations of the 
region (Chapter 2), theories (Chapter 3) and practices (Chapter 4). Chapter 2 
traced the trajectory of the Middle East as a geopolitical invention from its origins 
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in the British India Office into the Cold War, when the term entered the public 
discourse within the region itself. It was argued that the Middle East was 
invented to help British and later US strategists to think about and organise action 
in maintaining security in this part of the world. Chapter 2 also presented an 
alternative representation, that of 'Arab Regional System, ' which challenged not 
only the colonial origins of the Middle East, but also the Cold War security 
discourse by which it was shaped. By way of looking at this alternative 
representation, the chapter laid bare the way regions are shaped by the security 
thinking and practices of their inventors. It was argued that the spatial 
representation Arab Regional System was shaped by an alternative security 
discourse, that of Arab national security. 
Building on this discussion, Chapter 3 explored security thinking during 
the Cold War era. It was argued that Cold War Security Studies focused on the 
security of states, emphasised the military dimension and privileged the 
maintenance of the status quo. Cold War Security Studies, it was further argued, 
was not only a product of the Cold War, but also helped constitute it. This 
mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice, however, was 
obscured by the adoption of an objectivist conception of theory and the 
theory/practice relationship, and a restricted-'problem-solving'-notion of theory 
as governmental policy-making. 
Another aim of Chapter 3 was to point to some alternative ways of 
thinking about security that existed during the Cold War, but which had been 
marginalized by the prevalent Cold War security discourse. The latter, 'armed' 
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with an objectivist conception of theory, claimed command over knowledge, 
labelling the views of its critics as 'political' at best and 'propaganda' at worst. By 
presenting an overview of the contributions of Alternative Security thinkers, 
Peace Researchers and Third World experts, the chapter sought to show that the 
origins of critical thinking could be traced to their works. It was noted that 
Alternative Security thinkers and Peace Researchers criticised the military- 
focused and zero sum thinking and practices of the Cold War security discourse 
whilst Third World security experts pointed to the Western origins of the dominant 
Cold War concept of security. 
Chapter 3 also discussed an alternative approach to regional security, 
that of the Arab national security discourse. This criticised the top down, 
outward-directed and pro-status quo approach of Cold War Security Studies. 
Instead it emphasised the need to look at the domestic political and 
developmental dimensions of security. Students of Arab national security 
maintained that the relationships between Arab states could not be understood 
simply as one of `black box' states balancing each other through military build-up. 
Their shared Arab identity, they argued, rendered relations between Arab states 
different from any other group of states which did not share such similar 
characteristics. 
Whilst welcoming their critique of the Cold War security discourse, the 
chapter argued that students of Arab national security adopted this alternative 
conception of security when studying the security needs and interests of Arab 
states only, but remained content with an outward-directed, military-focused and 
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zero sum conception when thinking about security relations between Arab states 
and their non-Arab neighbours. It was further argued that non-military 
dimensions of security were almost always approached from a statist 
perspective, which resulted in the privileging of military and non-military threats to 
the security of Arab states whilst marginalizing the concerns of individuals and 
social groups. 
Chapter 4 concluded 'Cold War pasts' by bringing together earlier 
arguments in the attempt to further illustrate the relationship between 
representations, theories and practices. Towards this end, the chapter was 
organised along spatial lines. It looked at sets of security practices within the 
framework of the spatial representations they were shaped by. It was argued that 
the practices of Britain and the United States shaped and were, in turn, shaped 
by the Middle Eastern security discourse. These practices, the chapter argued, 
were designed to secure the Middle East against threats from outside. MEDO, 
the Northern Tier, and the Baghdad Pact were all regional security schemes 
designed to maintain access to bases in the region and to make it inviolable to 
Soviet influence or intervention. 
The chapter further argued that the reasoning of British and US policy- 
makers behind the creation of such regional security schemes, instead of backing 
the League of Arab States, which was an indigenously-generated regional 
security organisation, was to prevent the prevalence of the Arab national security 
discourse. The latter stressed issues such as de-colonisation, state building, 
economic and political sovereignty and the plight of the Palestinian peoples. 
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Needless to say, none of these issues were high on the agenda shaped by the 
Middle Eastern security discourse. Chapter 4 continued by examining practices 
that shaped and were shaped by the Arab national security discourse. It was 
argued that during the 1950s Egyptian president Nasser adopted a broader and 
societal-focused conceptualisation of Arab national security, and sought to use 
his influence over Arab public opinion to shape the security practices of other 
Arab governments so that the last remnants of colonialism could be eradicated 
from the Arab Regional System. The issue of the plight of the Palestinian people 
became a 'symbolic' tool that helped Nasser (along with other proponents of Arab 
national security) to voice numerous concerns such as do-colonisation, 
sovereignty and economic development. Nasser's evident popularity among 
Arab peoples, perhaps paradoxically, led to the decline of Arab national security 
discourse; Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states distanced themselves from 
Nasser's 'radical' approach and moved closer towards the pro-status quo 
approach of the United States. 
Following the failure of MEDO, the Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact, 
US policy-makers sought to re-conceptualise their approach to regional security 
in the Middle East. Rather than trying to create regional security schemes, they 
focused on key states such as Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. They also 
adopted a compartmentalised approach, refusing to acknowledge the linkages 
between different dimensions of regional security such as the Israel/Palestine 
conflict, oil and military stability. Considering how central these linkages were to 
the Arab national security discourse, the adoption of this compartmentalised 
approach in US policy, coupled with Gulf policy-makers' increasingly statist 
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approaches, and Egypt's decision to break ranks with the rest of the Arab states 
to sign an individual peace treaty with Israel, marked the decline of the Arab 
national security discourse at the governmental level. Indeed the 1980s were 
characterised by more statist practices, with the Israel/Palestine issue being 
pushed further to the background. 
Overall, therefore, Part I sought to advance the aims of the thesis by 
presenting a critique of the Cold War security discourse in theory and practice, 
based on an overview of Cold War critiques of Security Studies as well as a 
Critical Security Studies critique. The issue of the mutually constitutive 
relationship between theory and practice was central to the latter. It was argued 
that the relationship between theory and practice is never neutral, and that 
security discourses help shape `reality' by privileging certain practices whilst 
marginalizing others. In these ways, Part I sought to present an alternative 
reading of the pasts of regional security in the Middle East. It was argued that 
the region took its current shape not because there were no alternatives, but 
because choices were made in history, which resulted in the Cold War security 
discourse prevailing over other discourses and consequently shaping security 
practices. 
Part II: 'Presents, ' which examined regional security in the Middle East in 
the post-Cold War era, adopted a parallel structure to Part I. Chapter 5 began by 
tracing the development of the Middle East and the Arab Regional System In the 
post-Cold War period. It introduced two more spatial representations that came 
to prominence during this period, the 'Euro-Med Region' and 'Muslim Middle 
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East. ' These, it was argued, have been shaped, respectively, by the European 
Union's discourse on security in the Euro-Med Region and an Islamist discourse 
on security. 
Chapter 5 argued that the Middle East as a spatial representation has 
prevailed over the others in the post-Cold War era not only because of the 
constructive role the United States has played in the Madrid Peace Process, but 
also because of the further decline of the Arab national security discourse among 
Arab policy-makers. The Euro-Med Region also gained some backing among 
Arab actors, partly due to it being a relatively neutral representation and partly 
due to the resources the EU poured into constructing it. It was noted that the 
other two representations, Arab Regional System and Muslim Middle East, have 
been shaped mainly by the practices of non-state actors, many of whom actively 
oppose the other two representations. 
The overall conclusion of the chapter was that the competition between 
the contending representations of the region took a different turn in the post-Cold 
War period. The main divide is no longer between the proponents of the Arab 
Regional System versus Middle East (as was the case during the Cold War), but 
one between pro-status quo actors who seek to establish security by Increasing 
regionalisation (such as the United States and the EU via their respective 
projects) and anti-status quo actors that seek radical change. It was further 
argued that this competition no longer takes place mostly at the governmental 
level. The pro/anti-status quo divide cuts through boundaries forming coalitions 
between state and non-state actors in a struggle for prevalence. 
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Chapter 6 offered a critical overview of developments in security thinking 
in the post-Cold War era. It looked at the development of Arab national security 
and Third World security thinking as well as post-Cold War developments in 
Security Studies in general. It was argued that post-Cold War debates in 
Security Studies focused on the issue of broad versus narrow security agendas, 
and appropriate referent(s) for security. The chapter also identified three Issues 
as silences in post-Cold War Security Studies; those over issues of agency, 
practice and constitutive theory. 
Following a summary of the arguments put forward by the critics of 
broadening security, such as Mover and Deudney (who have argued against 
adopting broader security agendas to prevent non-military issues from being 
addressed through traditional practices) the chapter suggested that re- 
conceptualising practice would allay their worries. The argument was that this 
would enable students of security to suggest ways in which the use of traditional 
(statist, zero sum, militarised) thinking and practices to meet non-military threats 
could be avoided. The need for re-conceptualising practice becomes all the more 
acute when one considers the fact that Third World policy-makers in general and 
Arab policy-makers in particular have for long adopted broad conceptions of 
security but have approached non-military issues such as food and water security 
from a statist perspective, and have sought to address them through traditional 
practices. The fact that some governments have already broadened their 
security agendas, the chapter argued, not only challenges Walt's call for a narrow 
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military-focus, but also underlines how essential re-conceptualising practice 
becomes when non-military issues are put on the security agenda. 
Although it is possible to question, as Waiver does, whether 
'desecuritization, ' or taking issues out of the realm of security, may be a better 
strategy, the chapter argued that this would amount to leaving a useful tool (in 
terms of its mobilisation capacity) to the monopoly of state elites. They have not 
always been concerned with the security of individuals and'social groups. It was 
further argued that desecuritization would amount to remaining uncritical of the 
ways in which the military dimension of security has been addressed. Here, 
Feldman and Toukan's approach was used to point to how the unilateral and zero 
sum approaches of the Cold War years have only served to deepen mistrust and 
have led to the further militarisation of societies in the Middle East. Mernissi's 
critique was utilised to point to the effects military-focused thinking and practices 
have had on women's lives by sidelining their concerns. 
Turning to the issue of re-conceptualising agency, the chapter argued 
that this would enable students of security to move away from state-centrism. 
The chapter suggested that it is because of the state's unchallenged status as 
the main agent for security that it is still treated as the primary referent. Following 
an overview of Buzan's state-centric approach to the study of security, the 
chapter suggested that Buzan's thesis (since it is states that act for security, their 
security should be central to our analyses) could not be sustained. This is not 
only because states often fail to fulfil what they promise, but also because there 
already are non-state agents striving to provide for their own and others' security. 
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The chapter also noted that producing state-centric analyses does not only reflect 
a world 'out there' but ends up reinforcing statism in Security Studies by making it 
difficult to move away from the state as the main agent and referent. This, in 
turn, underlines the need to pay more attention to the relationship between theory 
and practice. 
Chapter 6 also considered Ayoob's call for more not less statism in 
Security Studies. It was argued that the argument Ayoob makes to justify 
privileging the security of states in the developing world is symptomatic of the 
tendency among students of Third World security to emphasise the different 
security needs and interests of developing states. The chapter suggested that by 
emphasising the different 'nature' of developing or'weak' states and the need for 
them to 'grow up' and become 'strong' states, Ayoob failed to explore the 
interconnections between state building and security maintenance in different 
parts of the world. Following Thomas, it was argued that in order to be able to 
understand the problem of insecurity in the developing world, some of its roots 
should be sought in the developing world and especially in the structural 
relationships between the two. 
In sum, Chapter 6 argued that merely broadening security without 
attempting to re-conceptualise agency and practice, and without reflecting upon 
the constitutive role played by theories would not allow students of security to 
move away from state-centrism, thereby ending up reinforcing statism in Security 
Studies. The ways in which these three issues were left unquestioned in post- 
Cold War debates serves to reinforce the point that much traditionalist thinking 
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remains in the post-Cold War era, just as much critical thinking existed during the 
Cold War. 
Chapter 7 brought together the arguments developed in the previous two 
chapters to investigate the relationship between representations, theories and 
practices. Like the previous 'practices' chapter (Chapter 4) it was organised 
along spatial lines; security practices were looked at within the framework of the 
security discourse and spatial representation they shaped and were, in turn, 
shaped by. It was argued that the US approach to regional security in the Middle 
East remains top down, military-focused and pro-status quo. The Gulf War, the 
subsequent bombings of Iraq and the Madrid Peace Process were used as 
illustrations to make the point that the compartmentalised approach to regional 
security in the Middle East adopted by US policy-makers could not be sustained if 
the aim is to achieve stability in the long run. The chapter maintained that 
although Arab policy-makers did participate in the Madrid Peace Process, little 
progress was made in the attempt to create regional institutions (such as a 
Middle East Common Market) or in arms control negotiations, because of US 
(and Israeli) policy-makers' refusal to acknowledge the linkages between the 
multiple dimensions of regional security. In this regard, it is important to 
remember that, notwithstanding the decline in the Arab national security 
discourse, the interplay between state and societal security makes it very difficult 
for Arab policy-makers to totally overlook the concerns of other Arab peoples 
(such as those in Iraq who continue to suffer under UN sanctions), and to carry 
on cooperating with an Israel that remains defiant of numerous UN resolutions, 
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and the United States (which punishes Iraq for not abiding by other UN 
resolutions). 
The chapter also reinforced the argument made in Chapter 5 that the 
post-Cold War era has been characterised by a pro/anti-status quo divide. The 
US policy of encouraging economic regionalism in the Middle East and the 
European Union's approach to security in the Euro-Med Region were pointed to 
as being top down and stability oriented. It was argued that both the US and EU 
have designed their respective regional security agendas by keeping their own 
pro-status quo concerns in mind, leaving those of regional peoples to be 
addressed in time as a side-effect of economic liberalisation and regionalisation. 
It was noted that such approaches (that sideline regional actors' concerns) evoke 
memories of a colonial past; as a result they strengthen the anti-status quo 
rhetoric of the proponents of Arab national security and Islamist discourses. The 
latter put issues such as social and economic justice, human rights, Identity, and 
democratisation as well as more basic needs such as subsistence, illiteracy and 
unemployment on their security agendas. It was argued that these are all 
security concerns for some people, and would need to be addressed by putting 
them on security agendas, by adopting alternative practices, and by making use 
of the agency of non-state actors to address them. 
Overall, therefore, Part II sought to advance the aims of the thesis by 
presenting a critique of post-Cold War security thinking and practices. This was 
attempted by drawing the contours of post-Cold War debates on Security Studies 
and offering a critique from a Critical Security Studies perspective. Taking 're- 
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thinking security' seriously requires not only broadening security, but also 
considering the practical implications of adopting a broader security agenda. 
One problem with simply broadening the security agenda from a statist 
perspective without re-conceptualising agency and practice is that these new 
issues are approached not from the perspective of individuals or social groups 
but from states and are addressed through traditional practices. The Gulf states' 
approach to the issue of labour migration was identified as an example of 
adopting a broader security agenda from a statist perspective. The European 
Union's approach to security in the Euro-Med Region was criticised for 
broadening security but not from the perspective of regional actors. 
Part II also pointed to non-state actors' practices and argued that they not 
only voice but also seek to address their own and others' concerns. It was 
argued that there exists unfulfilled potential in terms of human as well as material 
resources that could be tapped towards constituting alternative futures. 
Grassroots organisations (such as the FIS in Algeria and Hamas in Palestine) 
were pointed to as potential agents to meet a broadened security agenda. 
However, reliance on their practices could be problematic, it was noted, not the 
least because some seek to achieve security by creating insecurity for women. 
This, in turn, highlighted the need for studies to inform the practices of non-state 
actors and empower them to constitute themselves as agents for emancipatory 
change. This point was developed in Part III: 'Futures. ' 
Chapter 8 introduced Part III and presented a Critical Security Studies 
perspective on thinking about the future. In the attempt to show how Critical 
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Security Studies would allow one to think and act differently to shape 'desired' 
futures, the chapter focused on three themes; these were the three issues 
identified in Chapter 6 as the silences of post-Cold War Security Studies, namely, 
constitutive theory, agency and practice. It was argued that students of Critical 
Security Studies could make use of the constitutive role played by theories to 
shape alternative emancipatory practices. Following Booth, the chapter argued 
that such practices should include 'thinking about doing' as well as 'thinking about 
thinking. ' The imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities was 
presented as a prime example of the former. Regarding agency, the roles played 
by non-state actors, especially social movements and intellectuals were pointed 
to. It was argued that Critical Security Studies could produce knowledge to 
create space necessary for such non-state actors to take action, inform them of 
their own potential to make a change and empower them to constitute 
themselves as agents of security towards bringing about emancipatory change. 
Finally, the roles students of security could play as agents of security were 
emphasised. It was argued that students of security could act as agents of 
change by either producing the knowledge required to shape such emancipatory 
practices, or by reflecting upon the potential constitutive effects of their thinking 
and writing. 
Chapter 8 also utilised Beck's argument regarding 'threats to the future' 
to make two interrelated points. First, it was argued that it is only by thinking and 
writing about the future that one could raise actors' awareness as to 'threats to 
the future, ' what future outcomes may result, and what needs to be done in order 
to prevent them. Second, the chapter suggested that, as knowledge about the 
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future both shapes and constrains practices, thereby helping constitute the future, 
an uncritical adoption of existing knowledge produced by prevailing discourses- 
those that have been complicit in perpetuating regional insecurity in the Middle 
East-could in itself be construed as a `threat to the future. ' 
Indeed, given the conception of theory adopted by students of Critical 
Security Studies (that it is constitutive of the 'reality' it seeks to explain) it Is vital 
that its proponents do not limit their thinking to 'desired' futures, but also criticiso 
existing knowledge about the future that informs actors' practices in an often 
unthinking manner. The latter task was taken up in Chapter 9, which looked at 
other plausible futures. 
Chapter 9 looked at other plausible future scenarios and their potential 
practical implications. These were globalisation, fragmentation, 'clash of 
civilizations, ' regionalisation, and democratic peace. It was argued that those 
who present the future of world politics as one of increasing globalisation or 
regionalisation treat the search for regional security as a side-effect of increasing 
liberalisation and integration of production and finance. As a result these 
approaches sideline issues such as the perpetuation of global inequality by the 
very same processes. The chapter further argued that both approaches gloss 
over the structural relationships between different parts of the world, and how 
state building, democratisation and security maintenance in one part of the world 
depends (to a certain extent) on keeping other parts of the world non-democratic 
and insecure. The literature on globalisation and regionalisation as well as the 
democratic peace thesis neglect issues such as the emphasis US policy-makers 
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have put on encouraging 'low-intensity democracies' in the Middle East or the 
issue of arms transfers between North America, Western Europe and the Middle 
East. 
The chapter also looked at Huntington's vision of the future as a 'clash of 
civilizations, ' and that of Kaplan as a 'coming anarchy. ' It was argued that 
Kaplan's 'problem-solving' approach to world politics, by overlooking the ways In 
which human agency has been complicit in creating the dynamics he has 
identified, has failed to see how human agency may again intervene and alter 
them. Huntington's thesis was criticised for adopting a similar fatalistic attitude 
(as well as his failure to understand the fluid character of civilizations and the 
porous nature of the boundaries between them). It was argued that both fail to 
reflect upon the potential constitutive effects of their own theorising. 
Following an evaluation of other plausible futures, Chapter 10 turned to 
the theme of `desired' futures, and presented a preliminary inquiry into whether 
there exists a potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle 
East. Adopting the three-tier framework developed by Adler and Barnett as a 
checklist to assess the potential for the creation of a security community, the 
chapter pointed to the conditions that could indeed be viewed as conducive for 
such a development to take place. It was also argued that the very same 
conditions that could be viewed as propelling regional actors to look towards 
each other (such as the end of the Cold War, integration of world markets and 
global warming) could also be viewed as pushing them further apart from each 
other. It was argued that in order for such factors to propel regional actors to turn 
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towards each other, as Adler and Barnett expect them to do, actors would need 
to be presented by an alternative reading of their situation-a reading informed 
by an alternative conception of security which shows them as 'victims of regional 
security' rather than each other. The chapter noted that this would require the 
security community approach developed by Adler and Barnett to be re-worked 
from a Critical Security Studies perspective by adopting a broadened and 
deepened conception of security, and by paying more attention to the agency of 
non-state actors and the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and 
practice. 
Part III, therefore, tried to further the aims of the thesis by presenting a 
Critical Security Studies perspective on thinking about the futures of regional 
security and a critique of other plausible future scenarios. Part III also considered 
whether unfulfilled potential exists in the Middle East for a security community to 
be created. Drawing upon the arguments developed in Parts I and II, which 
sought to point to unfulfilled potential in regional politics, it was argued that there 
indeed is some potential in terms of both material and human resources that 
could be tapped to create a security community in this of all regions. Indeed, 
even the very act of investigating the potential for the creation of a security 
community constitutes a first step towards its creation by way of pointing to 
unfulfilled potential immanent in regional politics and emphasising the problems 
that would have to be addressed on the way. 
A security community may be formed by community-minded agents who 
agree to pool their resources to address security problems by adopting 
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cooperative security practices. The creation of a security community does not 
require the pre-existence of physical, linguistic or cultural ties among potential 
members. As Deutsch and his colleagues emphasised, security communities 
may have humble origins. Actors' willingness to work together to form a 
community may constitute the necessary conditions initially required to form a 
security community. Getting the potential members to view regional insecurity 
itself rather than each other as the threat to their security, in turn, could generate 
this willingness. Non-state actors such as intellectuals, who are in a mutually 
interactive relationship with social movements, could also play crucial roles in 
helping construct identities that cross physical and psychological borders. 
Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals 
and social movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for 
intellectuals to make a change is to get directly involved in political action. They 
can also intervene by providing a critique of the existing situation, calling attention 
to what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, 
and by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics. Students of 
security could help create the political space for alternative agents of security to 
take action by presenting appropriate critiques. It should be emphasised 
however that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world 
politics. The hope is that non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their 
potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents of security 
when presented with an alternative reading of their situation. 
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Thinking about the future becomes even more crucial once theory is 
conceptualised as constitutive of the 'reality' it seeks to respond to. In other 
words, our ideas about the future-our conjectures and prognoses-have a self- 
constitutive potential. What the students of Cold War Security Studies consider 
as a more 'realistic' picture of the future becomes 'real' through practice, albeit 
under circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about what a 'desired' 
future would look like is significant for the very same reason; that is, in order to be 
able to turn it into a 'reality' through adopting emancipatory practices. For, having 
a vision of a 'desired' future empowers people(s) in the present. 
Presenting pictures of what a 'desired' future might look like, and pointing 
to the security community approach as the start of a path that could take us from 
an insecure past to a more secure future is not to suggest that the creation of a 
security community is the most likely outcome. On the contrary, the dynamics 
pointed to throughout the thesis indicate that there exists a potential for descent 
into chaos if no action is taken to prevent militarisation and fragmentation of 
societies, and the marginalization of peoples as well as economies in an 
increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics exist as 'threats to the 
future' to use Beck's terminology; and only by thinking and writing about them 
that can one mobilise preventive action to be taken in the present. Viewed as 
such, Critical Security Studies presents not an 'optimistic, ' but a more 'realistic' 
picture of the future. Considering how the 'realism' of Cold War Security Studies 
failed not only when judged by its own standards, by failing to provide an 
adequate explanation of the world 'out there, ' but also when judged by the 
standards of Critical Security Studies, as the thesis has argued, it could be 
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concluded that there is a need for more `realistic' approaches to regional security 
in theory and practice. 
The foregoing suggests three broad conclusions. First, Cold War 
Security Studies did not present the 'realistic' picture it purported to provide. On 
the contrary, the pro-status quo leanings of the Cold War security discourse failed 
to allow for (let alone foresee) changes such as the end of the Cold War, 
dissolution of some states and integration of some others. Second, 
notwithstanding the important inroads critical approaches to security made in the 
post-Cold War era, much traditionalist thinking remains and maintains its grip 
over the security practices of many actors. Third, Critical Security Studies offers 
a fuller or more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world 
(including the Middle East). Cold War Security Studies is limited not only 
because of its narrow (military-focused), pro-status quo and state-centric (if not 
statist) approach to security in theory and practice, but also because of its 
objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship that obscured 
the mutually constitutive relationship between them. Students of Critical Security 
Studies have sought to challenge Cold War Security Studies, its claim to 
knowledge and its hold over security practices by pointing to the mutually 
constitutive relationship between theory and practice and revealing how the Cold 
War security discourse has been complicit in constituting (in)security in different 
parts of the world. The ways in which the Cold War security discourse helped 
constitute the 'Middle East' by way of representing it as a region, and contributed 
to regional insecurity in the Middle East by shaping security practices, is 
exemplary of the argument that 'theories do not leave the world untouched. ' 
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The implication of these conclusions for practice is that becoming aware 
of the 'politics behind the geographical specification of politics' and exploring the 
relationship between (inventing) regions and theories and practices of security 
helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play In the 
future. An alternative approach to security, that of Critical Security Studies, could 
inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby helping constitute a now 
region in the form of a security community. It should be noted, however, that to 
argue that 'everything is socially constructed' or that 'all approaches have 
normative concerns embedded in them' is a significant first stop that does not by 
itself help us adopt emancipatory practices. As long as we rely on traditional 
practices shaped by the Cold War security discourse-which remains prevalent 
in the post-Cold War era-we help constitute a 'reality' in line with the tenets of 
'realist' Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to address evolving 
crises through traditional practices whilst leaving a Critical Security Studios 
perspective to be adopted for the long-term will not work. For, traditionalist 
thinking and practices, by helping shape the 'reality' 'out there, ' foreclose the 
political space necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple 
actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a Critical Security 
Studies perspective that emphasizes the roles human agency has played in the 
past and could play in the future in shaping what we choose to call 'reality. ' 
Generating such an awareness of the potentialities of human agency could 
enable us to begin thinking differently about regional security in different parts of 
the world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors' multiple and contending 
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conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s) and how they think security 
should be sought in different parts of the world. 
After decades of statist, military-focused and zero sum thinking and 
practices that privileged the security of some whilst marginalizing the security of 
others, the time has come for all those interested in security in the Middle East to 
decide whether they want to be agents of a world view that produces more of the 
same, thereby contributing towards a'threat to the future, ' or of alternative futures 
that try to address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity. The choice is 
not one between presenting a more 'optimistic' or 'pessimistic' vision of tho 
future, but between stumbling into the future expecting more of the same, or 
stepping into a future equipped with a perspective that not only has a conception 
of a 'desired' future but is also cognisant of 'threats to the future. ' 
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